EDITED BY

NICHOLAS DOUMANIS

The Oxford Handbook *of* EUROPEAN HISTORY 1914–1945

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

EUROPEAN HISTORY, 1914–1945

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

EUROPEAN HISTORY, 1914–1945

Edited by

NICHOLAS DOUMANIS

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries

© Oxford University Press 2016

The moral rights of the authors have been asserted

Impression: 1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above

You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Data available

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016937148

ISBN 978–0–19–969566–9

Printed in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, St Ives plc

Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

Contents

List of Contributors ix

Introduction: Europe's Age of Catastrophe in Context 1
Nicholas Doumanis

PART I EUROPE AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

1. Belle Époque: Europe before 1914 23
Alan Sked

2. Societies at War, 1914–1918 41
Stefan Goebel

3. Total War: Family, Community, and Identity during the First World War 61
Tammy M. Proctor

4. The Left and the Revolutions 77
David Priestland

5. The Economics of Total War and Reconstruction, 1914–1922 97
Matthias Blum and Jari Eloranta

PART II RECASTING EUROPE, *c*.1917–1924

6. The New Diplomacy and the New Europe, 1916–1922 119
Alan Sharp

7. Nation States, Minorities, and Refugees, 1914–1923 138
Ryan Gingeras

8. Remaking Europe after the First World War 160
Conan Fischer

PART III INTERWAR EUROPE AND THE WIDER WORLD

9. The Great Depression in Europe 179
ROGER MIDDLETON

10. 'A Low Dishonest Decade'? War and Peace in the 1930s 207
ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

11. Interwar Crises and Europe's Unfinished Empires 223
MATTHEW G. STANARD

PART IV POLITICS, SOCIETY, AND IDEOLOGY BETWEEN THE WARS

12. Rural Society in Crisis 243
LAIRD BOSWELL

13. Interwar Democracy and the League of Nations 261
ANDREA ORZOFF

14. The Political 'Left' in the Interwar Period, 1924–1939 282
PAMELA RADCLIFF

15. Fascism and the Right in Interwar Europe: Interaction, Entanglement, Hybridity 301
ARISTOTLE KALLIS

16. Social Policy, Welfare, and Social Identities, 1900–1950 323
JULIA MOSES

17. Discipline, Terror, and the State 343
PAUL M. HAGENLOH

PART V THEMES

18. The Nationalization of the Masses 365
ROGER D. MARKWICK AND NICHOLAS DOUMANIS

19. Political Violence and Mass Society: A European Civil War? 388
MARY VINCENT

20. European Sexualities in the Age of Total War 407
DAGMAR HERZOG

21. 'America' and Europe, 1914–1945 423
DAVID W. ELLWOOD

22. European Integration, Human Rights, and Romantic Internationalism 440
MARCO DURANTI

PART VI EUROPE AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

23. Wartime Economies, 1939–1945: Large and Small European States at War 461
JEREMY LAND AND JARI ELORANTA

24. Axis Imperialism in the Second World War 480
SHELLEY BARANOWSKI

25. Everyday Life in Wartime Europe 497
CHRISTOPH MICK

26. The Holocaust in European History 518
MARK ROSEMAN

27. Europe's Civil Wars, 1941–1949 537
AVIEL ROSHWALD

PART VII RECASTING EUROPE, AGAIN

28. Nation-Building and Moving People 557
ALEXANDER V. PRUSIN

29. Europe, the War, and the Colonial World 576
MARTIN THOMAS

30. Power Relations during the Transition from Nazi to Post-Nazi Rule 593
GARETH PRITCHARD

31. The Memory of Europe's Age of Catastrophe, 1914–2014 613
BEN MERCER

Index 631

List of contributors

Anthony Adamthwaite Professor Emeritus, Department of History, University of California, Berkeley

Shelley Baranowski Distinguished Professor of History Emerita, Department of History, University of Akron

Laird Boswell Professor, Department of History, University of Wisconsin–Madison

Matthias Blum Lecturer, Queens Management School, Queen's College, Belfast

Nicholas Doumanis Associate Professor of History, School of Humanities and Languages, University of New South Wales

Marco Duranti Lecturer in Modern European and International History, Department of History, University of Sydney

David W. Ellwood Senior Adjunct Professor of European and Eurasian Studies, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Bologna

Jari Eloranta Professor, Comparative Economic and Business History, Department of History, Appalachian State University

Conan Fischer Honorary Professor in the School of History, University of St Andrews

Ryan Gingeras Associate Professor, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School

Stefan Goebel Reader in Modern British History, Centre for the Study of War, Propaganda and Society, University of Kent at Canterbury

Paul M. Hagenloh Associate Professor of History, Department of History, the Maxwell School of Syracuse University

Dagmar Herzog Distinguished Professor, The Graduate Center, City University of New York

Aristotle Kallis Professor of Modern and Contemporary History, Department of History, Lancaster University

Jeremy Land PhD Student, Department of History, Georgia State University

Roger D. Markwick Professor of Modern European History, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Newcastle, Australia

Ben Mercer Lecturer, School of History, Australian National University

Christoph Mick Professor of History, Department of History, University of Warwick

Roger Middleton Professor of the History of Political Economy, University of Bristol

Julia Moses Lecturer in Modern History, Department of History, University of Sheffield

Andrea Orzoff Associate Professor, Department of History, New Mexico State University

David Priestland Professor of Modern History at Oxford, and a Fellow of St. Edmund Hall

Gareth Pritchard Lecturer, School of Humanities, University of Adelaide

Tammy M. Proctor Professor of History, Department of History, Utah State University

Alexander V. Prusin Professor of History, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Socorro, New Mexico

Pamela Radcliff Professor of History, Department of History, University of California, San Diego

Mark Roseman Pat M. Glazer Chair in Jewish Studies and Professor in History, Indiana University Bloomington

Aviel Roshwald Professor of History, Department of History, Georgetown University

Alan Sharp Emeritus Professor of International History, Ulster University

Alan Sked Professor of International History, Department of International History, London School of Economics

Matthew G. Stanard Associate Professor of History, Department of History, Berry College

Martin Thomas Professor of Imperial History, Department of History, University of Exeter

Mary Vincent Professor of Modern European History, Department of History, University of Sheffield

INTRODUCTION

Europe's Age of Catastrophe in Context

NICHOLAS DOUMANIS

> Somewhere in the late fifties I began to notice that I was reacting differently to life from what I'd been doing for the past twenty years … coming from Central Europe … one got used to the idea that the only thing to be absolutely certain of is to have a valid passport, if necessary with a visa, and enough money in the bank to buy a ticket to wherever you could go if things got bad, and you never thought further ahead than about six months or twelve months. Then suddenly towards the middle to late fifties you began to notice that you were actually starting to plan ahead. I said to myself: 'Things have changed. We are in a different historical period. We are out of a period of crisis, like it or not.
>
> Eric J. Hobsbawm [1]

Eric Hobsbawm, whose interpretations of the modern era and its periodization have had an unrivalled influence on his profession, sometimes found it useful to relate personal impressions and experiences in order to cut through with audiences. Born (fittingly) in 1917, he witnessed at first hand many of the century's crises. He claimed that being a 'participant observer' influenced his appraisal of his times (*Age of Extremes*, 1994) and his ability to describe them to younger generations. It was particularly in his autobiography (*Interesting Times*, 2002) and occasional interviews that he gave a sense of the value of experience in rendering the impersonal forces or structures of history more tangible.[2] Hobsbawm once reported to a literary festival audience what life was *like* in the 1930s for someone like him, a Communist and Jew 'coming from Central Europe'.[3] By professing the absolute necessity of an escape plan, he conveyed the sense of peril shared by his generation but more particularly by that of his parents. Hobsbawm noted in interviews that for them, 'peacetime' meant the days *before* 1914.

To his mind, the belle époque and indeed the entire 'long nineteenth century' gave humankind (certainly Westerners) cause for optimism in the future, despite the savage injustices and social inequities wrought by industrial capitalism, colonialism, and

the forces of political reaction. Europe's most oppressed social groups knew the world around them was changing and that the social and economic constraints on their existence were mutable. 'In no century before or since', he wrote, 'have practical men and women had such high, such utopian, expectations for life on this earth.'[4]

By way of contrast, the ensuing period, the years 1914–45, gave cause for despair. If nineteenth-century Europe led the modern revolution, the greatest transformation in human life since the Neolithic era, then early twentieth-century Europe became the global epicentre of a crisis that threatened to bring civilized life to an end. In the summer of 1914 Europe committed to a war that consumed all the energies of the combatant societies, to the extent that it destroyed faith in 'every single institutional arrangement and every single political idea'.[5] The violence that marked European politics thereafter was in large part attributable to the sudden dissolution of the great multi-ethnic empires and their replacement by nation states that pursued ideals of cultural homogeneity.[6] In the economically turbulent interwar years, particularly during the Great Depression, which many at the time believed augured the end of capitalism, these new nation states (and some older ones) would suffer from a crisis of political legitimacy and collapse.[7] Social dislocation exacerbated political tensions, sharpened national differences, and generated mass support for the political extremes. In this environment, people found numerous reasons 'for hating each other'.[8] State authorities fanned hatreds to shore up mass support, pitting majorities against minorities. Interwar Europe was dominated by a succession of brutal dictatorships that coerced society into acquiescence, believed in its regimentation, and thundered the regenerational value of war. As Mark Mazower has argued, by the late 1930s such regimes appeared to hold the keys to the Continent's future.[9] For these reasons much of Europe, including such havens of relative stability as France and Britain, was morbidly preoccupied by a sense of degeneration and impending disaster.[10]

The anticipated war far exceeded expectations. There was no precedent in humanity's past for the Warsaw Ghetto, the death camps, the genocidal Nazi administration of Poland and occupied Soviet territories, and the forced expulsion of tens of millions of people in the war's aftermath. As many as 40 million people, at least half of them civilians, were killed during the Second World War in Europe, yet as Ian Kershaw has said of the raw mortality statistics for this general era, they 'tell us nothing, of course, of the death, pain and misery of the millions who suffered so grievously through the violence'.[11] The enormity of Holocaust is somehow minimized by the '6 million' figure: it has to be grasped through the stories of those who suffered the horrors, and which, as Saul Friedländer has said of the testimonies of Holocaust survivors, 'can tear through seamless interpretation and pierce the (mostly involuntary) smugness of scholarly detachment and objectivity'. They also relate 'the known with an unmatched forcefulness'.[12] It is through the testimonies of Poles, Ukrainians, and others who suffered Axis rule, or those of Yugoslavs and Greeks who were traumatized by brutal occupation and resistance to it, that one can properly appreciate the scale of Europe's destruction. The year 1945, deemed 'zero hour' by Germans and 'year zero' by Italians, was one of hunger, reprisals, and the displacement of 11 million people. The challenge for Holocaust survivors, the most traumatized in a traumatized continent, was how to live.

Even before the war had ended, a consensus had emerged regarding the need for the different Europe that took shape after 1945. Democracy did not triumph everywhere, but living conditions for most people did improve markedly. For Hobsbawm these were 'golden years' because more people (including most Europeans) now enjoyed the kind of material comforts that had been reserved historically for the few.[13] In the economically affluent and relatively benign domestic political conditions that ensued from the early 1950s, ideologies were eclipsed by what Mazower has described as the 'bloodless politics of consumption and management. Goods, not gods, were what people wanted.'[14] However much we might wish to qualify the positive image of the post-war era with references to the Cold War, Hungary 1956, Vietnam, Algeria, or Yugoslavia in the 1990s, in general Europeans really 'never had it so good'.[15] Even in the monochromatic Eastern bloc, societies became much more educated, egalitarian, and, for a while at least, materially better off. In the early 1960s, Soviet citizens were registering strong satisfaction and confidence in the future.[16]

Political Violence

The 1914–45 period was therefore defined by political violence. The nineteenth century had featured many inter-European wars, but these were small, short, and generally in accord with standard rules of warfare, whereas in the post-1945 era, Europeans firmly rejected war as a means of achieving political aims.[17] That at least was the case *within* Europe. The colonial world had been a 'training ground' for genocidal violence and related cultural conditioning since at least the 1870s, while brutal colonial wars were waged after 1945.[18] Within Europe, however, only the bloody breakdown of Yugoslavia in the 1990s recalled an early twentieth-century mode of politics. If war had been inscribed in Europe's genetic code since the Middle Ages, it was removed by the violent cataclysms of the 1914–45 period.

Indeed, it is hard to disagree with the view that war 'gives grim unity to this period'.[19] Aside from the two world wars, there were numerous civil wars (Russia 1918–20, Finland 1918, Ireland 1922–3, Austria 1934, Spain 1936–9, Greece 1944–9) and interstate wars (Balkan Wars 1912–13, Russo-Polish War 1919–20, the Hungarian-Romanian War 1918–20, Greek Turkish War 1919–22, and Russo-Finnish War 1939–40). In determining the distinctiveness of our period, the mortality statistics offer a most compelling measure. Estimates of premature deaths caused by Europe's conflicts, of war-related factors like famine and disease, and of the victims of political persecution, accounted for as many as 80 million people, including 8 million killed during the First World War, 7 million during the Russian Civil War, 6 million in the Ukrainian famine, 12 million due to collectivization and 'de-kulakization', and over 25 million civilians during the Second World War, including, of course, almost 6 million Jews. The period marked a transitional moment in state formation, as the removal of the old dynastic orders left much of Europe in the throes of violent political experimentation. The era produced a number of successful

and failed revolutions, counter-revolutions, and coups (Portugal 1917, 1919, 1926; Russia 1917; Bavaria 1918; Hungary 1918–19; Italy 1922; Bulgaria 1923; Spain 1923; Poland 1926; Greece 1936). It introduced novel forms of authoritarian governance that sought to rule through propaganda and coercion. As Charles Maier noted of the political prospects for Europe in the 1930s: 'increasingly the vital political forces of the epoch were those that spoke for disciplined collectives, that praised and practiced war, and that had no compunction about locking up or even murdering dissenters'.[20]

Equally distinctive was the nature of the violence. Modern technology obviously provided the means for the high killing rates, but the readiness to kill en masse was related to new cultures of violence that had developed along with democratization, nationalism, and other nineteenth-century developments related to mass society.[21] These cultures normalized and even legitimized the practice of mass slaughter and killing civilians. With the advent of mass society during the nineteenth century, war came to mean conflict between categories of people, between nationalities, ethnic groups, classes, and increasingly between supporters of rival political ideologies and movements. In the Soviet Union, for example, Stalin's regime reinvented class categories in order to divide the population into supporters and enemies, and found the deployment of resonant categories like 'kulak' useful in mobilizing enmities that ordinary Russians could understand.[22] Total war implied total destruction. The shocking realities of the trenches dispelled any ideas that modern warfare could be romantic or civilized, convincing many of the need to end war altogether. Yet for some, particularly those who continued to see war as the solution to society's ills and who joined right-wing paramilitary organizations after 1918, total war provided a model for state and society. Europe's interwar dictatorships aspired to forging national communities that could function along military lines, and were disciplined and virile enough to destroy other national communities.

At the same time, ordinary Europeans had many more social, economic, and political grievances in the depressed and often desperate conditions of the 1914–45 period, and hence were more amenable to mobilization. They were often responsible for participating willingly in state terror, and for perpetrating violence against other ethnic, religious, class, or racial communities during wartime. States were able to persecute elements in society by exploiting existing societal divisions and encouraging popular animus for minorities or other 'enemies'. Dictatorships could procure support for rooting out real or imagined subversives by encouraging or sometimes compelling citizens to inform on each other.[23] The effect of such state manipulation of societal tensions was to politicize everyday life by making political ideology an important factor in regulating social relations. In wartime this top-down political influence made social relations potentially more deadly. Stathis Kalyvas's claim that 'denunciation in civil war turns common disputes into violence' could be applied to societies living under dictatorships and certainly to territories under foreign occupation.[24]

Indeed, occupation authorities used the breakdown of order to encourage violence between rival groups and recruit collaborators. Such conditions obtained in Poland following the Nazi–Soviet invasions in 1939, when Catholic Poles set upon their Jewish

neighbours in the German occupied zone, much as Ukrainians did to Poles in the Soviet zone.[25] Wartime often ignited localized 'civil wars', as existing communal, family, and even interpersonal tensions could become violent. Kalyvas usefully refers to the 'intimacy of violence' in civil war: how politics could be privatized as interpersonal and local tensions were reframed ideologically, and were more punitively prosecuted because of the opportunities afforded by the new order.[26] Speaking of the breakdown in order behind Republican lines in Catalonia in November 1936, one anarchist reflected on what he called 'inopportune bloodshed':

> Here, for too long, there has been no law but that of the strongest. Men have killed for the sake of killing … men have been murdered not because they were fascists, nor enemies of the people, nor enemies of our revolution, nor anything remotely similar. They have been killed on a whim, and many have died as a result of the resentment or grudges of their killers.[27]

Experience: Centring the Everyday

It is important to remember that there were many more innocent victims of violence than there were perpetrators. Among the dead were millions of women, children, and the elderly, all of whom had History thrust upon them. As has often been noted, the era distinguished itself by making civilians fair game as military targets, while in peacetime authoritarian regimes secured conformity of subject populations principally through terror. With this in mind it is worth reconsidering Kershaw's aside, that the statistics 'tell us nothing … of the death, pain and misery' of millions of Europeans, for it seems to suggest what ought to occupy a central place in historical investigation. How, indeed, were ordinary men, women, and children affected by an era saturated by History? How did fascism, Stalinism, capitalism's greatest crisis, and total war transform them? How were they affected ontologically?

To date, the history of everyday life approach has been used to evaluate the efficacy of authoritarian state policies and practices, and to appraise the complex relationships that were developed by the state with ordinary people.[28] These studies have sought to glean levels of complicity and dissent and thereby measure the efficacy of totalitarian projects. These studies also offer glimpses into how the self was transformed through the new intimacy in state–society relations. That new intimacy, of course, affected Europeans in liberal democracies as well. As A. J. P. Taylor said of England during the First World War: 'The state established a hold over its citizens which, though relaxed in peacetime, was never removed and which the Second World War was to increase. The history of the English state [*sic*] and the English people merged for the first time.'[29] Total war established a new social contract whereby the state was now expected to secure the welfare of society, while ordinary Europeans were required to serve the state, prioritize its

interests, and subscribe to its culture. The revolutionary nature of these impositions on the self could be compared to that of religious conversion, in that it required a new way of life and of seeing the world. What Taylor said of the English, of course, applied more broadly to the British:

> Their lives were shaped by orders from above; they were required to serve the state instead of pursuing exclusively their own affairs. Five million men entered the armed forces, many of them (though a minority) under compulsion. The Englishman's food was limited, and its quality changed, by government order. His freedom of movement was restricted; his conditions of work were prescribed … The sacred freedom of drinking was tampered with; licensed hours were cut down, and the beer watered by order. The very time of the clocks was changed. From 1916 onwards, every Englishman got up an hour earlier in summer than he would otherwise have done, thanks to an act of parliament.[30]

Although acutely aware of the contempt of an upper-class-dominated state during the Second World War, British workers nevertheless rallied wholeheartedly behind the state and the nation, learning to define themselves as its 'people'.[31] As Selina Todd argues, such was the level of ownership of the struggle that they often made up for the state's deficits in public responsibility.[32]

One could argue that the most distinctive feature of the 'age of catastrophe', what made it more revolutionary than any other, was the extent to which History with a capital 'H' imposed itself on the everyday. The traumatic power of the era's events, the intensity of historical change, and the capacity of global trends like the Great Depression to turn lives upside down, gave ordinary people a new sensibility about their place in time and space. Europeans now identified as members of 'wartime' and 'Depression' generations, as survivors of dictatorships, state-induced famines, foreign occupations, civil war, mass expulsions, and mass murder.[33] Unlike their ancestors, Europeans whose formative years coincided with the early twentieth century would frame their personal histories using 'national' historical signposts. Peter Fritzsche has identified the rise of everyday *historical* consciousness as a fundamental aspect of modernity, and as a transformation that began with the dramatic 'temporal' dislocations of the French Revolution. What Fritszche says of the nineteenth century applies more compellingly for the 1914–45 period:

> [History] enabled contemporaries to recognize themselves as contemporaries, that is, as very differently situated subjects who nonetheless shared the same time and place; who, moreover, could be regarded as products of historical forces; and who were seen to have investments in how those forces resolved themselves.[34]

This sense of historical consciousness was useful in giving ordinary Europeans the wherewithal to find meaning in their experiences. Oral histories of Soviet and German citizens found that the unusual intimacy of state–society relations prompted reflection on what is 'normal' and what a normal life should be. Soviet citizens were told that they

were at the vanguard of a historical moment in world history, and yet so many were living in conditions of deprivation. Analysing interviews collected in a US research project among émigrés, Sheila Fitzpatrick noted that Stalinism had citizens wondering about the meaning of their lives:

> 'I feel I've lived someone else's life', said one woman interviewed in the post-Soviet period referring to the disruptions that propelled her out of the village at the time of collectivization. This was part of the complex of feelings that led … respondents to say that life in the Soviet Union in the 1930s was not 'normal', … Abnormality had many aspects, including unpredictability, dislocation, and state violence against citizens, but one motif was constant: it was an abnormal life because of the privations and hardships.[35]

Stalinism did succeed, as Fitzpatrick and others have shown, in forging new identities, creating many specimens of *Homo sovieticus*, much as fascist regimes managed to fascistize elements of the population that were initially anti-fascist. A German oral history project on workers in Essen and Hagen, most of them steelworkers who had been members of the socialist workers' movement before the Nazis came to power, showed some of the subtle ways in which people became incorporated into the Nazi order. These former SPD voters likened the Nazi period to 'normal times', simply because full employment allowed them to pursue such primary goals as running a household and raising a family. 'Normality' was nevertheless a concession from a regime that controlled the public sphere and compelled workers to conform. It was a normality enforced by threat of terror.[36] Thus, as Geoff Eley explains, even the *volk* had to negotiate carefully a way of living safely within the boundaries erected by the regime:

> Living under the Third Reich, for anyone seeking to preserve some non-Nazi distance or personal integrity, involved not just self protections and stubborn self-assertiveness … but also the fears and anxieties engendered by the widely diffused, clearly perceived, and brutally instilled awareness of the new state's dangerous lack of inhibitions—its alacrity for discrimination and harassment, verbal and physical assaults, stigmas and taboos, ritual humiliations and social exclusions, arbitrary arrests and sanctioned killings, all held together by the *ultima ratio* of the camps.[37]

If 'normal' refers to perceived standards, then many Europeans who lived through the 1914–45 period understood their conditions as anything *but* normal. Even those living in the relatively tranquil conditions of Europe's liberal democracies would have preferred to live in less interesting times. The conclusion of one major study of Nazi-occupied Ukraine, where the barbarous treatment of the civilian population was exceeded only by the regime's dealings with Jews, was that it produced an unfeeling mental stasis. The struggle for Ukrainians was finding a means to survive.[38]

Another important reason why popular subjectivities of the period ought to take up more space in research agendas has to do with the fact that ordinary people *were the subject* of 1914–45. The Holocaust was in the first instance about the victims and what

was done to them. The ideas, policies, and implementation of the genocide of Europe's Jewry, matters that have preoccupied Holocaust historiography, are also critical but ultimately auxiliary. Saul Friedländer said that 'the business as usual historiography' is not only inadequate but also has the effect of hiding the subject. In a similar vein, fascism, Stalinism, and other ideologies sought to overhaul society and remake identities, which placed ordinary people at the sharp end of much state policy and practice. Ordinary people therefore had 'History' dealt to them, which gave them privileged access to what something like fascism actually meant.

Periodization

Few would dispute that the first half of the century was radically different to the second half, yet many historians have preferred to combine the two halves as one 'short' twentieth century, given that the second was clearly shaped by the legacies of the first.[39] As one reviewer said of Tony Judt's magisterial *Postwar* (2005), which set special store for the complex influences of these legacies, Europe 'was able to rebuild itself politically and economically only by forgetting the past, but it was able to define itself morally and culturally only by remembering it'.[40] Indeed Judt goes so far as to claim that the catastrophes were the catalyst for ethnic rationalization that made possible (or easier) the post-war consensus politics that followed. The old Europe of an 'interwoven tapestry of languages, religions, communities and nations' was 'smashed into dust':

> The tidier Europe that emerged, blinking, into the second half of the twentieth century had fewer loose ends. Thanks to war, occupation, boundary adjustments, expulsions, and genocide, almost everybody now lived in their own country, among their own people … [The] stability of the postwar Europe rested upon the accomplishments of Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler. Between them, and assisted by wartime collaborators, the dictators blasted flat the demographic heath upon which the foundations of the new and less complicated continent were then laid.[41]

It should also be remembered, however, that things could have turned out very differently, and that the 1914–45 period augured other possible futures. When the Allies occupied Berlin in May 1945, Europeans still expected the crisis age to continue, anticipating another post-war slump, the revival of fascism, and another world war. The turn to growth and stability would be deemed miraculous, although the miracles came about so gradually that even Hobsbawm took years to realize that 'things had changed'. The problem with 'short' twentieth centuries, therefore, is that they say more about the nature of the second half than the first. A significant exception here is Mazower's *Dark Continent* (1998), which depicts a European world deserting democracy and other progressive political values, and drawn instead to reactionary, militaristic, and authoritarian responses to modernity's challenges.[42]

This 'darkening' Europe needs to be considered in its own terms. But what should be its temporal boundaries? There are many reasons why historians have used different starting points (1900, 1917, 1918) and why they have not terminated their narratives in 1945. Many in fact believe that the belle époque is more a figment of nostalgia than historical reality, better seen as a preparatory stage for the First World War. As an approximate starting point, therefore, such historians deem '1900' as more appropriate.[43] Mazower's *Dark Continent* begins with the end of the war in 1918 because his study is focused on the ideological struggles to recast Europe that followed the unanticipated collapse of the old regime.[44] Meanwhile, many historians have noted the problem of regarding 1945 as a clear moment of closure and new beginnings, given that the violence and displacement did not abate when Hitler and his bride committed suicide. The future still seemed bleak, as Europeans were to face further violence and deprivation.[45]

The standard 1914–45 time frame, however, is retained here because it underscores the constitutive roles of the two world wars. The key theme of this *Oxford Handbook* is the relationships between state and society, and revolutionary changes in that relationship. It considers Europe's experience from within the history of modernity, and specifically how Europeans experienced that transition and how they were transformed by it. In 1914 most Europeans were peasants; ruled by distant monarchs; didn't vote, read, or identify as nationals; and had little to do with the state. The two world wars were crucibles of modernity: they destroyed and created structures; they expedited, initiated, and ended historical developments. By 1945, Europeans lived either in liberal democracies or in so-called peoples' democracies. All of them had been nationalized, and they were literate, politicized, and, as Taylor said of the English, they had all, or seemed to have, been 'merged with the state'. The era was a critical juncture in the history of state formation in Europe, for the 'total wars' expedited the transference of sovereignty from royal dynasties to the citizenry. The first war destroyed the legitimacy of the old order and the second destroyed the anti-progressive or counter-revolutionary threat posed by the radical Right. If the first war delegitimized the political *ancien régime*, the second established an order composed of civilian polities focused on social services and consumption.[46] Given that the lives of Europeans of all countries and all classes were transformed indelibly, the wars ensured that the era was more revolutionary than the 'age of revolution' (1789–1848).

Periodization, as one historian aptly described it, 'is the product and begetter of theory … [that reflects] the priorities we assign to various aspects of human endeavor'.[47] Needless to say, periodization can never account for every important aspect of an age, and it can create and perpetuate distortions when used uncritically. Thus international history is one field in which the 'thirty years war' concept can be an impediment. The once commonplace understanding that the Second World War was umbilically tied to the First, that Versailles made Hitler and the war inevitable, encouraged historians to disregard the significant achievements of Versailles and the League of Nations, such as in collective security, international law, disarmament, health organizations and human rights, and its campaigns for such causes as the eight-hour day and the prohibition of child labour.[48] Historians who have focused on the failures of post-war peacemaking

have overlooked the fundamental destabilizing role of the Great Depression, a largely externally imposed and wholly unexpected factor. Yet even during the Depression, specifically between 1929 and 1932, France and Germany, led by Aristide Briand and initially Gustav Stresemann, worked with considerable dedication towards something akin to a European union. As Conan Fischer has demonstrated, this movement might have offset the descent into political darkness, but it was derailed by a number of chance factors, including the death of Briand in March 1932, the dramatic turn in the terms of trade in Germany's favour, and publications of Stresemann's diaries, whose controversial contents were exploited by French politicians opposed to rapprochement.[49] At this level of international politics, contingency and the agency of particular actors could determine globally significant outcomes, such that the likes of Briand might have prevented the possibility of Hitler being handed the keys to the Chancellery.

However, an argument can also be made that the radical upsurge of global conflict in the 1930s and 1940s was itself a product of the general culture of violence that grew out of the First World War. Adam Tooze has argued that this second phase of escalated violence of the 'thirty years war' was unleashed by regimes that behaved as if they were insurgents against Western liberal powers, and especially the United States, which was powerful enough to exercise global hegemony, and which already wielded enormous 'soft power' through mass consumerism and Hollywood. 'It was precisely the looming potential, the future dominance of American capitalist democracy, that was the common factor impelling Hitler, Stalin, the Italian Fascists and their Japanese counterparts to such radical action.'[50] In effect, Tooze provides a rare explanation for the violent character of the age, one that is grounded in a struggle for global dominance and order that was set in train by the First World War.

Europe as Historical Subject

One is hard pressed to think of a period in world history on which more has been written than this 'thirty years war'. Bookshops continue to stock new accounts of Churchill, Stalin, Hitler and his henchmen, the major battles of the First and Second World wars, and the Holocaust, with monotonous regularity. The era's wars figure prominently in the national historiographies and memory traditions, and are usually the focus of so-called 'history wars'. Yet in at least one important respect this most catastrophic and revolutionary era has suffered from neglect: the failure to deal with Europe, as opposed to its constituent national parts, as a subject in its own right.

European history in that sense barely exists. It has been treated, as Bismarck once said paraphrasing Metternich, as a mere 'geographical expression'. Europe has meant many things in symbolic terms, but historians have regarded it principally as a space within which many discrete national stories have unfolded. There are numerous textbook accounts, but unless discussing interstate wars, diplomacy, or trade, such works tend to present Europe's history as a collection of national case studies, usually with potted

accounts of Weimar Germany, Mussolini's Italy, the Spanish Civil War, and France during the Popular Front. To borrow a phrase used to explain a similar problem with Mediterranean history, these are histories *in* rather than *of* Europe.[51]

It is certainly true that the 1914–45 period was the zenith of nationalism. It was the era of autarky, of 'Socialism in One Country' and *sacro egoism*. But as the chapters of this volume will confirm, the histories of all Europe's nations, even its deadly adversaries, were entangled in manifold ways. Societies throughout the Continent contended with transnational crises and responded in ways that disclosed transnational influences. As Mazower shows in *Dark Continent*, the crisis of state formation that followed the First World War was pan-European in nature, as was the interest in eugenics, social welfare and societal engineering, the implications of the Nazi new order, and the planning for a post-Nazi Europe. Yet Mazower's transnational history of Europe is rare. So too is Charles Maier's 1975 classic *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*, which considers the regrouping of Europe's elites following the First World War through the creation of corporatist structures, which essentially restructured capitalism in a way that set the tone for the twentieth century.[52] For the most part, 'European history' has really meant the assemblage of parallel national histories: 'Europe' being the sum of its national parts, or more accurately, its great-power parts, with walk-on roles for peripheral powers like Italy and Spain. The distortions generated by nation-focused historiography have prompted calls for rectification and pleas for much more comparative, entangled, and transnational history.[53] Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick set out the problem in a recent study that rigorously compares Europe's most significant and written-about dictatorships. Despite many points of comparison between the contemporaneous regimes, Geyer and Fitzpatrick lament that the massive historiographies of Stalinism and Nazism have operated with scant reference to each other: they have passed 'each other like trains in the night'.[54] We might extend that metaphor to apply to the entire network of European states.

However, is Europe a useful category of analysis? What do we mean by 'European history'? Can histories *of* Europe be written? While this is not the place to define 'Europe', Michael Geyer has usefully offered some substantial reasons that have encouraged Europeans to think, talk, and put Europe into existence. Setting aside the 'ideas' of Europe and the diverse meanings ascribed to it, and ignoring any hard and needless geographical definitions, he notes that since the Middle Ages, a historical space took shape as an intensely fought-over, economically networked, and mutually referencing region. As an aggregation of states, 'Europe' acquired meaning through numerous interstate conflicts, such that Europeans were forced to habitually 'search for stability, for overarching structures and 'regimes' that would help reduce or contain this notoriously conflictual entity'.[55] Geyer refers to the fact that Europeans had always been interdependent economically, constantly exchanging people, goods, ideas, and money. Europe 'was never a solidaristic enterprise, but a starkly competitive, even cut-throat one, in which cascading divisions of class and labor established tiers of power and influence, wealth and welfare'.[56] And despite its long history of political fragmentation, Geyer alludes to the Continent's interconnectedness through what archaeologists call

peer-polity influence: how European polities have primarily looked to each other for paradigms and precedents, whether it was French revolutionary ideas, the British parliamentary system, or for our period, Soviet Communism, Italian Fascism, and German Nazism.

European history needs to contextualized within its global settings, among the colonial empires, and with particular regard to the growing influence of the United States.[57] Europeans also believed and behaved as if their political and economic destinies were tied together, and this was especially true after the 1914–45 'thirty years war'. Although rigidly divided and often bent on mutual destruction, Europeans were more transnationalized and interdependent than they had ever been in the past.

The Other Europes

The search for a common 'European' story must nevertheless account for the complexities of a continent that has always been extremely diverse in cultural terms and deeply fragmented politically, and which in the early twentieth century presented a great variety of historical experiences. There were parts of Europe that did not have a 'thirty years war': some nations were untouched by war or dictatorship. Swedish and Swiss experiences of the 1914–45 period bear no comparison with those of Poland and Ukraine. The Great Depression was catastrophic but its effects were patchy both among and within countries. It was catastrophic in Germany and relatively mild for the Nordic countries. Axis occupation conditions in Norway, Denmark, Holland, France, and Belgium, however dreadful, were markedly less harrowing than they had been in Yugoslavia or Belarus.

The era's political history tells us that there were at least two Europes. Cultures of war or political violence may have become the defining characteristic of our era, but across north-western Europe such cultures had limited traction. Robust parliamentary systems persisted in interwar Scandinavia and the Low Countries, where citizens generally retained faith in long-standing political institutions to manage national crises, and where Hitler's successes in Germany caused trepidation rather than admiration, such that local fascist movements found being associated with National Socialism a liability. In the Netherlands, established parties formed a cordon sanitaire that effectively nullified the local Nazi movement led by Anton Mussert.[58] Across Scandinavia and the Low Countries, the public expected national crises to be resolved through consensus or compromise. Scandinavian governments showed an unusual capacity for innovative economic and welfare policies, and compromise agreements among major interest groups. Such corporate responses had the effect of ameliorating social divisions.[59] Sweden in particular offered Europeans a 'third way', led by the Social Democratic Party, which forged an alliance with the Agrarian Party to entrench a hegemonic order based on cooperation between labour and capital, which offset social unrest by implementing social welfare policies.[60] In Britain the parliamentary system and the principal political

parties remained unchallenged. The local fascist movement made a great deal of noise but its support base was so slender that a law banning political uniforms seemed enough to halt its momentum.[61] The French Third Republic was certainly on shakier ground, but historians have made too much of France's drift from its 'liberal parliamentary moorings'.[62] The fact remains that the radical Right needed a German military victory to achieve its aims. The Third Republic in the end fell because of the failure of a military strategy.[63]

Robert Gerwarth has urged historians to be mindful of the complexities of the 1914–45 era, given the range of vital progressive developments that set the stage for a more stable and prosperous Europe after 1945.[64] Thus welfare policy became an entrenched feature of the policy platforms of liberal and authoritarian regimes alike.[65] The American-inspired vision of society as a body of consumers, sharing in the fruits of economic growth, was beginning to make headway even during the Depression years.[66] The average Briton in full-time employment had become a consumer with access to many more leisure activities than his or her forebears.[67] Indeed British social history offers a good case study against reading the age in simple dark or light terms. Historians no longer regard Orwell's depiction of working-class destitution in his *Road to Wigan Pier* (1937) as representative of workers' living conditions. The Depression in Britain was an uneven regional phenomenon. Long-term unemployment and malnutrition devastated lives in the industrial parts of northern England, southern Wales, and the Glasgow region, but the south of England seemed like another country altogether. Here, Hobsbawm himself once commented on the sense of 'business as usual'. As a recent arrival from Berlin, he was struck by the lack of popular consciousness of the crises affecting the world.[68]

In statistically verifiable terms, Europe was a more propitious environment for ordinary people than it had been during the belle époque. Europeans on average were enjoying rising living standards and social mobility throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Infant mortality declined, illiteracy was disappearing, including among young females, and the eight-hour day became the norm through much of Europe.[69] Significantly, the period covered in this *Oxford Handbook* witnessed radical changes in women's lives, but here too the mixture of dark and light applies. The First World War and the 1920s had substantial emancipating consequences for women, although there was evidence of liberation and new forms of repression, sexual adventure, and sexual violence.[70] Europeans witnessed the advent of the modern woman, with her bobbed haired and short-hemline dresses. The bob was a charged issue in France because it was thought to reflect the sexual upheavals and demographic crisis caused by the First World War.[71] For such reasons sex preoccupied Europe's dictatorships, which prized militarist masculinity and were determined to reimpose traditional female roles. Even so, fascism did try to mobilize women politically: in Italy the Fascist women's movement counted over 3 million members on the eve of the Second World War.[72] As interwar governments of all types set out to regulate women's bodies with pro-natalist policies, such measures were seen as all the more necessary because women were asserting greater claims to personal sovereignty. 'The typical woman of the interwar period', says Anne-Marie Sobn of French and British women, 'was neither Ophelia nor the bachelor girl, neither a

traditional wife nor a blue-stocking; she had begun to throw off the yoke of nature and to claim her rights as a married woman even while sacrificing herself, whether to motherland or to modernity.'[73] Women were already voting in Denmark, Norway, and Finland before 1914, but revolutionary Russia was the first state to achieve universal suffrage in 1917. Thereafter the franchise was extended in Sweden, Britain, Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Poland, and Turkey. Although in some of these cases voting rights were withdrawn, these were revolutionary developments by any measure.

Historians can also point to remarkable developments in physics and technology, including the jet engine, nuclear fusion, commercial radio, and the invention of television. The age gave the world Bauhaus, Josephine Baker, Diaghilev, Eisenstein, Kafka, Joyce, Brecht, T. S. Eliot, surrealism, jazz, and Hollywood film. And yet for all its achievements, it was still a dismal age, one that was overshadowed by an impending catastrophe that threatened to cancel out its achievements. Indeed, creativity in the high arts was usually driven by the apprehensions that preoccupied the times.[74] Most Europeans shared such apprehensions. Although they suffered less political instability and violence than the rest of the Continent during the Depression years, Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries feared the risk of contagion.[75] The Swiss would later develop a myth of national unity in the face of external adversity, if anything to forget a more troubling domestic reality.[76] Throughout the mid- to late 1930s, Hitler's undisguised contempt for the sovereign rights of any nation made all of Germany's neighbours nervous. Neutral Sweden and Switzerland never relaxed. Until the very end of the Second World War, each lived in constant fear of being dragged into the abyss, but profited from Nazi war-making.[77]

Towards an Explanation

An 'age' is a construct that is meant to capture the chief characteristics of a given time period. Periodization reflects theories of causation and its altering historical patterns. The period 1914–45 was not only an exceptionally violent one: it also promised a future of authoritarianism and militarism. If any time period deserves to be described as 'the age of catastrophe', it is this one. But why did it happen when it happened? How was the 'age of catastrophe' possible? Why did it happen in the early twentieth century? Why so many crises within such a short time span? Why did it make something like the Holocaust possible?

Comprehensive explanations are lacking. Perhaps this has to do with the Herculean scale of such an undertaking, or the conceptual blockages put in place by nation-centred historiography. It also might have to do with an aversion to theories of modernization or anything else that smacks of teleology or Eurocentrism. Whatever the reasons, historians of Europe have been more reluctant than most when it comes to adopting wider frames of reference. A notable exception has been Arno Mayer, who has identified (although without explicating) an interpretative framework to account

for all these crises. In many of his works he refers to the 'General Crisis and Thirty Years War of the Twentieth Century', a rupture so acute that it made something as unthinkable as the Holocaust possible. For Mayer, Verdun and Auschwitz were related. His 'general crisis' depicts a continent overcome by modernity's innate tensions: it was trapped in a state of disequilibrium 'in all major systems of thought and action'.[78] His specific claim is the determination of reactionary or counter-revolutionary interests to arrest progressive change, and which threw up such ideas as social Darwinism and such regimes as Nazism. The Second World War saw to the annihilation of these forces. Another scholar whose work focused on Germany but which was located within a 'crisis of modernity' frame was Detlev Peukert. His aim was to explain why a well-educated, advanced industrialized society became vulnerable to Nazism. Through an investigation of many aspects of society (science, high culture, labour relations, Americanization, youth, gender), Peukert identified a pattern of reaction against modernity that transcended the Weimar and Nazi years, that was predicated on economic dislocation and failed promises of the Weimar period, which fostered yearnings for a return to certainties and receptiveness to the assurances of a charismatic leader.[79] Peukert's idea of a 'crisis of modernity' could be used to appraise the instabilities of other European states, for the scale and preponderance of Europe's crises at the very least *suggest* that these convulsions were related to modernity's frictions and the era's intense economic dislocations.

Mayer and Peukert have been mentioned here to inspire rather than prescribe. The immediate aim of this edited collection is not so much to offer a new explanation for why the 'thirty years war' was possible, as to promote a greater appreciation of the range of dynamic tensions in political, economic, and social life that transcended borders and much of the Continent. Its modest purpose is to give other European historians a better sense of the possibilities of comparative and transnational approaches, with a view to casting fresh light on a time period that has been worked over by some of the historical profession's finest minds, and yet which also remains poorly theorized. With this in mind contributors were asked to rethink rather than survey. They do not necessarily subscribe to the heuristic value of the 'thirty years war' concept, the temporal frame proposed by the editor, or the level of 'darkness' he attributes to it. In focusing on the uniformities of the period, however, their collective efforts should foster interest in more considered explanations as to why such an age was possible, and more interest in the writing of histories *of* rather than *in* Europe.

Notes

1. Interview with Dai Smith, the Raymond Williams Lectures, Hay Festival, 28 May 1995, <http://www.hayfestival.com>.
2. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), x and *Interesting Times; A Twentieth Century Life* (London: Allen Lane, 2002), xiii.
3. Hobsbawm, *Interesting Times*, 76.

4. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 335, 338.
5. Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in the Twenty-First Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 16.
6. Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth, 'Introduction', in Bloxham and Gerwarth (eds.), *Political Violence in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 4–5.
7. Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, 87.
8. Richard Vinen, *A History in Fragments: Europe in the Twentieth Century* (London: Little Brown & Co, 2000), 77.
9. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Allen Lane, 1998), 140–1.
10. Richard Overy, *The Twilight Years: The Paradox of Britain Between the Wars* (New York: Viking, 2009), 7; Eugen Weber, *The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994).
11. Ian Kershaw, 'War and Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe', *Contemporary European History*, 14/1 (2005), 109.
12. Saul Friedländer, *The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939–1945* (London: Harper Collins, 2007), xxv–xxvi.
13. Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, 257.
14. Mazower, *Dark Continent,* 302.
15. Cf. Dan Stone, *Goodbye to All That?: The Story of Europe since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
16. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 283.
17. James Sheehan, *The Monopoly of Violence: Why Europeans Hate Going to War* (London: Faber, 2007), 7.
18. Donald Bloxham et al., 'Europe in the World: Systems and Cultures of Violence', in Bloxham and Gerwath (eds.), *Political Violence in Twentieth Century Europe*, 19, and James F. Macmillan, 'War', in Bloxham and Gerwath (eds.), *Political Violence in Twentieth Century Europe*, 75.
19. Julian Jackson, 'Introduction', in Jackson (ed.), *Europe 1900–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 7.
20. Charles S. Maier, *Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 273.
21. Sheehan, *Monopoly of Violence*, 7.
22. Sheila Fitzpatrick, 'Ascribing Class: The Construction of Social Identity in Soviet Russia', *Journal of Modern History*, 65/4 (1993), 745–70.
23. Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately (eds.), *Accusatory Practices: Denunciation in Modern European History, 1789–1989* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
24. Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 338.
25. Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands; Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (London: Bodley Head, 2010).
26. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 14.
27. Quoted in Paul Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain* (New York: Norton, 2012), 245.

28. See especially Detlev J. K. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life* (London: Penguin, 1987) and Luisa Passerini, *Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience of the Turin Workers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
29. A. J. P. Taylor, *English History 1914–1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 2.
30. Taylor, *English History*, 2.
31. Selina Todd, *The People: The Rise and Fall of the Working Class 1910–2010* (London: John Murray, 2015), 120–5.
32. Todd, *The People*, 137.
33. Selina Todd, 'Class, Experience, and Britain's Twentieth Century', *Social History*, 39/4 (2014), 498.
34. Peter Fritzsche, *Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 204.
35. Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 219.
36. Ulrich Herbert, 'Good Times, Bad Times: Memories of the Third Reich', in Richard Bessel (ed.), *Life in the Third Reich* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 108.
37. Geoff Eley, *Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology, and the Ground of Consent in Germany 1930–1945* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 44.
38. Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2004), 5, 313.
39. Most recently, see Konrad Jarausch, *Out of Ashes: A New History of Europe in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).
40. Louis Nemand, 'From the Ashes', *New Yorker*, 28 November 2005.
41. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 9.
42. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 3–4.
43. Vinen, *History in Fragments*, 14–15; Jackson, 'Introduction', 5; Jarausch, *Out of Ashes*, 11–12.
44. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 4.
45. Richard Overy, 'Interwar, War, Postwar: Was There a Zero Hour in 1945?', in Dan Stone (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 71.
46. Sheehan, *Monopoly of Violence*, 173–7; Volker Berghahn, *Europe in the Era of the Two World Wars: From Militarism and Genocide to Civil Society, 1900–1950* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
47. William A. Green, 'Periodization in World History', in P. Pomper, R. H. Elphick, and R. T. Vann (eds.), *World History: Ideologies, Structures and Identities* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 53.
48. Alan Sharp, *Consequences of the Peace: The Versailles Settlement: Aftermath and Legacy 1919–2010* (London: Haus, 2010), 217.
49. Conan Fischer, 'The Failed European Union: Franco-German Relations during the Great Depression', *International History Review*, 34/4 (2012), 705–24. See <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2012.690192#abstract>.
50. Adam Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order* (London: Allen Lane, 2015), 7.
51. Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

52. Charles S. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy after World War I* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 14.
53. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (eds.), *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives* (New York: Berghahn, 2009).
54. Michael Geyer with Sheila Fitzpatrick, 'Introduction: After Totalitarianism—Stalinism and Nazism Compared', in Geyer and Fitzpatrick (eds.), *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1, 3.
55. Michael Geyer, 'The Subjects of Europe', in Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger (eds.), *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories* (New York: Berghahn, 2007), 266.
56. Geyer, 'The Subjects of Europe', 269.
57. David W. Ellwood, *The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
58. Martin Conway and Peter Romijn, 'Belgium and the Netherlands', in Robert Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted Paths: Europe 1914–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 104.
59. Mary Hilson, Scandinavia', in Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted Paths*, 23–4.
60. Müller, *Contesting Democracy*, 65–6.
61. Peter Clarke, *Hope and Glory: Britain 1900–1990* (London: Penguin, 1996), 181.
62. Philip Nord, *France's New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 86.
63. Joan Tumblety, 'France', in Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted Paths*, 128–9.
64. Gerwarth, 'Introduction', in Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted Paths*, 2–3
65. Robert Millward and Joerg Baten, 'Population and Living Standards, 1914–1945', in Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O'Rourke (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe*, Vol. II: *1870 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 262; Béla Tomka, *A Social History of Twentieth-Century Europe* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 137.
66. Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through 20th-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005).
67. Martin Pugh, *We Danced All Night: A Social History of Britain Between the Wars* (London: Bodley Head, 2008).
68. 'Between the Wars', Hay Festival, 29 May 2004, <http://www.hayfestival.com>.
69. Millward and Baten, 'Population and Living Standards, 1914–1945', 262; Tomka, *A Social History of Twentieth-Century Europe*, 137.
70. Dagmar Herzog, *Sexuality in Europe: A Twentieth Century History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 45–6.
71. Mary Louise Roberts, *Civilization Without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917–1927* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994), 66.
72. Victoria de Grazia, *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922–1945* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 265.
73. Anne-Marie Sobn, 'Between the Wars in France and England', in Francoise Thébaud (ed.), *A History of Women*, Vol. V: *Towards a Cultural Identity in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1994), 119.
74. Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, 188.
75. Hilson, 'Scandinavia', 21.
76. Jonathan Steinberg, *Why Switzerland?* (2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 70.

77. Christian Leitz, *Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe during the Second World War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), chs. 2 and 3.
78. Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York: Pantheon, 1981), 3.
79. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany* and Detlev Peukert, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity* (London: Penguin, 1993).

Further Reading

Fischer, Conan, *Europe Between Democracy and Dictatorship, 1900–1945* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
Jackson, Julian (ed.), *Europe 1900–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
James, Harold, *Europe Reborn, 1914–2000* (London: Longman, 2003).
Lichtheim, George, *Europe in the Twentieth Century* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972).
Martel, Gordon (ed.), *A Companion to Europe 1900–1945* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
Taylor, A. J. P., *From Sarajevo to Postdam* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1966).
Wasserstein, Bernard, *Barbarism and Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Wiskemann, Elizabeth, *Europe of the Dictators, 1919–1945* (London: Fontana, 1966).

PART I

EUROPE AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

CHAPTER 1

BELLE ÉPOQUE

Europe before 1914

ALAN SKED

There has been a tendency among certain historians to view the period 1900–14 as one of crisis and decline. After all, according to one famous account, it included the 'strange death of Liberal England' brought about by the Irish Question, the struggle of the suffragettes, industrial unrest between 1911 and 1914, and the fierce political rivalry between the Conservative and Liberal parties;[1] France, of course, was deeply divided over the Dreyfus Affair; while Italy by 1900 seemed to be on the verge of a military coup; thereafter, even under the political ascendancy of the Liberal statesman Giovanni Giolitti, it still faced fundamental problems regarding both the status of the Catholic Church and the question of the south. Eastern Europe, meanwhile, saw the Russian Revolution of 1905 after Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, the growing nervousness of the supposedly militaristic regime in imperial Germany caused by the rise of the socialist party, and the persistence of nationality problems in the Habsburg monarchy under the ageing Emperor Franz Joseph. In international affairs, the period saw a run of crises which apparently threatened European peace, including the First Moroccan Crisis, the Bosnian Crisis, the Second Moroccan Crisis, and the Balkan Wars. The climax to this series of diplomatic confrontations was the July Crisis of 1914 and the outbreak of the First World War.

Despite all these factors, however, the period was actually one of great progress and was remembered with great nostalgia after 1918.[2] John Maynard Keynes in his famous attack on the Versailles settlement, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, could even write:

> What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in August 1914! The greater part of the population, it is true, worked hard and lived at a low standard of comfort, yet were to all appearances, reasonably contented with their lot.[3]

He continued in prose that was truly purple to describe the conditions of life prevailing in pre-1914 Europe for the middle and upper classes:

> The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages; or he could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or information might recommend. He could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other formality, could dispatch his servant to the neighbouring office of a bank for such supply of the precious metals as might seem convenient, and could then proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of their religion, language or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person, and would consider himself greatly aggrieved and much surprised at the least interference. But most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable.[4]

In short, Europe before 1914 seemed almost as integrated and globalized as it is today, but with none of the international bureaucracy associated with the EU.

Finally but crucially, Keynes felt able to add:

> The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion, which were to play the serpent in this paradise, were little more than the amusements of his daily newspaper, and appeared to exercise no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalisation of which was nearly complete in practice.[5]

As will be seen, Europe's stock markets discounted international tensions during the period and in all the major crises till 1914 the great powers had no desire to go to war. In fact, Keynes's view of the pre-war period—and he was an exceptionally intelligent observer—should be taken very seriously.

Politically Europe seemed as a whole to be heading towards parliamentary democracy. The speed varied from state to state, but everywhere there was the development of political parties, the expansion of the franchise, and increasing popular involvement in politics. In almost all European countries, the representation of urban and rural masses was becoming an urgent political issue. Indeed, there was a kind of mystique, an almost utopian belief in the transformative power of the ballot. Even Marx before his death came to believe that universal suffrage in Britain—where 85 per cent of the population were working class—might usher in the socialist millennium. And in imperial Germany, where the Reichstag had very little power, debates even there became popular, with the public queuing up to attend them. Needless to say, Europe's conservatives put

up a bitter resistance to socialist and liberal ambitions, a resistance which made politics everywhere all the more interesting. In France about 10 million adult males had the vote; in Britain about 5 million. About a quarter of the British adult male population were still denied the vote but the principle of universal male suffrage had been established as an objective. Meanwhile, it had already been granted in Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Norway, and Sweden. The Netherlands had almost conceded it while Denmark gave the vote to all males and females over the age of 25 in 1913. Reichstag elections in Germany were also conducted according to universal manhood suffrage but real power lay in the federal states and their voting rights varied enormously. In the South, Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg allowed universal manhood suffrage, whereas Hamburg, Bremen, Saxony, and—notoriously—Prussia all had class systems of voting. This meant that it was almost impossible for the Socialists to elect any representative to the Prussian Diet whereas they elected all but one of Berlin's members of the Reichstag. They had the same problem in electing representatives to the Saxon Diet. The two grand duchies of Mecklenburg, meanwhile, were still governed by medieval estates. The result was that the Socialists made electoral reform a key issue and after 1903 organized huge annual demonstrations in favour of it. In Belgium, where a system of plural voting kept conservative clericals in power for decades, demonstrators demanded 'one man one vote'. Indeed, many European cities during this period witnessed 'suffrage riots', which were often accompanied by strikes and violence.

These reform efforts, it should be added, produced results. Austria in 1907 and Italy in 1912 established manhood suffrage. In Austria class representation and indirect voting were abolished and seats in the Reichsrat reallocated. This, it was hoped, would allow the parliament to function yet disputes grew worse and by 1914 the Reichsrat was suspended. In Italy the electorate increased from 3 to 8.5 million although this caused little alteration in the balance of political power. Almost everywhere, women were denied the vote from a mixture of motives including calculations of party advantage and the fear that they would merely follow religious instructions or their husbands' advice. Many men thought them too politically innocent to vote. Others thought they should wait their turn until all males had secured the franchise! In Britain women were often split on the issue between uncompromising suffragettes, moderates who abjured confrontation ('suffragists'), and others who simply did not care about the vote. Continental movements were weaker and more moderate.

Parliamentary debate revolved first around budgets, a legacy of nineteenth-century liberalism, and then around issues such as national defence, electoral and constitutional reform, education, State–Church relations, customs, and tariffs. Church–State relations had been a burning issue in Germany in the 1870s during Bismarck's attack on the Catholic Church (the so-called *Kulturkampf*) and still plagued post-Risorgimento Italy. There, Pius IX had excommunicated Italy's leaders, declared himself a 'prisoner in the Vatican', and forbidden good Catholics from participating in Italian politics and elections. This changed slightly only in 1903 when Pius X allowed Italians to follow their conscience in elections in which the interests of the Church were at stake. It was a move meant by a patriotic Italian Pope to help spare Italy the ravages of radicalism or

socialism. The most severe case of strained Church–State relations during this period occurred in France in the aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair in which the Church had backed the anti-Dreyfusards. After the 1902 elections which resulted in a government led by the radical anticlerical republican Émile Combes, there was an attack on the Church which saw 3,216 religious orders (with memberships of over 200,000) banned, including the main teaching order in boys' schools and innumerable female orders responsible for most of the country's childcare, female education, medical care, and welfare. A third of Catholic schools were closed. Diplomatic relations with the Vatican were broken off in 1904 and in 1905 Combes ended the Napoleonic Concordat between Church and State, which had given Catholicism official recognition and funding as the state religion. Henceforth all religions were separated from the State. Inventories of church property were drawn up, leading to riots and protests across the country. Financially, the Catholic Church lost 35 million francs in salaries and 411 million in assets. Radicals, however, were disappointed, as they had computed the Church's assets at over 1 billion francs.[6]

More commonly, however, debate centred on labour legislation, social insurance, social welfare, and public health. In purely labour legislation, including trades union regulation and Factory Acts, Britain had taken the lead and almost every country in Europe by the turn of the century had begun to enact industrial legislation to protect women and children and to shorten the working day. Britain in 1909 also passed legislation to improve conditions in the 'sweated trades' and in 1911 in the retail ones. Old-age pensions were introduced in 1908—not that many people lived long enough to receive them at the age of 70—while the National Insurance Act of 1911 provided medical insurance for most workers and unemployment insurance for some. The contributory principle made these measures politically more palatable, although no contributions were needed for old-age pensions which were paid through post offices as a right for those old and needy enough to qualify for them. Several other countries were by now introducing social welfare legislation, although the main impulse for this—as will be seen—had originated in Germany.

France presided over a slower introduction of such reforms. Here the bureaucracy rather than the government took the lead with less impressive results. Although legislation was still needed, much of it was limited with respect to the number of people covered and was therefore ineffectual. The country by 1914 still endured a ten-hour day and a six-day week, limited accident insurance, few employment exchanges, and contributory old-age pensions only for those with incomes lower than 3,000 francs. The pension reforms of 1910 were even opposed by trades unions on the grounds that they were being offered by a bourgeois enemy state, that contributions were required, and that such pensions were pensions 'for the dead' as they started only at the age of 65, which was above the age of peasants' and workers' life expectancy. Just as in Britain, where Lloyd George successfully introduced a wide range of taxes on the rich including income tax and super-tax in 'the People's Budget' of 1909 and his budget of 1914, these reforms gave rise to a huge political battle. In France, on the other hand, the proposal to fund welfare benefits through income tax was consistently blocked by the French Senate. Income tax

modernization was also successfully resisted by parliamentarians in Italy, where none the less both social insurance and factory legislation were on the statute book by 1912.

Income tax had already been adopted by Spain, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and even Japan by 1914, this 'queen of taxes' being resisted only in France, the United States, Hungary, and Belgium. Other taxes developed in the pre-war period included inheritance and estate taxes, capital gains taxes, and several business taxes, while older consumption and excise taxes remained and were even increased. Britain charged the highest rates on spirits, France on tobacco, whereas in Russia by 1914 a quarter of state revenue derived from the vodka monopoly. Oron J. Hale wrote: 'It is a wonder of the age that parliamentary democracy could impose a tax burden which if levied by an absolute monarch in an earlier time would have provoked riots in every corner of his kingdom.'[7] All modern states during this period saw government expenditures doubled or tripled with taxes growing in proportion and national debts mushrooming. Increases in defence spending and on armaments accounted for much of the increase of course, yet expenditure on other state services increased proportionately. It was not cheap to finance social services and public health. Hence education budgets in France, Germany, and Britain increased fivefold between 1870 and 1914. And Germany spent more per capita on non-military services than any other major state.

This point may lead on to the surprising fact that Europe's empires—Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany—were also experiencing progress rather than decline during the decade and a half before 1914.[8] By 1914 their emperors all had to work within constitutional and legal frameworks; none enjoyed purely personal or arbitrary power, although all were hereditary rulers with substantial personal prerogatives; elections had become the norm of political legitimacy; the claims of workers and peasants and even women to a better standard of living, to protection against accidents, sickness, and unemployment and to greater educational opportunities were being recognized; freedom of the press was greater than at any previous time; the arts flourished as never before; and political parties, even of the extreme Left, were legal everywhere. This was also a period of a booming international economy with huge economic progress being recorded in all three empires. It is difficult to believe, therefore, that these empires were in a state of decline preceding some inevitable collapse. In fact, the constitutional monarchies of western Europe as well as the French Republic often faced similar problems. On the other hand, problems associated with economic growth and wealth distribution did result in political challenges and hence a certain amount of political volatility. Yet this was absorbed by the political establishments without recourse to violence. The Russian Revolution of 1905 was the exception. In 1890 Wilhelm II of Germany had refused to contemplate abolishing the Reichstag as Bismarck had desired, preferring instead to force Bismarck's resignation.

That is not to deny that all these empires had a repressive aspect. One thinks of their nationality policies and, although Germany and Austria-Hungary were *Rechtsstaaten* (i.e. they operated under the rule of law), Russia's 1905 revolution saw 15,000 people killed and another 70,000 arrested. Four thousand were condemned to death by summary trials between 1906 and 1908 while in Poland over 40,000 people went through

the Warsaw prisons alone between February 1905 and June 1907, of whom 258 were sentenced to death. The great constitutional gain of the revolution—the creation of the Duma—was also undermined when in 1907, by a veritable coup, Piotr Stolypin, the Russian prime minister, in contravention of the Fundamental Laws of the Empire, redrew the electoral laws to produce a Duma which the government could manage. The Finnish Diet, meanwhile, was dissolved annually and nationalist Finns were purged, jailed, or exiled. From 1911 conditions were relaxed and in 1913 there was an amnesty for 'literary-political' offenders to celebrate the tercentenary of Romanov rule. Yet the 1912 massacre at the Lena goldfields (200 killed and a similar number wounded) led to a massive strike wave which was still engulfing Russia in July 1914. (Revolutions, however, call for tough responses. It should be remembered that France, too, had resorted to harsh measures in the wake of the 1871 Paris Commune, when some 900 soldiers and some 25,000 Parisians had been killed, the vast majority of the latter slaughtered in cold blood. Thereafter, about 40,000–50,000 had been arrested, with thousands given long prison sentences and thousands more sent to the hell of New Caledonia. Likewise the Dreyfus Affair had shown that not only the eastern empires suffered from mass anti-Semitism. Nor had the Dreyfusards worried much about the fate of the other prisoners in French Guiana or New Caledonia. Russia's actions were not so different, therefore, from those of a leading western European power whose government felt under challenge.)

In fact, the Russian Empire was hardly the repressive autocracy it was reputed to be. Under Nicholas I the security police in Moscow had consisted of six officials with a budget of £5,000 for the whole province and 'even in 1900 it had not expanded very much; indeed, by then there were almost no political prisoners. The huge province of Penza had three police officers and twenty-one policemen'.[9] In the 1880s only seventeen people had been executed for political crimes, all of them guilty of assassinations or attempted assassinations. According to Richard Pipes, three factors made it impossible for imperial Russia to become a police state: respect for private property, the right to travel abroad, and the horror of being considered Asiatic.[10] On account of the first, Alexander Herzen in the early nineteenth century could live off his rents while publishing his subversive material abroad; likewise Lenin's mother could continue to draw her state pension although two of her children were revolutionaries and one had been executed for trying to kill the Tsar. Private individuals or local governments could provide employment for dissidents while in 1900 200,000 Russians spent on average eighty days abroad. The Russians objected to anything resembling oriental despotism. Thus while in internal exile Lenin was habitually referred to as 'Sir' and many prisoners were allowed to escape; torture was rare.

Russia was on its way to having a developed legal system by 1900. One authority writes: 'law courts with judges appointed for life were conducting public jury trials under a judicial code that provided higher instances for appeal and procedural rights for defendants. Judges frequently abrogated orders and actions of the executive administration on the grounds of their illegality, and administrators generally had to comply with the judges' decisions.'[11] He adds: 'Most contemporary observers rated the Russian judiciary on a par with its European counterparts.'[12] The system expanded and became

more bureaucratic by 1914 and if it did not quite reach the standards of Austria-Hungary or Germany this was because it failed to fully penetrate the countryside where there was a high proportion of nobles in judicial service and the traditional attitude persisted that all law emanated from the will of the Tsar.

Imperial Germany was clearly also more autocratic than the parliamentary states of western Europe. It was a constitutional state but under its constitution only the chancellor could be questioned in the Reichstag and he himself was nominated by and responsible solely to the emperor. There was no cabinet—all state secretaries were regarded as mere functionaries advising the chancellor—and defence policy was shielded from the Reichstag and indeed often from the chancellor. In 1890 Wilhelm II failed to inform his chancellor about the appointment of a new war minister and in the following year drafted a new Army Bill without the help of an aide-de-camp and without consulting any minister. Throughout his reign he met with the head of his Military Cabinet about three times a week, with his Naval and Civil cabinets twice a week, and with his chancellor maybe once a week. He saw most of his ministers only once a year at the Kiel Regatta. There were opposition parties in the Reichstag but despite the rise of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to become the largest party there by 1912, chancellors always had a parliamentary majority. Crucially, defence and foreign policy could only be coordinated by the emperor.

Did this mean that Germany was an autocracy? Hardly. Government was simply too complicated to be run by one man of limited intellect (the emperor's Civil Cabinet, for example, sent him 70,000–80,000 documents a year for consideration!) and politics too sophisticated to allow the Reichstag and the Opposition to be ignored. There was, of course, the press, the courts, the provinces, public opinion, and all sorts of other factors which had to be taken into account. In any case, chancellors such as Bülow knew how to manipulate the emperor.

Should imperial Germany nonetheless be seen as militaristic? True, under Article 63 of its constitution the emperor decided the army's peacetime strength, structure, and distribution. His Military Cabinet controlled personnel and all military commanders had direct access to the emperor or his staff. The powers of the war minister were also reduced between 1871 and 1883 and those of the Military Cabinet and chief of the general staff increased so that they became independent agencies directly responsible to the emperor. The attempt by Count Waldersee to make his office of chief of the general staff the equal of the chancellor failed, however, as did the plan to use military attachés to conduct an independent foreign policy. The Schlieffen Plan (albeit now a rather controversial topic) did restrict German foreign policy formulation by making any pledge to recognize the neutrality of Belgium impossible.

It should be stressed that by 1900 most of the old liberal demands for an annual military budget (instead of one every seven years as imposed by Bismarck) and full accountability on military matters had been dropped. By 1900 the Catholic Centre Party was supporting military expenditure and even the SPD admitted the need for a national defence. The role of the army in an age of international tension was seen to be one of winning wars rather than repression and most criticisms now revolved around military

courts, duelling, brutality, and anti-Semitism. The SPD focused its critique on the army's social role ('Junkers in uniform' etc.) and by 1914 was boasting that one-third of the army were Social Democrats.

In any case, the army was changing. No longer the heir of Frederick the Great, its 800,000 men depended on the general staff plus railways, heavy artillery, explosives, telegraphs, and rifled arms to function. In this it was just like all the other armies of Europe. Nor was it any longer the preserve of the nobility. By 1914 70 per cent of its officers and 50 per cent of its general staff were bourgeois. Between 1890 and 1912 the percentage of its officers with the *Abitur* rose from 35 per cent to 65 per cent. In the period 1888–1913 only 10 per cent of War Academy entrants were sons of landowners. On the other hand, the ethos of the army remained aristocratic, regulations still reflected this, and society fell into line—as Wilhelm Voigt's 1906 adventure in Köpenick demonstrated, when, dressed as an army officer, he proved able to commandeer willing civilians to help him commit a robbery. However, the changes in court martial regulations (resisted in both Austria-Hungary and France) again demonstrated that things were changing. True, Germany by 1914 was spending more on defence than the other European powers but proportionately she was spending only 4.6 per cent of her national income as compared to 6.3 per cent for Russia and 4.8 per cent for France. One American historian has asked whether contemporary French, British, and Russian military leaders were any less militaristic than German ones,[13] while another has pointed out that the German army actually fulfilled a very positive role at this time in German society: it integrated individuals and regions into the new Reich; it was a storehouse of positive memories from the wars of unification; its garrisons and manoeuvres helped boost the economies of medium-sized towns and villages; increasingly it offered a career open to the talents (cf. the prestige of the reserve officer status); it offered a rite of passage for young males, while for the poorest it offered an increased standard of living.[14]

The progress of the eastern empires should also be recognized in other ways: economic growth, welfare reforms, and intellectual vitality. The Habsburg Empire had shown consistent growth throughout the long nineteenth century. There were a few blips due mainly to wars but overall growth was at a respectable if not spectacular level, although growth in Bosnia-Herzegovina was spectacular indeed (reaching 12.4 per cent per annum between 1881 and 1913), far above anything witnessed elsewhere in the Balkans. Economic integration was greater than in the United States and the empire had a single currency and was an efficient customs union. All parts of it benefited from this economically after 1867. Imperial Germany, of course, witnessed rapid economic and social change. Between 1870 and 1913 its productive capacity increased eightfold, while that of Britain merely doubled and that of France tripled. By 1913 German steel production had overtaken that of Britain, by 1910 Germany's iron and steel exports had exceeded Britain's, while in the newer industries like chemicals, electricity, and optical products Germany established not merely European but global leadership. By 1900 Germany supplied 90 per cent of the world's dyestuffs, more than one-third of the world's electricity output, and more exports of electrical goods than Britain and the United States combined. The rise of these industries was based on Germany's excellent

technical education and the country's ability to turn the fruits of research to practical use as nowhere else in the world.

This success went hand in hand with the radical urbanization that took place in Germany at this time. Between 1882 and 1907 the population of German cities increased by 8,500,000. In 1890 twenty-six cities had populations of over 100,000 but by 1910 forty-eight had passed that mark. By 1914 some 30–40 per cent of the working population were industrial workers. The economic boom was partly the result and partly the cause of the steep decline in German emigration. For most of the nineteenth century no country save Ireland had experienced such a drain of population. In 1881, for example, 220,902 Germans or 4.86 per cent of the population had emigrated. After 1893, however, this number fell rapidly and in the following decade rarely rose above 30,000. After 1905 it became so small as to be almost negligible. Germans, therefore, were becoming literally more attached to their country.

Many of the new workers were employed in huge concerns and these large German companies normally combined in cartels. These were not mergers of previously independent companies—or even trusts on the US model (i.e. interlocking shareholdings)—but associations of manufacturers who came to a contractual agreement concerning production levels and price scales. They could and did acquire a monopolistic grip on basic commodities. For example the two electrical giants AEG and Siemens came to an effective price-fixing agreement while the Rheinisch-Westphälisches Kohlensyndikat controlled the coal and coke output of about half of Germany. Industrialists maintained that these arrangements brought stability. However, they also brought the risk—along with tariffs (Bismarck's legacy after 1879)—of rising prices and hence industrial unrest. By 1912, after all, the SPD was the largest party in the Reichstag. Wages in fact rose by 30 per cent between 1900 and 1914 but the high cost of living meant that workers had to spend 60 per cent of these on food. This was why Bismarck and his successors introduced Germany's social welfare legislation that became an example for other European governments to follow. As Bismarck put it, 'the contentment of the unpropertied classes [is] well worth the expense involved … [it] is a good investment for us as well. It enables us to thwart revolution.'[15] Given 'a bit of Christian charity' from the state, the workers would see government as seriously concerned with their welfare and desert the SPD.[16] As a result imperial Germany laid the basis for the modern welfare state.

Bismarck's welfare initiatives fitted in with his other policies: tariffs protected landlords and manufacturers; shipowners were subsidized by the imperial treasury. The measures he introduced included insurance against sickness, accidents, old age, and unemployment. The first three rested on imperial statute and were uniform throughout the Reich; the last was left before 1914 to provincial and municipal or even private provision. In 1911 all social security legislation was consolidated in a *Reichsversicherungsordnung* with 1,085 articles (not including the 104 in the introduction) and benefits were extended to widows and orphans and practically all workers not yet covered. The same year saw the *Versicherungsgesetz für Angestellten* which came into effect in 1913 and covered another 2 million people (420,000 of them women) over and above the 14 million already covered

for sickness insurance, not to mention the 16,500,000 receiving old-age or invalidity pensions and the 25 million enjoying accident insurance.

Ideally the worker was to be part of a system of 'national' or 'human' conservation. He was trained to be a good mechanic, insured against sickness, accident, and old age; if unemployed, help was provided through labour exchanges and even lodgings if he sought work in other cities; if sick, there were convalescent homes or TB clinics or farm colonies; in retirement, there was a small pension. The German education system pursued similar aims: public schools were compulsory for everyone—boys and girls—between the ages of 6 and 14. Elementary education included physical education as well as the rudiments of academic training. Excursions were paid for and so, too, were medical examinations. After leaving elementary school pupils had to spend two years in 'continuation' schools studying mainly practical subjects. Beyond this were *Gymnasien*, commercial colleges, art and other schools, where attendance was optional and not always free, but which attracted huge numbers of pupils. In all schools where attendance was compulsory, books were issued free to those unable to purchase them. Free breakfasts were also provided, it being widely accepted that all schoolchildren be fed at the public expense. Thus the German state did a great deal to look after the welfare of its citizens and laid the foundations of the modern welfare state, still the hallmark of a civilized society. In 1912 costs amounted to about 850 million marks out of a central government budget of 2 billion marks. There was a huge rise in the number of doctors, dentists, and hospital beds, a huge reduction in the incidence of TB, a greater respect for the elderly who could now contribute to family budgets, while the rise of a pensions industry allowed an accumulation of funds which helped pay for public baths, homes for the blind, nursery schools, new water and sewage works, not to mention low-cost dwellings for the disabled.

The German system was copied in Austria with social insurance laws being passed in 1887 and 1888. By 1906 the number of people covered by accident insurance was almost 3 million, over 20 per cent of them women. By the same date there were 2,917 sickness insurance societies, insuring almost the same number of people, again over 20 per cent women. Austria was the first European state to adopt an insurance law for salaried employees (1906). No consolidated law for insurance was on the statute book by 1914 but proposals were discussed in parliament from 1904 and reforms already agreed by 1914 included the provision of sickness insurance for 5,200,000 people; there were also proposals for better accident insurance as well as a comprehensive scheme for old age and invalidity insurance on the German model.

Imperial Russia meanwhile, although still overwhelmingly an agricultural society, experienced rapid economic development and growth, particularly in the 1890s and again between 1909 and 1914. There was huge foreign investment and Stolypin had introduced a major programme of agricultural reform, ending redemption payments and consolidating plots, although peasant unrest continued. There was a huge development of banking and credit institutions and the actions of the State Bank, which supervised the others, saved many commercial banks from disaster in 1900 and 1904–6. There was also an attempt to copy German welfare legislation. For example, a law of 2 June

1903 established the responsibility of the employer in cases of industrial accidents that resulted in disability or death, with a disabled worker receiving a disability pension of two-thirds his normal earnings, a widow receiving a pension of one-third. There were also allowances for hospital care, medical care, and funeral expenses—save if the accident had been caused by the worker's gross negligence. In 1912 funds for sickness benefits were established and 2,800 existed by 1914 covering more than 2 million people. There was also a new law on accident insurance in 1912, which updated that of 1903 and made the employer liable in all cases. Legislation was simplified and many loopholes closed.

Finally, it should be stressed that the three 'eastern Empires' during this period were all demonstrating huge artistic, cultural, and intellectual vitality. The dynamism of 'Vienna 1900' has become a cliché, given the activities of Klimt, Schiele, Mahler, Freud, Schoenberg, Schnitzler, von Hofmannsthal, Krauss, Loos, Kelsen, and the many other great names appearing in almost every field of intellectual or creative endeavour. Even in imperial Germany, there is now a greater appreciation of what has been described as 'the modernity of Wilhelmism'. Yet the outstanding nature of the cultural effervescence of imperial Russia is often ignored, although she was probably more avant-garde than the West in almost every field of art. Chekhov's plays were already masterpieces of world theatre as staged by Stanislavsky at the Moscow Arts Theatre and Maxim Gorky was already famous as a novelist of proletarian realism. Bunin, whom he influenced, became the first Russian to win the Nobel Prize for Literature. Realism, however, was already under attack from Futurists, Symbolists, and others. In painting realists were also being overtaken by Impressionists like Vrubel and Serov while in 1898 the periodical *Mir Iskusstva* (World of Art) was founded by artists devoted to 'art for art's sake'. This group combined the latest European trends with traditional Russian painting, including icons. It influenced the Futurists and helped make St Petersburg by 1914 the world capital of progressive art. In music Russia also stood out. The veteran composers Balakirev, Cui, and Rimsky-Korsakov were still active but Mussorgsky was rediscovered and in 1904 *Boris Godunov* was restored to the repertoire of the Imperial Opera House. At the same time two new talents emerged—Scriabin and Stravinsky, who is often considered the greatest composer of the twentieth century. But all sorts of great artists—singers, conductors, and soloists—were emerging (Horowitz and Heifetz for example); there were opera houses galore (four in St Petersburg); and ballet was in ferment. Petipa's influence was in decline, that of Fokine on the rise. Fokine's productions included *Le Spectre de la rose* and *Les Sylphides*. Most innovative of all were the scores of Stravinsky, including *The Firebird, Petrushka*, and *The Rite of Spring*. The dancing also benefited from costumes of great originality and colour and the virtuosity of dancers such as Pavlova and Nijinsky, while 1909 saw the new 'Russian Ballet', revealed to the world by Diaghilev. This proved so shocking that from 1911 it was performed permanently abroad. Meanwhile in the realm of science and technology Russia was also leading the world with breakthroughs in mathematics, biology, chemistry, psychology, and aviation. This intellectual ferment was reflected both in a growing feminist movement and in a press that was, despite censorship, the freest that Russia had ever experienced. There were 2,167 periodicals

published in 1912 in 246 Russian cities and towns, reflecting every variety of opinion from extreme Right to extreme Left. They were also published in no less than thirty-three languages. So intellectual, economic, and social progress was being recorded all over Europe before 1914 as states everywhere tackled problems of social welfare, constitutional reform, and industrial unrest. There were also debates everywhere on problems of international relations.

It should be stressed that in this context the period 1900–14 cannot be considered merely 'a countdown to war'. There were people around—the German historian Treitschke, for example—who believed that wars henceforth would be necessary. Treitschke also believed that wars would become 'rarer and shorter', even if more bloody. In his view, long Continental wars like the Napoleonic Wars or the Seven Years War were a thing of the past.[17] Europe's wars since 1815 had after all been very short and efficient—almost lightning wars. The experience of the US Civil War was seen as irrelevant, one German general in 1914 dismissing it as 'armed mobs chasing each other around the country from which nothing can be learned'. On the contrary, any new European war would be 'brisk and merry', as one German diplomat maintained in 1914. Treitschke seemed to believe that wars would be short on account of cultural factors: the modern horror of bloodshed, the modern system of credit and economic interdependency, the efficiency of modern armies. Thus, 'it is impossible to see how the burden of a great war could long be borne under the present conditions. But it would be false to conclude that wars can never cease. They neither can nor should.' Much of the enthusiasm for war and military values that existed before 1914 was based on the 'short-war illusion'. Thus in 1915 Sigmund Freud could write: 'we pictured it as a chivalrous passage of arms, which would limit itself to establishing the superiority of one side in the struggle, while as far as possible avoiding acute suffering that could contribute nothing to the decision'. In similar fashion, an English commentator, the Revd Father H. I. D. Ryder, had written in 1899 in an article on the ethics of war that 'war is calculated to evoke some of the best qualities of human nature, giving the spirit a predominance over the flesh'. He argued that modern war had lost some of its most offensive features and that non-combatants in particular could be regarded as 'henceforth excluded from the casualties of civilised warfare'. His, like Freud's, was a version of the 'short but civilised' war illusion. (Some military commentators, it is true, envisaged maybe a two-year war at most.)

Whether this was the majority view before 1914 is impossible to tell. In any case, there was also by now a long-established tradition of pacifism in Europe. The British Peace Society, for example, had been founded in 1816 and had petitioned Parliament in 1842 against wars being fought in China and Afghanistan. A number of International Peace Congresses were also held between 1848 and 1853, while several French utopian socialists in the 1840s had written books on the establishment of permanent international peace. Another Frenchman, Frederic Passy, in 1867 founded the Ligue de la Paix and in the same year an international conference, held at Geneva and chaired by Garibaldi, decided that Europe must be reorganized as a federation of free and democratically governed peoples to preserve the peace. Annual universal peace congresses took place from 1889 and the Nobel Peace Prize was founded in 1897 and first awarded in 1901. The

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was established in 1910. Pressure from pacifists and others for the codification of international law helped establish the permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in 1897. The result of all this, in the words of M. S. Anderson, was 'that the decade before 1914 probably saw a more widespread belief in the possibility of international cooperation and a more general optimism as to the possibility of achieving peace between the great powers than had ever been known before'. Anderson adds, however, that on account of disunity among the several strands of pacifists and their lack of any popular appeal or dynamism, their movement 'was at bottom no more than a fringe movement'.[18]

Perhaps this is true. Certainly, nationalism was much more visceral in its appeal. Nevertheless, sophisticated works of a Cobdenite heritage such as Sir Norman Angell's *The Great Illusion* (1910), which argued that war could not pay given the interconnectedness of the global economic system (Germany for example was Britain's greatest trading partner), were very widely read. And the doctrine of the Second International on international affairs was strictly pacifist, although its member parties were willing to contemplate a war in self-defence.

The disputes which exercised the international socialist movement before 1914 concerned revisionism, Millerandism—that is, collaboration in government with bourgeois parties—and pacifism. On all three topics, the Left won the argument. The idea that classical Marxism was outdated and undermined by social and economic reality was voted down at the Amsterdam Congress of the International in 1904; the idea that socialist parties should collaborate with liberals or radicals was voted down at the same congress on the grounds that it amounted to keeping 'the ruling classes' in power. Yet why did pacifism become the policy of the International?

Marx and Engels had never been pacifists and had always shunned the pacifist movement. Still, contrary to those who believed in the short war illusion, Europe's socialists came increasingly to believe that modern war could not be contained or made civilized and that in any war the working class would be the main losers, physically, politically, and economically. The German Social Democrats had been refusing for a long time to vote for military budgets and had always criticized military social privileges, the mistreatment of recruits, and duelling. This precedent was adopted by the International in 1900 at its Paris Congress. In any situation in which war threatened, the International would coordinate socialist efforts to maintain peace. For national defence, meanwhile, socialist parties advocated the possibly unrealistic expedient of using popular militias in a defensive war (see Jean Jaurès's work of 1910, *L'Armée nouvelle*). The Russian Revolution of 1905 brought demands from left-wing German socialists, particularly Rosa Luxemburg, to use the general strike as a weapon to prevent a capitalist war, but these were defeated by Bebel and Kautsky and the SPD leadership at their party congresses of 1905 and 1906. The French socialist pacifist Gustav Hervé then raised the issue at the International's Stuttgart Congress at Dresden in 1907, where he denounced the SPD as merely 'a machine for counting votes and cash'. An amendment moved by Lenin and Luxemburg then brought agreement that in the event of war, socialist parties should 'intercede for its speedy end, and … strive with all their power to make use of the violent

economic and political crisis brought about by the war to rouse the people and thereby to hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule'.[19] The Copenhagen Congress of 1910 rehashed the arguments with the same result. However, it established an International Bureau to coordinate such efforts. This body then called a conference in Basel in November 1912 to demand peace in the Balkans, a conference which was attended by 500 delegates from twenty-three socialist parties, and which demanded the end of alliances and secret diplomacy, thus conferring on the International some real credibility. Yet the trend among socialist parties was actually turning in a patriotic direction. The SPD deputies in the German Reichstag cooperated in 1913 in passing the military expansion bill by voting for a capital levy which would finance the measure. In France Jaurès's Socialists were unsuccessful in opposing the three-year service law. The Socialists in both countries meanwhile confessed that if attacked (by Russia or Germany) they would fight. And so they did. In 1914, with the exception of the Socialists in the Russian Duma and in Serbia, all European socialist parties rallied to the national cause. They also usually joined bourgeois parties in coalition to keep the war going, whilst trades unions forgot about general strikes or sabotage but helped keep workers producing armaments. No wonder one historian has written: 'In light of these facts the coming and going of fraternal delegations between France and Germany during the last years of peace have about them an air of pathetic unreality.'[20]

The international socialist movement also debated imperialism and many of its leading intellectuals, including Luxemburg, Bauer, Hilferding, Bernstein, and Kautsky wrote works on the subject. The general idea was that imperialism was the product of economic forces, usually a glut of capital which needed overseas investment outlets to sustain its profitability. Governments, under the control of capitalists, therefore, acquiesced in the annexation of foreign territories to provide scope for the required overseas investment. However, the competition between empires for territory, just like that between large capitalist enterprises in domestic markets, would inevitably lead to war; empires would seek to monopolize control of overseas territories and markets. Lenin, in order to explain the outbreak of war, later produced his own theory of imperialism, which he associated with the final stage of capitalism, although much of his thinking was influenced by the Austrian socialist Rudolf Hilferding and by the British radical J. A. Hobson, whose highly influential book of 1902, *Imperialism*, had been more concerned to point out that if British capitalists only remunerated their employees better and raised demand at home, they would have no need to seek external markets. Karl Kautsky, the leading theoretician of German Marxism before 1914, shocked many socialists by arguing after 1911 that imperialism would not cause war. The imperial powers had made arrangements similar to cartels in domestic markets in order to divide the world peacefully between them.

Kautsky was absolutely correct. The *entente cordiale* of 1904, the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, the de facto entente between Britain and Germany over the Baghdad Railway and the future of the Portuguese colonies—not to mention Britain's 1902 alliance with Japan and the Hay–Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 leaving the United States to police the Caribbean—effectively removed many colonial and security issues as a source

of great power conflict. Even the two Moroccan Crises never really threatened international peace since neither France nor Germany was prepared during either of them to resort to war. Besides, the 'Hobson–Lenin thesis' overlooked the fact that most overseas investment from Europe went to areas of the world where profits could be made—not the jungles, deserts, and swamps of most of Africa and large parts of Asia, but primarily the USA, Latin America (especially Argentina), Russia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, plus the diamond and gold-mining areas of South Africa. All these countries were independent. In short, the thesis fails to explain anything. However, Lenin's successful revolution in Russia in 1917 during the First World War was to lend it (and Marxism generally) a sham credibility.

David Stevenson has shown that during the two Moroccan Crises, the Bosnian Crisis, and the Balkan Wars, none of the great powers wanted to resort to force, even if they increasingly used military measures to back up their diplomacy.[21] The Bosnian Crisis, however, seriously damaged Russian prestige so that in 1914 she was not prepared to suffer it being undermined again by tolerating an Austrian attack on Serbia. The Balkan Wars also persuaded Austria-Hungary that Serbia could only be dealt with in future by the use of force, the threat of which, at the end of both wars, had been needed to deter first Montenegro and then Serbia from clinging to disputed territory. Hence two major powers were willing to use force in 1914. There was indeed a mounting arms race in Europe before 1914 but the money markets—like Keynes—discounted any real threat to peace. Crises just seemed to come and go. In Niall Ferguson's words: 'the traditional historiography on the origins of the war has, quite simply, over-determined the event. Far from there having been a "long road to catastrophe", there was but a short slipway. Such a conclusion offers little support to those historians who still think of the war as an "inevitable" consequence of deep-seated great power rivalries—a predestined cataclysm … the outbreak of war was an avoidable political error.'[22]

A generation ago the Hamburg historian Fritz Fischer argued that Germany had deliberately plotted war in 1914 on account of her fear of socialism at home and encirclement by the Triple Entente abroad. Today, his thesis attracts less support. Some of the key evidence behind it—the September Programme of 1914 and the War Council of 1912—no longer seems conclusive or even reliable.

Nationalism, prestige, and security fears rather than economics were the vital factors in causing the war. Italy set the ball rolling by attacking the Ottoman Empire in 1911 in order to acquire Libya in North Africa. This would satisfy Italian nationalists, humiliated by previous defeats in Africa, and raise Italy's prestige among the powers. More importantly it offered the Balkan states the opportunity to attack Turkey in Europe the following year. Their success, the doubling of Serbian territory, and the near expulsion of Turkey from Europe altogether, formed the background to the July Crisis of 1914.

The July Crisis came about with the assassination of the heir to the Habsburg throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife at Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. The Bosnian assassins had been armed and trained by Serbian military intelligence whose chief, Dragutin Dimitrijevich, known as 'Colonel Apis', led a secret revolutionary organization, the Black Hand. He and the other officers involved in it had been behind the

gruesome murders of the Serbian king and queen in 1903. The Serbian prime minister, Nikola P. Pašić, a political enemy of Apis, was aware that an assassination was being planned, yet he never directly warned Vienna.

For their part, the Austrian authorities, although soon aware that the assassins had been trained in Serbia, never acquired sufficient proof that the Serbian authorities had been involved. They determined none the less to use the opportunity provided by the murders to declare war on Serbia, discover the details behind the assassinations, and reduce the country to vassal status. This had less to do with the South Slav Question or nationality problem in the Habsburg monarchy—which, despite contemporary anxieties, all the latest research proves has been overrated by historians—than with the need to sustain Austria-Hungary's status as a great power.[23] Serbia could not—obviously—be trusted to investigate the assassinations but Austria's main motive was to deal with her looming challenge to Habsburg military and diplomatic predominance of the Balkans once and for all. There was a good chance that Russia would back Serbia, hence German support was sought and granted immediately—Berlin's famous 'blank cheque'. Wilhelm II believed that the Russians would not be ready for war till 1917 and that the Tsar would not support the regicide regime in Serbia. He and his advisers also believed that if Austria-Hungary moved quickly the war might be localized. This did not prove possible: the Hungarian prime minister, Tisza, wanted to ensure Romanian neutrality and the Austrian military chief of staff, Conrad, needed time until the large number of troops on harvest leave could be recalled to their regiments. In the meantime, before 23 July, Russia, with French support, decided to back Serbia and instituted mobilization measures which provoked an immediate German response. Germany's Schlieffen Plan meant that Germany had only six weeks to defeat France before turning against Russia, so there was no time for negotiations. The statesmen involved in any case were fairly second rate but not quite out of their depth. They understood the consequences of mobilization plans but basically they suffered from the short war illusion and were prepared to risk a contest of arms. British entry into the war was at first uncertain. There was no definite commitment to aid France, despite previous strategic agreements. There was also no legal obligation to aid Belgium militarily. Grey, the British foreign secretary, may even have been duped by the French and Russians into accepting that Germany had mobilized first. The Entente powers certainly paid little attention to Austria's strong case against Serbia whose sovereignty, however, seemed sacrosanct in liberal ideology. What really determined British intervention was, first, Grey's view of the balance of power which dictated that Britain should be in a position to influence the outcome of any war, and secondly, the assurances given by the Conservative Opposition that, should the Liberals split, it would enter a coalition with the prime minister in support of British intervention. Knowing this, Lloyd George, the key Liberal waverer, backed the war. The invasion of Belgium made it possible for him to justify his position.

Why then did the war break out? War through misadventure is today the answer given by several key historians, who now reject the Fischer thesis—although Ferguson, it should be noted, with regard to Britain, prefers to talk of a positive mistake, a wrong decision, the worst mistake in all her history! In short, it was rather like *Murder on the*

Orient Express—all suspects were equally guilty, although in the words of Christopher Clark, 'the war was a tragedy not a crime'.[24] This verdict is disputed by others who blame Austria for her determination to deliver an ultimatum that could not be accepted and to dismiss any compromise offered by the Serbs. One Austrian diplomat confessed: 'We started the war, not the Germans and even less the Entente—that I know.' Another called himself 'the man who caused the war'.[25] The historian Sam Williamson has described the Austrian foreign minister, Count Berchtold, as 'the man who could have prevented the Great War'.[26] Indeed, Countess Berchtold told a cousin that her husband could not sleep the night before the ultimatum was delivered and kept changing its wording in case the Serbs accepted it.[27] Certainly, wars do not begin by accident. Armies have to be mobilized and receive orders to attack. Yet the most recent analyses of Russian policy in July 1914 put the blame on Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, who on 24 July had decided on a military response before the Serbs had even replied to the Austrian ultimatum and before Vienna itself had declared war. In the words of Sean McMeekin: 'As indicated by their earlier mobilizations, (especially Russia's) in 1914, France and Russia were far more eager to fight than Germany—and far, far more than Austria-Hungary, if in her case we mean fighting Russia, not Serbia.'[28] Germany is not quite yet off the hook. There are still historians who believe that without her blank cheque to Austria, the latter would have had to back down and a world war could have been avoided. Europe might even have been able to resume that wonderful progress and enjoy that wonderful prosperity that Keynes remembered so blissfully after the catastrophe.

Notes

1. George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
2. For general background to this period, the works I found most useful, despite reading a great variety, were the older ones, namely Oron J. Hale, *The Great Illusion, 1900–1914* (New York, Evanston, San Francisco, and London: Harper & Row, 1971) and M. S. Anderson, *The Ascendancy of Europe: Aspects of European History, 1815–1914* (London: Macmillan, 1972). For a more recent, rather pessimistic, and not wholly convincing intellectual analysis of the period, see Philip Blom, *The Vertigo Years: Change and Culture in the West, 1900–1914* (London: Phoenix, 2009).
3. John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004), 9.
4. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, 9–10.
5. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, 10.
6. France during this period is well covered in D. L. L. Parry and Pierre Girard, *France since 1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
7. Hale, *Great Illusion*, 204. Presumably he was not including Russia.
8. For a longer, footnoted version of the case presented here, see Alan Sked, 'The European Empires: A Case of Fall without Decline', in Emil Brix, Klaus Koch, and Elizabeth Vyslonzil (eds.), *The Decline of Empires* (Vienna and Munich: Walter de Gruyter, 2001).
9. N. Stone, *Europe Transformed, 1878–1919* (London: Fontana, 1983), 174.

10. Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 313–15.
11. G. L. Yaney, *The Systematization of Russian Government: Social Evolution in the Domestic Administration of Imperial Russia, 1711–1905* (Urbana, Chicago, and London: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 389.
12. Yaney, *The Systematization of Russian Government*.
13. J. R. Dukes, in 'Militarism and Arms Policy Revisited: The Origins of the German Army Law of 1913', in Dukes and Joachim Remak (eds.), *Another Germany: A Reconsideration of the Imperial Era* (Boulder, CO and London: Westview Press, 1988), 19–39, at 36.
14. D. E. Showalter in 'Army, State and Society in Germany, 1871–1914: An Interpretation', in Dukes and Remak (eds.), *Another Germany*, 1–18. For a comparative view of the Habsburg army, see Alan Sked, 'Social Attitudes and Legal Constraints: Army Life in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1890–1914', *Journal on European History of Law*, 3/2 (2012), 11–32.
15. G. Ritter, *Social Welfare in Germany and Britain, Origins and Development* (Leamington Spa and New York: Berg, 1986), 34.
16. Ritter, *Social Welfare in Germany and Britain*, 47.
17. The quotes in this paragraph are taken from the following remarkable article: John Mueller, 'Changing Attitudes towards War: The Impact of the First World War', *British Journal of Political Science*, 21/1 (January 1991), 1–18, at 15–16.
18. Anderson, *Ascendancy of Europe,* 166.
19. Quoted in Hale, *Great Illusion*, 217.
20. Hale, *Great Illusion*, 218.
21. His key article is David Stevenson, 'Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914', *International Security*, 22/1 (Summer 1997), 125–61. See, too, his *Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
22. Niall Ferguson, 'Political Risk and the International Bond Market between the 1848 Revolutions and the Outbreak of the First World War', *Economic History Review*, NS, 59/1 (Feb. 2006), 70–112, at 102.
23. For a list of the relevant literature, see Alan Sked, 'Austria and the First World War', in *Histoire@Politique: Politique, culture, société*, 22 (Jan.–Apr. 2014), n. 13 and text.
24. Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 561.
25. For both quotes see, Fritz Fellner, 'Austria-Hungary', in Keith Wilson (ed.), *Decisions for War* (London: UCL Press, 1995), 9–25, at 14.
26. Samuel Williamson Jr., 'Leopold Count Berchtold: The Man Who Could Have Prevented the Great War', in Günther Bischof, Fritz Plasser, and Peter Berger (eds.), *From Empire to Republic: Post-World War I Austria, Contemporary Austrian Studies*, 19 (2010), 24–51.
27. See Alan Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815–1918* (2nd edn, London and New York: Longman, 2001), 253.
28. Sean McMeekin, *July 1914: Countdown to War* (London: Basic Books, 2013), 404.

CHAPTER 2

SOCIETIES AT WAR, 1914–1918

STEFAN GOEBEL

In October 1918, the Gramophone Company sent the head of its London studio to the western front, tasked with recording the noises of war. The outcome was an astonishing documentary of the soundscape of the First World War. Just over two minutes long, it captured the loading and firing of gas shells by the Royal Garrison Artillery near Lille. The recording ends with a patriotic appeal to support the war savings campaign: 'Feed the guns with war bonds and help win the war'. Tragically, the chief recordist inhaled gas during the expedition and returned home in poor health. There he fell victim to the influenza pandemic and died before the vinyl was released.[1]

Gas Shell Bombardment encapsulates the three themes running through this chapter. Firstly, it forces us to rethink conventional ideas about propaganda as a state-caused 'moral pollution' of innocent minds. Propaganda was a polycentric effort to mobilize the population for an increasingly total war. Propaganda—the manufacture of consent—did not have to be produced and choreographed by the state or its subsidiary organizations; it often produced itself. Both civil society (such as the war savings associations) and commercial mass entertainment (such as the gramophone industry) played a vital role in sustaining morale among civilians and the troops. Thus, secondly, this record also tells us something about the nexus between home and front. Far from being alienated from each other, people in and out of uniform remained in constant communication through a host of media. Thirdly, the subject matter of *Gas Shell Bombardment* and the eventual demise of its recordist prompt us to explore the new levels of violence unleashed during the war on the one hand and the advances in public health on the other.

Coercion and Consent

How can we explain why this bloody war went on for over four long years? Historians have traditionally highlighted the coercive elements of mass mobilization, notably

censorship and propaganda, conscription and surveillance. Also, manifestations of opposition—peace protests, military mutinies, food riots, and political revolutions—have been studied at length. Yet, more recently, scholars have begun to emphasize the consensual dimension of waging war, even though it is perhaps 'terrifying to contemplate the possibility that the Great War went on because millions of people believed that it had to do so'.[2]

The self-mobilization of the public took centre stage in the summer of 1914—or so it seemed to contemporary observers. The crowds gathering in the squares of Europe's capital cities appeared the incarnation of triumphant patriotic fervour. However, the meaning of the street scenes of July and August 1914 was more complex and ambivalent than acknowledged at the time. People did not react uniformly; there were significant geographical, social, and temporal variations in the degree to which people came round to accepting the idea of a (defensive) war in summer 1914. The crowds were motivated by sentiments ranging from excitement and curiosity to panic and depression, and there were not a few people who were enthusiastic and anxious at the same time. The patriotic crowds that would acquire a new centrality to the iconography of the nation at war were concentrated in the cities. Although confined to a section of the urban population, they were capable of making a great deal of noise amplified by the nationalist press. Conversely, on the land, with the harvest impending, the mood was often characterized by 'war angst'.[3]

Despite the sheer diversity of responses in summer 1914, 'war enthusiasm' became a powerful myth that was rehearsed time and again during the war and after. Within weeks of the outbreak of war, the notion of a 'spirit of 1914' overcoming older social and political schisms was re-enacted on the theatrical stages in the metropolises; almost two-thirds of plays staged in Berlin theatres between September and December 1914 were performances of (the embryonic memory of) the 'August experience'. The fusion of entertainment, business, and propaganda was pioneered in the large cities and rooted in urban civic culture. In Moscow and St Petersburg, commercial publishers issued traditional *lubki* (broadsides) long before the government began to grasp the power of official propaganda. Another traditional form, *images d'Epinal*, was resurrected by French poster firms in an effort to cash in on the heroic mobilization and the *union sacrée*. Folk art bore the messages of 'war enthusiasm' and 'sacred union' in a way intelligible to a mass audience.[4]

Patriotism and profit went hand in hand. To be sure, multinational businesses such as the British-based Gramophone Company proved vulnerable to the disruptions caused by the outbreak of war. Even though the German and Russian governments seized its foreign assets, the company experienced—after an initial dip—a period of steady growth. The business of propaganda boomed, and it knew no national boundaries. Consider the case of the German manufacturer of harmonicas, Hohner. As soon as September 1914, the firm launched its first new product line of war-themed mouth organs. These proved a big success. Yet, thinking ahead, Hohner also registered the trademark 'world peace' in October 1915. He even circumvented the Royal Navy's blockade of the German coast and supplied the British market with the popular model 'Tommy Atkins'. Hohner

himself was a German patriot through and through. But he was also a businessman who approached the war in the same disimpassioned way he would have exploited any other commercial opportunity, planning for all eventualities and never saying no to a lucrative deal.[5]

The importance of the emotional investment of ordinary people in the war effort cannot be overestimated, as can be illustrated by the wartime phenomenon of war landmarks (Figure 2.1). Throughout Austria and Germany local communities erected wooden objects (often representing medieval knights in full armour) which, in the course of month-long and sometimes year-long celebrations, were punctured by a series of nails. The participants had to pay for the privilege by contributing to war charities. Moreover, they had a creative part in the nailing ritual for every iron nail represented a particular motto chosen by the participant. Initiated and organized by local worthies, the success of this signifying practice ultimately depended on widespread participation. By means of collective action, the wooden objects were—or, sometimes, were manifestly not—turned into steel figures symbolizing the local community's iron will to see the military campaign through. War landmarks that remained incomplete—such as the colossal 'Iron Hindenburg' in Berlin—threatened to undermine the very meaning of the collective enterprise. In 1916, at the height of the war of attrition at Verdun, the new custom came by and large to an end. The real slaughter of the war of attrition dealt a hammer blow to the rhetoric of iron endurance and willing sacrifice.[6]

The practice of erecting war landmarks was without parallel in other countries. The nearest equivalent in Britain was the tank bank, launched by the National War Savings

FIGURE 2.1 War landmark 'Iron Man', Offenbach. Certificate for a participant in a nailing ceremony, 1915.

Source: Collection Bernd Thier, Münster.

FIGURE 2.2 Tank bank in Trafalgar Square, London. Photograph of a wounded officer purchasing the first war bond, November 1917.

Source: Imperial War Museum, Q 54248.

Committee in November 1917 (Figure 2.2). Tanks, exhibited in central squares from Bristol to Glasgow, solicited money from the populace for war bonds rather than war charity. Similar to the iron-nail war landmarks, tank banks were places of both spectacle and performance, sites where not only the organizers but also the audience played an active part. Both practices elevated ordinary people from mere viewers to true participants. Timing, though, was different. While the nailing ritual flourished in the mid-war years, the tank banks only got rolling in the final year of the conflict. By then, German savings had been eaten up by inflation and civilian morale reached low ebb. Tank banks mobilized financial and symbolic resources in Britain that had already dried up in Germany.[7]

Although the National War Savings Committee was responsible to the Treasury, in practice it was only loosely attached to the state. Key to its success was the vibrancy of local savings associations that organized the tank banks and other campaigns. The process of cultural mobilization was often bottom-up rather than top-down, and local actors could react angrily to political interferences from above. For instance, headmasters aimed to curb the direct influence of the National War Savings Committee on war propaganda in schools by arguing that 'the best results in every school will be obtained by leaving the teachers entirely to act on their own initiative'.[8] Yet, it would be artificial to

attempt to draw a sharp dividing line between self-persuasion and opinion control. The boundaries between grass-roots, commercial, and official propaganda were extremely fluid; and often they formed a synergistic relationship. Take posters and advertising: before 1914, it would have been easy to spot the difference between a public notice and a poster; but during the war, the two genres became blurred, as state agents—with assistance from the advertising trade—attempted to seduce, and as commercial producers, merchants, and advertisers sought to take advantage of the aura of public authority that came with support for the war.[9]

Arguably, the crucial phase in the propaganda war was the remobilization in 1917–18. It was during this period that official propaganda either came into its own or faltered. In Britain, government propaganda grew from being a sideshow to an integral element of war policy, with the creation of a department in February 1917 and eventually a fully fledged Ministry of Information headed by a press magnate one year later. The new department encouraged the creation of the National War Aims Committee in August 1917 in order to regenerate commitment to the national cause. The committee sought to influence public opinion mainly through open meetings. The meeting was also the preferred medium of a parallel broad-fronted campaign launched in France in March 1917, the Union des Grandes Associations contre la Propaganda Ennemie. Both organizations interpreted the war in terms of national survival and aimed to shock the timid and war-weary by invoking scenarios of a peace on German terms. While the British committee was modelled on a pre-war election campaign, its French counterpart emulated the republican league that supported state primary education. Both operated with official backing but eschewed advertising this fact.[10]

The ability of state and society in Britain and France to regenerate national resolve in 1917–18 stands in sharp contrast to the German case where the legitimacy of the regime had been severely damaged by the time the Supreme Command launched the 'patriotic instruction' in summer 1917. While this programme (initially aimed at soldiers, but later rolled out to civilians) was undisguised official propaganda, a new political movement, the German Fatherland Party, was founded with the backing of government in September to rally popular sentiment in favour of a victorious peace. Yet, all it achieved was a polarization of public opinion in the final year of the conflict. By comparison, divisiveness had characterized the Italian experience of war from the outset. Ironically, however, it was the military debacle of Caporetto in November 1917 that at last gave a certain surface plausibility to the notion of a nation in peril and that, briefly, seemed to galvanize public opinion in support of the war effort. Hampered by discontent at home, Italian propaganda was altogether more successful when targeted at the enemy. The Italian army's psychological operations acted as a catalyst in prompting the disintegration of the multinational Austro-Hungarian army.[11]

The manufacture of societal consent was buttressed by more coercive measures. While states produced remarkably little propaganda (apart from that directed at neutral countries) in the first half of the war, censorship and surveillance were in place from summer 1914. In both France and Germany, the state of siege imposed military administration on the entire territory; in France this was to such a degree that the republic came

close to being a military dictatorship. Britain, too, according to one historian, morphed into 'a kind of police state'.[12] This is an exaggeration, but the Defence of the Realm Act certainly curbed many civil liberties and marked a shift away from nineteenth-century liberal traditions. Yet, censorship was a two-edged sword; empty 'white spaces' in newspapers or even the suppression of entire copies could backfire. Thus, in the Habsburg Empire, the censor unwittingly created a veritable 'black market of information' fuelled by rumours. Moreover, censorship was never straightforward. Even official propaganda could fall foul of the censor. In March 1918, the War Office suppressed the exhibition of a disturbing painting by one of the official war artists in London. But displayed it was: with a diagonal notice on it, saying 'Censored'.[13]

It is important to note that coercion was not the sole prerogative of the state, and, moreover, that coercive measures were not necessarily forced on an unwilling populace. Almost all European countries had compulsory military service, with the exception of Britain, which until 1916 relied on volunteers. While most British men enlisted voluntarily out of a sense of duty, some were coerced into it by recruiting rallies or even by zealous women handing out white feathers as symbols of cowardice to any young man not in uniform. The issue of conscription challenged long-standing ideas of a citizen's autonomy from the state. That being said, by 1916 there was a consensus emerging among Britons that the government ought to compel men for reasons of equity. Yet, the introduction of conscription did not remove any opportunity for individual agency as many of those called up chose to appeal. Importantly, military service tribunals maintained consent by exempting men (mainly on domestic rather than conscientious grounds). Arguably, there was a popular demand for state interference in Europe. In Germany, calls for a benevolent 'food dictator' to sort out the distribution of foodstuffs were heard as early as 1915 and grew louder in 1916. Even surveillance had its supporters, for it suggested to ordinary people that their opinions mattered. For some Russians, surveillance became a medium through which they could express themselves.[14]

In sum, initial ambivalence in the summer of 1914 gave way to increasing commitment to what was understood as a war of national self-defence, at least in the first half of the war. Consent in wartime was not a matter of official lies and popular gullibility but essentially self-propelled. Commitment to carry on the war was generated from the bottom up, elaborated in civil society and through the market, and transmitted through cultural artefacts and signifying practices. The role of the state was one of co-ordination and encouragement, although governments became more proactive in the final two years of the conflict. Until 1917, the chances of any European belligerent being forced to exit the war due to military mutinies or domestic unrest remained slim; and in Britain it was never a real possibility despite war-weariness setting in. Strike activity that had largely ceased in 1914 returned in 1917–18. Now the distinction between economic strikes, political demonstrations, and subsistence riots tended to become blurred, and protests even spread to cities of neutral countries, for instance Barcelona. The revolutions that forced Russia out of the war and that swept central and eastern Europe in its aftermath were triggered by a collapse of consent. To be sure, they cannot be solely

attributed to the discord bred by the war—but that is the topic of another chapter in this volume.[15]

Home and Front

The (re)mobilization of society was successful as long as people continued to believe that war was waged for the safety of family and the home. Consent was to a large degree a function of the ties between home front and battle front. Did the dislocations of wartime experiences eventually open up a gulf of understanding between civilians and combatants? Did soldiers on leave—like the protagonist in Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1928)—encounter a strange land and experience the return to their units as a relief? Contrary to an earlier historiography which failed to interrogate interwar representations about the alienation between soldiers and civilians, the latest research highlights the strong bonds between those in and out of uniform throughout the war. What is more, the drive towards 'total war' broke down the barrier between military and non-military spheres. The logic of total warfare transformed enemy civilians into targets and one's own civilians (notably, the labour force) into an important resource.[16]

A nostalgic yearning for home and memories of the world of sociability kept many a soldier going. Asked whether he was fighting for 'the Empire', a private from the London Regiment replied in the affirmative. What he had in mind, though, was the Empire Music Hall in the metropolitan borough of Hackney. Even at the height of the age of empire and nationalism, the soldier's national identity rested on a very local sense of place: the family home, the neighbourhood, places of work and leisure. Popular culture, especially sentimental music, appealed to soldiers' instinctive loyalties. Hit records such as 'It's a long way to Tipperary' played on gramophones at the front conjured up memories of a world of sociability that men had not really left behind, but carried with them as cultural baggage. Conversely, recordings such as the Gramophone Company's *Gas Shell Bombardment* ('An actual record taken on the front line', was embossed on the vinyl) transported the sounds of war into sitting rooms. While this particular record was not more—but also not less—than an acoustic fragment from the battle front, it could be joined together with glimpses gained from film, photography, journalism, literature, paintings, trench art, and a host of other media.[17]

A particularly powerful medium was the exhibition. An integral part of the urban environment before the war, visual displays continued to attract large numbers of visitors, now sending a predominantly civilian audience on imaginary tours through space to the battlefields. In the Austrian and German capitals, huge war exhibitions opened in 1916 that aimed to represent the war in its totality. In Berlin as well as in other German cities, people could also take a stroll through model trenches dug in the city centres; in London, Trafalgar Square was temporarily turned into a model battlefield with guns, trenches, and debris in autumn 1918; and, in Paris, a *Panthéon de la Guerre*, a huge

panorama of the Great War, was inaugurated on a site near the Hôtel des Invalides in October 1918. Exhibitions conveyed a sanitized image of modern warfare. Nevertheless, they represented an important window to a landscape unknown to most viewers.[18]

Rural populations had fewer opportunities to form for themselves a picture of combat and life in armed forces, but they were not necessarily less well informed. The postal service allowed families to stay in communication with their loved ones in the field. The amount of mail that travelled in both directions was enormous; German postmen alone delivered an estimated 30 billion letters, postcards, and parcels. Letter writing was no longer a bourgeois thing; peasants with minimal schooling took to the pen, often writing frankly and poignantly of what they were going through. Yet, typically, the experience of war was couched in a recognizably journalistic language—after all, soldiers were avid readers of newspapers. But it was not all war talk. Farmers used the post to send their wives detailed instructions on how to run the business in their absence. The mail could be a source of both economic and emotional survival. Letters from wives and mothers updating soldiers on the minutiae of local life speak of connection rather than separation, compassion rather than estrangement. The post was a lifeline, but also a potential seed of subversion. The *Jammerbrief* complaining about the hardships of life on the home front was a genre much feared by the authorities in Germany. Censors were even more alarmed by letters from German front-line soldiers in autumn 1916 that openly dissuaded their relatives from buying further war bonds.[19]

In their correspondence, families assured their loved ones that they included them in their prayers. The physical letters as well as photographs and little objects that connected soldiers to their kinsmen could even act as charms. Home and front were spiritually united. All over Europe, families regularly beseeched God for the safety of absent members. Angels and saints were called on as heavenly mediators to protect the living and safeguard the dead. Some people embraced unorthodox beliefs and practices. Spiritualism had been the preserve of cranks before 1914, but now it became more respectable and even 'scientific'. There were bereaved who attended seances in which spiritualist mediums promised to establish a direct line of communication with the dead. Many more rediscovered conventional observance as a method of staying in touch. In London, neighbourhoods constructed temporary war shrines recording the names of inhabitants who had joined up. Prayers for the safety of the living incorporated the commemoration of the dead. When intercessions were made at the shrines, the congregation was frequently reminded that the soldiers were fighting a 'holy war' on behalf of the British people. Similarly, the term *union sacrée* assumed a spiritual resonance that for many French Catholics transcended its origin in political propaganda.[20]

A certain degree of emotional distance between combatants and civilians was inevitable. Armies developed their own 'war cultures' (including their own media, such as trench newspapers) distinct from their civilian counterparts, especially in the French army which did not foster regional regimental identities in the way the British and German armies did. Relations between home front and fighting front could also become strained. The combatants resented certain civilian types, notably 'the shirker' or 'the profiteer' living in luxury, 'the unfaithful wife', and all those journalists and politicians

engaged in what French soldiers termed *bourrage de crane* ('skull torture' or propaganda). But acrimony never spilled over into abandonment. The French mutineers of 1917 refused to advance, but not to defend. Yet, poilus were convinced that the home front was the weakest link in the war effort. A popular joke pictured two men in a trench reassuring each other that France will emerge victorious 'as long as they [that is, the civilians] hold out'.[21]

Suspicion that a wavering home front jeopardized the national cause was no joking matter for the Central Powers. In Vienna, the authorities were so alarmed at German-speaking citizens' fixation on the perceived enemy from within—the city's Jews, Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles—that they worried the people failed to grasp the seriousness of the external threat. Censors gathered from home front letters in 1917 that 'any and all interest in the big events has disappeared. Enthusiasm for the grand affair has disappeared along with a belief in holding out.' Police reports from Berlin in early 1917 noted that the daily battle for food eclipsed interest in news from the military front: 'an enormous portion of the population doesn't care about the war at all any more'.[22] In the perception of the ruling elites, civilians at the home front were no longer engaged in the same conflict as the soldiers at the front. A few months earlier, at the height of the war of attrition at Verdun and on the Somme in summer 1916, newspapers throughout Germany had printed 'An earnest appeal from the front' that pointed the finger of blame at the allegedly faithless home front: 'German People! Do not jeopardise the great cause, the lives and future of every German, with your petty discontents'.[23] The contours of the 'stab-in-the-back legend' that would come to haunt the Weimar Republic were starting to take shape in the second half of the war. However, there emerged also a powerful competing narrative that pitted not military front against home front, but front line against *Etappe*, the 'rear'. For a growing number of ordinary soldiers, the champagne-drinking rear epitomized the corruption of an officer corps that had betrayed the nation's cause.[24]

The legend of a victorious army 'stabbed in the back' by their own people posited a dichotomy between home front and fighting front. In reality, however, the gap between military and civilian spheres narrowed gradually during the war, not only in Germany but in all belligerent societies. It is significant that the expression 'home front' itself (borrowed from the German *Heimatfront*) is a product of the First World War. It was apparently introduced into English by *The Times* in April 1917, citing an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* about the recent expansion of national service to include all men aged between 17 and 60: 'The unity of the fighting front and the home front ought to be still more thoroughly understood by us … It is all one front.'[25] Two mutually reinforcing trends transformed the civilian sphere into a genuine second front: firstly, the militarization of non-combatants; and, secondly, the domestication of modern war.

The first trend is most closely associated with the issue of industrial conscription. In this first mass-industrialized war, politicians were caught in a dilemma of the competing manpower demands of army and industry. Despite repeated calls for the raising of an 'industrial army', the British government did not systematically intervene in the labour market; the Russian state, too, refrained from exercising control over the civilian workforce, apart from measures relating to exemption. Both France and Italy created

contingents of mobilized industrial workers who remained under military discipline (and could be sent back to the front at their employer's discretion), but in either case their number never exceeded half a million men. In comparison, roughly 1.2 million German men were exempted in early 1916, a figure that rose to 2.5 million by the summer of 1918. Yet, what the Supreme Command ultimately envisaged was a total mobilization of all resources including a civilian draft. Radical though the proposals were, the actual Auxiliary Service Law of December 1916 was a much watered-down version.[26]

The Auxiliary Service Law excluded women. The drafting of women was a cultural barrier that no belligerent was willing to break during the war. While women workers routinely replaced male labour in war factories (although in Germany to a lesser extent than in Britain or France), women's military service remained an anathema. To be sure, Britain saw the creation of a voluntary Women's Army Auxiliary Corps in January 1917. Even though pains were taken to distinguish the khaki-clad auxiliaries from regular soldiers, the recruitment slogan 'The Girl behind the man behind the gun' signalled that their role (which included tasks such as storekeeping and vehicle maintenance) was regarded as vital (Figure 2.3). Nevertheless, women's main contribution to the war was usually couched in the language of motherhood. The meaning of motherhood was intensely debated in all societies and in some discourses raised to an act of citizenship equivalent to military service. Children, too, were drawn ever deeper into the logic of total war. While formal schooling deteriorated (more so in Germany and France than in Britain), the 'child army' was made to participate in war work, relief efforts, and paramilitary exercise.[27]

Children were among the fatalities of war. One air raid on London hit a school, killing 18 pupils. To be sure, strategic bombing was still in its infancy. Air raids were not only not nearly as destructive as some of the darker scenarios had suggested but were also less lethal. Bombs caused the deaths of about 740 people in Germany, 984 in Italy, and 1,239 civilians in Britain. Yet, the mere figures cannot reveal the psychological impact of the bombs. City dwellers were not yet hardened to the idea of death from the air that could strike anyone at any moment. The fact that women and children were among the dead caused much public outcry, but it forced people to come round to the idea of a total war. Characteristically, the distinction between people in and out of uniform became sometimes blurred at the funerals of civilian air-raid casualties that elevated them to victim status on a par with the soldiers. The endurance of air raids created a sense of belonging to the community of those at risk of personal loss; it could even become a source of (re-gendered) civic pride. The organ of the London teachers' union, for instance, claimed that its members—predominantly women—had gained 'first-hand experience of the perils of modern warfare': 'We share now, at any rate in some small degree, the fortunes in the field of our husbands, brothers, sons and comrades.'[28]

War became part of the daily ordeal of those civilians who happened to dwell in territories occupied by the enemy or in and around the zones where the armies entrenched themselves: their home *was* the front. The western front ran through eight departments in France. Some of them were entirely taken by the enemy, others were battlegrounds or militarized zones right behind the front lines. After the German advance


QUEEN MARY'S ARMY AUXILIARY CORPS.
The GIRL behind the man behind the gun.
ENROL TO-DAY
FULL PARTICULARS AND FORMS OF APPLICATION FROM THE NEAREST EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE.
ASK AT POST OFFICE FOR ADDRESS.
M.40/58.
16356/12587/581. 6/18.

FIGURE 2.3 Poster 'The Girl behind the man behind the gun', Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps (Women's Army Auxiliary Corps), 1918.

Source: Imperial War Museum, PST 13167.

in the west in 1914, most of Belgium was under military occupation. The arrival of the Germans had caused a mass exodus; a quarter of the Belgian population fled the country in 1914. After assurances were given by the occupiers, many returned to their homes, yet others escaped later in the war, crossing a lethal electrified fence that now separated Belgium from the Netherlands. Belgian refugees—the eyewitnesses of German 'frightfulness'—brought the consequences of war directly to the local population. Those who went into exile in Britain were received into society, initially at least, with much compassion. However, their number was small compared to the vast influx of both Belgian and French refugees into unoccupied France. The French hosts were ambivalent in their attitude towards the refugees: pitiful examples of German barbarity on the one hand, they were a much resented strain on the local communities on the other. By contrast, the German lands were by and large spared occupation, apart from French and Russian incursions into parts of Alsace and East Prussia respectively.[29]

The plight of civilians caught between armies was worst in eastern Europe. On Russia's western frontier, the war unleashed a displacement of populations on an unprecedented scale. With over 6 million displaced people by 1917, refugeedom became a new social category. Refugees scattered from Siberia to Turkestan literally brought the war into the daily lives of provincial Russia. But many never made it that far: an estimated 318,000 perished in 1914–15. The Tsar's soldiers, in turn, invaded the borderlands between Austrian and Russian Ukraine. The inhabitants of Galicia and Bukovyna were subjected to repeated periods of Russian occupation and German-Austrian re-occupation between 1914 and 1918. In this multi-ethnic and multi-religious region, the occupiers sought to consolidate their grip on the territory by producing client nationalities and discriminating against supposedly hostile groups, thereby exacerbating long-standing tensions.[30]

In Ukraine, frequent regime changes thwarted any comprehensive attempt at political-cum-cultural annexation analogue to the quasi-independent military state the Germans created in the north-east. Between 1915 and 1918, Ober Ost stretched across most of the present day Baltic States as well as parts of Poland and Belarus. Ruthlessly exploited for labour and natural resources, these lands were also bombarded with cultural propaganda juxtaposing German *Kultur* and native *Unkultur*. In an attempt to cleanse the allegedly 'dirty' east, the occupiers implemented an authoritarian programme of public health, including forced inoculations and delousing. Ober Ost, it has been argued, was a utopia that created an 'imperialist mindscape' of the east—with long-term ramifications for an even more violent occupation during the Second World War.[31]

Violence and Well-Being

The Great War was murderous without precedent. The total of military losses is over 10 million dead.[32] What is more, an estimated 6 million civilians perished as a result of war,

many of whom were massacred or succumbed to exhaustion and starvation. The history of violence—on and off the battlefield, both during the war and in its aftermath—is a major theme of the current historiography. The staggering human cost notwithstanding, the conflict cannot, however, be described as an unmitigated demographic disaster, for there were important variations by age, place, and class. A seemingly paradoxical picture emerges when one compares the findings of cultural historians and historical demographers. While the former have shown that the war created a 'dynamic of destruction' including mass killings of non-combatants, the latter have pointed out that, in some cases, the war years saw unplanned improvements in the life expectancy of the civilian population.

Rises in life expectancy had nothing to do with better medical care, but were due to improvements in the standard of living. The British working class, in particular, benefited from the positive side effects of full employment, increased real wages, and the expansion of maternal and infant welfare. Material gains and improvements in public health translated into a heightened sense of well-being, at least among those civilians who contributed directly to the war economy. Yet, groups on the margin of the war effort registered increased mortality rates, notably the elderly and illegitimate children. France also saw modest improvements in civilian health, whereas mortality rates soared in Germany after 1916. While it is a matter of some debate whether German city-dwellers suffered starvation, undernourishment became a mass phenomenon. Precarious from the start of the war, the food situation developed into a full-blown crisis from 1916 onwards. The food crisis was partly a home-made one, partly caused by the 'hunger blockade' which cut the country off from overseas supplies. Again, it is important to note the war's differential impact on social groups, as male workers employed in war industry fared better than others. The food situation was no better in Austrian cities, and absolutely dismal in Russia where the combination of malnutrition and infectious diseases resulted in a deep health crisis.[33]

For those civilians and soldiers who fell into the hands of the enemy, violence became the hallmark of their war experience. A wave of atrocities accompanied the German advance through Belgium in summer and autumn 1914. The military in imperial Germany had long been haunted by images of insidious *francs-tireurs*, irregular snipers firing from the back, during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1. In 1914, memory transmuted into paranoia; surprised and frustrated by the stiff resistance put up by an underequipped army of a supposedly inferior nation, German soldiers pinned the blame for their military difficulties on phantom *francs-tireurs*. Injuries on German dead were perceived as mutilations, and members of the Belgian civil guard, who wore only rudimentary uniforms, were identified as irregulars. Army units wreaked vengeance on civilians, first spontaneously, later with official approval. Thus, the burning of the university city of Louvain originated in panic, whereas the mass killing of 647 civilians in the small town of Dinant was premeditated. However, some of the most outrageous atrocity stories that circulated at the time—about children with severed hands—were fabrications. Newspaper editors who reprinted them were often aware of the distortions but accepted the general truth of reports about German atrocities.[34]

The frenzied bouts of killing and formalized executions were not repeated in the west once the war of movement had come to a halt. Instead, new forms of violence were visited on the occupied populations. A vast prison for the inhabitants, the occupied territories were seen by the occupiers as a reservoir of people. From 1916 onwards, the Germans deported Belgians and Frenchmen across the Rhine or forced them to work, often under dangerous conditions, behind the front lines. Economic exploitation went hand in hand with a punitive occupation regime in which deportation was used as a collective punishment for alleged resistance. Most notorious was the forced evacuation of some 20,000 people—mostly women and young girls—from Lille at Easter 1916. To add humiliation to misery, those females who had been rounded up were subjected to a gynaecological examination normally reserved for prostitutes.

Invading armies treated pre-war initiatives to limit the impact of war on civilian populations with contempt. Likewise, legal efforts to protect prisoners of war failed. The Geneva and Hague Conventions proved just another scrap of paper. Particularly dangerous for prisoners of war was the moment of surrender. One scholar contends that the killing of Germans at the hands of their British captors in the heat of battle was routine.[35] However, the great majority of prisoners taken by the British, French, Germans, and Italians survived. Non-officer rank British and French prisoners suffered harsh treatment, notably in German forced labour companies, but survival was the norm. Yet, for some nationalities, captivity could be as lethal as combat: 29 per cent of Romanian prisoners perished; 25 per cent of Serbs died as prisoners of Austria-Hungary; and the death rate of German soldiers in Russian captivity is an estimated 20 per cent. Precise figures exist for the mortality rate of Italians in Austro-Hungarian captivity: nearly 20 per cent succumbed due to maltreatment by their captors and neglect by the Italian Supreme Command which tried to stop their countrymen from the sending of food parcels in order to deter potential deserters.[36]

Civilians deemed internal enemies or 'enemy aliens' experienced captivity and violence, too. All British males of military age living in Germany were arrested in November 1914 and interned in a camp on the outskirts of Berlin. A model internment camp, the conditions there were bearable. Even so, a high proportion of internees were pro-Germans or British nationals in a legal sense only, many of whom had never set foot in the United Kingdom. Britain itself adopted a policy of wholesale internment or repatriation in the aftermath of anti-alien riots in May 1915, when a street mob had hunted down supposed Germans, including naturalized Germans and Russian Jews. Around the same time, Italian-speaking subjects of the Habsburg Empire were confronted with the choice between internment in what was termed 'concentration camps' or resettling in Italy. To different degrees, all societies turned on themselves, persecuting and arresting the enemy in their midst. In Russia, the Tsarist government conducted a ruthless campaign against its own citizens, deporting suspected hostile populations (especially Russian-subject Germans and Jews, but also Latvians, Lithuanians, and Poles) by the hundreds of thousands to Russia's vast hinterlands. The Ottomans did the same to their non-Turkish subjects during the war. In the case of the Armenian Christians, deportations escalated into genocide in 1915–16. There was no blueprint for this state-sponsored

mass murder, but a process of a 'cumulative radicalization' resulted in the deaths of at least 1 million Armenians.[37]

Beyond '14/18'

Formally, the guns fell silent on 11 November 1918, and peace treaties were signed in Paris in 1919–20. But the violence continued in central and eastern Europe, and in Ireland, in the form of revolutions, ethnic clashes, wars of independence, civil wars, and military hostilities between states until 1923. Now paramilitary movements (partly but by no means wholly composed of veterans) rather than regular armies were responsible for much bloodshed and disorder. The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923—which sanctioned a massive exchange of populations between Greece and the new Turkish republic in the aftermath of the Greek-Turkish war of 1919–22—suggested that a continuum of political violence had existed between 1914 and 1923; its preamble stated that the signatories aimed 'to bring to a final close the state of war which has existed in the East since 1914'.[38]

Historians that endeavour to go beyond the conventional periodization of '14/18' have foregrounded the legacy of 'brutalization' on the one hand and the long-lasting emotional pains of the survivors on the other. The 'brutalization' thesis traces the physical and verbal violence of the interwar years—and, ultimately, the Second World War and the Holocaust—back to the war experience of 1914–18 or rather its mythological representation. It posits a continuation of wartime attitudes into peace, above all an indifference to human life and a hatred of the enemy. While non-poisonous in the victorious countries, namely Britain and France, the 'Myth of the War Experience' and its associated cult of the fallen soldier had allegedly a greater urgency and a brutal edge in defeated Germany. This bold thesis has not gone unchallenged. Its critics point out that most returning German soldiers managed to pick up the pieces of their civilian lives and that only a minority became involved in veterans' politics in general and the paramilitary *Freikorps* in particular. Moreover, the numerically strongest veterans' league was the social democratic Reichsbanner Black-Red-Gold. Although it cultivated a distinct military style, the Reichsbanner was a powerful voice of moderate pacifism, campaigning for international reconciliation between former enemies.[39]

The cultural reverberations and emotional aftershocks of the Great War are the subject of a different strand of the historiography. This school of thought argues that the proliferation of commemorative artefacts and practices were above all reflections of the depth of the trauma of war. This is not to say that one huge community of suffering was created by the losses of the First World War; what mattered was the accumulated presence of death in society, and it is through this fog that individual emotions were mediated. War memorials provided symbolic foci of bereavement that functioned as substitutes for the graves of the missing and the absent dead. Conscription continued in death, as almost all military dead—with the exception of the Tsar's soldiers—were

interred or commemorated in military cemeteries near the former front lines, with the assurance that 'Their name liveth for evermore'.[40]

The promise of eternal memory was the response to life cut short on the battlefield. The history and legacy of the Great War are characterized by a series of contrasts. The war increased exponentially state intervention, not only in all branches of public life but also in the private sphere. At the same time, the conflict unleashed new potentials of civic engagement. Consent in wartime was a matter of both coercion and self-mobilization. Regardless of whether they were volunteers or conscripts, the war catapulted male civilians into a new existence as soldiers; and yet, the majority remained intimately connected to home and their loved ones. To be sure, there was a marked disappearance of cultural constraints on violence, but the experience of brutality often led to a mining of cultural memory for examples of 'chivalry'. Thus, the British buried an Unknown Warrior (rather than a soldier), the French had Joan of Arc canonized, and Germans built war memorials reminiscent of medieval castles in an effort to commemorate the first mass-industrialized war the world had seen. A prevalent sense of historical rupture, of a turning point in history, prompted a search for images and themes which provided historical precedents for an unprecedented human catastrophe. The catastrophe of the Great War continued to impact on people's lives long after the last shot had been fired—until it was overshadowed by an even greater war.

Notes

1. *Gas Shell Bombardment* (HMV 09308, 1918); see P. Martland, *Recording History: The British Record Industry, 1888–1931* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2013), 205–35. I am grateful to Mark Connelly, Pierre Purseigle, and Jan Rüger for their comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
2. J. Winter and B. Baggett, *The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century* (New York: Penguin, 1996), 210.
3. J. Verhey, *The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); J.-J. Becker, *The Great War and the French People* (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1985); A. Gregory, *The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 9–39.
4. J. Winter, J.-L. Robert et al., *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914–1919*, vol. II: *A Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 126–7; J. Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 122–32; H. F. Jahn, *Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
5. H. Berghoff, 'Patriotismus und Geschäftssinn im Krieg: Eine Fallstudie aus der Musikinstrumentenindustrie', in G. Hirschfeld et al. (eds.), *Kriegserfahrungen: Studien zur Sozial—und Mentalitätsgeschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Essen: Klartext, 1997), 262–82.
6. S. Goebel, 'Forging the Industrial Home Front: Iron-Nail Memorials in the Ruhr', in J. Macleod and P. Purseigle (eds.), *Uncovered Fields: Perspectives in First World War Studies* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 159–78.
7. Winter et al., *Capital Cities*, vol. II, 152–62.

8. Cited in ibid., 215.
9. P. James (ed.), *Picture This! World War I Posters and Visual Culture* (Lincoln, NE: Nebraska University Press, 2009); J. Aulich, 'Advertising and the Public in Britain during the First World War', in D. Welch and J. Fox (eds.), *Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and the Modern Age* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 109–28.
10. J. Horne, 'Remobilizing for "Total War": France and Britain, 1917–1918', in J. Horne (ed.), *State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 195–211.
11. D. Welch, *Germany and Propaganda in World War I: Pacifism, Mobilization and Total War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2nd edn, 2014), 204–30; M. Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).
12. N. Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (London: Penguin, 1999), 221; see also J.-J. Becker and G. Krumeich, *La Grande Guerre: Une histoire franco-allemande* (Paris: Tallandier, 2008), 84.
13. M. Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 130–41; Winter et al., *Capital Cities*, vol. II, 177, 295–6.
14. Gregory, *Last Great War*, 101–8; N. F. Gullace, *'The Blood of Our Sons': Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship during the Great War* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); B. J. Davis, *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 74; P. Gatrell, *Russia's First World War: A Social and Economic History* (Harlow: Longman, 2005), 89–90.
15. See also L. H. Haimson and C. Tilly (eds.), *Strikes, Wars, and Revolutions in an International Perspective: Strike Waves in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
16. R. Chickering and S. Förster (eds.), *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); S. Goebel and D. Keene (eds.), *Cities into Battlefields: Metropolitan Scenarios, Experiences and Commemorations of Total War* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).
17. J. G. Fuller, *Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914–1918* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); J. Winter, 'Popular Culture in Wartime Britain', in A. Roshwald and R. Stites (eds.), *European Culture in the Great War: The Arts, Entertainment, and Propaganda, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 330–48; S. Goebel, '"Intimate Pictures": British War Photography from the Western Front', in V. Jakob and S. Sagurna, *Front 14/18: The Great War in 3D* (Steinfurt: Tecklenborg, 2014), 42–55.
18. Healy, *Vienna*, 87–121; Winter et al., *Capital Cities*, vol. II, 143–87.
19. M. Hanna, *Your Death Would Be Mine: Paul and Marie Pireaud in the Great War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); B. Ziemann, *War Experiences in Rural Germany 1914–1923* (Oxford: Berg, 2007), 66–7; A. Reimann, *Der große Krieg der Sprachen: Untersuchungen zur historischen Semantik in Deutschland und England zur Zeit des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Essen: Klartext, 2000); compare M. Roper, *The Secret Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).
20. A. Becker, *War and Faith: The Religious Imagination in France, 1914–1930* (Oxford: Berg, 1998); Winter, *Sites of Memory*, 54–77; M. Connelly, *The Great War, Memory and Ritual: Commemoration in the City and East London, 1916–1939* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2002), 25–35.
21. Cited in L. V. Smith, S. Audoin-Rouzeau, and A. Becker, *France and the Great War, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 105; see M. Connelly, *Steady the*

Buffs! A Regiment, a Region, and the Great War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); R. L. Nelson, *German Soldier Newspapers of the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

22. Cited in M. Healy, 'Local Space and Total War: Enemies in Vienna in the Two World Wars', in Goebel and Keene, *Cities*, 121; Davis, *Home Fires*, 193.
23. Cited in R. Chickering, *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd edn, 2014), 215.
24. A. Watson, *Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 134–5; B. Ziemann, *Contested Commemorations: Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 44–9.
25. *The Times*, 41449, 11 April 1917, 5.
26. R. Bessel, 'Mobilizing German Society for War', in Chickering and Förster, *Great War*, 437–51; G. J. DeGroot, *Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War* (London: Longman, 1996), 92–106; D. Stevenson, *With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918* (London: Penguin, 2012), 350–438.
27. S. R. Grayzel, *Women and the First World War* (Harlow: Longman, 2002); Winter et al., *Capital Cities*, vol. II, 188–234.
28. Cited in S. Goebel, 'Cities', in J. Winter (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, vol. II: *The State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 377; see R. Chickering, *The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 98–111; S. R. Grayzel, *At Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to the Blitz* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
29. A. Becker, *Les cicatrices rouges 14–18: France et Belgique occupées* (Paris: Fayard, 2010); S. de Schaepdrijver, 'Occupation, Propaganda and the Idea of Belgium', in Roshwald and Stites, *European Culture*, 267–94.
30. P. Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); M. von Hagen, *War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007).
31. V. G. Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
32. A. Prost, 'The Dead', in Winter, *Cambridge History*, vol. II, 561–91.
33. J. Winter, J.-L. Robert et al., *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914–1919,* vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); A. Offer, *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).
34. J. Horne and A. Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).
35. J. Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare* (London: Granta, 1999), 182–3, 189.
36. A. Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 62–8; H. Jones, *Violence against Prisoners of War in the First World War: Britain, France and Germany, 1914–1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
37. M. Stibbe, *British Civilian Internees in Germany: The Ruhleben Camp, 1914–18* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008); P. Panayi, *The Enemy in our Midst: Germans in Britain*

during the First World War (Providence, RI: Berg, 1991); E. Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 121–65; D. Bloxham, 'The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy', *Past & Present*, 181 (2003), 141–91; N. Doumanis, *Before the Nation: Muslim-Christian Coexistence and its Destruction in Late Ottoman Anatolia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 131–69.

38. Cited in R. Gerwarth and J. Horne, 'Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War: An Introduction', in R. Gerwarth and J. Horne (eds.), *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15–16; see also P. Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); A. Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923* (London: Routledge, 2001).
39. G. L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); compare Ziemann, *Contested Commemorations*; R. Bessel, *Germany after the First World War* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).
40. J. Winter, 'Commemorating War, 1914–1945', in R. Chickering, D. Showalter, and H. van de Ven (eds.), *The Cambridge History of War*, vol. IV: *War and the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 310–26; S. Goebel, *The Great War and Medieval Memory: War, Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and Germany, 1914–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Further reading

Audoin-Rouzeau, S., and A. Becker, *1914–1918: Understanding the Great War* (London: Profile, 2002).

Beckett I. W. *The Great War 1914–1918* (Harlow: Longman, 2nd edn, 2007).

Chickering R., and S. Förster (eds.), *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Goebel S., and D. Keene (eds.), *Cities into Battlefields: Metropolitan Scenarios, Experiences and Commemorations of Total War* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).

Grayzel S. R., *Women and the First World War* (Harlow: Longman, 2002).

Gregory A., *A War of Peoples 1914–1919* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Hirschfeld G., G. Krumeich, and I. Renz (eds.), *Brill's Encyclopedia of the First World War*, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

Horne J. (ed.), *A Companion to World War I* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

Kramer A., *Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

McMillan J., 'War', in D. Bloxham and R. Gerwarth (eds.), *Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 40–86.

Purseigle P., 'Home Fronts: The Mobilization of Resources for Total War', in R. Chickering, D. Showalter, and H. van de Ven (eds.), *The Cambridge History of War*, vol. IV: *War and the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 257–84.

Strachan H., *The First World War*, vol. I: *To Arms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Winter J. (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
Winter J., and A. Prost, *The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Winter, J., and J. L. Robert (eds.), *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914–1919*, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997–2007).

CHAPTER 3

TOTAL WAR

Family, Community, and Identity during the First World War

TAMMY M. PROCTOR

In his 1925 melodramatic film *Die Freudlose Gasse* (Joyless Street), G. W. Pabst painted a bleak picture of life in post-war Vienna, where the desperate poor wait in endless food queues or prostitute themselves, while the rich and prosperous wallow in corruption and greed.[1] Family ties have not vanished, but they are frayed from the stresses of wartime shortages and the bleakness of a cold hungry winter. Pabst's film, which was based on a post-war novel by Hugo Bettauer, admirably captures the impact of the First World War on ordinary families by highlighting rends in the social fabric. The main action focuses on three motifs: eroding class divisions, topsy-turvy gender roles, and the gap between the destitute and those profiting from their despair. Each of these themes in some way reflects the broader impact of the First World War on ordinary families in Europe.

In the film, two women from different backgrounds face almost identical dilemmas, but each chooses a different path. Grete, the middle-class young typist with a father who has reverted to a childlike dependence, successfully avoids the trap of prostitution with the help of an American aid worker who 'saves' her. Working-class Maria has no such luck, and in trying to escape her abusive, maimed father and downtrodden mother, she trusts the wrong people and ends up both a prostitute and a murderess. Other characters are reminiscent of wartime archetypes: the rich and greedy butcher, the millionaire war profiteers, the madam of a brothel, the morally upright American. In the film, changing gender roles are particularly emphasized. The queues for food are filled with sombre women and children as are the brothel and the respectable workplaces. Many of the patriarchs in the film are scarred, emotionally or physically, and the younger men have adopted a 'live while you can' ethos that has little regard for the ties of family life. The film, heavily censored in Europe and the United States, serves as a moving testament to war's shattering of social norms and certainties.[2]

Certainly not all of Europe faced the bleak prospects of Pabst's Melchior Street, but most people did experience the disruption of family life, a changed gender dynamic,

eroding class lines, new racial divides, and fractured communities as a result of war. As actors in the world's first 'total war', women and men in Europe witnessed a multi-year conflict that changed their relationships to states in profound ways and reshaped assumptions about generation, family roles, and sexuality, beginning a transformation that would continue in the Second World War. While scholars have disagreed about the extent and nature of total war, few dispute that a fundamental restructuring of citizens' lives and relationships occurred as a result of the First World War.

One of the first signs of war to affect life at the communal and familial level was the disruption of work and community patterns. The massive mobilization of manpower throughout European nations led to immediate shortages in agricultural labour for the autumn harvests and created needs for replacement workers in many industries. For example, roughly two-fifths of agricultural labourers in Russia were mobilized along with 10 per cent of the horses, leading to the use of women, youth, and prisoners for planting, harvesting, and maintenance of fields.[3] In Britain, 16,000 women worked as members of the Women's Land Army, often alongside or near more than 30,000 German POWs employed in agricultural work.[4] These substitutions had implications for traditional household work, gendered divisions of labour, and consumption patterns over the course of the war. Poor agricultural yield led to shortages of basic foodstuffs, only exacerbating the problems. In the Ottoman Empire, women tried to bring in crops, often in organized battalions under army supervision, but agricultural production still fell sharply by 1918 to only 60 per cent of its 1914 levels.[5]

Beyond the problem of labour, rural regions faced underproduction of their land or worse, rotting crops in the fields. Galicia had provided up to a third of the grain production for the Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to the war, but its devastation during the Russian occupation and retreat early in the war left the whole zone unable to recover during the war years.[6] Added to these difficulties was the widespread practice of requisitioning nitrate for munitions, which made it difficult to obtain fertilizer, a staple of many farm communities by 1914. Marie Pireaud, a French peasant, highlights all these headaches in her correspondence with her husband. Describing the strain war brought to rural households, Marie complained about the difficulty of finding agricultural labour, fertilizer, fodder, and farm animals. High prices and military requisitioning contributed to the problem, but at least Marie was able to work together with family and friends to bring in a harvest each year of the war, although at great cost. As she told her husband, 'Console yourself it's the same everywhere and how many will there be who will not have enough to live.'[7]

The state's need for war materials led women to flood into munitions, steel, and garment industries, helping to replace men and also to absorb the increased wartime demand for certain goods. Women, who had been barely represented in metalworking occupations in France prior to 1914, made up a quarter of the workers in that industry by 1918; in Britain, employed women in Britain went from just under 6 million to 7.3 million, and much of the rise in numbers can be attributed to wartime munitions industries[8] Germany saw a steady rise in numbers of women employed in munitions, and by 1917 more than 50 per cent of the labour force in armaments was female.[9] In the Julian

Alps (Italy and Slovenia, today), thousands of women even worked as porters, delivering supplies to the men engaged in mountain combat, and in the Ottoman Empire, women built roads.[10] Throughout Europe, women tended to the work of the nation—harvest, policing, clerical work, industry, transport—assisted by children and by men too old to go to war. Gender and age delineated the militarized home in relationship to the combat zones.[11]

Not only were workplaces transformed, but education at all levels was reshaped by war. Universities emptied of men throughout the belligerent nations, and some institutions shut their doors for the duration of the war. The University of Paris saw a drop from 14,000 students to 3,000 students during the first year of the war, and by October 1914, Cambridge enrolment was down by 50 per cent.[12] For younger schoolchildren, destruction of their homes and schools as well as heightened work obligations made it difficult for them to attend classes at all in some areas. Many older children took over childcare duties for absent fathers and mothers who had taken up paid work. Other states enlisted the work of children in formal ways. The Habsburg Empire devised a Pupils' Volunteer Corps, which became a teen work brigade for use in agriculture, transport, and other necessary occupations. Younger children did their war work at school by knitting, rolling cigarettes, or making bandages.[13] Shortages of teachers also exacerbated the problem of effective wartime schooling; in France, roughly 30,000 teachers were mobilized for service.[14] Schools faced requisition for military and municipal requirements, and classrooms became soup kitchens, hospital wards, and billets in support of the war machine. When children did go to school, the wartime curriculum emphasized patriotic service and that militarized many of their exercises. French children learned arithmetic by adding war loan amounts and worked on memorization of the 'Ten Commandments of Victory'.[15] In Germany, children collected scrap for the war effort, foraged for food, and learned about wartime cooking and conservation.[16] The disruptions of schooldays, the need for adolescent labour, and the general social disintegration of structures for youth led to increases in rates of petty crime among young people in many nations. Added to this problem were high rates of sick and underweight children, so states became increasingly concerned about the future of their youth. In Vienna, for instance, officials worried about a new 'generation of war-damaged degenerates' especially since clinics were admitting underweight children and documenting a high incidence of nervous conditions, such as bed-wetting.[17]

Beyond the community stalwarts of work and education, people also lost access to medical personnel, sometimes creating profound psychological and physical trauma. Perhaps the most tragic example of disruption of everyday life is in the impact of war on public health. People of all ages suffered throughout Europe as the war continued because of shortages of soap, housing, and heating fuel. Lack of soap, for instance, meant that clothing and bodies drew lice, and civilian families also had to contend with skin diseases such as scabies and impetigo. In Serbia, a quarter of its trained doctors perished during the war, leaving populations without access to basic medical care.[18] Shortages of medicine and personnel exacerbated a terrible situation in the countryside, where more than 200,000 Serb civilians died from a typhus epidemic in the first

year of the war.[19] Serbia, however, was not alone in shortages of medical caregivers. Leo van Bergen documents the vacuum left by conscription of medical providers in the belligerent nations:

Britain	1 doctor	per 2,350 people
Germany	1 doctor	per 5,800 people
France	1 doctor	per 14,000 people[20]

Such gaps in medical and dental care left populations extremely vulnerable, and the influenza epidemic of 1918 worsened the problem with floods of patients at local clinics.

If new work patterns, educational problems, and lack of basic health care were not difficult enough, families faced separation and grief. The massive casualties of wartime, the hasty interment of bodies at battlefields, poor communication, and reduced access to spiritual counsel (as many clergy also went to war) led to shifts in mourning rituals and religious devotion. The bonds of community that had framed parish life in Christian Europe suffered especially from the conscription of religious leaders and the crisis of authority that their absence brought. In their study of civilians in wartime Europe, Annette Becker and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau note the rise in spirituality in wartime, while also explaining its heterogeneity:

> soldiers and their families revived old forms of devotion, and ancient 'superstitions' arose again among people who were still very close to their rural roots. (This was particularly true of Italy.) A wartime religion developed that included traditional religious services and spiritualism, prayers and amulets, the sufferings of Christ and the intercession of saints, ordinary piety and the belief in supernatural signs.[21]

While often still attending church or chapel, some Europeans turned to objects for comfort, taking solace from the material world. Jay Winter has also documented this rise of popular religious practice, from Italian soldiers carrying sacks of native soil to French amulets for protection to seances aiming to speak with the departed.[22] Such religiosity sustained families separated by war and fearful of death, but it also weakened the authority of many leaders of organized religion. War pitted religious loyalties against political identities, as in the case of Muslims in the British Empire who were torn between imperial allegiance and a call by some religious leaders for support of the Ottomans.

The heightened atmosphere of patriotism, which was rendered as a fervent civic religion, also shifted popular notions of faith. Throughout the belligerent states, myths of personality emerged that valorized military leaders, giving them almost godlike qualities, while memorials to the fallen became new places of worship and reverence. Religious faith could be co-opted by wartime leaders and used to justify military service and acts of violence, as with the German military's use of the phrase *Gott Mit Uns* (God

with us) on army belts and other items. Posters aimed at mobilizing civilians relied heavily on religious imagery to motivate and cajole patriotic participation. In short, wartime destabilized religious identities.

For European Jews, the war brought different kinds of transformation, especially in Poland, Lithuania, and the so-called 'Pale' of Russian settlement. Wartime policies relocated thousands of homes away from the front, while troop occupations and state interventions in other regions destroyed traditional village life. Russian leaders forced nearly half a million Jews to move from the Polish/Russian borderlands into the Russian interior in 1915 alone.[23] While this destruction of Jewish communal life may have opened the door for more secular views of Jewish identity, including Zionism, it also reinforced deeply seated anti-Semitism in post-war states such as the Soviet Union, Poland, and Austria.[24] The violence that Jews experienced during the First World War violated families and villages, leading to post-war immigration to urban areas and sometimes to other countries.

Religious identity was certainly destabilized as a result of war, but so too was ethnic and cultural identity. National minorities in all the belligerent states and their imperial holdings were called to serve their 'nation', leading to the growth of nationalist groups and outspoken dissent. Families who had loosely identified with multinational empires such as the Habsburg or Ottoman embraced new identities based on language and culture as a result of the wartime demands from their multinational states. Rising death tolls and the state's inability to meet the needs of its civilian population for food and shelter strained the loyalties of minority groups. In the Habsburg lands, Czech, Hungarian, and Slovenian nationalist leaders sought to use the state's inadequacy in wartime to build their cases for separate nationhood and self-determination.[25] Other nationalist movements—in Ireland, central Europe, Belgium, and the Middle East—led to revivals of language and culture that had been on the decline. In some areas, disaffected citizens sought to cement ethnic or religious identities by creating separate schools and communities, hardening the lines of division between families in many villages or urban neighbourhoods. At the end of the war, ethnic violence erupted in regions where resources were scarce, leading to civil war, spontaneous violence against minority groups, and state-sponsored population exchanges.

The war also exposed racial divides in many communities or created racial tension with the movement of diverse peoples into European theatres of war. All the belligerent nations used imperial labourers for military work and sometimes for civilian tasks as well, bringing men from North, East, and West Africa, Indochina, China, and India into European communities. In France, for example, more than 300,000 colonial and foreign labourers worked in French civilian industries or for the armed forces during the war, especially in ports, industrial cities, and staging zones near the front.[26] Additionally, more than half a million people from the French Empire donned uniforms to fight in Europe.[27] The arrival of foreign men in Europe led to great fears among officials of racial mixing, and the presence of imperial citizens sparked spontaneous violence in some regions. Europeans, already hyped up by war and nationalist propaganda, expressed a range of curiosity, fear, excitement, and disdain in their interactions with people who

had lived at a distance in the past. As with class, ethnicity, and religion, race served as a line that war exposed.

Wartime shortages of resources and official rationing ignited many of these community divisions, as constituencies sought access to food, fuel, and clothing. Shared sacrifice was an important part of state propaganda, but the reality often fell short. Disputes between urban and rural households could be particularly fierce, given that agricultural communities often had power over the resources that they sold to cities. As the war ground on, these resentments led to food riots, smuggling, theft, and hoarding, all practices that undermined social life and the moral economy. Occupied zones saw especially fierce competition for resources as army requisitioning claimed food, fabric, animals, fuel, and metals from wartime households. Mary Thorp, a British governess in Brussels, described the scene by summer 1918:

> The prices of everything are rising daily: 3 frs 25 now, for an ordinary stick of chocolate, worth a penny formerly. Cherries 15 frs a kilo … Pieces of old india-rubber tyres hidden away from the requisitions are sold very dear for nailing onto boots, already some weeks ago I paid 5 frs for a piece for heels only. Such depression everywhere for want of food, and now train-loads of our new potatoes are being sent to Austria, with 'Aukraine' painted on the waggons, to make believe in Austria they came from there. Here, the alimentation is selling about ½ a kilo of potatoes per person, now & then, & vegetables are hardly seen for sale, when they are, the price is fabulous.[28]

In such conditions, a thriving smuggling economy emerged and arrest records from the war show men, women, and children caught illegally trading butter, potatoes, and leather, among other things.

Army and civilian officials sought to control such behaviours and the black markets springing up throughout Europe by instituting rationing and commissioning the creation of ersatz products, but their efforts were only partly successful, especially by 1918. Many families existed on 'war bread' by 1917, which at its best was a heavy dark bread made with soy, potatoes, and grains other than wheat. Other ersatz products included coffee made from roasted rye (*torréaline*), rutabagas instead of potatoes, and a malted war beer (*Kriegsbier*).[29] Rationing developed as needs arose, but all of Europe had embraced some form of rationing by the last year of the war. The most common products to be controlled were bread, sugar, fats, fuel, soap, and potatoes.

Women were the front-line soldiers in the 'food front,' as civilian Ernst Gläser reported: 'A new front was created. It was held by the women, against an entente of field gendarmes and controllers.'[30] Women waited in interminable queues, then attempted to organize the resources they could find for optimum use. Maureen Healy documented that on any given day in 1917, more than 12 per cent of Vienna's population was standing in shopping queues.[31] Propaganda also targeted women, asking them to conserve, to sacrifice, and to endure. Governments issued war recipe books and published tips in newspapers to help women cope with shortages in basic pantry items. For the most part, women did what their state asked of them, but in the fight to feed their families,

some engaged in illegal trading or smuggling in order to eat. As prices rose, so did black market activities. As Avner Offer has argued, states who failed to provide basics for their citizens 'forced every citizen into breaking the law' in order to live.[32] In cities, working women rioted and protested for food, especially in the large cities suffering from the blockade, such as Berlin. As Belinda Davis has argued, spontaneous riots broke out when prices rose or shortages of basic foodstuffs became acute, with urban women rioting over butter, potatoes, and bread in German cities.[33]

The chaos accompanying wartime brought with it another wartime creation that had profound implications for many families. The First World War witnessed an explosion of war relief organizations that employed voluntary workers throughout Europe and that functioned as surrogate families for war orphans, displaced people, and prisoners, among others. Traditional local welfare agencies found themselves subsumed in broader national or international organizations, and Americans, in particular, staffed these relief and aid agencies during and after the war. Examples of this aid ranged from soup kitchens in Belgium to house-building in northern France. In Germany, English Quaker pacifists partnered with a local organization to relieve the distress of civilian women and children, while diplomats from multiple countries dealt with stranded citizens and refugees in the chaos of war.[34] Once the war ended, these aid agencies expanded considerably, providing meals for schoolchildren throughout Europe under the auspices of the American Relief Administration and other private entities while also contributing to the rebuilding of Europe's physical environment through charitable schemes.

Aid targeted not just the poor, for increasingly the middle classes required relief from distress. In Vienna, for example, a separate system of restaurant relief was organized for the 'better-off' classes in order to spare them from the indignity of queuing up at a public soup kitchen. American relief in occupied Belgium also created a separate branch of 'discrete assistance' for people of means suddenly dislocated by war. In each case, aid workers felt it was important to maintain class divisions in order to retain a sense of social order in the midst of war. Indeed, despite the fact that social class status was in flux during the war, class identities emerged shaken, but intact, from the First World War. In Britain and Germany, the middle classes became more multifaceted in terms of occupational range, but retained their traditional relationship to landed elites and to workers. Germany's industrial leaders, for example, joined forces with socialist and army officials in the aftermath of the 1918 revolution to establish mechanisms (such as collective bargaining) for limiting the reach of the revolution and to sustain the social power of military and industrial elites.[35] In short, while some social mobility emerged during the war, the overwhelming result was maintenance of socio-economic distinctions in many nations.

This did not mean that labour radicalism was absent, and in fact, labour union membership rose throughout Europe. In Britain, it doubled from 1913 to 1920, and in Hungary, unions attracted more than seven times their pre-war numbers.[36] Despite rising numbers, gender continued to play a role in the division of workers in industrial settings. Many women found themselves in categories that excluded them from union membership or higher wages, and male workers fiercely protected their masculine privilege

and the higher wages that accompanied that status. Trade organizations and industries found themselves torn between older understandings of skill and status and the needs of a wartime economy. Amidst these tensions, unions spearheaded industrial actions with a variety of catalysts, from concerns about meagre rations to wage pressures to anti-war stances. Germany witnessed a major increase in work stoppages—from 137 in 1915 to 561 in 1917.[37] It was difficult for workers to unify and gain much traction, especially because of social pressures to support the war effort. For example, one of Germany's largest strikes in January 1918 involved nearly half a million workers, but it was quickly suppressed by police and military units. As punishment for the strikes, thousands of workers were tried or conscripted into penal battalions.[38] Of course, the most severe labour activism helped spark revolutions, such as the cataclysm of the October Revolution in Russia in 1917. The revolution and the long civil war that followed proved catastrophic for ordinary people in Russia, with major physical destruction of property, dislocation of millions, and starvation conditions during the famine of the 1920s.

The aftermath of war continued to disrupt work lives for many citizens of European nations. Strikes and economic instability plagued cities from Italy to France to Germany. Demobilization of millions of soldiers led to women and youth losing their jobs, while men competed for work in a changed post-war political and economic environment. For the middle classes, it is important to note that there was a widespread feeling of instability, especially among the lower middle classes, that would only be exacerbated by post-war hyperinflation in some nations and by the worldwide depression after 1929. Areas that had been occupied or in active military zones often lacked basic equipment and rail links, so it was difficult to restart industry. In Belgium, for instance, some towns had been burned to the ground, and the Germans had stripped towns of vital supplies of metals, wool, draught animals, and other economic necessities.[39] Poland, which suffered some of the same loss of machinery, land, and technology as Belgium, faced a continued conflict into the 1920s. American Chauncey McCormick described conditions in a January 1919 letter home:

> Poland is now at war on four fronts. Northeast the Russian Bolsheviks are attacking, East and Southeast the Ruthenian Bolsheviks, Southwest the Czechs so that railroad and telegraph with Vienna is now cut off. East the Germans are attacking … With the aid of an armoured train I got into Lwow (Lemberg or Leopol) with a carload of condensed milk. The children are literally dying and the town is under constant bombardment. School boys and women are armed and defending the city. It is quite the most awful sight I ever saw.[40]

It is hard to estimate the impact of such conditions on family life, education, and social stability in the short and long term, especially given the losses that these families had already sustained as a result of war.

Loss of loved ones to war also took an enormous toll on family life throughout Europe. Military losses varied considerably across nations, but each belligerent saw enormous decreases in birth rate during the war and demographic decimation of young men. Table 3.1 captures some of the variety and helps highlight the grief blanketing European households by 1918.

Table 3.1 Deaths as a percentage of men mobilized

Nation	Deaths as a percentage of men mobilized
Britain	12%
Bulgaria	22%
France	16%
Germany	15%
Ottomans	27%
Romania	25%
Serbia	37%

Note: Exact numbers are hard to pinpoint, but these are accepted approximations: Stéphane Audoin- Rouzeau and Annette Becker, *14–18: Understanding the Great War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 21; Ian F. W. Beckett, ***The Great War 1914–1918*** (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 310–12.

Another way to think about the enormity of these losses is to consider the deaths among certain groups. Of all German men who were of university age (19–22) in 1914, more than a third died before the armistice.[41] Russia's fighting forces had a daily attrition rate (killed or missing) of 1,459 per day.[42] These mortality rates when combined with high levels of physical and psychological trauma wreaked havoc on family life in Europe.

Beyond the stark impacts of injury and death on families, the conflict of 1914–18 also highlighted new patterns of sexuality and marriage. The wartime crisis allowed states to expand their role in individual and familial life, and governments throughout Europe tried to manage sexuality, childbirth, and domestic life. Women were important to the war effort both as active participants in wartime mobilization (as caretakers and labourers) and as ideological boosts to male mobilization (as those in need of protection). Balancing these two roles, while also reining in women's sexuality and independence, proved a difficult task for social welfare organizations and government officials.

One of the earliest and easiest ways to highlight the need for female and familial support of war was through propaganda. Posters, lecturers, films, and events all spoke of the importance of familial sacrifice—women and children became vital in these public appeals. In one of the best-known British posters, women and children stand in a doorway and watch their soldier/husband/father go to war—the caption says merely 'Women of Britain say—GO!'[43] In France, propaganda also encouraged women to maintain homes and farms while their men were gone, but they were also needed to bolster the courage of their menfolk by sending letters and packages. In fact, women's role

as caretaker and nurturer of men at war was institutionalized by the *marraines de guerre* (war godmothers) scheme, which was begun in January 1915. Women were encouraged to write letters to soldiers who did not have families (or whose families were behind enemy lines) as 'an act of patriotism'.[44] In both the British propaganda and the French godmothers schemes, women were encouraged to play a traditional role at home, waiting and supporting the soldiers at the front.

However, as the war lingered, governments throughout Europe needed women to take active roles in wartime production, both at home and increasingly through auxiliary service in the war and staging zones. Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary all created women's work corps to help replace men at home, in occupied zones, and in combat staging areas. The German example provides a sense of the scope of this work. Roughly 90,000 women worked with Germany as part of a formal army auxiliary organization, while another 17,000 travelled to occupied and staging zones to free up men for combat.[45] Women in these occupations did clerical work, laundry, cooking, and driving, among other things. Although not classified as soldiers, many of the female auxiliaries in Europe wore uniforms and lived in military housing, sometimes further destabilizing gender norms.

The presence of women at and near the fronts presented a great challenge for military planners, who saw the need to provide soldiers with 'diversion' but who also wanted to protect men from disease. Concern about the moral and physical health of the soldier led to efforts to control women's sexuality, through the creation of regulated or sponsored brothels (such as the French *maisons tolerées*) and through mandatory medical inspections of women thought to be involved in prostitution. In the reflections she published in 1916, American Ellen La Motte commented on the contradictory treatment of women in the war zone in Europe:

> There are many women at the Front … there are the Belgian women, who live in the War Zone, for at present there is a little strip of Belgium left, and all the civilians have not been evacuated from the Army Zone. So there are plenty of women, first and last. Better ones for the officers, naturally, just as the officers' mess is of better quality than that of the common soldiers. But always there are plenty of women. Never wives, who mean responsibility, but just women, who only mean distraction and amusement, just as food and wine. So wives are forbidden, because lowering to the morale, but women are winked at, because they cheer and refresh the troops.[46]

La Motte cannot reconcile the regard the men in her hospital have for their wives at home and their obsessive interest in letters, photographs, and news from home with their treatment of women as sex objects at the front. This divide, exposed in agonizing detail with cases of venereal disease, marks the gendered distinctions of wartime between the women representing 'home' and 'family' and the women who, as La Motte notes, function as mere materials of war.

Venereal disease, a serious problem for the armies in the First World War, became something to fight not just at the battle fronts, but at home as well. At the fronts, governments issued prophylactic kits, set up VD 'emergency stations' for men to seek

treatment after sex with a prostitute, and issued harsh penalties (such as loss of pay) for infection. At home, propaganda targeted men in training camps and laws targeted women who transmitted venereal disease to soldiers. An example of such legislation is Britain's Defence of the Realm Act, an ever-expanding series of regulations that marked an unprecedented intervention in the lives of citizens. Beyond regulating such things as pub hours, hiring age, and crop prices, it specifically targeted women as a class and sought to regulate venereal disease by curbing women's sexuality. In its Regulation 40D, the Act allowed compulsory medical examinations of women suspected of having venereal disease; it also criminalized infected women who had sex with soldiers, even if those men were their husbands and even if those same men had infected the women in the first place.[47]

Indeed, while wartime propaganda idealized women as wives waiting at home, countervailing notions of women as morally deviant and suspect, especially in their relations with soldiers, also became a feature of the wartime narrative. Families could serve as both the ideal for which men were fighting and the thing that was being lost through the prolonged war. Men worried about their wives' faithfulness, as in the case of Paul Pireaud, who wrote home to his French wife in 1917, hoping that she had 'not gone off with an American'.[48] This worry about infidelity was particularly true for those living in occupied zones where accusations of collaboration were common. Women who befriended enemy soldiers or who had relationships with them could be subject to physical violence and public shaming. The lines between collaboration and coercion were never clear, however, and rape was unevenly reported in communities that housed large numbers of soldiers. In a commission's investigation of atrocities in Belgium, the report noted that rape cases were 'naturally hidden by the families'.[49] Despite reticence in reporting rape, coercive sexual attacks on women were a feature of all invasions and occupations during the First World War, and in some cases, they may have constituted a deliberate strategy of shaming or destroying family and community identities, as in the case of Ottoman destruction of Armenians.[50]

For families displaced by war, either through the destruction of their homes or because they fled the violence of war, refuge was difficult to find. In Europe, approximately 10 million people became refugees over the course of the war—5.5 million of those were in Russia alone.[51] Romania, which only entered the war in 1916, was quickly occupied, leading to a massive retreat of its citizenry to Moldavia. The resulting overcrowding and chaos led to epidemic disease and grinding poverty for both the refugees and their overwhelmed Moldavian hosts.[52] The long-term impact of dislocation, violence, and homelessness is difficult to document, especially in its disruptive effects on masculine household authority, family cohesion, and daily routine. For some families, they could never go home because their homelands had altered. French and Russian villages disappeared from the map during battles, while more than 1.6 million people in the former Ottoman Empire found themselves forcibly 'exchanged' under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).[53]

Even those relatively protected from the violence and dislocation of war in distant home fronts found their families affected by shifts in marriage and divorce patterns. Jay Winter chronicled some of these changes for Britain and France, and his work serves as an example of some of the demographic changes the war wrought. In France, marriage

patterns shifted to account for wartime losses, with higher marriage rates for widowers and divorced men as well as a trend towards women marrying men who were their own age or younger. Britain, however, saw little change in its marriage patterns into the 1920s except for a tendency for marriage across geographical and social divides. What did change in Britain was a higher rate of divorce by the 1920s.[54] Birth rates also fluctuated as a result of war, with a steep decrease during the war years, followed by increases in the immediate aftermath. Throughout Europe, though, the trend for a falling birth rate continued into the 1920s, especially in industrialized nations such as Germany and Britain.

Conclusion

When the First World War ended in 1918, Europeans began to take stock of the devastation. In some areas such as Poland and Russia, civil war meant that violence and hunger continued, adding to the misery and loss of war. Widespread incidence of tuberculosis required medical intervention in central Europe, while aid organizations rushed sustenance to children in the defeated nations. War orphans, refugees, and people whose countries had disappeared required state help in finding homes and livelihoods. Physical devastation meant rebuilding of agriculture, industry, and housing in many of the areas where combat had occurred. For families, the longed-for reunion with demobilized soldiers could be both joyful and traumatic, especially given the number of men suffering from physical and psychological trauma as a result of war. Throughout Europe, widows were omnipresent; in Germany and France, the war widowed more than 600,000 women in each country.[55] Widows relied on newly created pensions from states, yet they still struggled to survive in the lean post-war years. Children's homes transformed as well. Even conservative estimates from the war count at least 9 million children whose fathers died in the war or soon afterwards from their wounds. Of those men who did return, more than 8 million were disabled for life, and countless others suffered physical and psychological pain in the post-war years.[56] Men returned to wives who had worked in new jobs in the war and to children who did not know them. For many, this new reality of home and workplace called into question their masculinity and led to depression, domestic violence, and other social adjustment issues. Reforming the home became a priority for individuals and governments, and the post-war backlash against independent women was widespread.

In considering the issue of the family and gender in the First World War, the main question that remains difficult to answer is the extent to which family life was mobilized and militarized by war between 1914 and 1918. Did anything really change? Cynthia Enloe argues that all war is organized on the basis of gender and that militarization of the household is a crucial precondition for war, while other scholars see the war as a temporary aberration that disrupted family life and gender norms for the duration of the conflict, but a post-war backlash ensured a return of order.[57] Total war had a specific gendered meaning in the First World War in that it required the participation of men,

women, and children in the maintenance of gendered notions of warriors, nurturers, workers, and patriots. Yet each of these ideals was also questioned and destabilized by war. What is clear is that much of the work of war rests on families, who are expected to maintain households, livelihoods, and emotional ties with men far from their homes. In an essay for an Italian newspaper, Maria Gioia lays bare the dilemma of families, and especially of mothers, in a Europe at war:

> If we were to ask all the mothers of Europe, 'Which should go to combat, you or your son?' the mothers of Europe would answer: 'Take me!' But there is no choice here, the son is called, and he himself says, 'If I don't go they will shoot me!' What is a mother to do? You can come home uninjured from a war, not from an execution. It is not egoism that holds her back, but the concept of a power that cannot be resisted and the terror of aggravating the destiny of a son. […] And while men make war, in the silence and pain perhaps a new harvest of proposals, ideals, and courage is growing.[58]

Notes

1. *Die Freudlose Gasse* (1925). A 2009 DVD produced in Germany and a 1990 VHS Kino International are uncensored versions of the film—most other available prints are heavily censored.
2. For an analysis of the film, especially in regard to gender, see Patrice Petro, *Joyless Streets: Women and Melodramatic Representation in Weimar Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 199–219.
3. Peter Gatrell, *Russia's First World War: A Social and Cultural History* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005), 155–60.
4. Caroline Dakers, *The Countryside at War, 1914–1918* (London: Constable, 1987), 149–53.
5. Şevket Pamuk, 'The Ottoman Economy in World War I', in Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (eds.), *The Economics of World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 120–4.
6. Max-Stephan Schulze, 'Austria-Hungary's Economy in World War I', in Broadberry and Harrison (eds.), *The Economics of World War I*, 92.
7. Quoted in Martha Hanna, *Your Death Would be Mine: Paul and Marie Pireaud in the Great War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 52–3.
8. Laura Lee Downs, *Manufacturing Inequality: Gender Division in the French and British Metalworking Industries, 1914–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 41, and Angela Woollacott, *On Her Their Lives Depend: Munitions Workers in the Great War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), 17.
9. Belinda Davis, *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 176.
10. *Donne nella grande guerra* (Gorizia: Libreria Editrice Goriziana, 2012), 56–7. For the experience of Ottoman women, see Yigit Akin, 'War, Women and the State: The Politics of Sacrifice in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War', *Journal of Women's History*, 26/3 (2014), 12–35.

11. Tammy Proctor, *Civilians in a World at War, 1914–1918* (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 67–72.
12. Martha Hanna, *The Mobilization of Intellect: French Scholars and Writers during the Great War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 70, and 'Cambridge Gone to the War', *The Times*, 26 October 1914, 3.
13. Maureen Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 241–3.
14. Joseph F. Byrnes, *Catholic and French Forever: Religious and National Identity in Modern France* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 168.
15. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, 'Children and the Primary Schools of France, 1914–1918', in John Horne (ed.), *State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 45.
16. Roger Chickering, *The Great War and Urban Life in Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 500–7.
17. Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 249–50.
18. Dragan Živojinović, 'Serbia and Montenegro: The Home Front, 1914–1918', in Béla Király and Nándor F. Dreisziger (eds.), *War and Society in East Central Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 243.
19. Dragolioub Yovanovitch, *Les Effets économiques et sociaux de la guerre en Serbie* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1930), 13, and Leo Van Bergen, *Before My Helpless Sight: Suffering, Dying, and Military Medicine on the Western Front, 1914–1918* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 23–5.
20. Van Bergen, *Before My Helpless Sight*, 24–5.
21. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, *14–18: Understanding the Great War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 114.
22. Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 54–77.
23. Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protections, 1878–1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 71.
24. Joshua A. Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905–1925* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003), 119–24; Aviel Roshwald, 'Jewish Cultural Identity in Eastern and Central Europe during the Great War', in Roshwald and Richard Stites (eds.), *European Culture in the Great War: The Arts, Entertainment, and Propaganda* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 124–5.
25. Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism & the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia & the Middle East, 1914–1923* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 70–90.
26. Tyler Stovall, 'The Color Line behind the Lines: Racial Violence in France during the Great War', *American Historical Review*, 103/3 (June 1998), 741–2.
27. Richard S. Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914–1918* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 2.
28. Mary Thorp, 'Local Gossip and "Side-shows" of the War during the German Occupation of Belgium', 5 July 1918; unpublished diary, Documentariecentrum Ieper, In Flanders Fields Museum, Belgium.
29. Proctor, *Civilians in a World at War,* 88.
30. As quoted in C. Paul Vincent, *The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915–1919* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1985), 21.
31. Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 82.

32. Avner Offer, *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 58–9.
33. Davis, *Home Fires Burning*, 76–92.
34. Proctor, *Civilians in a World at War*, 177–202.
35. For a full discussion of this process, see Gerald D. Feldman, *Army, Industry and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).
36. Ian F. W. Beckett, *The Great War 1914–1918* (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 320–2.
37. Matthew Stibbe, *Germany, 1914–1933: Politics, Society and Culture* (Harlow: Pearson, 2010), 51–3.
38. Stephen Bailey, 'The Berlin Strike of 1918', *Central European History*, 13/2 (June 1980), 158–63.
39. Sophie de Schaepdrijver, *La Belgique et la première guerre mondiale* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2005), 291–3.
40. Chauncey McCormick to Edith McCormick, 19 January 1919; Chauncey McCormick papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, California.
41. Van Bergen, *Before My Helpless Sight*, 409.
42. Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *14–18: Understanding the Great War*, 22.
43. E. J. Kealey (artist) for the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, 1915; Imperial War Museum, Art.IWM PST 2763.
44. Susan R. Grayzel, *Women's Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and France during the First World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 30, and Margaret H. Darrow, *French Women and the First World War* (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 79.
45. Ute Daniel, *Arbeiterfrauen in der Kriegsgesellschaft: Beruf, Familie und Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 91–3.
46. Ellen N. La Motte, *The Backwash of War: The Human Wreckage of the Battlefield as Witnessed by an American Hospital Nurse* (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916), 103–6.
47. Claire A. Culleton, *Working-Class Culture, Women, and Britain, 1914–1921* (London: Macmillan, 2000), 135–8.
48. Hanna, *Your Death Would Be Mine*, 269.
49. John Horne, *German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 196.
50. Alan Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 149–50.
51. Michael Amara, *Des Belges à l'épreuve de l'exil: Les Réfugiés de la première guerre mondiale, France, Grande-Bretagne, Pays-Bas 1914–1918* (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2008), 12.
52. Maria Bucur, 'Women's Stories as Sites of Memory: Gender and Remembering Romania's World Wars', in Nancy M. Wingfield and Maria Bucur (eds.), *Gender & War in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 173.
53. Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger: The Mass Expulsions That Forged Modern Greece and Turkey* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 12–14.
54. J. M. Winter, *The Great War and the British People* (London: Macmillan, 1985), 250–64.
55. Erika Kuhlman, *Of Little Comfort: War Widows, Fallen Soldiers, and the Remaking of the Nation after the Great War* (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 3.
56. Van Bergen, *Before My Helpless Sight*, 493.

57. Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarisation of Women's Lives* (London: South End Press, 1983), and Mary Louise Roberts, *Civilization without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917–1927* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994).
58. Maria Gioia in Margaret Higonnet (ed.), *Lines of Fire: Women Writers of World War I* (New York: Plume, 1999), 55.

CHAPTER 4

THE LEFT AND THE REVOLUTIONS

DAVID PRIESTLAND

In March 1918, Thomas Mann, a writer who had shown no previous sympathy with the Left, wrote in his diary:

> Rise up against the demagogical bourgeois! A national uprising … even in the form of communism … I am perfectly willing to take to the streets and yell 'Down with the lie of western democracy! Long live Germany and Russia! Long live communism!'[1]

Yet Mann's enthusiasm for communism was to be short-lived. In January 1919, he returned to his wartime nationalist conservatism, voting for the Bavarian Deutsche Volkspartei, and by the early 1920s he had embraced a pro-American liberalism, even joining the Munich branch of the Rotary Club in 1928.[2]

Thomas Mann's politics were notoriously volatile (and some would say unserious), but they show how far politics had been radicalized during and immediately after the First World War. Soviet governments were established in Petrograd/St Petersburg and other parts of the Russian Empire following the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917; in October–November 1918 the German and Austro-Hungarian empires collapsed amidst the formation of workers' and soldiers' councils; and in 1919–20 Europe saw a renewed radicalization, with Soviet republics proclaimed in Hungary, Bavaria, and Slovakia (of which Béla Kun's Hungarian regime was the only one to succeed in taking power for a significant length of time). Meanwhile in Italy the years 1919–20 came to be known as the *biennio rosso* and Spain experienced its *Trienio Bolchevique* between 1918 and 1920.

This radicalization had a permanent effect on the European—and indeed global—Left. After a period of socialist consolidation before the First World War, when the Marxist Second International became increasingly dominant and the main alternative—anarchism—more marginal, Marxism split between the more radical, pro-Soviet 'Communists' and the 'Social Democrats', formalized with the foundation of the Third Communist International (Comintern) in March 1919. And all of these political

upheavals coincided with much broader labour unrest, with strikes reaching a peak between 1918 and 1925.[3]

Mann's trajectory from communist sympathizer in 1918 to enthusiastic liberal in the 1920s also captures broader political and economic trends. Communist success was short-lived, reaching its high point in the summer of 1920 as the Red Army marched on Warsaw, and meeting its first serious defeats with the Soviet–Polish armistice and the end of the Milanese council movement in October. As the revolutionary tide turned, it soon became clear that the USSR would be the only surviving Communist regime in Europe, and in March 1921, even the Soviets made significant concessions to the market with its 'New Economic Policy'. Attempted Communist revolutions in Bulgaria (September 1923), Hamburg (October 1923), and Tallinn (December 1924) all failed dismally, and by the mid-1920s European elites had (temporarily) 'stabilized' capitalism, whether under liberal or authoritarian regimes.[4] And all of this was achieved with the help of loans from American international banks, and under the aegis of an (admittedly partial and unstable) American international hegemony.

Yet how far do the contingent causes and superficial nature of Mann's temporary conversion to communism reflect the reality of this radical era? This question lies at the centre of historiographical debate. During the early Cold War, a dominant liberal interpretation embraced a narrative that mirrored Mann's trajectory: the leftward turn of the era was temporary, and the result of the unusual circumstances of war, rather than a reflection of deep structural tensions within European societies. So, for Cold War liberal historians of Russia, had it not been for the war, the Tsarist regime would have survived, and had leaders such as the moderate socialist Alexander Kerensky acted more decisively in the summer and autumn of 1917, the Bolsheviks would not have won what was effectively a *coup d'état*, staged by a well-organized, ideologically driven minority.[5] The Cold War liberal view of the German revolutions was slightly different: here historians were eager to stress the power of Bolshevism rather than its accidental nature, thus allowing them to justify the decision of the Social Democrat leader Friedrich Ebert to ally with conservative military forces to suppress the council movement. However, they were still more interested in high politics and the activities of revolutionary vanguards than in the views of workers themselves and the nature of their tensions with other classes.[6]

This liberal view was challenged from the late 1950s, in the German case, and the 1970s, in the Russian one, when more left-leaning, so-called 'revisionist' historians adopted a newly fashionable social history approach, and sought the roots of the revolutionary movement in long-established working-class politics. In the case of Russia, the Bolshevik victory was seen less as the triumph of an ideologically driven vanguard than as the culmination of deep social tensions between privileged and non-privileged social groups, in the context of a highly repressive political system.[7] Meanwhile, German historians subjected the council movement of 1918–20 to detailed scrutiny, and found that, far from being an instrument of Bolshevization, it initially reflected the relatively moderate democratic socialist politics of German workers and soldiers, becoming more radical in 1919 as they became angry that their demands were not being met.[8] By redirecting

attention from ideology to working-class politics and interests, these historians were, if not exactly legitimizing, then at least explaining the revolutions as the result of deep-rooted processes, not wartime chaos and Bolshevik manipulation.

The social historians effectively won the debates of the 1960s–80s, and now even liberal historians generally accept that revolutionary impulses were genuine and came largely from below.[9] However, since the 1980s, historiographical trends have swung back in a more liberal direction—as one would expect given Western intellectuals' loss of faith in Marxism and working classes, their preference for contingency over 'grand narratives' involving the rise of classes or the progress of democracy, and their distaste for the militaristic style of politics adopted by the radical (and even Social Democratic) interwar Left.

So, recent historical work has shown little interest in working-class movements; as Antoine Prost has recently pointed out, 'workers have vanished from the landscape of the Great War', and there has been no book-length study of the working-class and labour movements for a generation.[10] As was the case with the Cold War liberal historians, it is the war rather than class and social conflict that lies at the centre of historiographical attention.

However, the new historiography of the central European revolutions differs from the old liberal one in its willingness to accept the importance of revolutionary politics—although this is more frequently seen through the lens of culture rather than socio-economic interests, and especially the militaristic culture engendered by war. George Mosse's influential *Fallen Soldiers* (1990) posited a 'brutalization' of European politics caused by war, while in 1989 Michael Geyer used the concept of wartime 'militarization' to explain the violently revolutionary politics of the interwar era, both on the left and on the right.[11]

In the Russian case, historians have tended to use the concept of militarization to depart even more substantially from the social history paradigm, by stressing the importance of state, nation, and ethnicity rather than class. Probably the most significant work on the Russian Revolution since 1989, Peter Holquist's *Making War, Forging Revolution* (2002), sees the revolutions of 1917 as just one stage in a 'continuum' of wartime crisis that lasted from 1914 and 1921, and focuses on the ultra-coercive 'state practices—many developed in the wake of the First World War', rather than 'the mobilization of social groups'.[12] Joshua Sanborn has gone further, viewing the revolution and the subsequent Bolshevik regime through the prism of the state's efforts to create a militarized national identity.[13]

In a recent essay on the relationship between war and revolutions, Richard Bessel has summed up what we might call this dominant 'culturalist liberal' trend in the literature, arguing, against both Cold War liberals and social historians, that it is not so much the 'ideologies and activities of self-proclaimed revolutionaries' that explain the revolutions of the period but rather 'contingency, as much if not more than ideology, made possible the revolutionary transformations … and it was war that framed contingency'. For 'Europe on the eve of the First World War appears at least in hindsight to have been remarkably stable'. Bessel agrees with Geyer that crucial was the '*Zivilisationsbruch*, the rupture in civility' produced by the war; 'the general history of the twentieth century in Europe is the history of the aftershocks of World War I. It is the history of the trauma inflicted by fighting.'[14]

In some ways, this new culturalist liberal approach improves on both the Cold War liberal and the social history historiographies. Unlike the former, it accepts the significance of revolutionary culture, avoiding an unconvincing and politicized stress on the role of Bolshevik ideology and malcontents-cum-troublemakers. And unlike the latter, it escapes national boundaries, giving due weight to the international and transnational forces, which strengthened the radical Left throughout Europe, and indeed beyond; it explores the important role of nationalism and ethnic conflict in the revolutionary era, and not just class issues; it 'brings the state back in'; and it avoids a tendency to neglect the role of the war and its varying effects, including the vital importance of defeat and imperial collapse in radicalizing politics.

However, this approach also has its drawbacks. The counterposing of 'civility' to revolutionary violence gives this historiography a peculiarly moralizing rather than a genuinely analytical character; indeed, culturalist liberal histories can become morality tales about the evil consequences of any political radicalism. More generally, an overemphasis on contingency, the war, and the state, and a neglect of the social forces in the countries involved, makes it difficult to explain Europe's revolutionary era satisfactorily. Firstly we need to distinguish between the outbreak of revolutions and their course and consequences: while war undoubtedly played a crucial role in the outbreak of the revolutions (and it is indeed reasonable to make the counterfactual argument that had war not broken out these revolutions would probably not have happened), if we are to understand revolutionary processes, outcomes, and legacies we also need to look at the role of the social forces which war unleashed. And secondly, we need to understand well-established social structures and long-standing social tensions—as well as war and its effects—if we are to explore the differences between the revolutions of the period and explain why, for instance, British and French elites were much less threatened by the revolutionary challenges than their German or Austro-Hungarian counterparts. As Robert Gerwarth has argued in his critique of the 'brutalization' and 'militarization of politics' literature, excessive focus on the war prevents us from explaining why some combatant powers experienced a much more revolutionary politics than others after the First World War.[15] A broader perspective is similarly needed if we are to understand the differences in the longer-term effects of the revolutions and the varying positions of the Left.

Beyond Liberal and Social Histories: The Crisis of Domestic and International Hierarchies

We therefore need to integrate the insights of social history, and indeed of (unfashionable) historical sociology, with the currently dominant culturalist liberal approach if we are to gain a better understanding of the revolutionary period. But we need to move beyond them both, in two ways: firstly we need to combine the social historians' interest

in long-term forces with the liberal historians' emphasis on contingency and the war itself. And secondly, when analysing the longer-term factors, we need to place the period in a broad framework—one that is conceptually closer to the social historians' approach, in accepting the importance of challenges to established hierarchies in the period, but also one that extends this analysis to the areas of international and ethnic conflict stressed by liberal historians, by exploring the role of changing geopolitical and ethnic hierarchies, as well as social ones.

On the first question, war did indeed have a similar radicalizing effect on all belligerent countries, as liberal historians argue, largely because it forced the state to engage in the mass mobilization of workers and peasants who had previously not been given full political rights and had a disadvantaged position in the economic system. Its interventions in the economy and demand for sacrifices, both on the front and at the rear, naturally undermined liberal arguments that rewards should be left to the market, and fuelled workers' expectations that the state would give them political rights and economic benefits in return for their suffering. When they failed to receive what they believed was their due, the state was faced with angry popular groups, trained in war and sometimes armed. And defeated powers were particularly vulnerable to revolutionary assault from below. Moreover, revolutionaries were further encouraged by the October Revolution and the establishment of the Comintern.

However, while war may have strengthened the Left everywhere, outcomes were very different, in large part because the nature and composition of states and classes, and the relations between them, differed enormously; and here the insights of social history come into their own. The Left became a major political force in the later nineteenth century for two reasons in particular: states were gaining more powers over their populations at the same time as industrial working classes were emerging; socialism therefore understandably became popular as an ideology that justified the incorporation of these subaltern social groups into the increasingly important political realm on more equal foundations than both aristocratic and middle-class groups were prepared to allow. However, societies differed in a number of areas—in particular in the nature of states, the social groups that dominated them, and the strength and degree of unity or fragmentation of all social groups. Inevitably, therefore, privileged groups adopted different strategies towards subalterns—both workers and peasants—and subalterns themselves embraced different strategies and ideologies (both socialist and non-socialist).

Variations between societies and subaltern ideologies are of course many and complex, but some generalization is possible. When it comes to the question of how subalterns were to be integrated into the political system, the historical sociologist Gregory Luebbert provided a useful model for western Europe. In 'liberal' societies, like Britain, France, and Switzerland, working-class movements were 'inextricably entwined in interclass coalitions with politically hegemonic liberal movements';[16] this reformist 'Lib-Labism' (as it was termed in Britain) was remarkably effective in undermining the development of working-class consciousness and defusing socialist radicalism, not just before but also after the war. In 'aliberal' societies, in contrast, liberals, while playing a major role in politics, were weaker (largely because of fissures of various types—often

religious, ethnic, or regional—within the middle classes), and were therefore more defensive and much less willing to make concessions to workers. This in turn encouraged the creation of autonomous working-class organizations and socialist parties that adopted a more radical politics. It was therefore predictable that they would be much more vulnerable to the post-war revolutionary wave than liberal societies.[17]

The social differences analysed by Luebbert, however, were only partially reflected in the ideologies prevalent in socialist movements. We can identify three major socialist ideological traditions in the international socialist movement: a reformist one, dominant in Britain and Ireland; a Marxist one, which stressed the importance of centralized working-class organization, centred on Germany and influential in much of northern, central, and eastern Europe; and an anarchistic and syndicalist one, which had some purchase in France, southern Europe, and the Russian Empire, and whose decentralized vision was more popular among small producers, some skilled workers, and peasants.[18] In some cases, ideology accorded with social structural conditions—for instance a reformist socialism was more dominant in liberal Britain. But elsewhere, ideology and social structure were less in accord, and history and culture played more of a role in the evolution of socialism. So France's long and complex revolutionary traditions left it with a socialist movement divided between Marxists and anarcho-syndicalists, even though the relations between workers and the state fitted a more liberal pattern.

Also, the popularity of Marxism often reflected the prestige of the formally Marxist German Social Democratic Party and the Second International which it dominated, rather than indicating a coherent ideological direction. While left liberalism and anarcho-syndicalism were clearly of the right and the left of the socialist movement respectively, Marxism—with its acceptance of the need for central state power and its hostility to 'utopian socialism'—was much more flexible as an ideology, and could mask major differences between reformism and a radical rejection of the existing order. So, before the First World War, Swiss and Belgian socialists formally adopted Marxism but in practice pursued a highly reformist politics, while at the other end of the spectrum Russian socialists, both Bolshevik and Menshevik, responded to state repression by advocating a radical, rejectionist Marxism.[19] Engels and Kautsky's German Social Democratic Party, meanwhile, claimed to represent the orthodox 'centre' of Marxism, but was increasingly divided between a reformist majority and a radical minority.

As Luebbert argues, western and some central European societies can be seen on a spectrum from liberal to aliberal, with Britain and France at one end, and Germany, Italy, and Spain at the other. However, as he also admits, this does not apply to eastern Europe (or to parts of the Russian Empire), and we need to analyse these countries differently. The less economically developed 'peripheries' of the Habsburg and Russian empires in eastern Europe and the Caucasus differed from both liberal and aliberal societies in that they were much less socially integrated, and were still often influenced by 'estate' (Russian: *soslovie*) systems which divided society into status groups that often combined class and ethnicity. Indeed, it makes sense to call these 'segmented' societies. So peasants (Poles in Poland, Georgians in Georgia) would be of a different ethnicity from middle classes, who in turn were often ethnically divided between bureaucrats and

professionals on the one hand and businesspeople on the other—much of the economy was owned by foreigners or ethnic minorities (Germans and Jews in Poland, Hungary, and Romania; Armenians, Greeks, and Jews in the Balkans and the Caucasus). This meant that rulers and state bureaucracies were more divorced from lower-status groups, and were more willing and able to use authoritarian methods of rule, while liberal forces were very much more fragmented and weaker than in aliberal states. At the same time, however, there were few threats from below, as these societies were largely agrarian: their working classes were small and peasantries less mobilized. Revolutionary politics, both worker and peasant, did emerge in some cities and regions—often in a more radical form than elsewhere—but the post-imperial politics of ethnicity and nation were often more influential, as was the revolutionary role of the USSR and the Red Army.

However, the core of the Russian Empire (as well as parts of the periphery) has to be placed in a different category. It is best seen as a hybrid of the segmented and the aliberal type: it combined a culturally distinct military-aristocratic state, a weak liberalism, and a divided middle class—all typical of segmented eastern Europe—with a large, relatively homogeneous mobilizable working class (in some regions), more typical of aliberal societies, together with an unusually radical and mobilizable peasantry. Given these political and social preconditions, it was no surprise that it was Russia that would be particularly vulnerable to a worker and peasant revolution, and that, as Lenin wrote, it should turn out to be the 'weakest link' in the chain of the world order.

An expanded historical sociological or social-history approach, combined with a recognition of the importance of contingency and the war, can therefore provide convincing insights into the changing fortunes of the Left. But at the same time it is clear that we need to accept recent historiographical trends and expand our vision beyond national boundaries. The war was a conflict that upset international hierarchies—imperial, national, and ethnic—as well as domestic social and ethnic ones. And this issue had a major impact on the Left—indeed the split between communism and social democracy during the First World War had its origins in disagreements over war, nationalism, and imperialism. The reformist Social Democratic Left could embrace a nationalism that integrated all classes, and even elements of imperialism.[20] However, when questions of ethnic relations overshadowed those of class, it could find it difficult to compete with right-wing liberals and radical nationalists; meanwhile, they were seriously damaged when their support for the state's war aims was discredited by defeat. Conversely, the Communists could benefit from their purist opposition to war and imperialism when old imperialist elites were delegitimized as a result of defeat. However, after the war they were vulnerable to the charge that their support for divisive class struggle was sabotaging post-imperial governments' efforts to forge national unity.

The war's reordering of international hierarchies therefore had varying effects on the fate of the Left, often intensifying the socio-economic forces discussed above, depending on war's outcomes. In all combatant countries, disillusionment with an apparently unwinnable war and the imperialistic and nationalistic ideologies that propelled it strengthened the radical Left, while damaging moderate socialists and other strong supporters of war efforts. And when imperialistic elites were defeated, as in the great

European multi-ethnic land-based empires—the Russian, the Austro-Hungarian, and the German—the tensions created by an aliberal politics were reinforced. In France and Britain, in contrast, the victory and the maintenance—even expansion—of empire after 1918 weakened the radical Left; and the emergence of a powerful anti-imperialist nationalism and the salience of ethnic politics in the successor states of eastern Europe undermined a radical Left already weakened by the socio-economic conditions of these segmented societies.

The War, the Left, and the Rise of Corporatism

Total war made unprecedented demands of all combatant states: they had to find millions of people to fight and work in weapons factories, and to ensure that both armies and civilians were supplied with food. However, at first it appeared that they would succeed in their efforts, because they could count on either popular acquiescence or actual support—including from the Left. Most socialists in parties of the Marxist Second International abandoned their erstwhile internationalism and supported the war, partly out of electoral considerations, but also partly because it accorded with their increasing acceptance of the liberal capitalist status quo, their belief in class compromise, and their desire to be seen as loyal patriots.[21] Numbers of strikes also fell, even in Russia.[22] It seemed that war was repairing the social and political fissures that had so scarred pre-war nations and empires.

Some socialists did oppose the war, but they were a minority, and tended to be those on the left of the Marxist movement who rejected the 'orthodox' reformists. The Swiss resort of Zimmerwald hosted a meeting of the anti-war Left in September 1915; the group then reconvened in Kienthal in April 1916, and this was to become the core of the future international Communist movement. But it was the more radical socialists from agrarian eastern European societies that dominated the meetings—from Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Russian Empire (Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, the peasant-based Social Revolutionaries, the Jewish Bund, the Polish and Lithuanian SDKPiL, and Polish elements within the German Social Democrats). The Italian socialists, radicalized in part by pre-war opposition to the 1911–12 invasion of Libya, were the only large western European party to attend (though they were also joined by the Portuguese).[23]

However, as the war dragged on, pre-war social and political divisions reopened. Food shortages and a gradual fall in working-class living standards led to strikes and demonstrations, as did the major changes which the war brought to the organization of work. Women and younger, less skilled workers were drafted in to expand the munitions workforce and replace workers sent to the front, while efforts were made to speed up mass production; the result was a mechanization and 'deskilling' of work that challenged

the privileges of skilled workers. At the same time, working hours were increased—in Italy they reached sixteen hours a day.[24]

All of this exacerbated social and political tensions—in Germany the summer of 1916 saw particularly serious unrest—and in both liberal and aliberal countries governments were forced to abandon their previous reluctance to act as economic regulators and establish corporatist systems which gave representation to workers and significant rights to trade unions. In January 1917, the French socialist minister of munitions, Albert Thomas, banned strikes but created commissions made up of employers and workers to arbitrate labour conflicts. Meanwhile, in Germany the Auxiliary Service Law of December 1916 established powerful elected workers' committees in firms with over fifty employees, in exchange for limiting worker freedoms to change jobs and making service compulsory.[25] In Italy trade unions participated in the committees of industrial mobilization, and British trade unions similarly became close participants in the mobilization effort. In return, states often forced employers to raise workers' wages.[26]

The socialist and trade unionist establishments welcomed these new collaborative arrangements, hoping that they would become the model of a new post-war order. Lingering mistrust of the state gradually dissolved—Italy's General Confederation of Labour (CGIL), for instance, replaced its old anarchist programme with a more reformist socialist one in May 1917, and the British Labour Party endorsed a policy of state nationalization.[27]

However, the price of this collaboration was an increasing alienation between reformist socialists and trade unions on the one side, and rank-and-file workers on the other—and especially those new unskilled workers who were not well integrated into trade union organizations. As living conditions deteriorated, especially during the bad winter of 1916–17 in France and Germany, workers became less willing to follow their representatives, and spontaneous strikes organized by workers' committees and shop stewards broke out. Yet there were also non-economic reasons for the breakdown of collaborative arrangements between the state and labour: events in Russia, which provided an example of how workers could take power into their own hands and effect major political change.

The Chain Breaks: Russia 1917

In most regions with significant levels of industrialization, including parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Austria and the Czech lands), states gave in to worker unrest and partially integrated them into the political system by developing corporatist arrangements. However, the Russian Empire was much more resistant, even though a large industrial proletariat had emerged in some regions, and especially in St Petersburg and Moscow. For the Tsarist autocracy remained wedded to an ideology that stressed inequality and difference: it conceived of a hierarchy of separate occupational and ethnic

groups, each of which knew their place in the social order, had limited or non-existent rights to participate in political life, and accepted the autocratic authority of the Tsar at the summit. This conservative ideology accorded with the segmented social system that had prevailed in the past, and still existed to some extent: at the turn of the century, an ethnically Russian aristocratic and military bureaucracy ruled; a third of all technical specialists in industry and a tenth of all administrative personnel were foreign subjects—most of them Germans;[28] the peasant 'estate' had inferior legal rights and their rights of movement were restricted; Jews were subject to harsh restrictions on residence and movement; and workers were not even recognized as an 'estate', and were banned from organizing trade unions.

This social system was being eroded by social and economic change, but conservatives, and the Tsar himself, were determined to maintain it and the hierarchical ideology that underpinned it. Yet the war posed a serious challenge to both system and ideology, because it demanded that the state mobilize the whole nation, irrespective of social and ethnic status. Meanwhile, worker resentment at the hardships and sacrifices of war, common in all combatant countries, were exacerbated both by the state's repressiveness and reluctance to accept any worker organization, and by the cultural separation between privileged social groups and the mass of the people. This division was much starker in segmented Russia than it was in the more integrated aliberal societies of western and central Europe, and a long-established sense of difference between the propertied or 'census' classes (*tsenzovoe obshchestvo*) and the ordinary people (the *demokratiia*) increasingly became inflected with Marxist and left-wing populist language, which referred to a 'bourgeois' (*burzhui*) elite. The perception of a privileged caste cut off from ordinary people could also take on an ethnic colouring—a phenomenon exacerbated by the war. Riots against foreign (largely German) businesses and technicians took place in Moscow in 1915, and the Tsar himself was seriously damaged by the German origins of his influential wife, Alexandra, and the widespread view that the regime was unpatriotic.[29]

The war initially strengthened reformers within the Tsarist administration, who accepted that the regime had to collaborate with social organizations outside the state in the interests of a unified national mobilization. So, the Union of Zemstvos (local councils) and the Union of Towns were central to military supply, and the War Industries Committees (WICs), established by liberal industrialists, sought to create the type of corporatist arrangements prevailing in Germany, France, and Britain. The WICs even included 'workers' groups', elected by workforces in major cities, and the only legal organization of labour activists in Russia.[30]

However, many Tsarist officials, and the Tsar himself, were not reconciled to the loss of political control this power-sharing inevitably brought. And as in aliberal societies, conservatives in the state found support among significant elements of the middle classes (and especially industrialists) who were unhappy with concessions to subalterns. By November 1916, the experiment in corporatism had broken down, as the WIC workers' groups reacted to state intransigence and employer resistance by organizing political strikes and demonstrations.

Yet it was not just workers who were being radicalized; the peasantry was also becoming a threat to the regime. The particular way in which the regime had emancipated the serfs in 1861 had left peasants without the gentry land they believed was theirs, while ensuring the continuing existence of the traditional peasant commune (*mir*)—an organization which became a powerful focus of resistance to the state. Therefore in contrast with most peasants in liberal and many aliberal countries, where the land reform question had been resolved (often by creating a large propertied smallholder class with an interest in the political status quo), the vast majority of Russian peasants could be mobilized by the Left; and unlike most peasants in segmented societies, they had organizations that could mobilize them effectively. Tensions between peasants and the regime were only exacerbated by the war, as the army was largely peasant in origin, and the state was forcing peasants to sell their grain at below-market prices in order to supply troops and starving workers. Peasant resentment at a war they felt was being pursued by fundamentally alien elites for imperialistic purposes they had little commitment to, combined with a string of military defeats, contributed to a collapse in military discipline.

The culmination of these tensions came in February 1917, when food shortages sparked strikes and demonstrations in Petrograd/St Petersburg. Harsh repression followed, leading to mutiny among the large number of soldiers stationed in the capital, who were then joined by other social groups demanding food, an end to the war, and the overthrow of the monarchy.

The Tsarist regime collapsed remarkably quickly, and liberals stepped in, seeking to create a corporatist system under the control of propertied elites, similar to that prevailing in other combatant countries, in order to continue the war. However, the sharp divisions in Russian society did not allow them to succeed. The outcome was 'dual power'—rule by both liberals in the Duma (parliament) and by the 'soviets'—councils of workers and soldiers, which had a much more redistributive and egalitarian agenda and were dominated by socialists.

Initially it looked as if compromise between these two organizations, and the social forces they represented, might be possible. The liberal Provisional Government of Prince Lvov collaborated with 'moderate' socialists in the soviet (Mensheviks and Right Social Revolutionaries), who, like 'orthodox' Marxists in central Europe, believed that the time was not ripe for a revolutionary, proletarian regime. The government arbitrated between employers and workers, and while it continued the war, it acceded to soldiers' demands that the harsh disciplinary regime that prevailed in the army be ended. But the fundamental problems that caused the February Revolution—the inability of the economy to sustain the war, the mutual mistrust between the propertied classes and the *demokratiia* over industrial relations and land reform, the willingness of confident and well-organized workers, soldiers, and peasants to confront the authorities, and the gap between propertied elites' imperialistic war aims and the rejection of those objectives by many ordinary people—remained.

Popular unrest and political crisis in July led to a new coalition government, dominated by moderate socialists under Alexander Kerensky, who made a final attempt to forge stability using moderate leftist solutions of class compromise and limited

nationalist (rather than imperialistic) war aims. But they failed to change the situation. And a disastrous military offensive, followed by an attempt by the army high command to reverse the democratization of the army, and of society more generally, discredited the moderate socialists. The radical Bolsheviks benefited from the shift in opinion, and in October pressed their advantage, ending Russia's experiment with liberalism.

The Bolsheviks immediately declared their intention to end the war (achieved in March 1918) and to redistribute land to the peasantry, but that did not resolve the problem of how to reconcile popular demands for higher living standards and more democratic control with the need to run an economy at a time of crisis—a crisis that continued with the outbreak of civil war in May 1918. In 1917 the Bolshevik programme combined the promise of worker democracy with a willingness to use a powerful state to overcome the crisis, a tension which they sought to overcome with the concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'—meaning the dictatorial rule of a whole class. In practice, this became the dictatorship of the Bolshevik party in the name of the proletariat, while the soviets and factory committees withered. However, looked at another way, the Bolsheviks succeeded (for a time) where the Tsar and the Provisional Government had failed, in establishing a form of corporatism to fight a (civil) war: the 'war communism' of the era combined the authoritarian militarization of labour with elements of worker representation in factory management. And given the long-term social divisions that affected Russia, it was more likely that a leftist regime hostile to the propertied classes would achieve this, especially as it could secure the support of many peasants who were crucial in helping them win the civil war. Indeed, the Bolsheviks even began to forge a new 'class-based' neo-imperialism, based on the (untheorized) notion of a vanguard Russian working class and peasant 'people' leading the world's oppressed towards socialism, an ideology that became more developed and explicit in the Stalin era.[31]

Yet the domestic policies pursued by the Bolsheviks were less important for the European Left than the symbolism of both Russian revolutions. For they showed workers, soldiers, and peasants everywhere that people in a similar position could destroy the state that was demanding such sacrifices for a war they were rapidly losing faith in, and replace it with an alternative—a participatory council form of democracy. This was a message energetically promoted by the Bolsheviks themselves, determined as they were that the breaking of the weakest link should destroy the whole chain. By the time the Central Powers collapsed, in October 1918, workers and the radical Left were emboldened to challenge not only their governments, but also the moderate Left that had supported them, and the revolution spread westwards.

The Revolutionary Wave

At the end of 1918, both the Bolsheviks and their enemies were convinced that the time was ripe for world revolution. The war had created similar conditions in the industrial centres and on the fronts of several belligerent countries, and workers and

soldiers were responding in similar ways—calling for an end to the war, organizing mass strikes, creating democratically elected councils and committees, joining mass trade unions, and demanding a programme more radical than that advocated by established socialist parties and trade unions. This radicalism continued after the war, and workers' confidence was intensified by the brief post-war economic boom, created by governments' inflationary policies, industry's conversion to peacetime production, and consumer demand.[32] However, the fate of radical forces varied enormously across societies.

The revolutionary wave had most impact in aliberal societies—largely those in which the state had been defeated (Germany and parts of Austria-Hungary), or felt cheated by the outcome of the war (Italy). Traditionally poor relations between states and labour movements, even if temporarily alleviated by wartime corporatism, were combined with a major crisis of the failed imperialistic *ancien régime* and the moderate socialists who had collaborated with them. This naturally discredited established trade unions and moderate socialists among workers, but it also led many intellectuals to see in the radical Left the only morally uncompromised force in politics. As the Viennese satirist Karl Kraus—by no means a communist—wrote, 'may God at least preserve [communism] for us as a never-ending menace to those people who own big estates and who, in order to hang onto them, are prepared to despatch humanity into battle, to abandon it to starvation for the sake of patriotic honour'.[33]

These central and southern European workers' revolutions shared several features with both their Russian counterparts of February and October 1917. Firstly, they were founded on spontaneous, grass-roots activity and workers' councils, rather than organized political parties and trade unions, though they certainly forged alliances with radical socialist forces—in Germany the Independent Socialists (USPD) and the Communist KPD, founded in December 1918, and in Italy the socialist PSI, which aligned itself with the Comintern. And secondly, the vision of many, like that of the soviets and unlike that of most pre-1914 non-anarchist socialist parties, was founded not on improving capitalism and liberal democratic institutions, but on a combination of workers' control, public ownership, and direct, participatory workers' democracy. The degree of their radicalism varied: some councils worked alongside existing state institutions, and others challenged them more fundamentally. Also, the councils' radicalism varied over time: in Germany, the councils (*Räte*) initially pressed for local economic improvements, but by the spring of 1919 the movement had become more ambitious in demanding broader political change, in part in response to repression by the governing SPD in alliance with the military; in Italy, its high point came with the Turin council's factory occupations of September 1920.

Strikes and radical political initiatives occurred in many aliberal countries, with varying degrees of impact: Spain experienced the *Trienio Bolchevique* (1918–20) when, following the Assembly Movement's brief and failed attempt to create a form of Lib-Labism in Catalonia in 1917, the Right regained control over government but was unable to suppress the anarchist and socialist worker and peasant movement until order was restored by Primo de Rivera's dictatorship in 1923; Norway's unrest allowed the

syndicalist labour opposition to take control of the trade union movement and then the Labour Party, a majority of which joined the Comintern; and the Netherlands had its *Roode Week* (Red Week) in November 1918, when the Social Democratic leader Pieter Troesltra unsuccessfully announced a 'revolution', following the German and the Russian examples.

There were, of course, many differences between the position of the radical Left in aliberal countries; crucial was the role of the peasantry: parts of Italy and Spain were closer to Russia in the alienation of the peasantry from the political system, in contrast to Germany where it was a conservative force. Meanwhile middle-class groups, such as industrialists, proved to be a much more powerful counterweight to the Left in some countries (such as Germany) than in others.

Liberal countries also saw strikes and working-class radicalism during the period. The Left's politics developed in different ways: unlike the British Labour Party, the French socialist SFIO split, with the majority voting to join the Comintern. However, as will be seen, both the French and British Lefts posed much less of a threat to the liberal order than in many aliberal states—in part of course because elites had not been defeated in war.

Least affected by the leftist revolutionary wave were the majority of the successor states of eastern Europe. Here the impotence of their small working classes, and poor connections between them and potentially mobilizable peasants, were reinforced by the crucial salience of nationalism in these post-imperial polities. Nationalism could be aligned with the Left as well as the Right, but the priority placed on national unity over class struggle inevitably rendered it more suited to a non-communist Left—as seen in the central role of the former socialist nationalist Józef Piłsudski in the politics of independent Poland, and of the left-liberal nationalist Tomáš Masaryk in Czechoslovakia. Communists found it particularly difficult to gain support in the region at a time when many of the new nation states felt threatened by Bolshevik Russia.

However, several parts of eastern Europe and the Caucasus had a politics more similar to Russia's, and multiple class and ethnic segmentations were overcome in favour of a horizontal class division, as excluded workers and radicalized peasants united to pose a radical challenge to a culturally and socially alien elite. In Finland, for instance, the gradual disintegration of Russian imperial control after February 1917 brought social tensions to crisis point, with industrial workers united with some poorer peasants confronting a conservative elite (much of it Swedish-speaking) allied with liberal nationalists and the majority of the rural population. By January 1918, when Finland had become independent, each side had its own armed forces, and Red Guards took control of Helsinki and established a revolutionary government. A civil war between German-backed nationalists and Soviet-backed socialists lasted until May, when the Reds were defeated because their support was not broad enough. In part Finland's relative insulation from the disruption of the First World War was responsible, but the Left was also weakened by divisions between militant workers and the majority of peasants—in contrast with its Russian neighbour.[34]

In Hungary, too, Russian-supported socialists came to power with the support of discontented workers, demobilized soldiers, and peasants demanding land reform. They then overturned the liberal Karolyi government, which they believed was not forthright enough in destroying the power of a small discredited aristocratic and business elite. In this case, though, the socialists were much more closely aligned with the Bolsheviks—their leader, Béla Kun, was a Hungarian prisoner of war in Russia who had become a Bolshevik supporter and 'imported' a particularly radical version of the Soviet model from the USSR. Crucially, he was able to combine his socialism with Hungarian nationalism, arguing that an alliance with the Soviets would deliver more to Hungary than the Allies, who were supporting Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav territorial demands. However, Kun's socially revolutionary policies soon alienated many of his erstwhile supporters, and especially the peasantry. He finally fell victim to foreign military pressure, fleeing Budapest on 1 August 1919; the Hungarian Soviet Republic, the first soviet-controlled nation state outside the USSR, had survived for just over four months. The geopolitical context also played a major role in the rise of radical politics in Bulgaria, when a significant Communist party, allied with the even more powerful radical Agrarians, seriously threatened the defeated and discredited regime of Tsar Ferdinand in 1918, and forced him to abdicate and hand power to his son.

The politics of class and nation interacted in different and complex ways across the region—as one would expect in these socially and ethnically segmented societies. Revolutionary forces, based on class and backed by the Soviets, commonly confronted anti-revolutionary coalitions led by nationalist intelligentsias and supported by the Germans (before the end of 1918). Nationalist forces were strongest where urban middle classes were less ethnically segmented, and where the old imperial state had allowed more political activity before and during the war; so they were stronger in Habsburg eastern Europe than the Russian Empire (partly explaining the differences between western and eastern Ukraine), and within Russia they were more effective in the more liberal Latvia and Finland than in eastern Ukraine and Belarus.[35] Meanwhile, revolutionary forces were particularly strong where working classes were united and ethnically different from the propertied, as in eastern Ukraine where the short-lived Donetsk-Krivoi Rog Soviet Republic relied on ethnically Russian workers, who confronted German and Polish propertied classes. This contrasted with Baku in 1917, where the working class was ethnically divided between Muslims and Russians, the ruling Soviet was made up of an alliance of Russian-supported Bolsheviks and more middle-class Armenian moderate socialists (the Dashnaktsutiun), and opposed by anti-revolutionary Muslims.[36]

Elsewhere, the salience of class and ethnic politics could change over time. In Tiflis, Georgia, the February 1917 Revolution brought a soviet to power dominated by a socialist alliance of Georgian workers, Russian soldiers, and the Armenian moderate socialist middle classes. But with the withdrawal of Russian troops and the advance of Turkish forces, class was eclipsed by ethnic politics, as all Armenians and Georgians united against the Muslim and Turkic enemy.[37]

Revolutionary Legacies and Paths to 'Stabilization'

In the summer of 1920 the Bolsheviks were supremely confident that history was going their way, and they were determined to consolidate the gains by forging what was a popular but highly diverse movement of radicals, syndicalists, and Moscow-aligned Bolsheviks into a unified force. The Second Congress of the Comintern of July 1920 sought to achieve this with its 'Twenty-One Points' to which all member parties had to subscribe—in particular proclaiming the superiority of the soviet model of democracy over the parliamentary, liberal democracy accepted by the Social Democratic Second International.

However, soon after the Congress, it was becoming clear that the radical Left was beginning to retreat. The collapse of the Milan council movement in October 1920 showed how difficult it was to sustain a highly decentralized council movement in the face of sustained employer and government opposition; the defeat of the Red Army in Warsaw showed that there were limits to the military-aided spread of communism in eastern Europe; and the end of the wartime boom, accompanied by the restoration of orthodox liberal economic policies and the gold standard, established conditions for a determined attack on the gains made by labour and the Left during the war (even the Soviet rouble went onto gold in 1926, with the new coins showing a portrait of the executed Tsar Nicholas II). By the mid-1920s, the Left's earlier confidence had evaporated, and Communist parties had become embattled minorities—even in Germany, where the Communists were the most successful European party outside the USSR (the KPD took between *c*.10 and *c*.13 per cent of the vote in the 1920s).

However, it would be wrong to see the post-war leftist advances as having had no effect—though again its legacy was in large part shaped by deep-rooted structural differences between societies. In liberal Britain and France, socialist and trade union efforts to maintain the high levels of power and influence they had acquired during the war were easily defeated. Long-established divisions within the trade union movement, the prevalence of reformist socialism (especially in Britain), and the unity shown by liberal and conservative forces all weakened the Left. The defeat of the French railway and general strikes of May 1920, and of the British trade unions' Triple Alliance in April 1921, ensured that labour would have to acquiesce in falls in living standards. In both countries, socialists remained a weak minority in opposition to centre-right governments, with a few brief exceptions, for most of the 1920s and 1930s.

In aliberal societies, in contrast, the long-term impact of the revolutionary era was much greater—as one would expect—though its influence was felt in different ways. A common pattern was the temporary establishment of a form of 'Lib-Labism' in the aftermath of war; its defeat in the early 1920s as conservatives and liberals sought to reverse the concessions it had made at a time when the new global power of the United States was strengthening liberalism's international legitimacy; and an extended period

of tense parliamentary stalemate, as divided liberals confronted powerful but minority socialists largely representing the urban proletariat and failing to garner peasant support.

Sweden and Norway broadly followed this pattern as did Germany, when the 1918 'social partnership' agreement between employers and unions broke down in 1923, as employers sought to unpick it and reduce wages.[38] But long-established divisions within the Centre Right (for instance between the Catholic agrarian Centre Party and other liberals) gave the Social Democrats the power to defend the gains made with the establishment of the Weimar Republic. Luebbert argues that German labour's ability to increase its share of national product in the 1920s was typical of aliberal countries; in contrast labour interests failed to maintain their economic gains in liberal countries.[39]

In Germany, the inability of the Centre Right to override the influence of the Left on questions of distribution contributed to the defection of many anti-socialists from parliamentary democracy and support for a radical right dictatorship in 1930–3. However, issues of international status and hierarchy were also crucial in explaining the successes of radical nationalism among many Germans who refused to accept the end of Germany's imperial status imposed by Versailles.

A similar rightist rebellion against the Left, democracy, and loss of national status occurred in Italy, though it happened much earlier, when, after the failure of Giolitti's 'Lib-Labism', divided and weakened liberals faced a radicalized working-class movement. Mussolini's Fascist dictatorship of 1922 did the Right's bidding, repressing the Left and trade unions, and embarking on a neo-imperialist project. But unlike conventional authoritarian regimes, it could not simply reimpose traditional hierarchies; labour was too strong for that. Rather it sought to transform and mobilize labour, introducing its own model of corporatism—albeit one much more advantageous to employers than the wartime version. Similarly, the dictatorship of Spain's Primo de Rivera increasingly incorporated the interests of labour—although it was a much less transformative regime than its Italian Fascist or Nazi counterparts.

In the segmented societies and nationalist polities of post-imperial eastern Europe, a weak labour movement was much more easily repressed and isolated from a potentially mobilizable peasantry by authoritarian governments, which were established in many countries, including Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, and Romania. Czechoslovakia was the only country in the region where a centre-left nationalism survived, under Masaryk and then Beneš, though in Poland Piłsudski established a 'leftist' nationalist dictatorship in 1926, in part to counter the authoritarian Right.[40]

The Soviet Union, however, followed an unusual course—in some ways a leftist version of the modern mobilizing authoritarian systems seen in aliberal Italy and Germany. If 'war communism' established a corporatism presided over not by the propertied classes but by a new Bolshevik elite made up of political specialists (the Party) and technocrats, after March 1921 Lenin's New Economic Policy sought to use market mechanisms to increase profitability and attack the privileged position workers still had in the economy. The efforts were of more success in consumer industries, where private ownership was restored, than in heavy industry, but the result was a breach between

the regime and sections of the industrial working class—a crisis which Stalin sought to resolve in 1927–8, when he established a new more statist basis for incorporating and mobilizing the working class. He also increasingly recast the regime as one that could restore the old Russian Empire in a new, socialist, more universalistic form.[41]

Europe's 'Red Years' as Revolutions

The dramatic events of 1917–23 and the changing position of the Left therefore have to be understood in the context of two interrelated crises: the first a social one, involving a challenge to pre-war hierarchies, especially in less liberal societies where old military-aristocratic elites were stronger; and the second an international one, which destroyed the old land-based multi-ethnic empires. And while both were the direct consequence of war—the social mobilization required by it, and the defeat of old imperial elites—this crisis of social, ethnic, and international hierarchies had a long history and continued long after the war—especially in aliberal societies.

Of course, any history of the Left during Europe's revolutionary years has to take account of cultural forces as well: the variations in leftist responses, especially in countries like France, are clearly related to the Left's political culture (and political culture more broadly); and the First World War had an enormous impact on the culture of the radical Left, as seen particularly in the Bolshevik Party and the KPD, with their aggressive, militaristic style. However, revolutions are fundamentally about a contest for power, and the cultural aspects of that conflict need to be placed firmly in their political and social contexts.

This approach accords with recent developments in the comparative study of revolutions too. In a recent intervention, Steven Pincus, a historian of the so-called English 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688, has sought to reconcile a 'neo-Tocquevillian' approach, which stresses the importance of failed state projects of modernization, including wartime mobilization, in the outbreaks of revolutions, with a more sociological one, which accepts that their outcomes are shaped by the social groups that are most able to come to the fore during the revolutionary period.[42] Crises of state mobilization projects, often caused by war, can unite an extraordinarily wide range of revolutionaries—even revolutionaries as unlikely as that supreme bourgeois Thomas Mann. But the course and legacy of the revolutions depend to a significant extent on deeper structural forces.

Notes

1. Quoted in Ivan Berend, *Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe Before World War II* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 123.
2. R. Robertson, 'Mann and History', in Robertson (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Mann* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9; Victoria de Grazia,

Irresistible Empire. America's Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 24.

3. H. Lagrange, 'Strikes and the War', in L. Haimson and C. Tilly (eds.), *Strikes, Wars and Revolutions in an International Perspective: Strike Waves in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
4. Geoff Eley, 'Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914–1923', in H. Aster and P. Potichnij (eds.), *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1990), 207 ff.
5. For this tradition, see E. Acton, *Rethinking the Russian Revolution* (London: Edward Arnold, 1990), 35–9.
6. See K. D. Erdmann, 'Die Geschichte der Weimarer Republik als Problem der Wissenschaft', *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 3 (1955), 1–19. For an analysis of this view, see E. Kolb, *The Weimar Republic*, trans. P. Falla (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 134, 138–9.
7. See R.G. Suny, 'Toward a Social History of the October Revolution', *American Historical Review* 88(1) (1983), 31–52.
8. Kolb, *Weimar Republic*, 142–3.
9. This is Kolb's judgement of the German debate, *Weimar Republic*, 142–7. Orlando Figes, one of the leading liberal historians of the Russian Revolution, also integrates a social history approach into a broadly liberal argument on the 'tragic' nature of the Russian Revolution. See O. Figes, *A People's Tragedy. A History of the Russian Revolution* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996).
10. Antoine Prost, 'Workers', in J. Winter (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, Vol. II: *The State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 325.
11. George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memories of the World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Michael Geyer, 'The Militarization of Europe, 1914–1945', in J. Gillis (ed.), *The Militarization of the Western World* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 65–102.
12. Though Holquist does not deny that the examination of mobilizations of social groups is useful; he merely argues that they are 'well studied'. Peter Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 6.
13. Joshua A. Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War and Mass Politics, 1905–1925* (DeKalb: University of Northern Illinois Press, 2003), esp. ch. 5. For a critique of the Holquist and Sanborn literature, see S. A. Smith, 'The Historiography of the Russian Revolution 100 Years On', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 16/4 (2015), 733–49.
14. Richard Bessel, 'Revolution', in Winter (ed.), *Cambridge History of the First World War*, Vol. II, 128–9, 143–4. Michael Geyer, 'War and the Context of General History in an Age of Total War', *Journal of Military History*, 57/5 (1993), 159–60.
15. Robert Gerwarth, 'The Continuum of Violence', in Winter (ed.), *Cambridge History of the First World War*, Vol. II, 641.
16. Gregory Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 53.
17. Luebbert, *Liberalism*, ch. 4.
18. S. Bartolini, *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980: The Class Cleavage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 69–78.

19. Bartolini, *Political Mobilization*, 85.
20. N. Stargardt, *The Idea of German Militarism: Radical and Socialist Critics, 1866–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
21. Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 126.
22. Prost, 'Workers', 346; Diane Koenker and William Rosenberg, *Strikes and Revolution in Russia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 58.
23. Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 129.
24. Prost, 'Workers', 340.
25. 'Auxiliary Service Law (December 1916)', <http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=953>, accessed 1 August 2014.
26. Prost, 'Workers', 342.
27. Prost, 'Workers', 347.
28. Eric Lohr, *Russian Citizenship: From Empire to Soviet Union* (Cambridge, MA: 2012), 123.
29. On the Moscow riots, see Eric Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign Against Enemy Aliens During World War I* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). For the serious weakening of the bonds between Tsar and people after 1914, see B. I. Kolonitskii, *'Tragicheskaia erotika': Obrazy imperatorskoi sem'i v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny* (St Petersburg: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2010).
30. Lewis Siegelbaum, *The Politics of Industrial Mobilization in Russia, 1914–1917: A Study of the War-Industries Committees* (London and Basingstoke, 1983), 159–61.
31. Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation*, chs. 1, 3.
32. Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 157.
33. Karl Kraus in *Die Fackel*, Nov. 1920, cited in J. Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburg* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), Vol. I, xviii.
34. This is argued by Pavel Osinsky and Jari Eloranta, 'Why Did the Communists Win or Lose? A Comparative Analysis of the Revolutionary Civil Wars in Russia, Finland, Spain, and China', *Sociological Forum*, 29 (2014), 328–9.
35. Eley, 'Remapping the Nation', 207–11.
36. Ronald Grigor Suny, 'Nationalism and Social Class in the Russian Revolution: The Case of Baku and Tiflis', in Suny (ed.), *Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change* (rev. edn. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 248.
37. Suny, 'Nationalism and Social Class', 241–60.
38. Kolb, *The Weimar Republic*, 14, 79.
39. Luebbert, *Liberalism*, 256.
40. For Piłsudski's leftist nationalist authoritarianism, see Eva Plach, *The Clash of Moral Nations: Cultural Politics in Piłsudski's Poland, 1926–1935* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2006).
41. For the complexities of Stalin's notion of nation and empire, see Terry Martin, *An Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).
42. Steve Pincus, 'Rethinking Revolutions: A Neo-Tocquevillian Perspective', in C. Boix and S. Stokes (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 397–415, <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199566020-e-17>.

CHAPTER 5

THE ECONOMICS OF TOTAL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1914–1922

MATTHIAS BLUM AND JARI ELORANTA

Introduction

The First World War produced an enormous shock to global trade, politics, and the movement of people, even though the majority of the fighting was focused on the European continent. Nationalism and political aspirations by the great powers plunged states into a war of unprecedented scale despite the extensive globalization that preceded it—a war that they thought would be over in a matter of months. The European nations, the primary participants in the conflict, experienced immense transformations involving extensive state regulation, substitution of market mechanisms by state officials, and the introduction of new military technologies. When the war ended in 1918, the institutional design of most European economies was drastically different to what had existed before the war. On the one hand, the war failed to resolve the many existing disputes between European nations and proved to be a source of discord and instability in the coming decades; on the other, it led to the introduction of many new European democracies and the extension of the voting franchise to new segments of the population.

Initially, the war did not produce far-reaching changes for the belligerent societies, even though the mobilization of large armies and disruption of foreign trade forced them to adjust to the realities of conflict. Most states had no intention of disturbing their daily economic routines, despite the extension of state authority. Most Europeans thought that the war would be over quickly—by Christmas at the latest. Few individuals foresaw the massive changes in the economy and society that the war would eventually bring about.

In this chapter we will first discuss the mobilization for the war by the various nations, and use the case of Germany as our comparative focus. We then analyse the implications and cost of total war, concluding with an examination of the contradictory legacies of the war. It is instructive to use Germany as our case study to examine the outcomes of a war economy and resource shortages, since characteristics of an economy at war were most pronounced among the major European warring parties. Studying the impacts of the First World War on Germany—a developed country with a strong economy—provides us with an in-depth look at the consequences of war on an economy, without the complications of separating out the issues of a developing country, which can often mimic those of war.[1] The economic challenges that Germany, just like its allies and opponents, faced during the war included mobilization for warfare, labour shortage, impaired domestic economic activity, restricted international trade, food rationing and the predictable emergence of black markets, and a drop in living standards.

Mobilization for War

Mobilization for the First World War in the early phase involved mobilizing the troops and the immediate economy for warfare. For Germany, the successive campaigns against France and Russia represented the most viable strategy which could bring about victory in the situation of geopolitical encirclement by the hostile powers. The possibility that the conflict would be prolonged and that Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary would have to fight a war of attrition on two fronts was not taken into serious consideration.[2]

The war did not go according to plan for the Central Powers. First, a swift deployment of the British forces on the Continent helped the French army resist the German offensive. After a few weeks of the war—the 'race to the sea' in which both sides attempted to outflank each other—the western front had stabilized with a series of trenches ranging from Switzerland to the Atlantic. Second, in August 1914 the British government announced a naval blockade of the German ports. At first this was limited in scope, but fairly soon the Allies decided to stop all shipments to and from the ports of the Central Powers. The broad range of measures was introduced to minimize German supply through the neutral countries (Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Switzerland). In response, the German government resorted to unrestricted submarine warfare against commercial vessels of the Allied nations. These developments placed severe constraints on the supply of resources available to the belligerent nations.[3]

By 1914, the military technology available to the European armies had made great advances, including quick-firing artillery and machine guns. A single Vickers machine gun shot bullets at a rate of 600 per minute—the quantity of ammunition previously fired by half a battalion of troops. The total amount of necessary daily supplies increased by a factor of twelve.[4] The stockpiles of munitions accumulated before the war were depleted in the matter of a few months, and the European nations confronted the task of

massive economic reorganization of their economies for war production. The demands could be met by producing more, by importing more, and by consuming less.[5]

Great Britain serves as an example of state-directed industrial mobilization. The Ministry of Munitions, which became a central agency directing economic mobilization, would generate mountains of regulations but it did not control the daily operations of private firms. The primary forms of state involvement were co-optation and coordination, not command and compulsion. By bringing in new manufacturers to war production, building new public factories, and buying munitions abroad, the government inadvertently promoted decentralization of the industry and sponsored competition among manufacturers. In a similar fashion, the market-based mechanism of transactions with raw materials had not disappeared; governmental control in this sphere was accepted as a forced and temporary measure. During the first two years of the war the government essentially refrained from intervening in food matters. Unlike all major Continental countries, Britain never established a full monopoly on grain. The rationing of some other foods was introduced only five months before the end of war. To sum up, British industry operated as a capitalist market economy, not an administered economy.[6]

Many of the features of a market economy fully applied to the wartime French economy. More than any other economic system, the French economy demonstrated an example of self-mobilization and self-organization of production. Although industrial mobilization was sponsored by the government, industrialists themselves came to play a primary role in organizing mass production of arms and munitions. French resource-allocation institutions, the consortia, represented a weak and temporary version of corporate organization. For about three years in the war the French authorities limited themselves to very few measures of food regulation, mostly price control of some foods. Because of large imports of food from overseas, more dramatic measures of food control did not seem necessary. The government introduced a grain monopoly and the rationing of bread late in 1917.[7]

If France and Britain remained largely liberal democratic states despite the war, the institutions of such states as Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia evolved into a far more distinct statist design. In Austria-Hungary, all major munitions workshops and mining establishments were supervised by military directors. These directors in turn were supervised by the inspectors of the War Ministry. Prompted by the German authorities, the Austro-Hungarian government developed a centralized system of raw materials allocation, although in contrast to the German raw materials corporations, the Austrian Centrals did not have legal and financial guarantees from the state. The Austro-Hungarian government instituted an industrial draft of the entire male population (albeit with numerous exemptions) in the first days of the war. Compared to the later German analogue, the Austrian action took place much earlier and was a more effective arrangement.[8] The market mechanism for food allocation was also to a large extent replaced by the administrative system. The government introduced a monopoly on grain as well as establishing rationing of bread and other staple foodstuffs. In the last two years of the war, the army itself began requisitioning food from the countryside.[9]

Wartime Mobilization: The German Case

German authorities were eager to allocate precious resources according to the demands of the war economy and civilian consumption. However, in expectation of a war of limited duration and intensity, war efforts were a clear priority. For example, while Germany's economy saw a decline in overall production during the years 1913 to 1917 with a decrease in GDP of approximately 25 per cent, government spending on war-relevant goods and services as a share of GDP increased from 10 per cent to 59 per cent.[10] War-related industries saw an increase above pre-war levels, while civilian industries with little in relation to the war effort saw declines. For example, production levels in the textile and construction material industries decreased by 17 per cent and 35 per cent respectively. Similar trajectories can be observed for residential construction (–4 per cent) and cereals (–57 per cent). Conversely, mining, iron, steel, and non-ferrous metal production experienced only a modest decline and, in some cases, increased. Similarly, shifts in labour allocation indicate increased demand in war-related industries (employment increased by 44.1 per cent) during the war, while the labour force in medium war-relevant industries and civilian industries shrank by 20.6 per cent and 40 per cent respectively.[11]

In terms of the real profits of industries, war-relevant industries experienced the least change (82 per cent compared with pre-war real profits), with medium and not very war-relevant industry profits hovering around half of 1913 levels. For medium and not very war-relevant industries, the significant drop occurred primarily between 1916 and 1917, each declining by about 35 percentage points. This drop can be partially attributed to the implementation of the Hindenburg Programme in 1916, which was in full effect by 1917. The Hindenburg Programme diverted input resources from non-relevant industries (civilian production) to war-relevant ones (military production), the result of which was an increase in 1917 profits over 1913 levels for the chemical and metal/machinery industries.[12]

Wages paid in the various industries reveal similar evidence. Zimmermann's wage compilation suggests that wages increased substantially throughout the German economy.[13] Relative wages—one wage series relative to others—suggest that wages in civilian industries, such as textiles, leather, rubber, beverages, food, and tobacco, grew proportionally less while the opposite was true in war-related industries.[14]

The second half of the nineteenth century up until the First World War was a time of accelerating industrialization for Germany, which led to a shift in the labour force from agriculture to industrial production, a trend that fuelled urbanization and increased wages. Per capita income rose and with it a change in food preferences, with demand for meat and dairy products increasing. As a result, Germany had to both be more efficient in agricultural production and rely upon imports to make up the gap between supply and demand.[15] Not only did the British naval blockade make imports from food exporting economies difficult, but trade with countries unimpeded by the blockade also

dwindled as these countries either became enemies or were suffering food shortages of their own.[16] As seen in Table 5.1, imports of dairy, meat, grains, and flours each fell by 80 per cent and more.[17]

The food shortage was aggravated by decreased domestic agricultural production, which was in large part due to the diversion of resources that formerly served as production inputs—such as fertilizer, labour, and human capital—from agriculture to the war effort.[18] German agricultural production was heavily reliant upon fertilizers to maintain intensive farming practices. Nitrogen in particular played a major role; this commodity was less abundant due to import restrictions, and remaining quantities were diverted for use in the production of explosives.

The decline in skilled human capital—nearly half of the male labour force was drafted to serve in the war effort—was also a blow to the agricultural sector.[19] Left to work the farms were males unsuited for military service, women, children, and prisoners of war—a hotchpotch labour force that was much smaller, less knowledgeable,

Table 5.1 German imports and exports of agriculture products, 1916–1918

	1916		1917		1918 Jan.–June		1918 July–Nov.	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
Grains	20,063	617	3,089	492	989	694	7,333	153
Flour	682	9018	229	2,069	138	3,090	279	298
Cattle (number)	29,686	48	19,699	79	9,690	35	14,502	43
Pigs (number)	322	114	116	216	33	3.3	549	32
Meat	5,778	853	1,848	557	244	450	260	6
Butter	7,978	158	3,513	118	1,492	45	1,239	38
Vegetable oil and fats	791	23	148	17	19	7.7	37.2	1.7
Margarine	555	22	106	78	2.1	0.1	0.4	0.4
Cheese	6,553	20	3,187	21	1,258	23	1,269	55
Fish	17,573	300	5,416	115	2,278	192	2,229	99

Sources: A. Ritsch, 'The Pity of Peace: Germany's Economy at War, 1914–1918', in S. N. Broadberry and M. Harrison (eds.), *The Economics of World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), based on A. Skalweit, *Die deutsche Kriegsernährungswirtschaft* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1927).

and ultimately less productive.[20] As a result, between 1914 and 1919 production of main crops declined by approximately half; evidence from the city of Dortmund indicates that the number of cattle and hogs slaughtered decreased by 57 per cent and over 90 per cent respectively.[21]

Government reaction to the food shortage—while well intentioned—proved short-sighted and ineffective, and, in some cases, made the situation worse. Limited rationing was introduced in 1915, and full rationing was in effect by 1916. Official rations provided only a share of pre-war consumption levels (Table 5.2). The most important and only abundant staple food was potatoes. Compared to pre-war levels, provision of potatoes averaged 71 per cent from July 1916 to June 1917. This figure increased to 94 per cent in subsequent years. Flour, a main component for the production of baked goods, dropped by approximately half. Other foodstuffs were less abundant or not available at all. For example, by late 1918 provision of meat, fish, and butter had dropped to 12 per cent, 5 per cent, and 28 per cent respectively.[22]

This policy created price distortions and ultimately the development of a black market since the artificial prices were set much lower than the natural price levels. In the case of rationing and price controls, supply and demand became distorted by a dual pricing structure consisting of official and unofficial prices. The greater the gap between these two price levels, the bigger and more robust the black market.[23] Table 5.3 illustrates this development for the city of Bonn. The natural prices of meat and dairy products

Table 5.2 Food rations as a percentage of pre-war consumption

	July 1916–June 1917	July 1917–June 1918	July 1918–Dec. 1918
Meat	31	20	12
Fish	51	?	5
Eggs	18	13	13
Lard	14	11	7
Butter	22	21	28
Cheese	3	4	15
Rice	4	–	–
Pulses	14	1	7
Sugar	49	61	82
Potatoes	71	94	94
Vegetable fat	39	41	17
Flour	53	47	48

Source: J. Kuczynski, *Die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter in Deutschland von 1880 bis in die Gegenwart* (Berlin: Verlag die Freie Gewerkschaft, 1947).

Table 5.3 Prices for foodstuffs in Bonn (in marks), 1914–1918

	Unit	*Official 1914*	*Official 1917/18*	*Black Market 1917/18*	*Increase (%)*
Beef	1 pound	1.00	2.80	4.75	375
Veal	1 pound	1.00	2.80	5.00	400
Pork	1 pound	0.80	–	6.00	650
Gammon	1 pound	1.20	–	13.00	983
Bacon	1 pound	0.70	2.75	15.50	2.114
Suet	1 pound	0.40	2.00	14.50	3.525
Lard	1 pound	0.80	5.00	18.00	2.150
Concentrated milk	1 can	0.50	1.70	4.50	800
Butter	1 pound	1.30	3.40	14.00	977
Curd	1 pound	0.20	2.30	3.50	1.650
Eggs	1 piece	0.06	0.40	0.65	983
Colza oil	1 litre	0.60	5.00	21.50	3.483
Salad oil	1 litre	1.40	–	24.00	1.614
Olive oil	1 litre	3.00	–	50.00	1.567
Rye flour	1 pound	0.15	1.85	4.00	2.567
Wheat flour	1 pound	0.20	–	4.00	1.900
Rice	1 pound	0.25	–	8.00	3.100

Source: A. Roerkohl, *Hungerblockade und Heimatfront: Die kommunale Lebensmittelversorgung in Westfalen während des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1991).

increased by several hundred per cent, whereas the prices of fats and flour increased by several thousand per cent. Similar evidence is available for the cities of Essen and Flensburg.[24]

Other consumption goods were also scarce, even though official statistics indicate this to a lesser extent. The reason for the perceived shortage was not only a decline in quantities produced, but also a deterioration of product quality since only low-quality products were available on the market and worn-out clothing could not be replaced adequately. A similar situation existed in the housing market. Germany already faced a tight situation in terms of living space before the outbreak of the First World War, after which construction activity was seriously hampered by the competing resource demands of other sectors and conscription. In 1913, the net increase in number of apartments in Germany was approximately 200,000; in 1918 this figure dropped to 2,800 (Figure 5.1).[25] This not only



FIGURE 5.1 Net increases in housing stock (1913=100) in German cities.

Source: J. Kuczynski, *Die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter in Deutschland von 1880 bis in die Gegenwart* (Berlin: Verlag die Freie Gewerkschaft, 1947).

meant a slowdown in construction work, but also a deteriorating quality of existing housing since repair work and replacement of outdated housing space had to be postponed.

In comparison, for example in Russia, the process of institutional merger of monopolies and the state reached its ultimate phase: in some sectors not only did the state take over the allocation of materiel, but by being the sole buyer of the output it started to manage the entire production process. On the other hand, the Russian system of state-corporate regulation was less developed organizationally and was less comprehensive than the German model. As managers of industrial mobilization, the Russian military-bureaucratic state and the national capitalist class turned out to be both weak and ineffective. Due to the weakness of the state and broad opposition of the population at large, militarization of the workforce was completely out of the question. The earnest efforts to institute a state-controlled economy in food supply, as compared to analogous measures introduced in Germany and Austria-Hungary, came too late, were poorly implemented, and proved completely ineffective. Eventually these regulatory efforts resulted in an institutional stupor. The war strengthened the existing tendencies towards a command economy but had not produced a centralized command system.[26] In the end, Russia functioned, by and large, as a command economy, but with an ill-functioning and disintegrating structure.[27]

Importance of Resources in Total War: Germany v. the Rest

Overall, the First World War became a war that was determined by economic resources. As scholars have pointed out, Germany did not necessarily mismanage all of its resources and thus lose the war.[28] In fact, the Allies had a massive advantage in terms of total GDP,

population, military personnel, armaments production, and food supply throughout the conflict, which became even more pronounced when the US finally entered the war. For example, in November 1914, the Allies had 793 million people within their borders in comparison with 151 million on the Central Powers' side. Towards the end of the war, the Allies had a total population of 1,272 million, whereas the Central Powers were still under 200 million. Furthermore, the Allies possessed a combined GDP of 1,761 billion (1990 Geary-Khamis dollars) at the end of the war, which was far superior to the less than 400 billion the Central Powers had in 1915. This advantage became even more pronounced as the war went on.[29]

Allied great powers were ultimately able to mobilize their resources more effectively during the war. Even though the Central Powers initially did quite well with the limited resources they had, the Allies were able to mobilize their superior resources better both at the home front and on the front lines. Their more democratic institutions supported the demands of the total war effort better than their authoritarian counterparts. Therefore, the richer, and usually more democratic, countries mobilized more men and materiel for the war, and their war industries proved quite capable of serving the needs of the war machine. Moreover, having a large peasant population turned out to be a hindrance for the production of food since labour was scarce and the British naval blockade impeded imports which could have been a relieving factor, such as in the French case. As we have shown, in poorer countries, and even in affluent Germany, mobilization efforts siphoned off resources from agriculture.[30]

Therefore, economic processes and mobilization had a decisive effect on the outcome of the war. It was the economic disorganization in Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany that ultimately brought these states down. The war-induced economic disorganization manifested itself in major disruptions of provision supply and subsistence crises. In the 'interior' nations that were placed under conditions of economic blockade (i.e., Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany) living conditions were worse than in 'exterior' nations that maintained relatively free access to the world economy and imports from overseas (Britain and France). In these countries economic protests turned at the final stage of the war into mass movements against the war and existing political regimes. Under the impact of worsening economic and social conditions large segments of the ruling classes and the army had withdrawn their support from the rulers and had taken the side of the opposition.

Russia was the first great power to collapse during the war. Yet, there was little specifically Russian in the process of socio-economic disintegration that caused this breakdown. For two years of the war, Russia's economic system was able to cope with the numerous problems and bottlenecks in economic mobilization relatively well.[31] During the winter of 1916/17, however, the provision supply system fell apart. It broke down because the government failed to institute an effective mechanism of mobilization and allocation of agricultural resources. In Petrograd, as in other big cities, the dismal situation with bread could perhaps have been alleviated temporarily had the authorities established a system of rationing. However, the supply of bread diminished so rapidly that the authorities did not have enough time to take necessary measures. The dire social conditions fuelled strikes, food riots, and protests in Petrograd and other big cities. At

the end of February 1917, mass demonstrations flooded the capital, and when the regular army refused to suppress the rebellion, the Tsarist autocracy collapsed. The Provisional Government made up of members of the state Duma proved unable to stop the war because of Russia's obligations towards the Allies. Nor could it resolve the complex economic problems of the country. Eventually, in October 1917 it was overthrown by the Bolsheviks.[32]

Like Russia, Germany was placed under conditions of economic blockade which severely constrained its capacity to draw resources, including basic provisions like food, from overseas.[33] Similar to other nations under blockade, a massive subsistence crisis struck German cities during the winter of 1916/17. The food crisis was exacerbated by a very poor harvest of potatoes which traditionally made up a large portion of the German diet, particularly among the working-class population. The quality of most foods was extremely poor. For example, coffee was made of tree bark; pepper contained 85 per cent ash; milk and beer were diluted by water. By the end of the war there were about 11,000 ersatz foods.[34] As a consequence of shortages in consumption goods, especially foodstuffs, Germany experienced a downturn in living standards. Several indicators point towards significant increases in the disease environment and a decrease in nutritional standards. In regard to deteriorating living standards, other warring parties fared only slightly better.

Using average height as an indicator of net nutritional status provides overwhelming evidence that nutritional standards of children born during the First World War were compromised due to lack of quantity of and decreased quality in foodstuffs.[35] Blum uses final average height of adults and finds an overall adult height decrease. Average adult height of those born in 1914 was 171.6 cm, while average adult height of those born in 1917—possibly the worst year of the war in terms of food supply—decreased to 169.2 cm.[36] Moreover, prior to the war, northerners, Protestants, and the upper classes were better off than those living in other geographic regions, Catholics, and the lower classes. However, during the war, northern Germans, Catholics, and the lower classes were hit the hardest, whereas in pre-war years, no differences are observed between urban dwellers and their counterparts living in rural places. During the war, however, proximity to food production turned out to be an advantage. The average height of urban dwellers decreased starkly in comparison to the average height of rural citizens.

The severity of the shortages was greater in Germany than in other western European countries. Average height development in the neutral Netherlands does not show any impairment, while British and Italian evidence indicates stagnation. French evidence is somewhat mixed, with one series showing no war-related effect and another suggesting that biological living standards in France decreased slightly (Figure 5.2).

While average height is conventionally interpreted as the standard measure of nutrition, it contains—among other things—information on the disease environment as well. Figures 5.3–5.4 illustrate the development of health standards, and this information may help in evaluating the relative importance of food shortages and the impact of factors related to health and hygiene. Siegmund-Schultze, a contemporary witness, reports that in German cities during the war, mortality due to respiratory diseases increased by



FIGURE 5.2 Average heights in western Europe, 1900–1920 (in centimetres).

Note: All heights refer to male populations.

Sources: Germany: M. Blum, 'Government Decisions Before and During the First World War and the Living Standards in Germany during a Drastic Natural Experiment', *Explorations in Economic History*, 48 (2011), 556–567; France I: M. A. Van Meerten, 'Developpement économique et stature en France, XIX^{ème}-XX^{ème} siècles', *Annales Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 45 (1990), 755–777; D. L. Kuh, C. Power, and B. Rodgers, 'Secular Trends in Social Class and Sex Differences in Adult Height', *International Journal of Epidemiology*, 20 (1991), 1001–1009; Netherlands, France II, and Italy: J. W. Drukker and V. Tassenaar, 'Paradoxes of Modernization and Material Well-Being in the Netherlands during the Nineteenth Century', in R. H. Steckel and R. Floud (eds.), *Health and Welfare during Industrialization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).



FIGURE 5.3 Infant mortality rate in western Europe.

Source: B. R. Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics, Europe, 1750–1988*, 3rd edn (Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan; Stockton Press, 1992).



FIGURE 5.4 Inequality and average height (centimetres) by socio-economic group in Germany, 1900–1924.

Note: Height inequality is measured as the coefficient of variation (CV) of height, defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of height measurements of a group of individuals to its mean height.

Source: M. Blum, 'War, Food Rationing, and Socioeconomic Inequality in Germany during the First World War', *Economic History Review*, 66 (2013), 1063–1083.

52 per cent and child mortality among 6–10-year-olds and 11–15-year-olds increased by 97 per cent and 91 per cent respectively.[37] Infant mortality trends, a somewhat broader proxy for general health conditions in a society, suggest that this facet of living standards generally improved during the early twentieth century (Figure 5.3). Assuming that health conditions in neutral countries were not affected directly by the war (but only indirectly, for example via food prices), a comparison of Swiss infant mortality figures with those of combatant countries shows that the war and war economy had a significant impact on health conditions in 1917 and 1918. The most dramatic increases were experienced by France and followed by Germany, while infant mortality in England and Wales increased only slightly.[38] Temporary increases in infant mortality between 1918 and 1920 were not directly attributable to the war, but rather the result of an influenza pandemic.

However, there is evidence that the burden was not shared equally between social groups. Cox, for example, distinguishes German schoolchildren by their social background and finds significant differences in terms of their anthropometric characteristics.[39] Not only was there an overall decrease in heights but also a significant difference in the physical traits of children belonging to different social classes, particularly between 1918 and 1922. Her findings indicate that existing inequalities were exacerbated by the war economy and the British naval blockade. Working-class children suffered most, although average heights of all social classes were affected. Using data on adults born during the First World War, Blum finds similar evidence.[40] His results suggest that in general the upper social strata (measured by fathers' occupation) had the highest average height, followed by the middle and lower classes. Socio-economic differences

became more pronounced during the First World War when children from upper-class families experienced only a small decline in average height compared to their counterparts from the middle and lower social strata. Inequality, measured as the coefficient of variation of the average height series of three social classes, had been decreasing in the years prior to the war, but increased as a result of unequal consumption of foodstuffs (Figure 5.4).

The increase in nutritional inequality is quite surprising since the German authorities implemented a rationing system intended to limit inequality. Nevertheless, inequality increased in the course of the war even though—at least in theory—equalizing nutritional supplies could have had the opposite effect. The explanation lies in the existence of flourishing black markets, which allowed the wealthy to purchase required goods while the lower classes found themselves short on consumption goods, especially foodstuffs.

The key difference separating the Kaiserreich from Russia was that the German military-bureaucratic state was more administratively effective than the corrupt, inactive, and incompetent Russian autocracy. By the end of the war, the military-bureaucratic dictatorship of Hindenburg and Ludendorff had succeeded in suppressing and subjugating the working class and marginalizing political opposition. Therefore, the breakdown of the state could only be possible with a dismantling of the military establishment. German military defeats on the western front in the summer and autumn of 1918 were the crucial events. Once the monarch lost support of the army, he was forced to resign. The provisional government, like the one in Russia of 1917, was confronted by a formidable political challenge from the radical Left. However, the total collapse of the state, such as occurred in Russia in October, was prevented by an agreement between the new government and the military command. In early 1919, by relying on the assistance of paramilitary formations, Ebert's government was able to suppress the radical revolutionary forces, recentralize the German state, adopt a new constitution, and lay the institutional foundations for a new economic and political system.[41]

Aftermath of the War

The individual participants of the First World War devised different solutions to pay for the enormous burden of war. Germany and France were less willing to tax their populations to pay for the war effort. Britain funded the conflict by using a variety of different taxes in addition to other means (namely, borrowing). The war was a huge shock to the Western economies in particular, since it shattered the international trading system and the gold standard. Inflation was also a major problem (including Germany's infamous hyperinflation), and most of the participants imposed price and wage controls, as well as rationing systems that persisted into the early years of peace.[42]

The practice of bringing businessmen into government service in order to maximize production and oversee supply chains and mobilization plans continued into the postwar era. Similarly, corporatism saw its inception in the 1920s with Mussolini's Italy,

but elements of it had been introduced already during the war in a more limited form, and big business gained a foothold in government acquisitions for some time to come. Therefore this was the beginning of the so-called Military-Industrial Complex in its modern form.[43]

Trade deficits tended to worsen substantially as a result of the two world wars, and especially in the case of the First World War. In particular, the deficits of the participants, or countries that became involved in the wars in one way or another, tended to be large. Furthermore, these deficits decreased noticeably in the 1920s, or in some cases even turned to surpluses, such as in Germany, Russia, and Sweden. The beggar-thy-neighbour policies, which were meant to promote domestic production and self-sufficiency at the expense of imports, reinforced this tendency further in the 1930s.

It also appears that democratic governance was among both the winners and losers of the First World War. As the war signified the culmination of the so-called first wave of democratization, it introduced sweeping political changes, especially for the western European states. One of the most important reforms brought on by the war—stimulated by the need to maintain public support for massive wartime government spending during the war—was the extension of the franchise.[44]

There were many factors that contributed to a new climate of political competition in the interwar period, in particular the economic and political changes and pressures brought on by the First World War. The extension of the voting franchise—also to women—was one of the revolutionary features of the First World War phase and its immediate aftermath as was the rise of labour and socialist parties to the national political arena as worthy contenders. In some countries, like Finland, this had already taken place before the war. Also, the electoral reforms that were carried out gave more voice to the minority groups in national politics. This meant more political conflicts and cabinet instability, since the coalition partners in the cabinets often brought down the government if it adopted policies considered unacceptable. Even the well-established democracies, such as the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway, experienced more political instability in the interwar period than in the pre-war period.[45] In the French case, diminishing economic conditions were indelibly connected to the turmoil in domestic politics in the 1930s.[46]

After the ceasefire in 1918 and the Versailles peace treaty of 1919, Germany experienced political instability and economic turmoil which culminated in hyperinflation and the rise of extremist parties. The interplay of a number of factors, such as military defeat, economic exhaustion, the burden of reparations and war debt, and an uncertain political future, laid the basis for three more turbulent decades. One consequence of the war and the war economy, which contributed to the destruction of the Weimar Republic, was the hyperinflation experienced between 1921 and 1923. In contrast to Britain and France, which raised taxes to finance the war, German officials decided to finance the war (as well as post-war expenses) predominantly with credit. This decision, in addition to the demand for assets to pay reparations, put substantial pressure on public finances in post-war Germany. Moreover, inflation tendencies, which had been repressed during the period of rationing and price controls, further accelerated price developments. The

index of the relative value of the German currency against the US dollar increased from parity in 1913 to approximately 1.6 and 1.4 in 1917 and 1918 respectively. After the war this figure rose to 4.7, 15, and 24.9 in 1919, 1920, and 1921. In 1922, when the inflation changed to a hyperinflation, this value was 449.2 and in 1923 it skyrocketed to 127.4 *billion*. By 1923, the average price indices for food prices and retailer prices were 198 billion and 166 billion respectively, while wages rose disproportionally. Wage indices for skilled workers in 1923 were 85 billion, while corresponding figures for unskilled and civil servants were 100 and 56 respectively (1913 = 1 for all).[47] Despite the fact that hyperinflation was a stimulus for economic impulses, especially for the exporting sectors, and helped clear considerable amounts of internal and non-reparation foreign debt, the aggregate effect of inflation was disastrous: German GDP dropped by one-third from 1922 to 1923.[48]

Central government spending tended to increase substantially as a result of both world wars, during and after. This tended to increase sovereign debts as well. In general, central government debt-to-GDP ratios remained quite stable until the First World War, since strong economic growth made budget surpluses possible without changes in taxation. Most politicians did not want to resort to higher taxation to finance peacetime reconstruction and to serve war debts.[49] Moreover, the share of foreign government loans increased in the late 1920s. The debt burden incurred by Great Britain, for example, grew noticeably as a result of the war, whereas those European nations that stayed out of the war were barely affected by it.

One of the biggest problems following both world wars was the demobilization of the troops and the war economies after the conflict. For example, in the French case post-war demobilization policies were focused on addressing the labour shortages affecting reconstruction efforts and dismantling price controls. All in all, in 1919–21 over 4 million men were reintegrated into the French domestic economy. In Britain, the government was particularly interested in restoring many of the pre-war economic institutions, and the demobilization of the troops took place quickly in 1919–20.[50]

In most European countries in the interwar period the authorities focused on redesigning and refining crisis planning, based on the experience of the First World War. The anticipated wartime supply problems required private- and public-sector actors to cooperate in the drafting of these plans, which in turn gave European domestic firms a greater influence in the military acquisition decisions of the period. By the Second World War, most countries were much more prepared on how to mobilize resources for the war effort. For example, in Finland and Sweden governments formed several committees consisting of the military and economic elites to set the groundwork for the mobilization plans.

On the whole, as Feinstein et al. have argued, four direct economic consequences arose from the war: (1) two immediate exogenous shocks, in terms of disruptions of supply and demand as well as excess mobilized production (and military) capacity after the conflict; (2) a more rigid economic environment, since (for example) wage flexibility was diminished; (3) a weaker financial structure, since the economies had to carry the new increased levels of public spending as well as the acquired debts with mainly pre-war levels of taxation; (4) a fragile international monetary system. The 'winners' of the

war, at least in terms of economic growth effects, seemed to be the neutral states, such as the Nordic countries, who outperformed other western European states.[51]

Ronald Finlay and Kevin O'Rourke have summarized the challenges brought on by the period of world wars which impacted on the future of global trade and politics. First of all, there were three wartime adjustments that had serious consequences in the interwar period: (1) non-European producers' increased role during the war, and the subsequent price competition; (2) industrial expansion during wartime, which was difficult to redirect after the conflict; (3) the boost to non-European industrialization. In terms of broader effects, they list: (1) the increased importance of turbulent domestic politics; (2) the legacy of the war debts; (3) the difficulties in returning to the gold standard; (4) the creation of new nation states; (5) the Communist revolution and state in Russia; (6) the creation of instability and conditions as a result of the First World War that would lead to the Second.[52]

In general, most of the political and economic impacts were negative. The negative economic impacts arise from (1) the fact that soldiers bear a large proportion of the costs as a result of high risks and lost income; (2) lost private-sector investments (the crowding-out effect); (3) distorted production incentives, geared towards military production, due to mobilization of the economy; (4) accelerating inflation during and after the conflict; (5) increased government role in the economy, due to for example reconstruction efforts; (6) human and other capital lost as a result of the conflict, of which human capital (young, productive members of the society) was particularly hard to replace.[53] The links between the Great Depression and the First World War were extensive. Without the war the depression would have been much less severe. The human costs and injuries resulting from the war damaged the European economies even more than the destruction of capital. Another notable feature of the interwar economy was the significant decline in foreign trade, even in the 1920s—this development was mainly caused by national and autarkic commercial policies. Overall, this period was marked by uneven economic growth in the 1920s and divergent experiences of recovery from the depression in the 1930s among the Western democracies.

Notes

1. M. Blum and J. Eloranta, 'War Zones, Economic Challenges, and Well-Being: Perspectives on Germany during the First World War', in Nathan R. White (ed.), *War: Global Assessment, Public Attitudes and Psychosocial Effects* (New York: Nova, 2013).
2. D. Stevenson, *Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy* (New York: Basic Books, 2004); H. Strachan, *The First World War*, Vol. I: *To Arms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
3. M. Blum, P. Osinsky, and J. Eloranta, 'Organization of War Economies', in *1914–1918 Online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War* (forthcoming).
4. M. Van Creveld, 'World War I and the Revolution in Logistics', in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds.), *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

5. J. Eloranta and M. Harrison, 'War and Disintegration, 1914–1945', in Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O'Rourke (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe*, Vol. II: *1870 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
6. Blum et al., 'Organization of War Economies'.
7. Blum et al., 'Organization of War Economies'.
8. J. R. Wegs, 'Austrian Economic Mobilization during World War I: With Particular Emphasis on Heavy Industry', PhD dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1970.
9. See e.g. H. Haselsteiner, 'The Habsburg Empire in World War I: Mobilization of Food Supplies', in Béla K. Király and Nándor F. Dreisziger (eds.), *East Central European Society in World War I* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
10. S. N. Broadberry and M. Harrison (eds.), *The Economics of World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); A. Ritschl and M. Spoerer, 'Das Bruttosozialprodukt in Deutschland nach den amtlichen Volkseinkommens—und Sozialproduktsstatistiken 1901–1995', *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 2 (1997), 27–54.
11. A. Ritschl, 'The Pity of Peace: Germany's Economy at War, 1914–1918', in Broadberry and Harrison (eds.), *The Economics of World War I*; Blum and Eloranta, 'War Zones'.
12. J. Baten and R. Schulz, 'Making Profits in Wartime: Corporate Profits, Inequality and GDP in Germany during the First World War', *Economic History Review*, 58/1 (2005), 34–56.
13. W. Zimmermann, 'Die Veränderungen der Einkommens—und Lebensverhältnisse der deutschen Arbeiter durch den Krieg', in R. Meerwarth, A. Günther, and W. Zimmermann, *Die Einwirkung des Krieges auf Bevölkerungsbewegung, Einkommen und Lebenshaltung in Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1932).
14. Blum and Eloranta, 'War Zones'.
15. J. Flemming, *Landwirtschaftliche Interessen und Demokratie: Ländliche Gesellschaft, Agrarverbände und Staat 1890–1925* (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1978); F. Aereboe, *Der Einfluss des Krieges auf die landwirtschaftliche Produktion in Deutschland* (Stuttgart and Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927).
16. Blum and Eloranta, 'War Zones'.
17. Ritschl, 'Pity of Peace'; A. Skalweit, *Die deutsche Kriegsernährungswirtschaft* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1927).
18. Blum and Eloranta, 'War Zones'.
19. D. Huber and E. M. Fogel, 'Food Conditions and Agricultural Production', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 92: *Social and Industrial Conditions in the Germany of Today* (1920), 131–6.
20. Aereboe, *Einfluss*.
21. Flemming, *Landwirtschaftliche Interessen*; K. Hilgenstock, *Der Dortmunder Schlachtviehmarkt, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung* (Dortmund: Crüwell, 1926).
22. J. Kuczynski, *Die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter in Deutschland von 1880 bis in die Gegenwart* (Berlin: Verlag die Freie Gewerkschaft, 1947).
23. Blum and Eloranta, 'War Zones'.
24. J. Lange, *Die Lebensmittelversorgung der Stadt Essen während des Krieges*, Phil.Diss., University of Erlangen, 1929; Britta Nicolai, *Die Lebensmittelversorgung in Flensburg 1914–1918: Zur Mangelwirtschaft während des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Flensburg: Schriften der Gesellschaft für Flensburger Stadtgeschichte e.V. Nr. 39, 1988).
25. Kuczynski, *Geschichte*.
26. L. H. Siegelbaum, *The Politics of Industrial Mobilization in Russia: A Study of the War-Industries Committees* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1983).

27. P. Gatrell, *Russia's First World War: A Social and Economic History* (Harlow: Pearson/Longman, 2005).
28. N. Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
29. S. Broadberry and M. Harrison, 'The Economics of World War I: An Overview', in Broadberry and Harrison (eds.), *The Economics of World War I*, 3–40.
30. Blum et al., 'Organisation of War Economies'.
31. A. Markevich and M. Harrison, 'Great War, Civil War, and Recovery: Russia's National Income, 1913 to 1928', *Journal of Economic History*, 71/3 (2011), 672–703.
32. Blum et al., 'Organisation of War Economies'.
33. A. Offer, *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
34. See esp. M. Blum, 'Government Decisions Before and During the First World War and the Living Standards in Germany during a Drastic Natural Experiment', *Explorations in Economic History*, 48 (2011), 556–67; M. Blum, 'War, Food Rationing, and Socioeconomic Inequality in Germany During the First World War', *Economic History Review*, 66 (2013), 1063–83; R. Chickering, *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
35. M. Cox, *War, Blockades, and Hunger: Nutritional Deprivation of German Children 1914–1924* (Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers, 110; University of Oxford, 2013).
36. Blum, 'Government Decisions'.
37. F. Siegmund-Schultze, *Die Wirkungen der englischen Hungerblockade auf die deutschen Kinder.* (Berlin: F. Zillessen, 1919).
38. B. R. Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics, Europe, 1750–1988*, 3rd edn (Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan; Stockton Press, 1992).
39. Cox, *Nutritional Deprivation*.
40. Blum, 'War, Food Rationing'.
41. See P. Osinsky, 'War, State Collapse, Redistribution: Russian and German Revolutions Revisited', *Political Power and Social Theory*, 19 (2010), 3–38 for a comparison of the Russian and German crises.
42. Eloranta and Harrison, 'War and Disintegration, 1914–1950'.
43. J. Eloranta, 'Rent Seeking and Collusion in the Military Allocation Decisions of Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain, 1920–1938', *Economic History Review*, 62/1 (2009), 23–44; P. A. C. Koistinen, *The Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective*, foreword by Congressman Les Aspin (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980).
44. See e.g. B. J. Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939*, NBER Series on Long-Term Factors in Economic Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
45. Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters*.
46. P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Fontana, 1989).
47. Statistisches Reichsamt, *Zahlen zur Geldentwertung in Deutschland 1914 bis 1923* (Berlin: R. Hobbing, 1925).
48. Gerald D. Feldman, *The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) C. L. Holtfrerich, *Die deutsche Inflation 1914–1923: Ursachen und Folgen in internationaler Perspektive* (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1980). Please see Ritschl, 'Pity of Peace' and other chapters in Broadberry

and Harrison (eds.), *The Economics of World War I* for a discussion of 'incompleted' defeat of Germany, which served later as a basis for the 'stab-in-the-back' legend.

49. C. Webber and A. Wildavsky, *A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).
50. A. T. Lauterbach, 'Economic Demobilization in Great Britain After the First World War', *Political Science Quarterly*, 57/3 (1995), 376–93.
51. C. H. Feinstein, P. Temin, and G. Toniolo, *The European Economy between the Wars* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
52. R. Findlay and K. H. O'Rourke, *Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
53. See e.g. W. R. J. Alexander, 'The Impact of Defence Spending on Economic Growth: A Multisectoral Approach to Defence Spending and Economic Growth with Evidence from Developed Economies', *Defence Economics* 2/1 (1990), 39–55.

PART II

RECASTING EUROPE, *c.*1917–1924

CHAPTER 6

THE NEW DIPLOMACY AND THE NEW EUROPE, 1916–1922

ALAN SHARP*

The outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 prompted enhanced radical criticism of the current practice of diplomacy, greater concern about the suppression of national identities within the European multinational empires, further demands for the control of armaments and their manufacture, and calls for a new international security architecture. On 17 September 1914 Ramsay MacDonald, Norman Angell, E. D. Morel, Charles Trevelyan, and Arthur Ponsonby signed a letter to the press on behalf of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), a group of British left-wing liberals and socialists concerned at the lack of parliamentary scrutiny and sanction for British foreign policy and blaming the war upon the secret machinations of an aristocratic European elite. The letter set out the four cardinal points which were adopted, with modifications, as the union's manifesto at its inaugural meeting on 17 November 1914. These demanded the population's consent for any transfer of territory; parliamentary assent for any treaty; that Britain should 'eschew alliances for the purpose of maintaining the "Balance of Power"' and instead seek action through an international court; and a drastic reduction in global armaments, with nationalization of armaments manufacture.[1] A fifth point, sponsored by the economist J. A. Hobson, was adopted in May 1916 demanding no continuation of economic warfare when the present conflict ended and British promotion of free trade.[2]

The manifesto has been dubbed 'the first important synthesis of the so-called New Diplomacy in any form'.[3] Other groups advocating new approaches to international relations and the encouragement of east European and Balkan nationalism also contributed to the pool of ideas,[4] but the realization of their hopes depended upon a powerful sponsor—as Frederick II of Prussia had disparagingly remarked of the eighteenth-century proposals of the abbé de Saint-Pierre, these required only 'the agreement of Europe and a few other trifles' to become effective.[5] The endorsement of Woodrow Wilson, the president of the United States, with whom several of the UDC members corresponded, was crucial.

Wilson and the New Diplomacy

On 27 May 1916, Wilson told the Republican League to Enforce Peace that 'The peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy'. This he defined thus:

> First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live … Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and national integrity … And, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origins in aggression and disregard for the rights of peoples and nations.

Declaring that the United States must be a participant in world affairs he committed it to membership of 'any feasible … universal association of nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas … and to prevent war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning … a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence'.[6] His surprise address to Congress on 22 January 1917, the 'Peace without Victory' speech, reinforced his commitment. Thomas Knock hailed it as '*the* Wilsonian manifesto of the Great War', in which he became 'the first statesman to articulate a comprehensive synthesis of progressive internationalism—a New Diplomacy based upon the principle of the equality of nations, self-determination, the peaceful settlement of disputes, freedom of the seas, disarmament, and collective security'.[7] On 2 April 1917 he asked Congress to declare war on Germany. 'The world', he stated, 'must be made safe for democracy.'[8]

On 8 January 1918 he outlined his 'Fourteen Points' to Congress. His 'program for the peace of the world' advocated 'open covenants of peace openly arrived at', neutrals plying their trade in wartime without hindrance in international waters, the removal of barriers to free trade, the reduction of armaments to 'the lowest point consistent with domestic safety', and 'a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial' colonial settlement. Germany and its allies must evacuate and restore all territories occupied in Russia, Belgium, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. Denying any intention to destroy Austria-Hungary or to deprive the Turks of their national territory, he sought autonomy for the peoples of Austria-Hungary and the non-Turkish peoples of the Ottoman Empire, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, Italian frontiers redrawn 'upon clearly recognizable lines of nationality', and an independent state of Poland. Finally he called for a League of Nations offering 'mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike'.[9]

In subsequent speeches, notably the 'Four Principles' (11 February), the 'Four Ends' (4 July), and the 'Five Particulars' (27 September), he demanded an end to 'the great game, now forever discredited, of the Balance of Power', the satisfaction of 'all well-defined national aspirations', and 'a fair and just and honest peace … in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike'. 'These great objects', he declared, 'can be put into a single sentence.

What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.'[10]

David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, sharing a common Gladstonian liberal legacy, expressed similar views, though without achieving the same universal acclaim. His 5 January 1918 address to the Trades Union Congress with its three-point programme—'First, the sanctity of treaties must be re-established; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed; and, lastly, we must seek by the creation of some international organisation to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war'[11]—pre-empted much of the spirit of the Fourteen Points, nearly causing Wilson to abandon his speech. His friend and confidant, Colonel Edward House, persuaded him to persevere and it was Wilson's 1918 rhetoric that impacted so strongly on both sides of the belligerent lines.[12]

After the dramatic events of March 1918, when a massive German onslaught threatened to split the British and French armies, subsequent attacks continued to menace Paris until the tide turned inexorably in July and August. The war ended almost as precipitously as it began. Bulgaria accepted an armistice on 29 September. The Ottomans and Austria-Hungary began negotiations leading to their respective armistices on 30 October and 3 November. On 4 October 1918 Germany requested an armistice from Wilson and an undertaking that the peace settlement would be based on the principles of the Fourteen Points.[13]

Wilson demanded regime change in Germany and the consideration of all his 1918 speeches. However much they resented Germany's approach to this latecomer to their ranks, French premier Georges Clemenceau and Lloyd George knew that their freedom of manoeuvre was limited. John Maynard Keynes, the British economist, emphasized Wilson's enormous moral prestige, America's increasing military might, and Europe's dependency on America for its finance and food. 'Never', he suggested, 'had a philosopher held such weapons wherewith to bind the princes of this world.'[14] On 5 November, after some delicate negotiations about the freedom of the seas and the definition of the 'restoration' of occupied territories, the Allies agreed, in a note sent by the American secretary of state Robert Lansing, 'to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses'.[15]

The armistice with Germany on 11 November 1918 ended the fighting between the Allies and the Central Powers, though conflict continued. Lansing recorded in his diary for 22 January 1919, 'all the races of Central Europe and the Balkans in fact are actually fighting or about to fight with one another … the Great War seems to have split up into a lot of little wars'.[16] In this unpromising situation the New Diplomacy stood centre stage, with the victors committed to the difficult task of reconciling Wilson's inspirational articulation of liberal values to the complex realities of European and world society, embittered by recent experience. En route to Europe he recognized the enormity of his task. He urged his colleagues, 'Tell me what is right and I will fight for it',[17] but he knew his speeches had created impossible expectations. He found that subjects of

the European overseas empires, for whom his words had not been intended, anticipated self-determination as eagerly as aspiring national groups in Europe, of whom there were more than he had anticipated. He predicted 'a tragedy of disappointment', a foreboding that cannot have been eased by his messianic welcomes in Europe.[18]

Wilson believed in the fundamental goodness of mankind. National self-determination would allow people to choose their state, over which democracy would give them control. They would elect wise governments, facilitating domestic harmony and economic progress. Internationally the League of Nations, by preventing a repetition of the headlong rush to war of 1914, would permit rational and informed publics to encourage their governments to seek alternative methods of dispute resolution. Making the world safe for democracy would make the world a safer place. Wilson declared, 'My conception of the League of Nations is just this, that it shall operate as the organized moral force of men throughout the world and that whenever or wherever wrong and aggression are planned or contemplated, this searching light of conscience will be turned upon them and men everywhere will ask, "What are the purposes that you hold in your heart against the fortunes of the world?"'[19] Clemenceau was unconvinced—'vox populi, vox diaboli' he growled, whilst paying Wilson an ambiguous compliment in acknowledging 'la noble candeur de son esprit'.[20]

The Paris Peace Conference

The Paris Peace Conference's formal opening suggested the New Diplomacy might struggle. Saturday 18 January 1919 marked the anniversary of Otto von Bismarck's proclamation of the German Empire in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles in 1871, following victory in the Franco-Prussian War. Clemenceau saved Versailles for later but made it clear who was now victorious. 'I hear that when the Delegates were putting on their hats to leave,' noted the British diplomat Esme Howard, 'Wilson who saw Clemenceau putting on an old soft felt hat said "I was told I must wear a tall hat for this occasion". "So was I" retorted C. cramming his soft hat over his eyes.'[21] The world's press, hopeful that the negotiations would be conducted in the public view, were disappointed. Wilson understood the need for confidentiality whilst terms were settled and simply required that the outcomes must 'appear in the final covenant made public to the world'.[22]

An early clash of old and new proved fateful. A French agenda of 20 November 1918 proposed to dictate terms to the Germans before convening a larger gathering to discuss the broader issues, just as the victors had done in Paris and Vienna in 1814–15. Placing the League as the final item and stating that the Fourteen Points were 'not sufficiently defined in their character to be taken as a basis for a concrete settlement of the war' ensured Wilson's rejection. No alternative was suggested, leaving the conference without any clear programme or priorities, beyond Wilson's insistence that the League come first.[23]

Many participants commented on the resulting confusion and incoherence. Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary, remarked, 'At this Conference all important business is transacted in the intervals of other business.'[24] Anticipating eventual negotiations with the Germans, the expert commissions drafted their conditions allowing space for later concessions. Their deliberations emphasized their differences. Fearing that it would not require a German of Talleyrand's ability to set each against the other as the French diplomat had the victors of 1815, the Allies tacitly agreed that they would dictate their terms, but these were not revised, thus creating a treaty of maximum and uncoordinated demands. The British diplomat Harold Nicolson reflected, 'Had it been known from the outset that no negotiations would ever take place with the enemy, it is certain that many of the less reasonable clauses of the Treaty would never have been inserted.'[25]

The League of Nations

The League was the keystone of Wilson's New Diplomacy. He insisted that drafting its Covenant be the conference's first priority and that the Covenant's twenty-six articles should be the first part of each of the treaties. In under a month, meeting in the evenings so as not to interrupt other business, working from a composite Anglo-American script, and driven by himself and his deputy, the prominent British Conservative Lord Robert Cecil, his commission presented the draft Covenant of the League of Nations to the Plenary Conference on 14 February 1919. Lord Eustace Percy, a British diplomat, judged that, 'As a matter of cold historical fact [the League] happened because Cecil and Wilson wanted it—and for no other reason!'[26] Their commitment, but especially that of Wilson, was crucial. His partners were at best lukewarm, seeing his obsession with the League as an opportunity to extract concessions in matters they considered more vital.

A general alliance to preserve peace was not a new idea—as Sir Harry Hinsley observed, 'Every scheme for the elimination of war that men have advocated since 1917 has been nothing but a copy or an elaboration of some seventeenth-century programme—as the seventeenth-century programmes were copies of still earlier schemes.'[27] The latest, the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe, was a great-power club in which Austria (after 1868 Austria-Hungary), Britain, France, Prussia (after 1871 Germany), and Russia agreed to consult on matters of international importance. Europe remained relatively peaceful for much of the century. The first Hague Conference in 1899 established a Permanent Court of Arbitration and almost all the great powers had formal or informal agreements to resolve, by non-violent means, questions not involving their national honour or security. War, according to Norman Angell's widely read and translated *The Great Illusion* (1910), was irrational, immoral, uneconomic, and impractical.[28]

In 1913, the Concert, notable for its demonstration of Anglo-German cooperation, resolved the recent spate of Balkan wars, but, to the chagrin of the British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey, it could not compel its members to negotiate. Following the

assassination of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 he failed to assemble the conference that he believed would have prevented war. He was hence an early convert to the idea of a reformed Concert with powers to enforce discussion and delay before hostilities commenced—a policy which had the added advantage of chiming with Wilson's thoughts as the belligerent nations vied for American support.

Wilson's first draft of the Covenant in January 1919, in common with several earlier British and French proposals,[29] proposed an automatic sanction: 'Should any Contracting Power break or disregard its covenant … it shall thereby *ipso facto* … become at war with all the members of the League.' Here was the kernel of his alternative international organization, collective security, the automatic guarantee by all the members of a universal alliance of the political independence and territorial integrity of each member in the face of an attack launched before all the League's mechanisms had been exhausted. The concept posed a revolutionary challenge to national sovereignty because this absolute commitment meant that the fundamental decision for war or peace would be taken for each member by another government which had broken its international pledges. Faced with constitutional protests from his advisers and concerns from his major allies, Wilson amended his proposal, which eventually became Article 16: 'Should any Contracting Power break or disregard its covenant … it shall thereby *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all the members of the League.' Now each member could formulate its own response, thus depriving the system of the immediacy and certainty on which it depended for its credibility.[30]

Hence, although Wilson insisted that Article 10's promise 'to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing independence of all members of the League' was fundamental and without it the League would be 'hardly more than an influential debating society', Cecil tellingly asked 'Yes, but do any of us mean it?' Léon Bourgeois, one of the French delegates to the League commission, suggested that 'Without military backing in some force, and always ready to act, our League and our Covenant will be filed away, not as a solemn treaty, but simply as an ornate piece of literature'. Wilson and Cecil, however, resisted the French proposal for a permanent League army, preferring moral to military sanctions. Cecil stated, 'For the most part there is no attempt to rely on anything like a superstate … What we rely upon is public opinion … and if we are wrong about that, then the whole thing is wrong.' The other French delegate, Ferdinand Larnaude, was overheard asking, 'Am I at a Peace Conference or in a madhouse?'[31] Clearly neither he nor Clemenceau shared Wilson's belief in a benign human nature.

Lloyd George was not a great League enthusiast but, like Wilson, he recognized that one of its crucial functions would be to correct the inevitable mistakes that the peace conference would make, given the pressure under which it operated. There was strong British support for flexibility in the new system, otherwise its very rigidity in the face of changing circumstances could itself pose a challenge to peace. Article 19 allowed the League to advise the reconsideration of 'international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world', thus introducing further uncertainty and a potential clash with Article 10. Many of the frontiers endorsed by the conference were

disputed and might well constitute a threat to peace but could their reconsideration and amendment be reconciled with the League's commitment to protect the territorial integrity of its members? Given the ambiguity over what security the League could provide, emphasized by the French acceptance of additional Anglo-American guarantees against German aggression, it is unsurprising that Clemenceau spoke for many when he declared, 'There is an old system of alliances called the Balance of Power—this system of alliances, which I do not renounce, will be my guiding thought at the Peace Conference.'[32]

This clash between the new and old diplomacies was obscured by the public support for the League offered by politicians aware, in a democratic age, of the electoral power of this idea, even though, in private, they doubted its effectiveness. In 1935, however, the British government would find itself uncomfortably falling between the two, as it juggled unsuccessfully with the problem of maintaining the credibility of the League in the face of Italian aggression in Abyssinia and yet retaining Italian support to preserve the balance of power against Hitler's Germany.[33]

Wilson's insistence that the Covenant be part of the treaties rebounded when the United States Senate refused its consent to the Treaty of Versailles, first on 19 November 1919 and finally on 19 March 1920. Of all the consequences of this reneging of responsibility for a settlement upon which America's representatives had profoundly impacted, its absence from the League was amongst the most significant. Lloyd George told the Imperial Conference in 1921, 'You cannot have a League of Nations without America; it would not be of the least use.'[34] The loss of its major sponsor left Britain and France as the reluctant and fractious guardians of Wilson's orphan. It became an adjunct to the old diplomacy, an avenue to be exploited over some issues and ignored in others, notably in matters of treaty enforcement. If it ultimately failed in its primary objective to prevent another major war or in its efforts to bring about world disarmament, it did enjoy some success, particularly in the humanitarian sphere, and in resolving disputes between minor powers.[35]

All States Are Equal?

The drafting of the Covenant also exposed other difficulties facing the New Diplomacy. Despite a theoretical commitment to democracy and the equality of states, only with great reluctance did Wilson and Cecil agree to expand the League commission to include delegates from a further four smaller powers in addition to the original ten delegates from the five great powers (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States) and five from smaller countries. On that occasion they bowed to the majority and they did so again when the commission refused to accept that the Council of the League would be composed exclusively of great powers. When, however, the Japanese demanded a vote on their racial equality clause, Wilson and Cecil resisted, fearing the implications for Asian immigration to California and Australia and race relations in America. With

eleven votes in favour and none against (with Britain and America amongst the abstainers), Wilson insisted that such an important clause must have unanimous backing—a dubious use of procedural niceties.[36]

The conference was dominated by the great powers, first in the Council of Ten (the heads of government of America, Britain, France, Italy, and their foreign ministers, together with two Japanese representatives), the principal decision-making body until March 1919, and then in the Council of Four (Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Vittorio Orlando, the Italian premier, and Wilson) which replaced it until June. Their foreign ministers—Stephen Pichon, Balfour, Sidney Sonnino, and Lansing, together with Baron Makino of Japan—became the Council of Five, which undertook much of the detailed work on the new frontiers of Europe and the treaty with Austria. The smaller states were limited to brief appearances before these bodies, a few places on commissions, or a meaningless and formal role in the Plenary Conference, which met only nine times—Clemenceau was characteristically blunt, telling them, 'I make no mystery of it—there is a conference of the Great Powers going on in the next room.'[37]

National Self-Determination

The League was one cornerstone of the New Diplomacy; national self-determination was another. Wilson was clear. 'This war', he stated on 11 February 1918, 'had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life.' The remedy was equally clear: '"Self-Determination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action.'[38] The sequential collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg, and Hohenzollern empires and the abject defeat of the Ottomans appeared to offer the peacemakers the opportunity to remake the map of Europe on the national lines advocated by pressure groups such as the New Europe or the experts and academics in the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence Department, the French Comité d'Études, or its American counterpart, the Inquiry.[39]

Unfortunately central and eastern Europe did not divide into neat national blocks (even assuming an undisputed definition of nationality). Centuries of conflict, migration, intermarriage, and dynastic convenience had created a kaleidoscopic ethnographic map which, given the peacemakers' reluctance to resort to forcible movements of population,[40] could not be unscrambled. There were additional complications because these potential new states had, ideally, to be economically viable, to possess defensible frontiers and secure communications, with the further refinement that the boundaries suggested by each criterion rarely coincided.

Pressure mounted. The peacemakers perceived themselves to be in a race to establish order before they were overtaken by the alternative Bolshevik vision proselytized by Vladimir Lenin and his comrades in Moscow. As Lansing wrote on 4 April 1919,

> Central Europe is aflame with anarchy; the people see no hope; the Red Armies of Russia are marching westward. Hungary is in the clutches of the revolutionists; Berlin, Vienna and Munich are turning towards the Bolsheviks…. It is time to stop fiddling while the world is on fire … everybody is clamouring for peace, for an immediate peace.[41]

Then there were the wartime promises made either to states such as Italy or Romania to tempt them to join the Entente, or to emigrés and dissident groups, in the hope of spreading nationalist discord within the enemy ranks. This was a double-edged strategy—as the Central Powers pointed out on 11 January 1917, 'If the adversaries demand above all the restoration of invaded rights and liberties, the recognition of the principle of nationalities and of the free existence of small states, it will suffice to call to mind the tragic fate of the Irish and Finnish peoples, the obliteration of the freedom and independence of the Boer Republics',[42] but desperate times prompted them to take the risk. They were also unclear, particularly in the case of Austria-Hungary, whether their objective was to encourage the empire to make peace separately, or to provoke rebellion and secession in the hope of destroying it. The Inquiry neatly expressed this conundrum: 'Our policy must therefore consist first in a stirring up of nationalist discontent, and then in refusing to accept the extreme logic of this discontent which would be the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.'[43]

It was symptomatic of much that transpired in eastern and central Europe during the conference that this dilemma was resolved, not by the deliberations of Allied statesmen, but by events on the ground as Austria-Hungary imploded. Various aspiring new states laid claim to the wreck of this and the other empires, and the peacemakers were left to adjudicate between the conflicting ambitions of such as actually survived. Their control stretched as far east as Germany's frontiers with Poland; beyond that the new map depended more upon the outcome of wars and local initiatives. The only tangible signs of their authority were the German troops obligated by the armistice to stay in these regions until 'the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories'. As the conference dragged on and the Allies demobilized, the situation became more precarious. Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary, wrote from Paris in July 1919: 'Mr Balfour pointed out that the Allies who six months ago possessed the greatest military power in the world were now militarily impotent to impose their will either upon their old enemies or upon the rebellious little states in Eastern Europe.'[44]

Few chose to notice Wilson's caveat that national aspirations should be met only if they did not introduce new or perpetuate 'old elements of discord and antagonism', instead expecting that he and Lloyd George would deliver what they were perceived to have promised. The fate of the Banat of Temesvár, which had been Hungarian in 1914, illustrated many typical characteristics of the problems involved. Romania claimed it all, on ethnographic grounds and the Allied promises in the 1916 Treaty of Bucharest, though there were doubts whether this was invalidated by Romania's conclusion of a separate peace in 1917. Another Allied state, Yugoslavia (technically, until 1929, the

Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), claimed the western and part of the central regions, arguing a complex case on ethnic, strategic, historic, and economic grounds. Both claimants crafted clever ethnographic maps but the population was hopelessly mixed and no frontier could avoid creating substantial minorities. The expectation that these two hitherto friendly powers could reach an amicable compromise foundered,[45] whilst matters were further complicated by the conflicting interests of the great powers.

Britain and America agreed that the Banat should be divided amongst Hungary and the two claimants, recognizing the validity of part of the Yugoslav case. Italy, an implacable opponent of Yugoslavia, backed the Romanians, who raised the spectre of Bolshevik revolution should their hopes be disappointed. France, wary of Italy, in turn backed Yugoslavia. There were no reliable statistics, neither side would accept a plebiscite unless its form guaranteed a successful outcome for its claim, and both considered, at different times, the use of force.[46] The eventual Allied decision, which allocated most of the territory to Romania, leaving Hungary the area around Szeged, with Yugoslavia gaining part of the western region, satisfied nobody: 75,000 Romanians and 65,000 Slavs found themselves on the wrong side of the new border whilst both states resented the League minority protection regime imposed by the great powers.[47]

Most of the territorial issues were handled by the Council of Five, who agonized over many rival claims as they attempted to reconcile conflicting principles and practicalities. Could Wilson's promise of secure access to the Baltic for the revived state of Poland or France's reasonable claim to the coal of the Saar in compensation for the deliberate German wrecking of its mines be delivered without breaching the principle of self-determination? Here ceding the sovereignty of Danzig and the Saar to the League proved a useful solution. Should the German-speaking inhabitants of the Czech borderlands or the rump of Austria be allowed to join Germany, thus rewarding it for losing the war and increasing its already formidable strength? Should those in the South Tyrol be assigned to Italy to secure its Alpine frontier?

For the most part the Four accepted the Five's recommendations but Lloyd George baulked at their Polish proposals, insisting that Danzig be made a free city and that the Polish Corridor linking the Polish heartlands to the sea be as limited as possible. Here, but most significantly of all in Upper Silesia which had originally been assigned in its entirety to Poland, he invoked plebiscites to determine the outcome, reminding a reluctant Wilson that he was only following the president's own principles.[48]

The New Europe had thousands of miles of new frontiers. The settlements consolidated the Balkans where the major winners were Yugoslavia which trebled Serbia's pre-war population and territory and Romania, which more than doubled its 1914 size and population. Greece also doubled, but Bulgaria's hopes of territorial gain (however unrealistic for a defeated power) were disappointed and its losses, though relatively minor, meant it no longer had access to the Aegean and, proportionate to its size and wealth, faced the highest reparations bill of all the Central Powers. By contrast eastern and central Europe fragmented with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary, together with the Soviet Union, filling the political vacuum left by the collapsed empires. Hungary, the heaviest loser of all, lost two-thirds of its pre-war territory and 58 per cent of its population, with one-third of Magyars now living in neighbouring

states. Typically, but most significantly in eastern Europe, where the revival of Germany, or Russia, or both, could threaten their very existence, all these states had grievances with their neighbours that hindered economic or political cooperation. The settlement halved the number of minority populations in the area from the 60 million of 1914 but still 25 per cent of people found themselves as feared and resented minorities in the new states, each a witness to the impossibility of applying Wilson's 'troublesome principle'.[49]

Disarmament

The peace settlements reflected the New Diplomacy's advocacy of disarmament and the removal of the private profit motive from arms manufacture. Whilst it was not unusual for victors to impose limits on the military strength of their main enemy, an extension to lesser defeated states was,[50] and the Allied undertaking to proceed themselves towards reducing armaments unprecedented. Despite its prevarications and dissimulation Germany was disarmed, at least in the sense of being deprived of offensive war-making capacity, which satisfied the British, though not the French, who sought to break Germany's 'military spirit' and achieve 'moral disarmament'.[51] The League set up a Disarmament Committee at its first Assembly meeting in 1920 but expected to accomplish little before the former enemy states had been disarmed, whilst uncertainty over the intentions of Soviet Russia added to the understandable caution of states that lacked confidence in the good faith of their neighbours.[52] There was a perennial problem of perception: one state's definition of its minimum defensive requirements might resemble the means of aggression to others. Aristide Briand, the French statesman, taxed by an American correspondent in 1922 about France's obsession with the Rhineland, pointed out that America was building battleships. When informed these were for purely peaceful purposes he responded, 'Very well, but so far as I know battleships were not invented for fishing sardines.'[53]

It was President Warren Harding, no friend of the New Diplomacy, who made the most significant contribution to disarmament in the early post-war period by calling the Washington Naval Conference in 1921–2. The major maritime powers (America, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) fixed the ratio of capital ships between them, a decision helped in an age of submarines, mines, and aircraft, by doubts about the continuing value of battleships. This limited agreement, relating to a specific type of weapon, proved a more reliable signpost to future successes in international arms control than the League's more ambitious vision.[54]

The Settlement

Keynes in his magnificent yet tendentious polemic, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, reduced the complexities of peacemaking to what he judged the vindictive decisions of three flawed men secluded in Wilson's 'hot, dry room'.[55] Seductive as this might

be, it was neither an honest nor a complete assessment but his version of events has had a profound effect on later evaluations of the post-war settlements. Although the general trend of scholarship, particularly since the opening, from the 1960s onwards, of most states' archives on the period, has been more sympathetic to the peacemakers and the enormity of their problems,[56] Keynes's condemnation of their works as a Carthaginian peace still exercises a strong hold on popular perceptions of the settlement, and not all historians are persuaded that the peacemakers made the best of a bad job.[57]

Some recent studies seek to place the settlements in a larger context. Margaret MacMillan's *Peacemakers* and the thirty-two volumes of the Haus *Makers of the Modern World* series emphasize the impossible task facing the peacemakers and the pressures, both domestic and international, under which they laboured. Zara Steiner's magisterial *The Lights that Failed*, besides offering a comprehensive coverage of the League, the economic recovery, and European relations in the 1920s, also illuminates the role of some of the smaller states in a story often dominated by the great powers. Patrick Cohrs's *Unfinished Peace after World War I* suggests that, although the Parisian peacemakers failed, cooperation between American financial power and Britain's political leverage created a basis for European stability until wrecked by the Great Depression. In *The Great Inter-War Crisis* Robert Boyce argues that the economic and political crises that ultimately scuppered European peace need to be analysed as linked rather than coincidental occurrences. They agree in seeing Steiner's 'hinge years' of 1929 to 1933 as more decisive to the world's future than any failures of the peacemakers.[58]

Nicolson's verdict, in 1933, was that 'We came to Paris convinced that the new order was about to be established; we left it convinced that the old order had merely fouled the new.'[59] Isaiah Bowman, one of the American experts, was perhaps more realistic and balanced in his assessment:

> In the modern, closely organized, strongly commercialized world it is virtually impossible to make a clean-cut distinction between what is right from the standpoint of ethnography, nationalistic sentiment, and abstract justice, and what is fair from the standpoint of economic advantage…. So that if we introduce a new set of conceptions into diplomacy, if we call it, let us say, 'The New Diplomacy', we shall perhaps be able here and there to achieve justice in minor cases, but the great stakes of diplomacy remain the same. We simply discuss them in different terms.[60]

Reparations and Inter-Allied Debts

Nothing exemplified this better than the tangled problem of the Central Powers' liability to compensate the victors for their losses. Wilson and Lloyd George both precluded in their 1918 speeches any claim for their full war costs—an indemnity, whilst the pre-armistice agreement required only recompense for 'all damage done to the

civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air'—reparations. The wording was crafted carefully, but insincerely, by Lloyd George,[61] who, in Paris, joined Clemenceau in demanding full compensation, provoking Wilson's adamant opposition. The 'solution' to this clash of old and new was Article 231 of the treaty asserting the Allied moral right that Germany (and its allies) should cover all their losses because Germany (and its allies) were responsible for the war, but Article 232 restricted their claims to certain categories of civilian damage, including however, at Britain's insistence, the costs of pensions and allowances paid to servicemen and their families. Wilson acceded to the dubious argument that service personnel were merely civilians in uniform, hoping to create a fairer basis for the distribution of an anticipated fixed German payment to discharge all its debts.[62]

The conference failed to agree on such a sum, instead setting up a Reparation Commission to make recommendations. Its 1921 demand for £6.6 billion was illusory, inflated to satisfy Allied public opinion. Of the three series of bonds Germany was to issue, over £4 billion were C bonds which no one believed would be paid. Its real debt, under the A and B bonds, was therefore about £2.5 billion, well within British and American estimates of its capacity to pay. Reparations were also closely interlinked with inter-Allied borrowing. Faced, unlike Germany, with heavy reconstruction costs and sizeable external debts of £3.7 billion of which £2.96 billion was owed to the United States,[63] Britain and France had genuine need of assistance, and suggested an all-round cancellation of inter-Allied debt in return for reducing Germany's liabilities. Rejecting the argument that some had paid for victory with blood and others with treasure, President Calvin Coolidge's response was typically brief: 'Well, they hired the money, didn't they?'

The Americans did step in after various Allied attempts to enforce German payment culminated in the abortive Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. The 1924 Dawes and 1929 Young plans attempted to create workable payment schedules, aided by foreign investment, largely American, of £1.27 billion between 1924 and 1930, most of which Hitler later refused to repay. In 1932 Germany defaulted, having paid some £1.1 billion, including payments in kind.[64]

Russia and Germany

The major problems for the peacemakers were Russia and Germany. The former they largely ignored for the good reason that they had no idea with whom they should deal—for most of 1919 the most probable successors to the Tsars looked to be one or more of the White generals, whose armies threatened to swamp the Bolsheviks before collapsing that autumn. A brief attempt to bring all the warring factions to a conference in early 1919 on the Prinkipo Islands in the Sea of Marmora came to nothing and Russia was dismissed in two brief clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.[65]

Not so Germany, which lost Alsace-Lorraine to France; Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium; northern Schleswig to Denmark; Danzig to the League; the Polish Corridor (which split East and West Prussia), Posen, and half of Upper Silesia to Poland; and Memel to Lithuania. France was awarded the Saar coal mines with the territory ceded for fifteen years to the League, after which a plebiscite would determine its destiny. The Rhineland was demilitarized permanently and occupied by the Allies for fifteen years. Germany's losses amounted to over 6.5 million people and 27,000 square miles of land (10 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively, of its pre-war resources).[66] It was forbidden union with the rump state of Austria. Germany's forces were restricted to an army of 100,000 long-term volunteers and a tiny navy of 15,000 men without submarines or dreadnoughts. It was forbidden an air force, heavy artillery, tanks, poison gas, and a general staff. It was obligated to deliver as yet unnamed 'war criminals' and as yet unspecified reparations to the victors. Its overseas empire of over 1 million square miles was surrendered to the League for redistribution under mandates—an imperial carve-up in practice, but with some international oversight.[67]

This came as a profound shock to the Germans. The peacemakers perceived that Germany had caused the war, fought it with barbarity, and lost. The German public accepted none of these premises. Knowing that they had won the war in the east and believing that they had fought a draw in the west, they rejected any notion of defeat, misled by the elite's myth of a 'stab in the back' by domestic dissidents that had robbed them of victory. Living in what Ernst Troeltsch called a 'dreamland', they expected that Wilson's programme might bring rewards and certainly prevent major losses. The Allied imposition of a victors' peace rendered risible Lloyd George's hope that Germany would loyally execute a treaty it perceived to be just and fair.

Aftermath

Yet the peacemakers had neglected to specify how they proposed to enforce their settlement. The treaty was remarkably vague about penalties and sanctions, and was especially weak when it came to measures that might, by the immediacy of their threat, encourage Germany to act with any urgency. Many of the actions taken by the Allies in various combinations between 1920 and 1923 were of dubious legality, relying upon adaptations of clauses intended for other purposes or upon interpretations of treaty provisions disowned by their original authors.[68]

Matters were further complicated by the inability of France and Britain, left by America's lamentable absence as the main enforcers of a treaty they would not have negotiated but for Wilson's presence, to agree on whether Germany could not, or would not, meet its obligations. Old rivalries re-emerged—'I am seriously afraid that the great power from whom we have most to fear in the future is France', stated the future foreign secretary George Curzon on 2 December 1918—and fed British concerns about France's military power and annexationist intentions towards the Rhineland and the Ruhr.[69] The

early years of peace were marked by a clash between Britain's inclination to modify the terms in Germany's favour and France's preference for enforcing the treaty as it stood. They succeeded only in creating a stalemate in which Germany took advantage of their divisions to prevaricate and obfuscate.

In what proved to be his last major initiative as prime minister, Lloyd George did seek, in the Genoa Conference in the spring of 1922, to solve as many of the European problems as possible, placing his faith in the liberal shibboleth of trade. He hoped to create reconstruction contracts by engaging the Soviet Union, thus enabling Germany to restore its prosperity, pay reparations, and allow the Allies to repay their debts to America. This would re-establish European stability and incidentally 'kill Bolshevism with kindness'. His attempt at a panacea was frustrated by the American refusal to participate, the French rejection of any discussion of reparations, and the secret deal concluded between the Soviet Union and Germany at Rapallo on 16 April, Easter Sunday.[70] In October 1922, Lloyd George, the last of the Big Four still in post, left high office for ever. It would fall to others to solve the problems posed by diplomacy, old or new.

Notes

* I am grateful, as always, to Professors Tom Fraser, Tony Lentin, and Sally Marks for their support and suggestions.

1. Thomas Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 37; Sally Harris, *Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union of Democratic Control, 1914–1918* (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1996), 54–5.
2. Harris, *Out of Control*, 132–3.
3. Knock, *To End All Wars*, 37.
4. Arno J. Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), *passim*; A. J. P. Taylor, *The Troublemakers: Dissent over Foreign Policy 1792–1939* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), 95–166; Keith Robbins, *Politicians, Diplomacy and War in Modern British History* (London: Hambledon Press, 1994), 101–213.
5. M. S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919* (London: Longman, 1993), 233.
6. Knock, *To End All Wars*, 77.
7. Knock, *To End All Wars*, 105–6 and 115.
8. <http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson%27s_War_Message_to_Congress>, accessed 8 October 2013.
9. H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, 6 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1920–4), i. 431–5.
10. Temperley (ed.), *Peace Conference*, i. 435–8.
11. David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs*, 2 vols (London: Odhams, 1938), ii. 1517.
12. Charles Seymour (ed.), *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, 4 vols (London: Ernest Benn, 1928), iii. 350.
13. David Stevenson, *With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918* (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 30–169; Bullitt Lowry, *Armistice 1918* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1996), *passim*.

14. John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), 38.
15. Seymour (ed.), *Intimate Papers*, iv. 152–209; Temperley (ed.), *Peace Conference*, i. 379–80.
16. David Perman, *The Making of the Czechoslovak State* (Leiden: Brill, 1962), 105.
17. James T. Shotwell, *At the Paris Peace Conference* (London: Macmillan, 1937), 78.
18. Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), *passim*; George Creel, *The War, the World and Wilson* (New York: Harper, 1920), 161–2; Knock, *To End All Wars*, 194–9.
19. David Armstrong; *The Rise of the International Organisation: A Short History* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982), 9.
20. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Clemenceau* (Paris: Fayard, 1988), 738 (The voice of the people is the voice of the devil). *Candeur* means naivety as well as integrity.
21. Lord Howard of Penrith, *Diary for 1919*, 18 January 1919, D/HW1/5, Cumbria Archive Service, Carlisle.
22. Seymour (ed.), *Intimate Papers*, iv. 158–9.
23. Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement*, 3 vols (New York: Doubleday Page, 1922), iii. 56–65.
24. Lord Percy of Newcastle, *Some Memories* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1958), 60–1.
25. Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (London: Constable, 1933), 100.
26. Percy to Temperley, 10 November 1920, in 'History of the Paris Peace Conference Correspondence 1919', File 16/2a, archives of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
27. F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 3.
28. Anderson, *Modern Diplomacy*, 236–79.
29. George Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914–1919* (London: Scolar, 1979), 63–109.
30. Ruth Henig, *The League of Nations* (London: Haus, 2010), 25–53; Alan Sharp, *The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking after the First World War, 1918–1923* (2nd edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 42–80.
31. Sharp, *Versailles Settlement*, 57 and 62; Henig, *League*, 36.
32. Margaret MacMillan, *Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War* (London: John Murray, 2001), 31.
33. Zara Steiner, *The Triumph of the Dark: European International History, 1933–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 100–36; Anthony D'Agostino, *The Rise of Global Powers: International Politics in the Era of the World Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 295–302.
34. Henig, *League*, 64.
35. Henig, *League*, 174–87; Susan Pedersen, 'Back to the League of Nations', *American Historical Review*, 112/4 (2007), 1091–117.
36. Kristofer Allerfeldt, 'Wilsonian Pragmatism? Woodrow Wilson, Japanese Immigration, and the Paris Peace Conference', *Journal of Statecraft and Diplomacy*, 14/3 (2004), 545–72.
37. Sharp, *Versailles Settlement*, 24–5.
38. Temperley (ed.), *Peace Conference*, i. 438 and 437.
39. Erik Goldstein, 'The Foreign Office and Political Intelligence 1918–1920', *Review of International Studies*, 14 (1988), 275–88; Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British*

Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference 1916–1920 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 57–89; Alan Sharp, 'Some Relevant Historians—The Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office 1918–1920', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 34/3 (1989), 359–68; Kenneth Calder, *Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), *passim*; Victor Rothwell, *British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914–1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), *passim*; Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (London: Methuen, 1981), *passim*; Lawrence Gelfand, *The Inquiry* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963), *passim*.

40. See however Carolyn Grohmann, 'From Lothringen to Lorraine: Expulsion and Voluntary Repatriation', in Conan Fischer and Alan Sharp (eds.), *After the Versailles Treaty: Enforcement, Compromise, Contested Identities* (London: Routledge, 2008), 153–69.
41. Perman, *Czechoslovak State*, 169.
42. Alfred Cobban, *The National State and National Self-Determination* (London: Fontana, 1969), 49–50.
43. S. H. Thompson, *Czechoslovakia in European History* (London: Frank Cass, 1965), 326.
44. Article 12 of the Armistice, Temperley (ed.), *Peace Conference*, i. 463–4; Kerr to Lloyd George (n.d., *c.*23 July 1919), F/89/11 in the Lloyd George Papers in the Parliamentary Archive, London.
45. Article on the Banat in *The New Europe*, 13 February 19, by R. W. Seton-Watson. H. and C. Seton-Watson, *New Europe*, 342.
46. The Yugoslavs in February, the Romanians in August 1919. I. J. Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in Frontier Making* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963), 143–5, 165, 173–7, 235; Keith Hitchens, *Ion I. C. Brătianu: Romania* (London: Haus, 2011), 117–19; Dejan Djokic, *Pašić and Trumbić: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes* (London: Haus, 2010), 88–91.
47. Temperley (ed.), *Peace Conference*, iv. 229; Lederer, *Yugoslavia*, 181; S. D. Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in the Diplomacy of Ioan I. C Brătianu* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1962), 123–6.
48. Sharp, *Versailles Settlement*, 127–32.
49. Sharp, *Versailles Settlement*, 143–66; Sharp, 'The Genie that Would Not Go back into the Bottle: National Self-Determination and the Legacy of the First World War and Peace Settlement', in Seamus Dunn and T. G. Fraser (eds.), *World War I and Contemporary Ethnic Conflict* (London: Routledge, 1996), 10–29. The phrase is Karl Meyer's in the *New York Times*, 14 August 1991.
50. Philip Towle, *Enforced Disarmament: From the Napoleonic Campaigns to the Gulf War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1 and *passim*; David Stevenson, 'Britain, France and the Origins of German Disarmament, 1916–1919', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29/2 (2008), 197–8; Alan Sharp, 'Mission Accomplished? Britain and the Disarmament of Germany, 1918–1923', in Keith Hamilton and Edward Johnson (eds.), *Arms and Disarmament in Diplomacy* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2008), 73–90.
51. Richard Shuster, *German Disarmament After World War I: The Diplomacy of International Arms Inspection 1920–1931* (London: Routledge, 2006), *passim*.
52. Henig, *League*, 109–33.
53. Robert Boyce, *The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse of Globalization* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 115.

54. Alan Sharp, *Consequences of Peace: The Versailles Settlement: Aftermath and Legacy 1919–2010* (London: Haus, 2010), 149–61.
55. Orlando is dismissed in one sentence and a footnote—further Keynesian distortion.
56. Manfred Boemeke, Gerald Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser (eds.), *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 11–20; Steiner, 'The Treaty of Versailles Revisited', in Michael Dockrill and John Fisher (eds.), *The Paris Peace Conference 1919: Peace without Victory?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 13–33; Mark Mazower, 'Two Cheers for Versailles', *History Today*, 49 (1999) 8–10; MacMillan, *Peacemakers*, *passim*; Sharp, *Consequences of Peace*, 1–40 and 211–19; Sally Marks, 'Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany and the Versailles Treaty, 1918–1921', *Journal of Modern History*, 85/3 (2013), 632–59.
57. See, for example, David Andelman, *A Shattered Peace: Versailles 1919 and the Price We Pay Today* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), or Norman Graebner and Edward Bennett, *The Versailles Treaty and Its Legacy: The Failure of the Wilsonian Vision* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), both of whose bibliographies are distinctly dated.
58. MacMillan, *Peacemakers*; Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Patrick Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe 1919–1932* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Boyce, *The Great Interwar Crisis*. Sally Marks, *The Ebbing of European Ascendancy: An International History of the World, 1914–1945* (London: Arnold, 2002) provides a global perspective.
59. Nicolson, *Peacemaking*, 187.
60. Edward House and Charles Seymour, *What Really Happened in Paris: The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918–1919* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921).
61. Antony Lentin, *Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From Versailles to Hitler 1919–1940* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 39–43.
62. Lentin, 'Maynard Keynes and the "Bamboozlement" of Woodrow Wilson: What Really Happened at Paris? (Wilson, Lloyd George, Pensions and Pre-Armistice Agreement)', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 15/4 (2004), 725–63; *The Last Political Law Lord: Lord Sumner (1859–1934)* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008), 90–1.
63. Sally Marks comments that, without German reparations, 'German economic dominance would be tantamount to victory. Reparations would both deny Germany that victory and spread the pain of undoing the damage done': 'Smoke and Mirrors: In Smoke-Filled Rooms and the Galerie des Glaces', in Boemeke et al., *The Treaty of Versailles*, 337–70, at 338.
64. Étienne Weill-Raynal, *Les Réparations allemandes et la France*, 3 vols (Paris, 1947), iii. 769–71; Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (London: Allen Lane, 1998), 417; Stephen Schuker, *American 'Reparations' to Germany, 1919–1933: Implications for the Third-World Debt Crisis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
65. Richard Debo, *Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1918–1921* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1992), 11–84.
66. Boyce suggests that, if one discounts recent German conquests and considers those Germans who moved from the lost territories to Germany, these figures should be 1.8 and 9.4 per cent respectively. Such calculations would not have altered Germany's perception of a swindle: *Great Interwar Crisis*, 52–5.
67. Sharp, *Versailles Settlement*, 109–38.

68. Alan Sharp, 'The Enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919–1923', in Fischer and Sharp (eds.), *After the Versailles Treaty*, 5–20.
69. Eastern Committee minutes in CAB 27/24 in The National Archives, Kew.
70. Carole Fink, *The Genoa Conference: European Diplomacy, 1921–1922* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993); Stephanie Salzmann, *Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union: Rapallo and After, 1922–1934* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2003).

CHAPTER 7

NATION STATES, MINORITIES, AND REFUGEES, 1914–1923

RYAN GINGERAS

Resolving the First World War, from the perspective of both the Entente and the Central Powers, entailed more than simply achieving victories on the battlefield. As a conflict that pitted two sets of mighty empires against one another, the Great War called forth a great series of internal and external territorial and administrative questions. Whether it was over land, security, economy, or domestic legitimacy, warring and neutral states confronted a great host of 'national questions' during this era. So-called national issues had naturally been a part of the fabric of inter- and intra-European politics before 1914. However, never had one singular event called into question the national status and prerogatives of big and small polities at one point in time.

Winston Churchill's quip that the Great War, a 'War of the Giants' in his words, produced a 'quarrel between pigmies' is revealing of only one part of this chapter in European history.[1] The conflict did help to define and lay bare a series of sensitive political issues revolving around the future of 'minorities' on the Continent. Even before representatives met at Versailles to negotiate the war's resolution, a number of determined national movements had engaged in bloody campaigns bent on independence or unification with their ethnic kin. Yet the outbreak of armed conflict over the status of various European minorities, whether instigated by nationalist insurgencies, mobs, or states, comprised only a portion of minority struggles that mark the years between 1914 and 1922. Far larger numbers of 'small peoples' earnestly endeavoured to integrate themselves into the presiding norms and cultures of their home states. Likewise, governments of the era were compelled, one way or another, to make peace with the complex demographic, political, and economic realities that produced the minority populations living within their national borders. The mass transfer or flight of civilians during the First World War posed both further complications, as well as opportunities, for states and peoples already saddled with daunting national dilemmas. On the one hand, the

arrival of refugees and migrants represented a test for provincial communities and state administrations in the throes of settling the meaning of integration and national belonging. On the other hand, the opportunity to deport, resettle, or even liquidate populations provided a tool for states seeking to resolve national questions in a decisive and capricious manner. Through it all, the war produced an immeasurable number of victims who lost out or were defeated at the hands of the post-war political order. Even with the creation of the League of Nations, a body designed in large measure to address and remedy the 'national questions' plaguing the post-Versailles world, minorities in Europe, more often than not, suffered at the hands of governments representing greater majorities.

States, Empires, and Minorities: A Brief Summary of Pre-War Conditions

Before one can appreciate the plight and achievements of minority groups during the Great War, it is essential to briefly contextualize the uneven development of nationalism as a mode and means of governmental, elite, and popular expression by the turn of the twentieth century. A general survey of European history during the nineteenth century provides us with an immense number of examples of how nationalism became rooted in European society. The rise of modern Europe encapsulates the triumph of a select number of critical nation states. While notions of being British (and English), French, or German did come as the result of movements long in the making, the modern articulation of national identity in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany is greatly indebted to the further bureaucratization and expanding industrial base of each of these states. New regimes and administrative reforms concerning public health, education, city planning, and military preparedness helped to acculturate and further affirm national consciousness among both elites and popular classes in this era. Governments were not the only agents responsible for the rising tide of nationalism in Europe; a vast coterie of private actors, of greater and lesser social standing, contributed to the conception and maintenance of dominant national cultures. Sport, language, fashion, child rearing, history, work ethic, consumption, and many other facets of 'modern life' became critical subjects of national negotiation and agreement for everyday citizens.

While each European state aspired to build and buttress national institutions and cultures, such efforts were often bedevilled by concurrent imperial enterprises. The experience and ramifications of empire-building in the nineteenth century were markedly different from the precedents found in the early modern world. In addition to the onset of new economic values grounded in capitalism, as well as the creation of more effective means of societal control and governmental extraction, erecting colonial and imperial administrations demanded that special attention be paid to the 'superior' national tastes and interests of governing states (although, depending on the context, consideration

would be given to the supposed needs of subject peoples). How the states of Europe met and addressed national challenges within their respective empires did differ considerably among governments to the west and east of the Elbe. In the cases of Britain and France, administrators at home and in territories abroad did their very best to render barriers between colonial subjects and citizens of the metropole. The desire found among some subjects to migrate to the empire's core, however, greatly hampered the ability of officials in London and Paris to maintain this division. After years of attempting to prevent Algerians from entering France, Paris finally gave way to political and economic pressures and allowed Algerians (legally French citizens) to migrate and find work on the French mainland after 1905.[2] Generalized restrictions placed upon non-white subjects did not deter some colonial students, tradesmen, and intellectuals from seeking work or education in London or other cities in the United Kingdom (a trend best exemplified by the pre-war experiences of Marcus Garvey and Gandhi).[3] The onset of industrialization also brought with it an immense influx of newcomers from outside the empire. In the case of London, this seismic shift in modes of production, transport, and trade led to the creation of new urban quarters populated with Jewish, West Indian, and Irish migrants. In the case of Ireland, industrialization transformed and ignited long-standing religious tensions between recently settled Protestants and Catholics in towns such as Belfast.[4]

As contiguous empires, 'minority' politics in imperial Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman state possessed altogether different connotations and implications for governments and local communities alike. The desire to foster national sentiments and loyalties among the diverse populations of these empires manifested itself in many ways over the course of the nineteenth century. Iterations of Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman nationalism alternately emphasized allegiance to the monarchy, love of the land, and, to some degree, recognition of the empire's regional, linguistic, or sectarian diversity. Vienna, St Petersburg, and Istanbul, like British and French empire-builders in Asia and Africa, attempted to use a variety of modern tools and institutions to imbue their respective populations with uniform national sympathies. Along with the building of schools, courts, hospitals, and barracks, Russian, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian administrators placed their faith in railway officials, telegraph operators, and cartographers to monitor and oversee nation-making programmes.[5] The surging forces of liberalism and nationalism ultimately forced each of these three empires to codify the rights and attributes of citizenship as well as extend some degree of electoral representation. By the late nineteenth century, all three states came to recognize every member of their diverse societies as citizens. However, certain corollaries applied to the recognition of individual and communal civil rights. In the case of Russia, some of the empire's inhabitants, particularly Muslim and nomadic groups, continued to be defined as 'resident aliens' or *inorodtsy*.[6] Ottoman attempts to apply a blanket form of citizenship to the empire's vastly diverse population did not deter some local communities of non-Muslims from asserting their collective rights as members of the defunct *millet* system.[7] Meanwhile, the Habsburgs, after the passage of the 1867 constitution, were obliged to recognize individual and communal rights regarding language and self-representation,

a step that led to the creation of an enormous patchwork of nationally defined provincial educational and electoral jurisdictions.[8]

Communal reaction to these steps towards imperial reform and nationalization (which often lacked coordination) was invariably mixed, contradictory, and at times violent. In Congress Poland, harsh 'Russification' efforts did not fully deny Polish nationalists the right to open schools or organize in the name of their ethnic kin (despite the objections and anger of the region's Russian minority).[9] Class and regional conditions influenced the decisions of some ethnic Germans living in St Petersburg to assimilate and adapt to the growth of Russian nationalism, while others sought to accentuate their status as members of an indivisible minority tied to Germany.[10] Some Muslim intellectuals in such places as Crimea, Azerbaijan, and Turkestan interpreted Russian imperialism in a different light, seeing it as forming a series of benchmarks useful in creating a more modern and enlightened sense of self.[11] The nineteenth century was undeniably an era that featured the blossoming of a number of national movements in Habsburg lands (as witnessed through countless newspapers, histories, and literary anthologies penned in regional vulgar languages). However, in portions of Bohemia and Transylvania, the ability of local communities to organize and promote German, Czech, Hungarian, or Romanian identity, language, and culture created heated debates and drew contentious boundaries in communities that had never known such divisions.[12] In Ottoman Anatolia, the formation of stronger provincial governments and a more militarized border along the empire's eastern frontier greatly empowered a select number of Kurdish tribes and landowners (which came at the expense of weaker Muslim and Christian groups).[13] When the Balkan Wars broke out in 1912, officials in Istanbul did demonstrate an ability to raise units of Muslim and Christian soldiers willing to fight at the front. However, deep-seated suspicions regarding the loyalty of Ottoman Greek troops ultimately prevented the empire's high command from fielding them in battle against their co-religionists.[14] Lastly one cannot ignore the intense outbreaks of intercommunal fighting that resulted from the shifting economic and political trends that accompanied this era of imperial administrative and communal reform. Violent nationalist agitation on the part of Serb activists in Austrian Bosnia, anti-Armenian riots in Adana, and pogroms against Jews in Kishinev demonstrated the degrees to which conflicting notions of national belonging, mixed with the stresses of reformed imperial governance and economic restructuring, influenced provincial militias, mobs, and radicals to exact bloody retribution on their neighbours.[15]

The birth of several new states in the Balkans during the nineteenth century foreshadowed important, but still fledgling, patterns of national development that held dire consequences for twentieth-century minority populations throughout Europe. Nation-building in Serbia, Greece, and Romania entailed a grand series of initiatives that targeted the visible remnants of Ottoman rule. Efforts to demolish and renovate old *mahalle*s and debates over the future of agrarian production complemented more generalized campaigns to neutralize or convert populations deemed alien to new national norms.[16] Belgrade, Athens, and Sofia methodically persecuted Orthodox Christian communities that resisted accepted state-endorsed national rites and liturgies.[17] Muslims bore

the worst of these nationalizing campaigns. While Bulgaria did begrudgingly accept a few Muslims within the halls of its national assembly, the Sabor, many more Turkish- and Slavic-speaking Muslims faced the agonizing choice of converting to Christianity or abandoning their homes for a life in exile.[18] The aftermath of the Balkan Wars highlighted the generalized uncompromising approach of those Bulgarian, Serb, and Greek administrators and soldiers tasked with incorporating newly acquired Ottoman lands in Macedonia. The conflict produced a bloody exposition in ethnic cleansing, as hundreds of thousands of Muslims were forced to flee to the Ottoman Empire. While Istanbul had faced other refugee crises in the past, the Committee of Union and Progress, which had acquired power in the midst of the war, interpreted the flight of the empire's citizens from the Balkans in ominous and intolerant terms. Beginning with newly reacquired territories in eastern Thrace, as well as in portions of western Anatolia, Ottoman authorities undertook their own programme of 'demographic re-engineering', forcing tens of thousands of Bulgarian and Greek Orthodox Christians to leave the empire in the name of maintaining provincial security and economic sovereignty.[19]

Minorities at War: Mobilization, Loyalty, and Assimilation

It seems that there were very few segments of European society that were immune to the mobilization campaigns that followed the July Crisis of 1914. Even before the formal declarations of war that preceded Austria's invasion of Serbia, each of the conflict's combatants had laboured to create a 'nation-in-arms' capable of offering up young men eager to form ranks and march off to the front.[20] The mass public demonstrations of 1914 in major cities in Britain, France, and Germany do reflect the relative strength of pre-war nationalist policies (despite the ongoing misgivings in some quarters about the fighting to come).[21] While outright opposition and aversion to the war did plague some regional and national minority groups, large numbers of migrants, as well as citizens drawn from mixed or marginal areas and communities, did answer the call to mobilize and served faithfully in arms. Still others, driven by patriotism or sheer economic need, contributed to the war effort by manning factories or transport stations. The extent to which governments and national majorities greeted these acts of minority support did vary throughout Europe. In many cases, European states welcomed the war and its aftermath as a means of assimilating 'small peoples' into existing or newly established administrative frameworks, a process that did lead to several instances of mutual accommodation and negotiation on the terms of national belonging. In a select number of other cases, however, the willingness of minority soldiers and workers to serve the nation did not dissuade politicians and local inhabitants from viewing minority groups in inherently subversive or undesirable terms.

Filling the ranks of vast armies dispatched to multiple fronts inside and outside Europe required the full exploitation of native populations. In rallying to the cause, a

number of established minority organizations, and countless individuals from minority backgrounds, seized upon this opportunity to prove their loyalty to the state. The desire to be seen as socially amenable, as well as politically loyal, to the dominant national culture added further incentive for young men to take up a soldier's uniform. The most universally recognizable expression of this experience can be found in the case of Jews living across the Continent. The Herzl-Bund, one of Germany's largest Zionist organizations, was adamant that each of its members would 'fulfill his duty to the fatherland' and take up arms.[22] British, Austrian, and Ottoman Jewish soldiers and citizens expressed equally solemn feelings of devotion in defending their respective empires.[23] Despite possessing profoundly different opinions and motivations, assimilationists and Zionist Jews in Britain could agree upon the need to support London's war upon the Central Powers (support that some advocates of the Balfour Declaration mistook as evidence of a globally powerful Jewish consensus).[24] Government officials and fellow citizens did not universally treat such expressions of fealty as genuine. Anti-Semites in Russia and Austria continued to maintain that Jews posed a threat to the body politic as either potential spies or economic exploiters of the nation.[25] Despite respective efforts to maintain a 'no-pogrom' policy towards the latter stages of the conflict, neither the German occupying army nor the Bolshevik government could prevent Poles and Ukrainians living in the borderlands of Vilnius from targeting local Jews who were generally suspected of supporting one of the two major factions.[26]

The experiences of Jewish conscripts and citizens resonated in the sacrifices and obstacles encountered by a plethora of other native minorities in Europe. The outbreak of the Easter Rebellion in 1916, as well as the subsequent separatist narrative elicited by the Irish republican movement, continues to obscure the fact that tens of thousands of Protestant and Catholic Irish citizens entered the British Army.[27] They, alongside tens of thousands of Scottish and Welsh men and boys, were counted among the legions of infantrymen who 'went over the top' in the face of blistering fire at various battles along the western front.[28] Large numbers of French Basque citizens likewise answered the call to defend the *patrie* from the German onslaught despite the long history of Basque aversion to conscription. Nevertheless, authorities in Paris, under the auspices of its official censorship regime, continued to monitor correspondence between Basque soldiers and their families in the hopes of intercepting subversive messages.[29]

Like the cases of British Ireland and Scotland, pre-war disagreements over the administration of the empire did beset the relationship between Vienna and its Croat, Bosnian Muslim, and Serb citizens. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, Yugoslav troops 'formed the pre-dominant element' in many of the emperor's units and provided critical, determined service on multiple fronts.[30] Revolutionary activism among conscripts and returning prisoners of war after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution (as seen in a mutiny among South Slav and Czech sailors on the Bay of Kotor) did lead to some apprehension within Austrian imperial circles, leading the government to intern discharged soldiers returning from Russian captivity.[31] The experience of imprisonment had a similar destabilizing and contentious effect upon Turkish and Arab troops in the service of the Ottoman Empire.[32] Despite suffering persecution at the hands of the

imperial government (who generally held their nationalist leanings as suspect), Russian Germans and Ottoman Armenians did join the war in the name of their respective sovereigns (a topic that continues to spark considerable controversy in Turkey with the republication of the memoirs of Sarkis Torrossion, an officer of Armenian descent who served at Gallipoli).[33]

The need for workers and soldiers, as well nationalist imperatives, compelled states to engage colonial subjects and migrant labourers in new ways. London and Paris summoned up huge reserves of troops from Africa and Asia to fight the Central Powers. West Africans, North Africans, and Vietnamese conscripts bore the brunt of particularly fierce fighting along the western front as both infantry and menial labourers. While Paris was eager to portray the service of these colonial troops as emblematic of the empire's unity and civilizing tendencies, Richard Fogarty reminds us that racial and cultural bigotries often prevented French officers and civilians from greeting *troupes indigènes* with affection or admiration.[34] Discrimination, to the point of violence, also plagued colonials who worked along the coastal docks and urban factories of France. The sheer presence of large numbers of non-white men (which led to competition over wages and jobs, as well as charges of miscegenation) drew harsh rebukes from labour unions and angry mobs.[35]

The end of the war did yield some gains for minority communities who were deemed to have served and suffered for the sake of the Entente cause. The inculcation of new international norms on the treatment of minorities following the Treaty of Versailles, as well as the establishment of the League of Nations, compelled a series of new states, as well as more established countries, to adopt regimes of tolerance and recognition for religious and ethnic minorities. Before signing up to the peace treaty negotiated at Paris, Romania, Poland, and Albania agreed to extend equal civil rights to their native Hungarian, Jewish, and Greek minorities. Rome, meanwhile, consented to sanction the opening of provincial schools in recognition of Slovene, Croat, and French-speaking communities living along Italy's borders.[36] While predicated on a brief but vicious civil war, the establishment of an independent state of Finland did lead to an internationally brokered agreement recognizing the existence and autonomy of the Swedish minority living on the island of Åland.[37] Throughout the war, expatriate members of the French Alsatian elite had lobbied Paris for attention and inclusion into the French state, an aspiration realized with the province's annexation in 1918 (an act that also subsequently entailed the suppression of the region's German-speaking population).[38]

The dissolution of the Habsburg Empire represented a supreme victory for those self-styled 'national' political leaders who threw in their lot with the Entente. The modest contributions of the Czechoslovak Legion helped to validate the demands for independence asserted by Tomáš Masaryk and Edvard Beneš.[39] Poland's reappearance as an independent state in the heart of Europe similarly benefited from the wartime and post-war exploits of Józef Piłsudski (even through he had supported the Central Powers until Russia's collapse). Serb and Romanian activists living in Bosnia and Transylvania

could claim victory with the territorial amalgamation of Yugoslavia and Romania respectively.[40]

The war did not immediately serve the interests of nationalist movements elsewhere within eastern Europe and the Balkans. Béla Kun's defeat, coupled with the rise of an assertive Romania, led to the creation of a large Hungarian minority bound within Transylvania.[41] Meanwhile, Poland's re-emergence after 1918 had a devastating effect upon Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalists living in Vilnius and Lvov.[42] While the Albanian state barely survived the war as an independent republic, Albanian-speaking Chams struggled for domestic and international recognition as a distinct minority residing within Greece.[43]

The post-war order was equally unkind to many nationalist activists living in territories formerly belonging to the Russian and Ottoman empires. As armed conflict persisted in the lands of these once-mighty empires, an array of incipient and entrenched minority movements struggled to capitalize upon the international assurances found within Woodrow Wilson's framework for peace and self-determination. After a period of dramatic political fluidity and international intervention, most minorities living in Anatolia, the Caucasus, and the Eurasian steppe failed to realize the creation of independent nation states similar to those that replaced the condemned Habsburg Empire. In the place of self-determination, national activists were left to contend with triumphant governments staffed by revolutionary Bolsheviks and Kemalists. While the Soviet Union and Republic of Turkey ultimately propagated very different regimes governing minorities, the conclusion of the Russian and Turkish civil wars in 1922 marked a definitive end to independent civil negotiation over the political, social, economic, and cultural status of minorities.

No understanding of the post-war defeat of autonomist or separatist minority movements in Ottoman Anatolia and the Russian imperial periphery is complete without an appreciation of the wartime demographic politics of these two empires. Between 1912 and 1918, both Istanbul and Petersburg undertook rigorous attempts to count, manage, and redistribute diverse elements of their respective populations. In part the imperial demographic politics of this period stemmed from the human toll reaped by the conflict itself. By 1918, both governments were forced to contend with the resettlement and reintegration of hundreds of thousands of Russian and Ottoman refugees. Resolving the plight of refugees, a process that imposed profound material, economic, and political hardships upon both state and society, compounded pre-existing imperial apprehensions regarding the loyalty and status of settled and unsettled minority populations. In both Russia and the Ottoman Empire, officials and officers engendered ad hoc efforts to transfer, exile, or exterminate concentrated groups of peoples deemed politically unreliable or undesirable. In the case of Anatolia and Syria, Ottoman aspirations to demographically re-engineer provincial life would yield terribly violent results. Rather than providing a means to resolve intercommunal conflict or domestic stability, Istanbul's policies of deportation and exile created or exacerbated local conditions that led to minority separatist movements and further armed conflict after the world war was over.

Maintaining, Reordering, and Cleansing the State in the First World War

Refugees rarely appear within popular renderings of the First World War. One tends instead to reimagine the war along the western front in very fixed terms due to the intractable nature of trench warfare. Yet the fighting between Germany, France, and Great Britain did force many in Belgium and Picardy to take flight. French statisticians, for example, estimated that 30,000 Belgian refugees had come to reside in France by the end of the war.[44] Sectarian conflict in Ireland during the immediate post-war years also produced its own internal refugee crisis as thousands of Catholics driven from their homes in Ulster were forced to seek shelter in Dublin.[45]

In the Balkans, eastern Europe, and Anatolia, fighting between the Entente and the Central Powers produced far larger numbers of refugees. When Serbian forces finally gave way and collapsed in the face of advancing Austrian and Bulgarian armies in the autumn of 1915, over 100,000 officers and men fled for the Albanian coast. Tens of thousands of civilians from the Kingdom of Serbia followed the army into exile and established camps on Corfu and elsewhere.[46] Russian reversals on the battlefield beginning in 1915 prompted an even greater tidal wave of displaced peoples. One study suggests that as many as 6 million Russian subjects, accounting for 5 per cent of the population, were forced to flee their homes by the outbreak of the 1917 Revolution.[47] In the case of the Ottoman Empire, refugees escaping the fighting in the Caucasus added greater strain upon governmental and private agencies tasked with assisting people who had fled the Balkans and southern Russia in advance of the First World War. While estimates of the number of internally displaced peoples vary (particularly if one takes into account the victims of the Ottoman government's own policy of forced deportation), it is clear that the Great War, followed by the Turkish War of Independence, rendered millions of civilians homeless.[48] Post-war Istanbul represented a particularly striking microcosm of the effect the war had upon displaced peoples from across eastern Europe. In addition to the thousands who remained unsettled from the First World War, the Ottoman capital housed an estimated 150,000 refugees fleeing the Russian Civil War as well as 130,000 people fleeing the Greek Army's invasion of western Anatolia in 1919.[49]

Settling and caring for refugees placed a nearly insurmountable burden upon both the Russian and Ottoman empires. In both town and country, Russian authorities relied heavily upon private initiatives and local generosity in tending displaced civilians. Nevertheless, it is estimated that Russia spent over 600 million roubles (amounting to about 1.5 per cent of the empire's war budget) in feeding and housing refugees. Government and private efforts were no less earnest in the Ottoman Empire. While local official government agents from the newly established Directorate of Tribes and Refugees attended to the interests of both foreign and domestic migrants and refugees,

American and other foreign missionaries played a notable role in providing care and housing to Armenians internally exiled to Syria.[50]

The displacement of such large numbers of civilians was not always incidental to the fighting that took place along the eastern, Balkan, and Middle Eastern fronts. Immediately military necessity and prerogatives provided officers in the field an excuse to remove or transfer enemy and native non-combatants alike. In Serbia, Austro-Hungarian occupational authorities ordered the deportation of 180,000 people from their homes.[51] Russian forces were accused of engaging in a 'scorched earth policy' against the populations of Galicia, Latvia, and Poland in the early stages of the war, a policy which resulted in the uprooting of thousands of Jews, Ukrainians, and Poles from the region.[52] Ottoman military officials and civilian bureaucrats cited accusations of spying and complicity in the Entente war effort in transferring tens of thousands of Orthodox Christians from Anatolia's western coastline during the spring of 1915.[53] The now infamous 'Deportation and Settlement Law' enacted by the Ottoman government in the spring of 1915 equally cited the threat posed by Armenians in 'areas of warfare (*mınaktık-ı harbiye*)'.[54]

Yet it is clear that the supposed needs of the military only partially contributed to the decision taken by Ottoman and Russian administrators to forcibly exile civilians from their homes. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, internal displacement of a wide variety of groups served a number of developing and long-standing imperial interests. In the wake of the Balkan Wars, Young Turk administrators obsessed over the implications the empire's demography had upon its security. The resettlement of refugees was an enterprise that demanded strict governmental coordination. Since many of the displaced civilians fleeing their homes were drawn from historically 'disruptive' or recalcitrant communities and ethnic groups, Young Turk officials were attentive in identifying and distributing individuals of Albanian, North Caucasian, Bosnian, Kurdish, Arab, Roma, and Turcoman extraction in the hopes of socially and culturally assimilating them into Turkish-speaking Anatolian society.[55]

The refugee crisis that followed the fateful battle of Sarıkamış also allowed Istanbul an opportunity to address what many perceived to be the inherently disaffected and rebellious nature of the empire's Christian population. Armenian, Orthodox, and Eastern Christians, in the eyes of many within the Committee of Union and Progress, comprised monolithic collectives incapable of reconciling themselves within the Ottoman nation. As individuals and communities possessing sympathies with foreign governments, Ottoman Christians were deemed categorically prone to insurrection and national subversion. The existence of large, densely packed concentrations of non-Muslims, in the minds of the Young Turks, also posed a severe economic challenge to the government. The empire would never achieve genuine economic sovereignty nor develop into a modern industrial state so long as Armenians and Greek Orthodox Christians continued to hold pre-eminent positions within Ottoman commerce and agriculture. In order to achieve a truly 'national' economy, which entailed the building of 'a culture of trade' and entrepreneurship among loyal Muslims, the Unionist government sought to undermine Christian landowners and merchants or strip them of their land and capital goods

in order to distribute the mass of their capital to more trusted Muslim residents and refugees.

This ideological and programmatic turn within the Young Turk government resulted in a vast effort to reorganize and re-engineer Ottoman society during the course of the Great War. Beginning in 1913, tens of thousands of settled and displaced Muslims and Christians were forcibly transplanted across the empire. To some extent this policy was a highly centralized and tightly executed endeavour directed by the Ottoman interior ministry and elements of the state security services. The crafting of ethnographical maps and census data augmented careful monitoring from Istanbul of the transfer of internally exiled and wartime migrants alike. The treatment of displaced persons, however, varied radically depending upon an individual's ethnicity and the political and social contours of certain regions.[56] The desire to dilute and homogenize the empire's Muslim population drove Young Turk administrators to relocate thousands of Arabs, Kurds, and Turcomans to western portions of Asia Minor. In eastern Thrace and western Anatolia, Young Turk officials lent support for a general boycott of Christian businesses and utilized clandestinely recruited paramilitaries in forcing hundreds of thousands of Orthodox Bulgarians and Greeks from their homes between 1913 and 1916.

Under a mandate passed by the Ottoman parliament in April 1915, a multistage programme of deportation targeting Armenians began. Most Armenians dispatched from their homes came to be settled in the deserts of northern Syria and Iraq, while many others went into hiding or, in some cases, fled abroad. Meanwhile, government agents seized an untold number of orphaned Armenian children and deliberately placed them in state orphanages and Muslim households in order to subvert their Christian Armenian identities. Deported Armenians, Chaldeans, Nestorians, Syriacs, and Greeks were subject to a variety of concerted and impromptu acts of deprivation during the course of the war. Official and personal testimony conclusively demonstrates a deliberate pattern of clandestine official involvement in innumerable acts of murder, kidnapping, and forced starvation suffered by Armenian deportees during the course of the war.[57]

While many Ottoman Christians did escape death (as a result of flight, armed defiance, or internal bureaucratic resistance on the part of regional officials), an overwhelming majority of contemporary scholars agree that genocidal intentions motivated the Young Turk government's treatment of Armenians and eastern Christians. Although some scholars have argued that acts of rebellion by Armenian nationalists in the regions of Van and Zeytun served as the primary impetus for the death and deportation of hundreds of thousands of Armenians, it is clear that attacks on Muslim civilians carried out by Armenian nationalists or soldiers in the Russian Army did not singularly prompt or justify the deportations or killings of Armenians, Greeks, and others throughout the conflict.[58] In surveying the government's policies towards both Muslims and non-Muslims, the transfer of land and capital was of critical importance. Even though deported Albanians, Nestorians, Kurds, Arabs, Greeks, and Armenians experienced differing degrees of displacement and violence, administrators at both the imperial and local levels uniformly sought to remand abandoned Christian property and place it in the possession of settled and displaced Muslims. As an effort justified in the service

of the government's desire to unify the nation and solidify Muslim control over the national economy, Istanbul's universalized seizure and redistribution of Christian assets suggests the conclusion that the victims of deportation, one way or another, were never meant to return home.[59]

One finds a similar vein of thought and approach in looking at the deportation of civilians, foreigners, and refugees by Russian military and domestic authorities. The war elicited the ire of Russian nationalist officials and citizens who blamed native Germans, Jews, and other 'alien' subversive minorities for exploiting the economic vitality of the empire. In the spring of 1915, a mob of protesters in Moscow attacked businesses and homes belonging to Germans and other suspected 'foreigners'.[60] By 1917, Russian officials had deported over a quarter of a million people registered as 'enemy aliens'.[61] Native Germans and Jews living in the Baltic—two groups equally associated with elite 'foreign' control of the Russian economy—were victimized alongside Latvians and Roma in acts of ethnic cleansing, expulsion, and internal deportation.[62] Like the Young Turk government, both the Tsarist and Provisional governments sought to deny any criminal wrongdoing in evicting large numbers of citizens from their homes. The post-revolutionary administration in Petrograd, for example, argued that the forcible transfer of peoples represented nothing more than 'spontaneous' acts of migration in wartime.[63]

While it does appear that the Soviet government continued the previous government's policy of deporting 'socially insecure' foreign nationals, it remains to be seen to what extent Russian imperial demographic policies influenced Moscow's overall perceptions of nationality.[64] Nevertheless, a strong current of continuity did bind the pre- and post-revolutionary regimes in terms of their collective maintenance and use of ethnographic and census data in forming policies related to nationality.[65] It should also be added that the post-war independent governments of Poland rigorously pursued their own agenda of population management through the use of deportation. Against the backdrop of Warsaw's brief war with the Soviet Union, many refugees and native Russians were forcibly removed by the government. All in all, this effort, like the Ottoman and Russian cases, was an expression of Poland's uncompromising stance towards those communities who were deemed too untrustworthy or undesirable to remain.[66]

Minority Resistance and Intercommunal Violence in the Post-War Era

It may be safe to say that the men who formed Woodrow Wilson's 'Inquiry' did not readily anticipate the chaotic and violent repercussions the conflict would have upon post-war minority politics. Very few of the scholars who influenced the articulation of the president's Fourteen Points possessed any expertise in eastern European, Balkan, or Middle Eastern politics or history. Of those who did claim an intimate knowledge

of the key issues facing these regions, several expressed undeniably personal national biases in levelling their advice.[67] Be that as it may, it is clear that Wilson's terms for peace, particularly those that favoured self-determination for minorities, held direct and often bloody implications for a number of communities throughout the imperial and post-imperial world. The signing of the Treaty of Versailles did indeed represent a grand act of deliverance for many who championed national minority interests in eastern Europe. However, official consent to protect and tolerate minority religious and ethnic communities did not necessarily lead to continued compliance among the signatories of the peace. Without any punitive or imposing mechanisms to police the observance of the minority rights provisions, dissenting or disgruntled activists found little solace in petitioning the League of Nations for redress. As one official in the British Foreign Office put it, 'More harm would in the end be done by unnecessary interference than, even at the risk of a little local suffering, to allow these minorities to settle down under their present masters.'[68]

Needless to say, many nationalist agitators failed to heed such advice. Even before the war lurched towards its conclusion in 1918, militancy and armed resistance braced numerous minorities across Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Frustration with the presiding national or imperial cultures, as well as with the conduct of the war, fed into a number of violent, but largely marginal, movements that had predated both the war and its settlement. British observers, for example, could have looked no further than the growth and success of Irish militancy after the Easter Rising of 1916. While armed opposition to British rule did possess a storied history on the island, militant Irish Republican Army activists arguably enjoyed far wider support for their efforts as a result of the suspension of the Home Rule Act and the imposition of mass conscription upon the whole of Ireland in 1918. Peter Hart further reminds us that violence associated with the Irish War of Independence (as well as the civil war) was a highly provincialized affair and mostly incorporated participants active in areas where 'the courts and police were least effective'.[69] Meanwhile, the island's minority Protestant Unionist establishment, despite rendering its services in the name of the empire, ironically found itself reconstituted as a majority population in a truncated exclave on the northern tip of the island.[70] London's contemplation of Home Rule, followed by the creation of the Irish Free State, equally offended and helped to mobilize militant Unionists across Ulster. Even with the successful retention of Northern Ireland's six counties by Lloyd George's government, official fears of Protestant vigilantism towards Catholics and lingering resentment born out of 'Ulster's betrayal' continued to stoke clashes between Loyalists and British security personnel in Northern Ireland well into the 1920s.[71]

The changing tides of the war, as well as the muddled politics of the conflicting powers, ushered in both opportunities and disappointing returns for other militant minority factions in eastern Europe and Central Asia. Serbia's defeat at the hands of Austria-Hungary represented an advantageous turn for Albanian nationalists inhabiting the regions of Kosovo and Macedonia. With the onset of the Austrian occupation of 'Old Serbia', some local notables did help raise Albanian troops on Vienna's behalf.[72] German and Austrian occupational authorities were also keen to exploit nationalist

discontent among the diverse peoples living under Berlin's authority along the eastern front. German hopes to transform and reform the Russian steppe into a more coherent, rational whole clashed and coincided at different times with the desires of Ukrainian and Polish nationalists seeking to form independent states at the expense of their old Russian and new German administrators.[73] Further east in Turkestan, Kazakh and Kyrgyz rebels rose in rebellion and staged violent attacks against Russian settlements, military units, and other representations of imperial rule from St Petersburg.[74]

Similar patterns of wartime revolt and militancy were exhibited among constituent elements of the Ottoman Empire during the latter years of the war. One finds multiple acts of resistance among Ottoman Armenians during the course of the First World War. Thousands of Armenians volunteered as soldiers in the invading Russian Army or rose up in defiance of the Istanbul government (most notably in Van and Zeytun).[75] Assyrian fighters staged similar acts of resistance towards the regular Ottoman Army and administration.[76] However, contrary to the claims of many who refuse to accept the wartime government's genocidal intentions or results, Armenian and Assyrian acts of rebellion or defection did not constitute singular organized efforts. Moreover, regional conditions, such as pre-war intercommunal relations and differing degrees of administrative abuse, arguably had a far greater effect upon the rise of militancy among non-Muslims during the war than nationalism. Provincial politics and conditions were similarly crucial in compelling Arabic-speaking Ottomans into taking up arms. Sharif Husayn's Arab Revolt, rather than the product of Arab nationalism, grew largely in response to Istanbul's centralization efforts in the Hijaz. Antipathy towards the Committee of Union and Progress's governance in Syria similarly drove Druze notables in Hawran to join the Hashimite rebellion.[77] Yet while the harsh policies of Syria's wartime governor, as well as the generalized suffering caused by starvation and disease, did erode the political confidence of many peoples in the Levant, the majority of the empire's Arab population, including many possessing strong Arab nationalist sympathies, remained loyal to the state to the very end.[78]

The Russian Revolution in 1917, coupled with the collapse and imminent partition of the Ottoman Empire, radically transformed the nature of minority resistance and intercommunal violence in both states. Istanbul's agreement to end the war at Mudros, as well as Petrograd's capitulation at Brest-Litovsk, cast an undeniable stigma upon both governments that affected loyal and disgruntled citizens alike. In the absence of strong imperial centres of power, localized independence movements, in conjunction with foreign support, seized the initiative in establishing fledgling governments in the Ukraine, the Baltic, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Syria. Yet neither the Bolsheviks, nor the insurgent National Movement under Mustafa Kemal, refused to fully accept the complete territorial erasure of the empires to which they laid claim. During the ensuing civil wars that swept the Soviet Union and the Ottoman Empire, both Moscow and Ankara fought as hard as their imperial predecessors in asserting their administrative authority in the name of a new national ethos.

Even before the Greek landing at Izmir in May 1919, a large portion of the Ottoman officer corps and provincial elite refused to accept the dismemberment of Anatolia,

Thrace, or the Arab lands along national or Western imperial lines. Time and again, the Nationalist consensus that eventually formed around Mustafa Kemal pointedly argued that Anatolia was a region that possessed an overwhelmingly 'Turkish and Muslim' majority.[79] Armenians returning from exile to the lands of eastern Anatolia and Cilicia rejected such assertions and in turn formed armed militias under the auspices of the newly established Armenian state and the French occupation of Syria respectively. Greece's invasion and occupation of western Anatolia similarly radicalized and militarized local Orthodox Christians who had been disenfranchised or deported by the Ottoman government during the war. While some rebels threatened with French occupation did seek Kemalist support (most notably in Aleppo), most armed supporters of King Faysal's government in Syria chose to distance themselves from any vestige of the Ottoman state.[80] Bitterness towards the Young Turks, as well as the lingering ill effects of the Great War, drove some Kurdish and Circassian notables and intellectuals to contemplate independence or violent resistance towards the National Movement.[81] Ankara arose victorious over competing separatist movements in Anatolia only after a series of intensely violent clashes. All sides that partook in the so-called Turkish War of Independence exacted violent reprisals upon civilian populations. Even before Ankara and Athens agreed to exchange populations in 1923, hundreds of thousands of native Armenians, Greeks, Circassian, Assyrians, and Kurds fled or were deported from Anatolia. Greece's defeat at the hands of the Turks, however, did little to impact Athens's authority over the region of western Thrace, which it acquired from Bulgaria as a result of the Treaty of Neuilly. While Greek and Turkish negotiators at Lausanne did agree upon the protection of the region's Muslim population, Athens had already cleansed much of the territory of Orthodox Bulgarians, as well as Muslims, before 1923.[82]

The Russian Civil War was an even more complicated display of violent and often unsuccessful efforts by separatist minority groups. The ideological clash between Red and White forces in the Caucasus, for example, made strange bedfellows out of native Cossack, Georgian, Armenian, Azeri, and North Caucasian rebels. While the end of the First World War initiated a union between Armenians, Georgians, and Azeris under the umbrella of a Transcaucasian republic, each constituent part separated within a month of its establishment in the spring of 1918.[83] Independence did not lead immediately to peace within these new states. While local Adjari notables contemplated separation from the Georgian Republic, struggles over land and political authority claimed the lives of thousands of Muslims and Armenians in the regions of Baku, Yerevan, and the Karabagh.[84] The situation in the Mountaineer Republic of North Caucasus proved even more complicated as local Circassian and Dagestani forces struggled to maintain independence in the face of Bolshevik and White armies.[85] Meanwhile, in Turkestan, the evaporation of Russian imperial authority opened up new fissures between reformers organized under the banner of the Jadidist movement and more socially and nationally conservative factions in the region.[86] Such internal disagreements, as well as the lack of material resources, ultimately favoured more assertive and better-organized Bolshevik forces and helped to condemn autonomist and nationalist aspirations throughout Turkestan and the Caucasus.

While victorious, Mustafa Kemal and Lenin did endeavour to address issues regarding the political and cultural status of minorities in the immediate post-war era. Ankara, as per the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, forswore further acts of violence against Anatolia's remaining non-Muslim population and stood committed to maintaining the office of the Ecumenical Patriarch. Moscow, by contrast, formulated a far more expansive and ambitious programme bent on addressing nationalist discontent among the constituent bodies that had comprised the old Russian Empire. Soviet 'affirmative action policies' instituted after the civil war would officially sanction the creation of discrete republics and autonomous provinces governed by indigenously recruited representatives. With the freedom to develop and celebrate their respective 'national cultures', 'small peoples' in the Soviet Union were now free to place themselves upon the path to national fulfilment (a necessary step, it was reasoned, that consequently led to the building of socialism).[87]

Discontent with the post-Versailles order led to violent clashes in portions of central Europe as well. The creation of a plebiscite, and the intervention of the Allied Powers, exacerbated, rather than lessened, local tensions among the mixed communities of Poles and Germans in Upper Silesia. In advance of the League of Nations' settlement of the issue, violence between rival paramilitary bands inflicted thousands of casualties among the region's inhabitants.[88] While the partition of Upper Silesia did not result in the complete 'unmixing' of Germans and Poles in the region, opposition to renewed Serb governance (which entailed the mass transfer of land from Muslim to Orthodox Serb/Montenegrin hands) produced a new wave of *kaçak* resistance among rural Albanian communities in Kosovo and Macedonia. The rigid nationalization policies enforced in 'Old Serbia' also instigated the partial resurrection of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization within Slav Macedonian quarters inside and outside the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In reaction to the violent campaigns of Albanian and Macedonian militants, Belgrade escalated its use of paramilitary militias in order to violently suppress potential sources of opposition and cleanse the land of nationally undesirable populations.[89]

It is tempting to see post-war events in Silesia, Macedonia, Anatolia, and elsewhere as foreshadowing greater tragedies to come with the passage of the Second World War. Indeed the population transfers following the Treaty of Lausanne, as well as lesser informal ones undertaken in eastern Europe, did provide models for later forced migrations (as well as genocidal campaigns) undertaken in Poland, the Ukraine, Palestine, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere. It is also easy to indict the League of Nations as an institution for its inability to uphold the rights or interests of minority populations throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Eurasia.

Nevertheless, recent scholarship on minority politics during the First World War and its immediate aftermath offers somewhat more ambivalent lessons than one might normally assume. The war did not necessarily provide an immediate catalyst for the oppression or marginalization of minorities. Ample evidence suggests that enlistment in the army, as well as the Wilsonian principles imposed upon the post-war era, did compel a select number of governments and minority populations to reconcile with one another's

existence (however happily or unhappily). The loyalty demonstrated by Jewish, Basque, Moroccan, Armenian, Irish, and Yugoslav soldiers and civilians to their respective states and empires serves as a reminder of the chances and lost opportunities for governments and peoples to accommodate each other.

Notes

1. T. K. Wilson, *Frontiers of Violence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1.
2. Neil MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), 50–1.
3. See, for example, Colin Grant, *A Negro With a Hat* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 34–51; Stephan Hay, 'The Making of a Late-Victorian Hindu: M. K. Gandhi in London, 1888–1891', *Victorian Studies*, 33/1 (Autumn 1989), 74–98. According to one census, London possessed a population of less than 5,000 'Africans' in 1912.
4. Mark Doyle, *Fighting Like the Devil for the Sake of God* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).
5. See Isa Blumi, 'Contesting the Edges of the Ottoman Empire: Rethinking Ethnic and Sectarian Boundaries in the Malësore, 1878–1912', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 35/2 (May 2003), 237–56; Gary B. Cohen, 'Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society, 1867–1914', *Central European History*, 40/2 (June 2007), 241–78; Thomas Kühn, 'Shaping and Reshaping Colonial Ottomanism: Contesting Boundaries of Difference and Integration in Ottoman Yemen, 1872–1919', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 27/2 (2007), 315–31; Dominic Lieven, 'Dilemmas of Empire 1850–1918: Power, Territory Identity', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 34/2 (April 1999), 163–200; Robert Nemes, 'Mapping the Hungarian Borderlands', in Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz (eds.), *Shatterzone of Empires* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 209–27; Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, 'Travel, Railroads and Identity Formation in the Russian Empire', in Bartov and Weitz (eds.), *Shatterzone of Empires*, 136–51; Stephen Velychenko, 'Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?', *Russian Review*, 54/2 (April 1995), 188–208.
6. Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire* (Harrow: Longman, 2001), 169; Dov Yaroshevski, 'Empire and Citizenship', in Daniel Brower and Edward Lazzerini (eds.), *Russia's Orient* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 58–79.
7. For further discussion see Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982), *passim*.
8. Gary B. Cohen, 'Our Laws, Our Taxes and Our Administration: Citizenship in Imperial Austria', in Bartov and Weitz (eds.), *Shatterzone of Empires*, 103–21.
9. Theodore R. Weeks, 'Defending Our Own: Government and the Russian Minority in the Kingdom of Poland, 1905–1914', *Russian Review*, 54/4 (October 1995), 539–51; Weeks, 'Defining Us and Them: Poles and Russians in the "Western Provinces," 1863–1914', *Slavic Review*, 53/1 (Spring 1994), 26–40.
10. Anders Henriksson, 'Nationalism, Assimilation and Identity in Late Imperial Russia: The St. Petersburg Germans, 1906–1914', *Russian Review*, 52/3 (July 1993), 341–53.
11. Robert Geraci, *Window on the East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999); Edward Lazzerini, 'Accommodation and Resistance to

Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century Crimea', in Brower and Lazzerini (eds.), *Russia's Orient*, 169–87.

12. Pieter Judson, 'Marking National Space on the Habsburg Austrian Borderlands, 1880–1918', in Bartov and Weitz (eds.), *Shatterzone of Empires*, 122–35; Robin Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Gunther Rothenberg, 'Toward a National Hungarian Army: The Military Compromise of 1868 and Its Consequences', *Slavic Review*, 31/4 (1972), 805–16.
13. Stephan Astourian, 'The Silence of the Land: Agrarian Relations, Ethnicity and Power', in Ronald Suny et al. (eds.), *A Question of Genocide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 55–81; Janet Klein, *The Margins of Empire* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
14. Fikret Adanır, 'Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army and the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912–1913', in Suny et al. (eds.), *A Question of Genocide*, 113–25.
15. Bedross Der Matossian, 'Bloodless Revolution to Bloody Counterrevolution: The Adana Massacres of 1909', *Genocide Studies and Prevention*, 6/2 (August 2011), 152–73; Ryan Gingeras, '"Scores Dead in Smerdesh": Communal Violence and International Intrigue in Ottoman Macedonia', *Balkanistika*, 25 (2012), 75–98; Monty Noam Penkower, 'The Kishinev Pogrom of 1903: A Turning Point in Jewish History', *Modern Judaism*, 24/3 (2004), 187–225.
16. Emanuela Costantini, 'Dismantling the Ottoman Heritage? The Evolution of Bucharest in the 19th Century', in Eyal Ginio and Karl Kaser (eds.), *Ottoman Legacies in the Conteporary Mediterranean* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press, 2013), 231–54; Natasa Miskovic, '"Mission, Power and Violence": Serbia's National Turn', in Hannes Granditis et al. (eds.), *Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 205–24.
17. James Frusetta, 'Bulgaria's Macedonia: Nation-Building and State Building, Centralization and Autonomy in Pirin Macedonia, 1903–1952' (doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland, 2006); Anastasia N. Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1997).
18. Mary Neuburger, *The Orient Within* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 33–42.
19. Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pres, 2012), 63–96.
20. See, for example, Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Ian Beckett, 'The Nation in Arms, 1914–1918', in Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds.), *A Nation in Arms* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 1–36.
21. For a concise discussion of the debate over European war fever and mobilization in 1914, see Eric Dorn Brose, *A History of the Great War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 37–40.
22. Tim Grady, *The German-Jewish Soldier of the First World War* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 24.
23. Feroz Ahmad, 'The Special Relationship: The Committee of Union and Progress and the Ottoman Jewish Political Elite, 1908–1918', in Evigdor Levy (ed.), *Jews, Turks, Ottomans* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 212–30; Joshua Rozenbilt, *Restructuring a National Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
24. Jonathan Schneer, *The Balfour Declaration* (New York: Random House, 2010), 138–51.
25. Peter Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 17–18; Maureen Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 145–6.

26. Mark Levene, 'Frontiers of Genocide: Jews in the Eastern War Zones, 1914–1920 and 1941', in Panikos Panayi (ed.), *Minorities in Wartime* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993), 98–105.
27. Jane Leonard, 'The Reaction of Irish Officers in the British Army to the Easter Rising of 1916', in Hugh Cevil and Peter Liddle (eds.), *Facing Armageddon* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Select, 2003), 256–68.
28. Edward Spiers, 'The Scottish Soldier at War', in Cevil and Liddle (eds.), *Facing Armageddon*, 314–35.
29. Sandra Ott, *War, Judgment, and Memory In The Basque Borderlands, 1914–1945* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2008), 33–49.
30. Richard Spence, 'Yugoslavs, the Austro-Hungarian Army and the First World War' (doctoral dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1981), 311.
31. John Paul Newman, 'Post-Imperial and Post-War Violence in the South Slav Lands, 1917–1923', *Contemporary European History*, 19/3 (2010), 253.
32. Yücel Yanıkdağ, 'Ottoman Prisoners of War in Russia, 1914–1922', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 34/1 (1999), 74.
33. Ayhan Aktar, *Yuzbaşı Sarkis Torosyan—Çanakkale'den Filistin Cephesi'ne* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012); Kappeler, *Russian Empire*, 348–9.
34. Richard Fogarty, *Race and War in France* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).
35. Tyler Stovall, 'Color Line Behind the Lines: Racial Violence in France during the Great War', *American Historical Review*, 103/3 (June 1998), 737–69.
36. Ester Capuzzo, 'Die Stellung der Minderheiten im italienischen Staatsrecht von der Krise des liberalen Staates bis zur Gründung der Republik', in Umberto Corsini and Davide Zaffi (eds.), *Die Minderheiten zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1997), 42.
37. Tore Modeen, 'Die Lage der schwedischen Volksgruppe in Finnland in der Zwischenkriegszeit (1919–1939)', in Corsini and Zaffi (eds.), *Die Minderheiten zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen*, 71.
38. Paul Smith, 'The Kiss of France: The Republic and the Alsatians during the First World War', in Panikos Panayi (ed.), *Minorities in Wartime* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993).
39. Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), 77.
40. Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 162–3.
41. Rothschild, *East Central Europe*, 151–8.
42. Theodore Weeks, 'Jews and Others in Vilna-Wilno-Vilnius: Invisible Neighbors, 1831–1948', in Bartov and Weitz (eds.), *Shatterzone of Empires*, 90–2.
43. Dimitris Michalopoulos, 'The Moslems of the Chamuria and the Exchange of Populations Between Greece and Turkey', *Balkan Studies*, 26/2 (1985), 303–13.
44. John Horne, 'Immigrant Workers in France during World War I', *French Historical Studies*, 14/1 (Spring 1985), 59.
45. Alan Parkinson, *Belfast's Unholy War* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), 65.
46. According to official estimates, over 150,000 Serbian soldiers retreated to the ports of Corfu and Bizerta in Tunisia. At least an additional 20,000 civilians followed the flight of the Serbian Army: Andrej Mitrovic, *Serbia's Great War 1914–1918* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007), 161.
47. Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking*, 3.

48. The war, as well as the mass deportation of non-Muslims, may have displaced over 10 per cent of the Ottoman population. Justin McCarthy estimates, for example, that close to 3.3 million Muslims were internally displaced or forced to flee abroad as a result of warfare between 1912 and 1922. See Yiğit Akın, 'The Ottoman Home Front during World War I: Everyday Politics, Society and Culture' (doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2011), 245; Justin McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün* (Istanbul: İnkilap, 1998), 374.
49. Stanford Shaw, *From Empire to Republic* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), 216.
50. Akın, 'Ottoman Home Front', 245–52; Keith Watenpaugh, 'The League of Nations' Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors and the Makings of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920–1927', *American Historical Review*, 115/5 (December 2010), 1315–39.
51. Peter Holquist, 'To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia', in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (eds.), *A State of Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 126.
52. Peter Gatrell, 'War, Population Displacement and State Formation in the Russian Borderlands, 1914–1924', in Nick Baron and Peter Gatrell (eds.), *Homelands* (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 12–13; Mark von Hagen, 'War and the Transformation of Loyalties and Identities in the Russian Empire, 1914–1918', in Silvio Pons and Andrea Romano (eds.), *Russia in the Age of Wars* (Milan: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 2000), 40–1.
53. Ryan Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 43.
54. To view an original copy of the official justification for the deportation of Armenians, see <http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b6/Regulation_of_the_Tehcir_law_council_of_ministers_to_governors_cover_letter_June_10_1915.png> (viewed 9 September 2013).
55. Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913–1918)* (Istanbul: İlestişim Yayınları, 2001); Uğur Ümit Üngör, 'Seeing like a Nation-State: Young Turk Social Engingering, in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1950', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 10/1 (2008), 15–39.
56. For further discussion on the internal differences governing Ottoman resettlement policy, see Hilmar Kaiser, 'Genocide at the Twilight of the Ottoman Empire', in Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 365–85; Hilmar Kaiser, 'Regional Resistance to Central Governmental Policies: Ahmed Djemal Pasha, the Governors of Aleppo and the Armenian Deportees in the Spring and Summer of 1915', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 12/3–4 (2010), 173–218.
57. Fuat Dündar, *Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1878–1918)* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2010); Raymond Kevorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Hans-Lukas Kieser, *Der Verpasste Friede* (Zurich: Chronos Verlag, 2000); Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, *Survivors* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).
58. Yücel Güçlü, *Armenians and the Allies ın Cilicia, 1914–1923* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010); Justin McCarthy et al., *The Armenian Rebellion at Van* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006).
59. Hilmar Kaiser, 'Armenian Property, Ottoman Law and Nationality Policies during the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1916', in Olaf Farschid et al. (eds.), *The First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean* (Beirut: Orient-Institut, 2006), 49–71; Uğur Ümit Üngör and Mehmet Polatel, *Confiscation and Destruction* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011).

60. Eric Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 31–50.
61. Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire*, 127.
62. Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking*, 22–6.
63. Peter Gatrell, 'Domestic and International Dimensions of Population Displacement in Russia, 1914–1918', in Pons and Romano (eds.), *Russia in the Age of Wars*, 42.
64. Peter Gatrell and Nich Baron, 'Conclusion: On Living in a "New Country"', in Baron and Gatrell (eds.), *Homelands*, 208, 244.
65. Holquist, 'To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate', 111–44.
66. Konrad Zielinski, 'Population Displacement and Citizenship in Poland, 1918–1924', in Baron and Gatrell (eds.), *Homelands*, 118.
67. Godfrey Hodgson, *Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 160.
68. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent* (New York: Vintage, 2000), 55.
69. Peter Hart, 'The Geography of Revolution in Ireland, 1917–1923', *Past & Present*, 155 (May 1997), 172.
70. James Loughlin, 'Mobilising the Sacred Dead: Ulster Unionism, the Great War and the Politics of Remembrance', in Adrian Gregory and Senia Paseta (eds.), *Ireland and the Great War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 133–54.
71. Wilson, *Frontiers of Violence*, 88–9.
72. Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 260.
73. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *The German Myth of the East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 130–69.
74. Kappeler, *Russian Empire*, 352.
75. Aram Arkun, 'Zeytun and the Commencement of the Armenian Genocide', in Suny et al. (eds.), *A Question of Genocide*, 221–43; Anahide Ter Minassian, 'Van 1915', in Richard Hovannisian (ed.), *Armenian Van/Vaspurakan* (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2000), 209–44.
76. David Gaunt, 'The Ottoman Treatment of the Assyrians', in Suny et al. (eds.), *A Question of Genocide*, 244–59; David Gaunt, *Massacres, Resistance, Protectors* (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006).
77. Michael Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 43; Mary C. Wilson, 'The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt and Arab Nationalism', in Rashid Khalidi (ed.), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 204–24.
78. Abigail Jacobson, 'Negotiating Ottomanism in Times of War: Jerusalem during World War I through the Eyes of a Local Muslim Resident', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 40 (2008), 69–88; Hasan Kayali, 'Wartime Regional and Imperial Integration of Greater Syria', in Thomas Philipp and Birgit Schaebler (eds.), *The Syrian Land* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998), 295–306; Salim Tamari, *Year of the Locust* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 2011).
79. Howard Eissenstat, 'The Limits of Imagination: Debating the Nation and Constructing the State in Early Turkish Nationalism' (doctoral dissertation, UCLA, 2007), 67–127.
80. James Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 83; Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1997), 203–4.

81. Ryan Gingeras, 'Notorious Subjects, Invisible Citizens: North Caucasian Resistance to the Turkish National Movement in the South Marmara, 1919–1923', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 40/1 (February 2008), 89–108; Hakan Özoğlu, '"Nationalism" and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman–Early Republican Era', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 33/3 (August 2001), 343–409.
82. George Kalantzis, 'Outcomes of the First World War in Southeastern Europe: Population Movements in Western Thrace during the Inter-Allied Administration', *Études balkaniques*, 40/3 (2004), 24–41.
83. Alex Marshall, *The Caucasus under Soviet Rule* (London: Routledge, 2010), 85–100.
84. Marshall, *Caucasus*, 139–46; Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 66–7.
85. Sefer Berzeg, *Kuzey Kafkasya Cumhuriyeti, 1917–1922* (Istanbul: Birleşik Kafkaysa Derneği, 2004); Ryan Gingeras, 'The Sons of Two Fatherlands: Turkey, the Soviet Union and the North Caucasian Diaspora, 1918–1923', *European Journal of Turkish Studies* (2011), 2–17.
86. Adeeb Khalid, 'Taskhent 1917: Muslim Politics in Revolutionary Turkestan', *Slavic Review*, 55/2 (Summer 1996), 270–96.
87. Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005); Terry Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).
88. Wilson, *Frontiers of Violence, passim*.
89. Banac, *National Question*, 319–28; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 264–88.

CHAPTER 8

REMAKING EUROPE AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

CONAN FISCHER

Dreams and Nightmares

The European powers soon discovered that ending the bloodletting of the First World War would be far harder than unleashing hostilities in the first place. National economies were cannibalized to produce the munitions and increasingly expensive materiel of modern warfare, leading to chronic indebtedness or even bankruptcy. Public debt had mushroomed to outstrip, in just four years, Europe's borrowing over the previous century, even as propagandists promised traumatized citizens a better tomorrow. Governments portrayed the fighting as a crusade for eternal peace, for a future in which all would enjoy prosperity and political liberty. A land fit for heroes awaited soldiers who survived the fighting, while their dead comrades, who had sacrificed themselves in their millions to secure this utopian future, were to be paid homage in countless memorials and, of course, cemeteries. Their widows and orphans would be provided for, as would the millions of permanently crippled and mutilated.

It could hardly have been otherwise after such a bloodletting. Wherever political power rested on electoral success, voters were promised limitless spoils of war or, in defeated countries, near-utopian visions of recovery and reform. In Britain the 'khaki election' campaign of November and December 1918 saw the incumbent prime minister, David Lloyd George, initially stress the need for a just and lasting peace, only to discover that the electorate would not stand for this. He and his political allies changed tack and by early December talked of hanging the Kaiser and stripping Germany bare, even of personal jewellery, public art collections, and libraries. This secured his coalition electoral victory, but he then struggled at the peace conference to retrieve something of his earlier statesmanlike moderation. It was little different in France. Ministers despaired of ever paying off the country's enormous debts and sought refuge in an imagined German-funded bailout: the Hun will pay (*le Boche payera*), they reassured their

constituents, who returned a post-war parliament packed with war veterans fixated on a tough peace. The alternative, of admitting to France's international creditors, or confessing to the millions of French men and women who had patriotically staked their personal fortunes in war bonds, that after the huge blood sacrifice of 1.3 million lives national bankruptcy threatened, was unthinkable. As for Germany its enormous military losses had been compounded by wartime famine as tens of thousands of citizens literally starved. Once the fighting was over, quantitative easing and progressive but exorbitant social and welfare reform took precedence over any notion of rebalancing the budget, for austerity would only serve to facilitate reparations payments to the country's victorious enemies. As the German government printed more and more money to pay its bills and breathe life into a moribund economy, the value of the German mark plummeted and with it the value of real wages and purchasing power.

Advocating Liberal Democracy

If peace and prosperity had been universal war aims, the espousal of political liberty was pursued with greater conviction and more single-mindedly by the west European Allies. They and the United States contrasted their liberal democratic orders with the authoritarian and militaristic regimes to be found in Germany and Austria-Hungary. They blamed these regimes for the outbreak of the war and also for notorious atrocities, which included a massacre of civilians in Belgium and north-eastern France in the opening weeks of the war, and the subsequent use of U-boats to sink merchant and passenger shipping on sight. If anything, the military in both these empires increased its role in government as the war progressed, whereas Britain could point to a process of political and civic emancipation extending back over many generations and a war effort which left the civilians in charge. The same applied in France and the United States, republics which viewed their eighteenth-century revolutions as the ideological bedrock upon which these hard-won civil freedoms rested. When the United States joined the war in April 1917, in response to Germany's unrestricted U-boat campaign, it had already become the principal financier of the Allied war effort and now promised to break the military stalemate on the western front. American leaders envisaged using their economic and military power primarily to secure victory for the forces of democracy over those of militarism, but also to steer the wider European continent towards democratic renewal.

The US president Woodrow Wilson had campaigned throughout his political career for democratic principles, to curb the power of domestic big business in the USA, or to intervene in Latin America and establish, as he saw it, order and democracy in the United States' southern neighbours. Once in the war he advocated far-reaching regime change in Europe, informing Berlin and Vienna that he would only countenance peace talks if and when their governments became accountable to the electorate rather than to a dynastic monarch. Wilson elaborated his aims in a speech to the US Congress in

January 1918. These 'Fourteen Points' included arms control, open diplomacy, and, most crucially, national self-determination. A new global order of democratic nation states would be regulated by an international executive, the League of Nations, which would serve as the collective will of these sovereign states. Wilson did not mention democracy in his speech to Congress, but for any heir of the American War of Independence national self-determination and democracy were simply two sides of the same coin. However, the president seemed unaware that for many Europeans the ideals of nationhood and democracy were by no means synonymous, begging the question of whether interwar nationhood could ever subscribe to a set of universal principles at all. This was particularly so given that these allegedly universal principles in fact rested on the particular experiences of the USA and, at a push, those of its west European allies.

Even the west European democracies possessed vast overseas empires where the popular will often counted for very little indeed, and Allied high-mindedness was further compromised from the outset by the presence of Europe's most unreconstructed and reactionary autocracy, Tsarist Russia, in the anti-German camp. However, in February 1917 Tsar Nicholas II was overthrown and his regime succeeded by a provisional government committed to democratic reform. This briefly squared the Allied ideological circle, before the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 saw the Russian parliament and any adherence to liberal freedoms swept aside. Allied leaders disagreed over what Bolshevism might signify. Woodrow Wilson speculated that beyond an obvious aversion to big business, it might bring greater freedom for the individual citizen. However, as a pitiless civil war erupted between Russia's new rulers and diverse elements of the pre-revolutionary order (the Whites) and brought devastating famine in its wake, the British prime minister David Lloyd George questioned whether Bolshevism would prove viable at all. His French counterpart, Georges Clemenceau, was openly hostile without being able or willing to commit significant resources to the anti-Bolshevik side. In the event the cash-strapped Allies intervened half-heartedly in the civil war to support the Whites, largely because the Bolsheviks had been quick to seek peace with Berlin.

When the civil war eventually went the Bolsheviks' way during 1920 the Allies withdrew their troops, even as Moscow openly promoted revolution across the globe. Soviet leaders claimed that their brand of revolutionary socialism encapsulated the future of mankind, dismissing 'bourgeois' liberalism as outdated and reactionary. The entire capitalist order rather than any individual state, they argued, had been the midwife of an imperialist war. It was thus an open question whether it was Russia (from 1922 constituted as the Soviet Union) or Germany that posed the most immediate threat to the pacification and democratization of Europe.

However, Soviet leaders overestimated the appeal of their ideology to the peoples of Europe and the wider world. There were short-lived Bolshevik-inspired upheavals, for example in Bavaria, Hungary, and even Italy, but without Moscow ever enjoying any realistic chance of promoting world revolution. The failure of a Red Army invasion of Poland during late 1921, with Paris its ultimate military objective, finally forced Soviet leaders to retrench and promote a particular brand of nationalism under the watchword

of socialism in one country. Between 1921 and 1929 the New Economic Policy saw the Bolshevik leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and his successor Joseph Stalin accommodate private business activity and owner-occupied farming. Living standards recovered and a degree of cultural pluralism was tolerated before, in 1929, Stalin embarked on a programme of forced collectivization and industrialization which was accompanied by the unleashing of terror against political enemies, real and imagined. At the end of the day the radicalism and millenarianism of the Bolshevik Revolution had provoked and entrenched fear and hostility towards it across much of European society, without Soviet leaders being able to chalk up any durable compensating gains beyond their own borders.

The Peace Conference and Germany

Unable or unwilling to engage with the Bolshevik Revolution, the Allies excluded its leaders from the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Meanwhile they continued to insist that, as the bastions of democracy, they had the right to make constitutional demands of their defeated enemies. This boiled down to the terms of peace with Germany, for even in defeat it retained the potential again to become the strongest Continental power. However, the Allies never reconciled Wilson's original vision of a peace founded on restitution, bringing with it German participation in the post-war international order, with more punitive objectives, including reparations, territorial losses, and the partial occupation and disarmament of the country. This was demanded by France in particular, but its leaders were trapped in a cleft stick. Efforts during late 1918 to persuade the United States to cancel France's wartime debts (arguing that this American financial sacrifice would have a certain equivalency with France's blood sacrifice) came to nothing, as did French proposals for a post-war Allied economic bloc, excluding Germany. Advocating unrealistically punitive reparations against Germany, Paris calculated, might bring America to relent in a game of bluff or, failing that, provide France with the means to pay its bills. In any case, French leaders genuinely feared for their nation's future security, being convinced that their German neighbour remained incapable of meaningful domestic reform and that it represented an irredeemably malevolent force in international affairs. Reparations would help to keep it weak and tractable, or so the argument ran.

Germany, however, was not quite the authoritarian caricature of Allied propagandists or, for that matter, the French political imagination. Bismarck's founding constitution of 1871 provided for a twofold separation of powers: between the imperial executive and a legislature where the lower house or Reichstag was elected by universal male adult suffrage; and between central government and the individual states of the German federation which retained considerable political, fiscal, and even constitutional autonomy. This allowed the reunited country to accommodate the political liberalism of its south-western states with the conservatism of the north-east. Furthermore, central

government budgets had to gain approval from the Reichstag, leaving the Crown's ministers indirectly subject to the popular will. Some crusty army commanders imagined that the war would strengthen the monarchy, but the imperial chancellor Theobold von Bethmann-Hollweg knew better. He had as good as promised the powerful, republican Social Democratic Party that their support for the war budgets would be rewarded with further democratization of the German and Prussian constitutions once the fighting was over. Then, in 1917, as mounting casualties and domestic privation fuelled growing demands for peace, the majority of German parliamentarians approved a peace resolution which anticipated Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points in key regards. It also served implicitly as a parliamentary challenge to imperial authority, for the constitution reserved power over foreign policy to the Kaiser, his ministers, and military chiefs. Finally during the autumn of 1918 as Germany faced imminent defeat, these domestic pressures combined with Woodrow Wilson's demands for regime change to bring fundamental constitutional reform, followed swiftly by revolution. During October the government became answerable to parliament, which also gained control of foreign policy and the military, while in early November popular revolution saw the monarchy collapse and a republican democratic order proclaimed. Weeks later, in January 1919, male and female German citizens voted overwhelmingly for parties of the political left and centre in elections to a National Assembly set up to draft a new parliamentary constitution and in the meantime to function as an interim legislature.

Much would now depend on how the Allies responded to events in Germany. The initial signs seemed positive. Armistice talks, essentially between the reformed German government and the Americans, opened in October and brought an end to hostilities on 11 November 1918. During these talks Berlin was promised a negotiated and moderate peace based on the principles enunciated by Woodrow Wilson. However this same armistice made provision for far-reaching German demobilization, partial occupation of Germany by Allied forces, restitution for civilian war damage, and de facto territorial losses, all as a precondition for any eventual settlement. German negotiators were perforce taking a great deal on trust. Unfortunately, the Allies' stance thereafter helped unwittingly to transform Germany's process of home-grown constitutional renewal into something its domestic enemies could attack as an alien imposition, the handmaiden of defeat and national humiliation. This festering sore grew with time into a full-blown crisis of legitimacy of Weimar democracy which became in turn part of a wider post-war crisis of democratic legitimacy that extended across much of central, eastern, and Mediterranean Europe.

Each Allied government sought an optimal peace settlement on its own terms. The European victors squabbled over the territorial spoils on offer in Europe and also from Germany's and Turkey's ceded empires. Claims cut across each other and pledges made by Britain and France to one junior ally in the heat of war flatly contradicted promises made to another. The Italians, for example, had joined the Allied side during 1915 in return for promises of territory in present-day Slovenia and Croatia, only to be offered meagre pickings as French leaders insisted that the same lands be granted to a new south Slav federation, later to become Yugoslavia. China and Japan felt slighted, even racially denigrated,

by the Europeans and North Americans, who displayed scant regard for Chinese sensitivities, and baulked at Japanese insistence that the League of Nations' charter contain a racial equality clause. The Arab lands discovered that the Allies' promises of liberty, offered to fuel their revolt against Turkish rule, largely evaporated as French and British colonizers seized the plum assets of the Middle East. The designation of these territories as League of Nations mandates provided an ethical fig leaf of sorts for this final European extra-continental land grab. In eastern Europe, meanwhile, former Austro-Hungarian and Russian territories were convulsed by a series of border wars as embryonic national states sought to maximize their territories at the expense of their neighbours or domestic minorities. If and when the Allies could intervene, strategic considerations of creating new states sufficiently strong militarily and economically to withstand future Soviet and German pressure, as often as not took precedence over any elevated notion of national self-determination. Territory apart, the Europeans and Americans continued to bicker over money, while through all of this, French negotiators remained adamant, in the face of British and American objections, that a tough settlement was needed to cut Germany down to size.

Under these chaotic circumstances, the earlier Allied promise of open negotiation with their defeated enemies became unthinkable. Hastily drafted peace terms, which in key regards amounted to a settlement of inter-Allied differences, were imposed, and the new, democratic governments in Berlin and Vienna threatened with renewed military intervention should they refuse to sign. Almost every shade of political opinion in Germany and Austria could agree that these peace terms were unjustly harsh, while the Hungarians, under the leadership of a makeshift Communist-dominated coalition, renewed hostilities against neighbour states that were helping themselves to substantial slices of Hungarian-speaking land. They were soon enough defeated and the Communists removed from power, but in Germany a democratic coalition that extended from the Social Democrats to include the (Catholic) Centre Party and the (liberal) German Democratic Party struggled to contain domestic upheaval born of grinding social misery.

To this was now added a peace settlement that attributed responsibility for the war to Germany and its allies; stripped away territory, economic resources, and intellectual property; enforced far-reaching disarmament; and demanded that prominent wartime leaders, often regarded as heroes and including the ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II, be surrendered for trial as war criminals. These leaders were not given up, or in the case of Wilhelm II had gained asylum in the Netherlands. Many imperial grandees continued to participate in public life, but some preferred to avoid any blame for the defeat or for their role in unleashing war in the first place. Instead they accused the reformist politicians of betraying the country. The Social Democrats, Centre Party, and Democrats had been the least keen on war in the first place, and in 1917 had, as noted, voted through the Reichstag Peace Resolution. This, the wartime military commander Paul von Hindenburg later insisted, was tantamount to stabbing the army in the back. The home front had allegedly buckled despite the heroic steadfastness of the soldiers at the front. Adolf Hitler was later to parrot this accusation.

The peace terms soon enough became integral to this reactionary narrative. Although Hindenburg continued as military commander until the peace had been concluded, its terms and acceptance had been the political responsibility of Germany's post-revolutionary civilian leaders. The men who stood accused of stabbing the German army in the back were now condemned by imperial diehards for their acceptance of a dictated peace, the terms of which were seen by virtually all Germans as little short of scandalous. It was just a question of where to apportion blame. Under these circumstances it was unfortunate at best that the Allies hit upon the notion of 'war guilt' to legitimize the high and initially open-ended reparations payments demanded primarily from Germany—the impoverished Austrian and Hungarian rump states lacked the wherewithal to make meaningful payments. This rankled among Germans who simply refused to accept that their country was uniquely culpable for the outbreak of war (and historical debate on that issue has rumbled on ever since), and became increasingly ready to question the bona fides of the democratic politicians who, *faute de mieux*, had signed the peace agreement. The issue was more than symbolic, for 'war guilt' was, as noted, coupled with Germany's liability to pay reparations which Germans were not alone in regarding as excessive. The celebrated English economist John Maynard Keynes dismissed them as self-defeating and symptomatic of a wider Allied attitude which failed to address the deep-seated economic crisis that gripped much of central and eastern Europe in the aftermath of the war.[1] A good deal of energy was consequently expended by Weimar Germany's Foreign Office in efforts to refute what became known as the 'war guilt lie' in the hope of seeing reparations annulled. These efforts enjoyed some success but without the Weimar statesmen who negotiated better deals in 1924, 1929, and 1932 ever being given due credit by their domestic opponents.

Militarism in Peacetime

The stigmatization of parliamentary democracy as ineffectual and unpatriotic was to contribute to the growth of militaristic values within German civil society, but comparable issues had more immediate consequences elsewhere on the Continent. The war had mobilized many millions of younger male citizens and despite the bloodletting the majority managed to return home and pick up the pieces of their lives. However, the war years remained for most an indelible experience, people and events to remember, sometimes in quiet reflection or at others in glorification of what war had meant. Veterans' associations allowed the war's survivors to gather with old comrades, remember their common past and those who had not returned, and sometimes offer support to former soldiers who had now fallen on hard times. These old combatants were by no means universally hostile to the parliamentary order; some of their leagues were supportive of the democratic process and some dedicated political energy to the cause of peace and even reconciliation with former enemies.

However, many were less forgiving, particularly those organizations that had taken part in border skirmishing across much of central and eastern Europe which continued for months and even years after the ceasefires had been signed. Where historic demarcation lines were used to define the borders of new national states, these all too often bore little relationship to the ethnic make-up of an area. Sometimes different peoples lived cheek by jowl, which as often as not had worked well enough in the multinational Habsburg Empire, but not when the genie of nationhood had been conjured up and released. Border disputes aside, the leagues often became caught up in civil insurgencies that swept the eastern half of the Continent and, for that matter, Ireland. For all these groups the use of force proved the ultimate arbiter in forging domestic and interstate settlements where Woodrow Wilson's idealistic vision of harmonious negotiation between or within national democracies had been found wanting or even meaningless.

Germany's experience provided nourishment for these paramilitaries as its contested eastern frontier came under attack from Polish irregulars, while other German units, with Allied blessing, fended off efforts by the Bolsheviks' Red Army to overrun the newly independent Baltic States. German politicians, these fighters reflected, had signed away German territory, whilst they fought to retain it. They also intervened in domestic politics, often at the request of government, to crush efforts by Communist and anarchist activists during 1919 and 1920 to reignite the German revolution and transform the country from an open parliamentary into an avowedly socialist republic. Yet again, the paramilitaries observed, they had pulled the civilians' chestnuts from the fire only to be disowned by the same politicians once the immediate post-war crisis had passed.

Some army units had also been involved in these upheavals and many of them were subsequently disbanded by the government in compliance with the disarmament clauses of the peace settlement. Their members, too, could feel ill served, and many flooded into the Stahlhelm veterans' association. This subscribed strongly to the retention of military values in a largely disarmed society, to the consternation of the French government, among others. In French eyes the million or more members of the Stahlhelm represented the preservation of a powerful German army reserve in all but name. This seemed all the more so when the million-strong Stahlhelm went beyond organizing war veterans and recruited actively to its youth section, the Jungstahlhelm, in an effort to strengthen soldierly values in a society where disarmament had meant the end of national service. The rump German army contained just 100,000 professionals on long-term service contracts.

However, the German Republic survived its traumatic birth and by the late 1920s appeared to have stabilized. Not all war veterans had joined the Stahlhelm. Others joined an avowedly republican league, the Reichsbanner, which had been founded in 1924, but even this body had come to exist precisely because its founders recognized the strong hold soldierly values maintained over Weimar society. No doubt its leaders took comfort from the results of the 1928 German elections which saw democratic parties win a clear majority over an assortment of nationalist and pressure group parties in an Indian summer for parliamentary rule, born of a temporary uplift in the German economy.

There was no inevitability about what was to follow in Germany during the Great Depression of the early 1930s. The Nazis were a small grouping during the 1920s whose own attempt at a paramilitary coup in November 1923 (the Munich Putsch) was crushed by the authorities. Its leader, Adolf Hitler, was imprisoned and thereafter banned from political activity in much of Germany. However, the Nazis picked up the pieces, patiently rebuilt their party and also their paramilitary 'Storm Troopers' (*Sturmabteilung*, or SA) in a country where many hankered after authoritarian leadership, a militarized version of social solidarity, and shared a trenchant and highly nationalistic critique of the post-war international order. When this discontent was reinforced by the devastating impact of the Great Depression, the Nazis combined mass electoral campaigning and paramilitary activism to deadly effect.

Fascism in Italy

South of the Alps, in Italy, the post-war crisis proved increasingly incapable of resolution by the country's parliamentarians. Italy had been in a pre-war alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, in the hope of maximizing colonial gains in the Mediterranean, primarily at France's expense. By 1914 the scramble for North African colonies was over (Italy did acquire Libya but was thwarted by France in Tunisia) and as war broke out Italian ambitions turned to absorbing Italian-speaking enclaves in the Alps and along the eastern shore of the Adriatic, which were still governed by Austria or Hungary. Berlin persuaded a reluctant Vienna to accede to Italy's key demands in return for its continuing neutrality and Italian public opinion had little appetite for war. However, the country's senior ministers and also the king were tempted by fulsome Allied promises of territorial gain and, as liberals, were drawn to the western, democratic camp rather than to the more authoritarian central European bloc. Italy itself had functioned as a constitutional parliamentary monarchy since its unification during the mid-nineteenth century, but the male-only franchise was limited by a literacy qualification which effectively excluded much of southern society. The young state's prospects were further compromised by an ongoing feud between the political establishment and the Church, which deeply resented Italy's annexation in 1870 of Rome, hitherto the seat of the Papacy. Practising Catholics needed little bidding from the clergy to boycott political life, all of this leaving the oligarchic liberal state resting on relatively narrow foundations.

Italy joined the war in May 1915, but did not fare particularly well. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was finding it hard to motivate Slav soldiers to fight against their 'brother' Slavs in the Russian army, but Austria's Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, as well as its Germans, were well aware that Italy coveted lands they regarded as their own and consequently they fought hard and well on the Italian front. Against them were pitted Italian southerners (many northerners worked in war industries and avoided the draft) who had little time for a war fought in the alien Alpine foothills and in October 1917 a combined Austrian–German army group delivered a devastating blow at Caporetto

which came to serve as shorthand for Italy's lacklustre but very costly war effort. In 1918 the Allied victory saw Italy emerge as a winner almost by default, but the peace conference delivered less than either the politicians or public opinion had expected. The victory, critics raged, was 'mutilated', by perfidious allies, but especially through the incompetence of Italy's leaders.

There were two distinct, ultimately conflicting responses to the bungled peace, the first involving veterans of the fighting. Many of these embittered ex-soldiers kept their rifles and were mobilized by the celebrated writer and adventurer Gabriele D'Annunzio who went on to seize the disputed border town of Fiume (today's Rijeka) from the Croats. The foreign minister Sidney Sonnino had demanded Fiume at the peace conference, only to be rebuked by Woodrow Wilson. Now the paramilitaries had acted where the civilians had proved impotent and although the city briefly became an independent city state in 1921 after an embarrassed Italian government used force to turf out D'Annunzio's paramilitaries, it was finally annexed by Italy in 1924.

However, by this time the leader of a new movement, the Fascists, was in office and Italy was well along the road to dismantling parliamentary democracy. The leader in question was the journalist Benito Mussolini, who had broken with the Socialist Party over its anti-war stance and launched a new newspaper to promote the war effort and lambast the authorities for their lacklustre performance. Mussolini became a rallying point for local patriotic leagues within which war veterans, diehard nationalists, and embittered right-wing liberals bemoaned the government's performance and by extension the entire parliamentary order. Soldierly solidarity and preparedness for action rather than words united the members of these leagues.

They were not alone in their contempt for the liberal parliamentary order and the second reaction came from the Left and from the landless peasantry. Like most Europeans, ordinary Italians had looked to a better existence after the fighting was over and for many Socialist supporters and trade unionists the Russian Revolution served as an inspiration. The Russian model appeared all the more attractive when post-war unemployment soared and inflation destroyed the value of savings and pensions. A wave of industrial strikes, workplace occupations, and urban food riots ensued. An appalled middle class looked on as a badly rattled coalition government cobbled together from supporters of the old pre-war order struggled to buy off the discontent by imposing swingeing price cuts, pledging a war profits tax, and offering to cede the trade unions control over the hiring and firing of labour. By 1921 the Socialists had nailed their colours to the revolutionary mast by actually joining the Moscow-based Communist International, while trouble of a different sort had flared up in the countryside. On returning from the fighting many peasant conscripts were loathe to return to a life of toil and grinding poverty as landless labourers and now used their military training and army rifles to seize farmland, with support from a new, radical, peasant-oriented political party, the Popular Party, and sometimes with the connivance of sympathetic local priests.

In this febrile atmosphere fewer and fewer Italians regarded the government either as effective or legitimate. Businessmen, landowners, and more conservative sections of society were terrified of where the mounting upheaval was leading, while the rural and

urban insurgents were themselves no friends of the disintegrating liberal order. It was at this critical stage that the paramilitary squads took a hand in domestic politics. In March 1919 Mussolini organized many of the individual leagues in and around Milan into a loose confederation dubbed the 'Fasci di Combattimento' or Fascists, named after the ancient Roman symbol of a bundle of small branches surrounding an axe, tied together to signify collective strength. For the modern Fascists it also evoked the lost glory of Rome which they promised to retrieve. During 1920 these leagues mutated into armed squads which fanned out across northern and central Italy, taking on the Socialists and trade unions whom they accused of defeatism and promotion of a class struggle which threatened the integrity and cohesion of Italian society. The leagues were equally hostile to the peasant militants and fought them across the farmland of central Italy to the undisguised relief of rural landlords. In fact Italy's elites in general were ready to turn a blind eye to Fascist outrages on the presumption that their enemies' enemies were their friends. However, the leagues' support for the old elite was not unconditional. Their hostility to the Socialists rested on a rejection of what they saw as a potentially ruinous confrontation between labour and capital, in place of which they proposed worker participation in the day-to-day management of the workplace. Rejecting a 'winner takes all' model based on class struggle, their ideology posited a mediation of differences within a corporate national community which owed something to the solidarity and sense of common cause to be found within a wartime army.

Mussolini was too skilled a politician to imagine that these street fighters alone could grant him sustainable power. In Germany, after all, the government had turned pretty decisively against the paramilitaries once the immediate threats of revolution or territorial loss had passed. In October 1921 Mussolini formed a National Fascist Party whose commitment to the electoral process within the fracturing liberal state left the established order under attack from within as well as without. This combination of a robust paramilitary presence on the streets and a more conventional electoral assault on parliament thus predated the comparable tactics adopted by Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party.

Leaving aside the detailed story of the next few years, Mussolini succeeded in forming a Fascist-led electoral coalition which quickly came to dominate parliament. He convinced the king in October 1922 to appoint him as prime minister, arguing that the Fascists were the only force capable of reconciling the antagonistic extremes of Italian politics. Thereafter Mussolini did not shy from using his leagues to crush residual dissent and in 1924 even to kill the Reformist Socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti, after he had criticized the bullying and intimidation that had paved the road to Fascist power. By 1925 Mussolini was the undisputed political leader of Italy and remained so until the Allied invasion of 1943, but despite his vaunted claims to infallibility and the declared Fascist aim of forging a totalitarian state and society, the reality was somewhat different.

Fascist Italy represented a compromise of sorts between the old establishment and the new political order. It wasted little effort in trying to control or coerce institutions or groups that posed no obvious threat to its rule; the king remained head of state and commanded a significant degree of loyalty from the army officer corps, existing property relations were upheld, the courts continued to function, and the Church even saw

its authority enhanced when Mussolini ceded Vatican City to the Papacy. Fascism and Catholicism continued to eye each other warily, but more or less coexisted in areas such as education and youth politics. Secular cultural life also remained relatively autonomous in certain respects, although the press and radio were heavily regulated, the cinema less so. However, the one-party state gave its active opponents short shrift. Dissidents were sentenced to terms of imprisonment on remote islands or in isolated communities, cut off from mainstream society; some suffered violent treatment while others were murdered. This darker, repressive side of fascism was compounded during the later 1930s as Fascist Italy moved into Nazi Germany's orbit and began to adopt elements of the racialist ideology and practices of the Third Reich. In the interim, however, the part-revolutionary regime could simultaneously appeal to the reactionary, could satisfy demands for dynamic change, while reassuring others that Italy had avoided the revolutionary mayhem and bloodletting that had swept post-war Russia. Even Winston Churchill felt able to laud Mussolini in 1933 as the greatest living legislator and the Broadway composer Cole Porter praised him in the tune 'You're the Top', before the Second World War saw his name expunged from the song.[2]

Europe's Democratic Heartlands

By the mid-1920s the political map of Europe was already evolving on very different lines from those posited by Woodrow Wilson less than a decade earlier. North-western Europe, however, remained a positive on the democratic balance sheet, pretty much as it had been before the war, even if post-war demobilization had proved challenging. This demobilization promised a return to the golden years, the 'normalcy' that had preceded the war, but also had to accommodate accelerated cultural and social change which saw the traditional elites struggle to justify their privileges in a world where organized labour expected a voice and where women were less and less prepared to exist as second-class citizens. The birth and growing pains of modern twentieth-century European society were affecting this north-western region, but change did take root, eventually to assume developed form in the aftermath of the Second World War. Even during the early 1930s as the Great Depression ravaged the Continent, the Scandinavian lands anticipated this future as socialists and agrarians settled their differences and collaborated within a democratic framework to deliver the societal solidarity and collective benefits that are a hallmark of the region. The Low Countries also weathered the interwar economic crisis and the Belgian and Dutch polities continued to accommodate profound social, cultural, and political differences. In Britain, despite crippling levels of unemployment in regions dependent on traditional heavy industry, a conservative-dominated political consensus eventually came to prevail which successfully marginalized the political extremes. In most of the country the interwar depression proved relatively brief and mild, and by the mid-1930s many citizens, including a significant part of the (shrinking) working class, began to enjoy a standard of living more characteristic of Western Europe

during the later 1950s. The jury remains out on the French Third Republic. Following the military collapse of 1940, French society was accused of failing to address the challenges of the age, of decaying from within, as horse trading between entrenched political interests took the place of clearly articulated and durable policymaking. However, this harsh judgement was essentially based on hindsight and was instrumentalized after 1940 to legitimize the Vichy state. Until 1931 it had looked very different as France recovered rapidly from the war, rebuilt its gold and currency reserves, and even seemed to be riding out the depression as its German neighbour, and also the United States, suffered mass unemployment. The debate continues to this day over whether 1940 represented a military defeat pure and simple, or represented a wider, systemic collapse.

Problems in Eastern Europe

In eastern Europe, however, where democratization had work to do, it had an altogether harder time of it. Initial appearances were deceptive as the aspiring leaders of various east European peoples spent the war touring western Europe and the United States before attending the peace conference. These leaders came from the small urban elites of their respective societies, intellectuals in the main who identified sincerely and unequivocally with Western democratic values. Polish intellectuals, for example, had long-standing cultural ties with France, which harked back to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, allowing them to empathize with the French republican, democratic settlement. Although the Polish military leader Józef Piłsudski initially threw in his lot with Germany and Austria-Hungary in order to fight the Russians (who ruled in Warsaw), he eventually fell out with the Central Powers and was interned by the Germans until the end of hostilities. The majority of his country's elite, however, sided with the West from the outset, among them the celebrated pianist Ignace Paderewski, who persuaded Woodrow Wilson to make Polish access to the Baltic Sea, through the German province of West Prussia, an American war aim. The promise was delivered, contributing to poisonous interwar rows between Germany and Poland, in particular over the status of the German-speaking port city of Danzig (Gdansk). Czech leaders also chose exile in the West, including the academics and future political leaders Edvard Beneš and Tomáš Masaryk, while the Slovak leader Milan Štefanik had lived in France before the war and then served in the French air force. For France in particular, the prospect of a series of strategically placed, Francophile east European democracies was particularly alluring as a potential counterweight to a still-powerful Germany. And at first sight it appeared to Woodrow Wilson that the defeat of the German and Austrian empires would equate with a democratic settlement that would reach far into eastern Europe and so contribute to the efficacy of a world political community organized within the League of Nations.

Things turned out very differently, although in Czechoslovakia parliamentary rule survived Slovak resentment at Czech primacy, and also the presence of 3.5 million

Germans unhappily trapped within the new state's borders. It took interference by Hitler first to destabilize and then to break up east-central Europe's most robust democracy. Finland also established a durable democratic order which, like Czechoslovakia's, was founded on a relatively prosperous economy and a pattern of broad property and land-ownership. That said, neither of these countries considered itself east European, with Lutheran Finland counting itself part of Scandinavia and Catholic Czechoslovakia looking to central or even western Europe. However, the remaining and more unequivocally central or east European states adopted a variety of authoritarian solutions to a range of increasingly intractable problems. Even the liberal intelligentsia of the region had bolstered their claims to independent statehood through ethnic distinction, which could extend to an organic identification with blood and soil and undermine notions of inclusive citizenship.

However, the Allies could not afford to pay too much attention to the labyrinthine intricacy of ethnic relations in the region, despite the existence of meticulously drafted linguistic atlases compiled by British intelligence. These revealed exactly how intertwined the peoples of central and eastern Europe had become, as conquerors infiltrated lands hitherto belonging to conquered subjects, and also as ethnicity came to serve as a determinant of social stratification. Towns and cities across the region housed German and Jewish merchants and traders, while landowners (for example the Polish gentry of Habsburg Galicia) employed land labourers (in Galicia often Ukrainians) who spoke yet another tongue. If the lack of a common language, ethos, or social identity threatened to undermine any workable parliamentary system, religious distinction often compounded division, as in the emergent Yugoslav state. Here the Catholic Croats and Slovenes barely coexisted with the Orthodox Serbs (not to forget the Bosnian Muslims). In countries with large Jewish minorities, such as Poland, anti-Semitism added to the difficulties in creating any sense of democratic consensus or legitimacy. The divide between town and country went deeper still, for beyond ethnic or economic difference, the peasantry and villagers regarded cities such as Cracow or Vienna with incomprehension or outright hostility. Eastern and much of central Europe may have been strongly rural and agrarian, but its cities functioned as avant-garde cultural hothouses in fields such as representative art and photography, and nurtured socialist and liberal parties, usually secularist, which came into conflict with rural-based, conservative, religious parties, such as the Christian Social Party in Austria. For the latter 'Red' Vienna epitomized everything that was wrong with modernity, a prejudice heightened by an anti-Semitic twist. In western Europe, democratic politics served to mediate 'difference', but nothing of the sort was possible in the fractured social and cultural landscape of the East, or for that matter in the Iberian lands, where in 1936 Spain finally erupted into a civil war essentially between the traditional and the modern. Finally there were practical issues, for the emergent east European states lacked common taxation systems, currencies, tariff regimes, legal, educational, or administrative systems, across territories whose war veterans had as often as not fought in opposing armies.

Perhaps prosperity might have bought time and allowed greater popular engagement with the newly created states, but the region's complex historical legacy melded

with wartime impoverishment and interwar structural and cyclical economic crises to fuel seething resentment. The devastation wrought by four years of fighting had been compounded by requisitioning and general economic dislocation. Widespread famine resulted, only to be followed by the 1918/19 influenza pandemic, which (unusually for flu) killed the young and economically productive in disproportionate numbers. The United States channelled food aid into the region, but this was insufficient to overcome the immediate crisis, still less address its origins. Low levels of agricultural productivity were exacerbated by social upheaval as large estates (often previously owned by Germans or Magyars) were parcelled out between peasants and land labourers from the former subject nationalities. These new farms were seldom genuinely competitive, with just 17 per cent of all landholdings in Poland and 33 per cent in Yugoslavia capable of producing a living wage. Regions such as Galicia (part of interwar Poland) or Bosnia experienced levels of poverty and illiteracy described as 'Third World'.[3] Many former subjects of the Hohenzollern or Habsburg emperors found themselves poorer a decade after the war than they had been at its outbreak.

Fragile democratic systems feared for their survival, printed money, borrowed it from abroad or from the League of Nations as they struggled to put off the reality of national bankruptcy and avoid revolution. However, hyperinflation and further economic misery was the inevitable result as good money was thrown after bad and gold-denominated loans proved to be beyond repayment. The region's rulers turned to the military, invoked wartime ideals of national emergency, greatly strengthened executive powers over those of parliament, and in much of south-eastern Europe deposed and reinstated monarchies in a struggle to sustain functioning government.

In Poland, for example, fourteen administrations came and went between 1919 and May 1926 before Piłsudski seized power with army backing and imposed austerity in order to restore economic confidence and secure a degree of social stability. The Polish parliament was shorn of powers, but not abolished—a trend comparable with the experience of most east European states. Some of these oligarchies proved more competent than others, but none were based on the mass support that had helped to create Fascist Italy and later Nazi Germany. Fascist-style paramilitary and popular movements did spring up across central and eastern Europe, but the post-democratic elitist regimes arguably served as a barrier against them. Their turn only came when Nazi Germany took a hand in the region's affairs during the latter stages of the Second World War.

1919: Assessing the Legacy

The 1919/20 settlement has its defenders, who stress the scale and complexity of the challenges confronting the Allied leaders at the Paris Peace Conference. However, Woodrow Wilson had offered Europe and the wider world a prospectus which struggled to accord with reality on the ground. His ambitions were further stymied by American public opinion, which demanded a swift disengagement from Europe, and he failed to sell his

vision of a global settlement upheld by the League of Nations to a sceptical, Republican-dominated Congress. It refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty, which included the Covenant of the League, and so left the weakened European Allies, already struggling to put their own houses in order, to police the peace.

A European-centred settlement followed, but without any clear agreement over objectives or the means to attain them. Britain sought the rehabilitation and reintegration of Germany into the international order from the outset, but France only sought rapprochement with Germany from 1925 after first trying and failing to reduce its hereditary enemy's territory and economic potential beyond the limits agreed in the peace treaty. For its part, Germany initially complied with the peace terms half-heartedly, even grudgingly, before temporarily engaging with a more conciliatory France between 1925 and 1932. Meanwhile, grievance and domestic upheaval defined the politics of much of eastern and southern Europe. The waves of ethnic cleansing that accompanied the fall of the central and east European emperors were far removed from the Fourteen Points as the term 'nationhood' often served almost as a synonym for blood feud. Millions of refugees shuffled across an impoverished east European landscape where need dictated that charity, if it existed at all, began at home. Stark premonitions of Hitler's genocidal empire stalked the region.

In the longer term, however, efforts to extend democracy have borne fruit. The Second World War and a more robust post-war American engagement secured liberal parliamentarianism in the West, and the eventual collapse of the Iron Curtain opened the way to representative parliamentary democracy across most of eastern Europe. East European society had changed as Communist regimes removed traditional oligarchies and promoted a process of urbanization and industrialization that went some way to addressing structural backwardness. The well-resourced European Union was, therefore, able to promote democratization in a much more favourable environment than that facing the peacemakers in 1919 as it admitted a series of East European states as members. However, the post-1919 settlement deserves due credit for its attempts, however compromised, to promote national parliamentary democracies under an umbrella of supranational bodies which included the League of Nations in Geneva, its Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague, the International Labour Organization, and also the Bank for International Settlement in Basel. Whatever their failings, these institutions demonstrably provided a template for the international and transnational institutions which today form an indispensable part of global diplomatic architecture, while the large and small democracies of Western Europe ultimately offered a model too alluring for dictatorship to withstand.

Notes

1. John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1920), 211.
2. Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism 1914–45* (London: Routledge, 1996), 218.

3. Derek H. Aldcroft, *Europe's Third World. The European Periphery in the Interwar Years* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

Further Reading

Acton, Edward, *Rethinking the Russian Revolution* (London: Edward Arnold, 1990).
Adamthwaite, Anthony, *Grandeur and Misery: France's Bid for Power in Europe 1914–1940* (London: Edward Arnold, 1995).
Aldcroft, Derek, *Europe's Third World: The European Periphery in the Interwar Years* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
Bessel, Richard, *Germany after the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
Bloxham, Donald, and Robert Gerwarth (eds.), *Political Violence in Twentieth Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
Boemeke, Manfred, Gerald Feldman, and Elizabeth Glaser (eds.), *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years* (Cambridge, 1998).
Bosworth, Richard, *Mussolini* (London: Arnold, 2010).
Clark, Martin, *Modern Italy 1871–1982* (London: Longman, 1984).
Clavin, Patricia, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Cohrs, Patrick, *The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe 1919–1932* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Fischer, Conan, *Europe between Democracy and Dictatorship 1900–1945* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
Fitzpatrick, Sheila, *The Russian Revolution, 1917–1932* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
Gerwarth, Robert (ed.), *Twisted Paths: Europe 1914–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Gerwarth, Robert and John Horne (eds.), *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War (The Greater War)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Keynes, John Maynard, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1920).
Macmillan, Margaret, *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War* (London: John Murray, 2003).
Marks, Sally, *The Ebbing of European Ascendency: An International History of the World 1914–1945* (London: Arnold, 2002).
Mazower, Mark, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Allen Lane, 1998).
Payne, Stanley, *A History of Fascism 1914–1945* (London: Routledge, 1996).
Sharp, Alan, *The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris 1919* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).
Steiner, Zara, *The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919–1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

PART III

INTERWAR EUROPE AND THE WIDER WORLD

CHAPTER 9

THE GREAT DEPRESSION IN EUROPE

ROGER MIDDLETON

> We are today in the middle of the greatest economic catastrophe—the greatest catastrophe due almost entirely to economic causes—of the modern world. I am told that the view is held in Moscow that this is the last, the culminating crisis of capitalism and that our existing order of society will not survive it. Wishes are fathers to thoughts. But there is, I think, a possibility—I will not put it higher than that—that when this crisis is looked backed upon by the economic historian of the future it will be seen to mark one of the major turning-points.
>
> J. M. Keynes (June 1931)[1]

Introduction

Keynes was right. Economic historians do see this as a 'highly pathological period of European economic history'.[2] Flanked by two devastating world wars, and punctuated by the greatest cyclical disturbance of the twentieth century, economic crisis bred political crisis and vice versa. All had lasting effects upon the role of government, itself now more sharply delineated with the post-1917 rise of Soviet communism confronting the variety of then contemporary western capitalisms. Individual country experiences of the Great Depression varied hugely,[3] but generic factors were important as this was a global phenomenon affecting primary producing and manufacturing countries.

This was a worldwide cyclical decline of 'unprecedented intensity and duration'.[4] As Table 9.1 panel A shows, at its nadir (1932), world trade had contracted by 25 per cent in volume terms (some 36 per cent peak-to-peak, 1929.IV–1932.III) and over 60 per cent by value from the 1929 peak (with the International Labour Organization (ILO)'s world unemployment rate rising from 5.4 to 21.1 per cent).[5] Whilst world production levels

Table 9.1 World production and trade, volume indices and prices (1929=100), 1929–1937

										percentage change		
		1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1929–32	1932–7	1929–37
A.	**World trade:**												
	1. Value at current prices*	100	81	58	39	35	34	35	38	46	-61	18	-54
	2. Volume	100	93	85	75	75	78	82	86	96	-25	28	-4
	3. Price	100	87	68	52	47	44	42	44	48	-48	-8	-52
B.	**World production:**												
	1. Industrial production												
	a World†	100	87	75	64	72	78	86	96	103	-36	61	3
	b Europe†	100	92	81	72	77	86	93	101	110	-28	53	10
	c N. America	100	81	68	54	64	67	76	89	93	-46	72	-7
	2. Primary production: food												
	a World	100	102	100	100	102	101	101	103	106	0	6	6
	b Europe†	100	99	102	104	106	107	107	107	109	4	5	9
	c N. America	100	102	103	100	100	98	91	96	97	0	-3	-3

3. Primary production: raw materials												
a World	100	94	85	75	81	87	95	106	119	-25	59	19
b Europe†	100	90	82	73	77	85	91	98	109	-27	49	9
c N. America	100	90	80	64	69	71	78	91	108	-36	69	8
4. World prices												
a Food	100	84	66	52	46	42	40	42	46	-48	-12	-54
b Raw materials	100	82	59	44	40	40	39	42	47	-56	7	-53
c Manufactures	100	94	78	64	56	50	48	48	51	-36	-20	-49

Notes:

* Index of value of world imports and exports in pre-devaluation US gold dollars.

† ex-USSR.

Sources:

A. C. H. Feinstein, P. Temin, and G. Toniolo, ***The European Economy Between the Wars*** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), tables 6.1, 9.1.

B. Feinstein et al., *European Economy*, tables 6.2, 9.2.

(panel B) fell far less, and would more than fully recover—especially in Europe relative to the US—world trade volumes were by 1937 still some 4 per cent short of the 1929 level. The depression of incomes and employment was compounded by widespread autarkic policies which destroyed the foundations of multilateral trade and payments. The 1930s thus became a decade of de-globalization,[6] with the Americans in the vanguard (the 1930 Hawley–Smoot tariff) but European states also culpable.[7]

One European country, the USSR, escaped the depression, and for many its existence provided something of a natural experiment in face of a generalized western 'crisis of capitalism'. For a generation now,[8] economic historians have framed the Great Depression as an international phenomenon in origin and impact. The US-centric view of the interwar crisis as 'an American recession that, extended by policy errors on the part of the Federal Reserve System into a US depression, spilled abroad' no longer prevails.[9] The modern focus is upon linkages amongst countries, the destabilizing influence of the international monetary and financial system, and on testing hypotheses by comparing the experiences of countries with a range of downturns and recoveries. Specifically European-wide perspectives are less developed,[10] but there are a plethora of national studies, with much of the earlier comparative work still very useful.[11]

The complexity and variety of the Great Depression has created a huge literature. The challenge of making sense of this is compounded by the European economies varying significantly in scale, key characteristics, and stage of economic and political development, so that for some, especially in eastern Europe, the Great Depression stymied catch-up industrialization whilst, of course, there was the special case of the Soviet economy (the third-largest European economy) which from 1928 onwards was guided by successive five-year plans. The very notion of a European economy is an artefact, with very different levels of capital, commodity, and labour market integration: many European states were economically insular, but others were variously integrated into sub-regional, European-wide, and global economies.

Table 9.2 provides key indicators for Europe on the cusp of depression. It would be tempting to proceed on the basis of western versus eastern Europe, but, as can be seen, levels of economic development varied significantly within western Europe (the less-developed south—high agricultural employment shares and low GDP per capita—versus the more highly developed north-west), as also political organization as measured by the Polity 'state fragility' index (from −9 for Fascist Italy to +10 for Britain and other mature democracies).[12] Differences apart, western Europe was economically dominated by the big three economies (France, Germany, and Britain), although it is noteworthy that in 1929 the sum of their national incomes was only 84 per cent of US GDP and, on average, only 69 per cent of US real GDP per capita. Central and eastern Europe was also very far from economically homogeneous, though there was far less variance politically (a preponderance of negative Polity scores). Czechoslovakia was the democratic exception; it was also the most economically developed, with a GDP per capita in 1929 higher than five of the western European states, having gained the 'lion's share of the industrial capacity of the former Austro-Hungarian empire',[13] and being the one successor state not to resort to inflation at the end of the First World War to lessen the real value of war

Table 9.2 Economic and political development: key indicators, 1929–1930*

		Population, 1929 (m)	Real GDP, 1929		Real GDP per capita, 1929		Working population distribution (%), 1930			Illiteracy rate (%), 1929†	Trade openness ratio (%), c.1929¶	Average tariff level, 1927 (%)	Polity IV index, 1929
			$1990	US=100	$1990	US=100	Agriculture	Industry	Services				
		[A]	[B]		[C]		[D]			[E]	[F]	[G]	[H]
A.	**Western Europe:**									1.6			
	Austria	6.66	25,412	3.0	3,816	55.3	32	33	35		45	17.5	8
	Belgium	8.03	40,665	4.8	5,064	73.4	17	48	35		116	11.0	9
	Denmark	3.52	16,941	2.0	4,813	69.8	35	27	38		60	n.a.	10
	Finland	3.45	9,953	1.2	2,885	41.8	65	15	21		62	31.8	10
	France	41.23	185,281	22.0	4,494	65.1	36	33	31		29	23.0	9
	Germany	64.74	278,626	33.0	4,304	62.4	29	40	31		34	20.4	6
	Greece	6.29	13,426	1.6	2,135	30.9	54	16	30		45	n.a.	10
	Ireland	2.94	8,300	1.0	2,823	40.9	48	15	37		67	n.a.	10

(*Continued*)

Table 9.2 Continued

	Population, 1929 (m)	Real GDP, 1929		Real GDP per capita, 1929		Working population distribution (%), 1930			Illiteracy rate (%), 1929[†]	Trade openness ratio (%), c.1929[¶]	Average tariff level, 1927 (%)	Polity IV index, 1929
		$1990	US=100	$1990	US=100	Agriculture	Industry	Services				
Italy	40.55	131,423	15.6	3,241	47.0	47	31	22		22	27.8	–9
Netherlands	7.78	39,008	4.6	5,014	72.7	21	36	43		73	n.a.	10
Norway	2.79	9,536	1.1	3,418	49.5	35	27	38		42	n.a.	10
Portugal[‡]	6.71	10,800	1.3	1,609	23.3	48	18	34		n.a.	n.a.	–9
Spain	23.1	62,916	7.5	2,724	39.5	56	21	23		19	49.0	–6
Sweden	6.11	23,814	2.8	3,898	56.5	36	32	32		36	20.0	10
Switzerland	4.02	25,466	3.0	6,335	91.8	21	45	34		48	16.8	10
Britain[§]	45.67	247,283	29.3	5,414	78.5	6	46	48		39	9.5	10
B. Eastern Europe												
Albania	0.98	905	0.1	926	13.4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	71.3	n.a.	n.a.	–9
Bulgaria	5.66	6,383	0.8	1,128	16.4	80	8	12	36.5	26	67.5	–3
Czechoslovakia	14.59	42,571	5.0	2,918	42.3	37	37	26	4.1	55	31.3	7
Hungary	8.583	21,767	2.6	2,537	36.8	53	24	23	9.3	33	30.0	–1
Poland	31.08	65,842	7.8	2,118	30.7	65	17	18	24.6	n.a.	53.5	–3

	Romania	17.54	19,334	2.3	1,102	16.0	79	7	14	42.0	n.a.	42.3	–4
	Yugoslavia	13.58	18,529	2.2	1,364	19.8	79	11	10	48.0	n.a.	32.0	–10
	USSR	156.1	222,646	26.4	1,426	20.7	83	6	11	n.a.	9	n.a.	–8
C.	**US**[||]	122.25	843,334	100.0	6,899	100.0	21	33	46	4.3	11	13.8	10

Notes:

[*] Except Bulgaria (Maddison 1990 boundaries from source [A]), interwar territorial boundaries for all countries [A], [B], and [C].

[†] 10 years and over.

[‡] Portugal, 1930 for Polity index.

[§] Tariff: 1925 estimate from Capie (source [G]).

[¶] Defined as exports+imports as % of GDP. All countries 1929 except Belgium (1927).

[||] No 1930 estimate available, thus midpoint between 1920 and 1930 estimates.

Sources:

[A] A. Maddison, *The World Economy: Historical Statistics* (Paris: OECD, 2003), tables 1a, 2a, 3a as adjusted by EuroGDP2dataset from S. N. Broadberry and A. I. Klein, 'Aggregate and Per Capita GDP in Europe, 1870–2000: Continental, Regional and National Data with Changing Boundaries', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, 60/1 (2012), 79–107, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/whosWho/profiles/sbroadberry.aspx>, accessed 13 August 2013.

[B] Maddison, *World Economy*, tables 1b, 2b, 3b as adjusted by EuroGDP2dataset.

[C] Maddison, *World Economy*, tables 1c, 2c, 3c as adjusted by EuroGDP2dataset.

[D] C. H. Feinstein, P. Temin, and G. Toniolo, *The European Economy Between the Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), table 4.1; USSR (1926 estimate): R. W. Davies, M. Harrison, and S. G. Wheatcroft, *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 8; US: S. B. Carter et al., *Historical Statistics of the United States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Vol. II, series Ba652–69.

[E] M. C. Kaser and E. A. Radice (eds.), *The Economic History of Eastern Europe, 1919–1975* 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985–6), Vol. I, table 6.19.

[F] Europe: B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics, 1750–1975* (1981), tables F1, K1; US: S. B. Carter et al., *Historical Statistics of the United States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Vol. III, series Ca74, Ca77, Ca78. Denominator for France is Mitchell constant price estimate adjusted by GDP deflator from P. Beaudry and F. Portier, 'The French Depression in the 1930s', *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 5/1 (2002), table X.

[G] Britain: F. H. Capie, 'Tariff Protection and Economic Performance in the Nineteenth Century', in J. Black and L. A. Winters (eds.), *Policy and Performance in International Trade* (London: Macmillan, 1983), 10; US: Carter et al., *Historical Statistics*, Vol. V, ser. Ee429; all other countries: H. Liepmann, *Tariff Levels and the Economic Unity of Europe* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938), table IVb, absolute height of general tariff.

[H] Polity IV annual time series, 1800–2012, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>, accessed 12 August 2013.

debts.[14] As the most open economy it was also extremely vulnerable to any contraction in its export demand.[15] Many of the new and reconstituted states of eastern Europe were small, most were dominated by agriculture and, as shown by illiteracy rates, had little human capital endowment. In scale and development, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland led the pack, but, as Aldcroft concluded, all the eastern European states 'faced a constant struggle for survival, politically as well as economically' as 'Weak states, barely fit for nationhood, internally rent by nationality conflicts and divided one against the other, they became pawns in the renewed struggle for the hegemony of Europe'.[16]

It is only possible here to provide a highly selective survey of individual country experiences. More can be said about regional groupings, but our focus is necessarily the generic. Moreover, our account is, in part, within a stylized framework designed to highlight, from the economist's perspective, the twin problem of attaining simultaneous internal and external balance in an age of marked instability, namely how to secure low unemployment, price stability, and balance of payments equilibrium. This has a number of advantages in terms of the economic history, but also more broadly the political economy as it was the different political configurations which, in large measure, determined policy responses and how they, in turn, impacted upon domestic and international politics to produce what many see as the ultimate consequence of the Great Depression: the Second World War. That question is not within our remit; rather, as Temin puts it, 'It is not possible to separate the effects of the depression from those of the Nazis and World War II, but it is possible to ask if the Great Depression could have been avoided.'[17] A counterfactual thus lurks in any European account of the Great Depression.

This chapter seeks to address three issues: the scale and scope of the depression and the unevenness of countries' recoveries by the eve of the Second World War; the general causes, domestic and international, of the depression of the European economies; and the reasons why individual countries fared so differently as they sought to recover from the depression. Some conclusions are also drawn about the legacy of the Great Depression.

The Contours of Depression and Recovery

Table 9.3 provides key macroeconomic data for the major European states (plus the US) for four key years (or changes between them), 1920, 1929, 1932, and 1937 with the purpose of detailing the magnitude and pattern of the depression and recovery for individual economies. Data problems are here very significant (as with Table 9.2), with large gaps for eastern Europe in all three indicators. Western Europe is very much better covered, but even here the key source (Maddison) does not extend to all four data series for all countries. Where we can, we supplement Table 9.3 with additional sources.

Table 9.3 Interwar macroeconomic key performance indicators, 1920–1937

	Real GDP: % change p.a.*					Unemployment rate %†‡				Price indices§¶				Balance of Payments (%)‖			
	1920–9	1929–32	1932/37	1929–37	1920–37	1920	1929	1932	1937	1920	1929	1932	1937	1920	1929	1932	1937
	[A]					[B]				[C]				[D]			
A. Western Europe:																	
Austria	5.2	−7.1	1.5	−1.8	1.9	n.a.	5.5	13.7	13.7	5,115	111	108	106	n.a.	−6.0	−4.2	0.4
Belgium	3.4	−2.4	1.9	0.2	1.9	6.1	0.8	11.9	7.2	366	805	673	739	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Denmark	3.6	1.4	2.7	2.2	3.0	10.0	8.0	16.0	11.0	261	173	155	181	n.a.	0.6	0.4	1.6
Finland	5.4	−1.3	6.9	3.7	4.6	1.8	2.8	5.8	2.6	899	1,111	933	944	n.a.	−0.2	0.7	0.3
France	4.9	−5.1	2.6	−0.4	2.4	2.7	1.2	2.2	4.5	371	621	546	611	n.a.	1.2	−1.5	−1.1
Germany	4.9	−5.6	7.5	2.4	3.7	1.7	5.9	17.2	2.7	900	154	121	125	n.a.	−0.2	0.8	n.a.
Greece	3.5	0.5	5.3	3.5	3.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Ireland	0.7	0.9	0.5	0.6	0.7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	−4.0
Italy	2.9	−0.8	3.2	1.7	2.3	n.a.	1.7	5.8	5.0	467	503	394	454	−8.8	−1.5	0.7	−1.3
Netherlands	4.9	−2.6	2.7	0.7	2.9	1.7	1.7	8.3	10.5	194	138	116	112	n.a.	n.a.	−2.5	4.0

(*Continued*)

Table 9.3 Continued

	Real GDP: % change p.a.*					Unemployment rate %†‡				Price indices§¶				Balance of Payments (%)‖			
	1920–9	1929–32	1932/37	1929–37	1920–37	1920	1929	1932	1937	1920	1929	1932	1937	1920	1929	1932	1937
	[A]					[B]				[C]				[D]			
Norway	3.2	1.9	3.9	3.1	3.2	5.6	5.4	9.5	6.0	300	166	150	166	–11.5	–0.9	1.4	1.3
Portugal	4.3	1.9	2.6	2.4	3.4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Spain	3.6	–1.3	–5.8	–4.2	–0.1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Sweden	4.1	–1.4	5.3	2.7	3.4	1.3	2.4	6.8	5.1	269	170	156	163	–5.7	2.8	–1.1	1.7
Switzerland	4.8	–2.8	1.9	0.2	2.6	n.a.	0.4	2.8	3.6	224	161	138	137	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Britain	1.9	–1.7	4.3	2.0	1.9	1.9	7.2	15.3	7.7	248	167	143	152	5.4	1.9	–1.2	–0.9
B. Eastern Europe																	
Albania	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Bulgaria	n.a.	8.3	2.7	4.8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	62	100	74	58	n.a.	–5.2	–0.2	n.a.
Czechoslovakia	6.0	–3.6	1.9	–0.2	3.0	[72]	[42]	[554]	[409]	n.a.	100	92	95	n.a.	1.2	n.a.	n.a.
Hungary	5.1	–3.2	3.8	1.1	3.2	n.a.	[15]	[66]	[48]	n.a.	100	83	87	n.a.	–3.6	–0.4	1.9
Poland	n.a.	–6.6	4.2	0.0	n.a.	n.a.	4.9	15.6	12.8	9,084	100	75	62	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

	Romania	n.a.	1.2	0.9	1.0	n.a.	n.a.	[7]	[39]	[11]	n.a.	100	59	65	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Yugoslavia	4.7	–4.8	3.9	0.5	2.7	n.a.	[8]	[15]	[22]	n.a.	100	77	65	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	USSR**	n.a.	2.6	9.1	6.6	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.3	–3.0	0.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C.	**US**	4.0	–10.0	6.2	–0.2	2.0	3.9	3.1	22.3	9.1	194	165	131	138	3.7	0.7	0.3	0.1

Notes:

* Real GDP: interwar boundaries; unemployment rate and CPI: 1990 boundaries; see also Table 9.2 n. *

† Belgium/France, Norway: 1921 not 1920; France: 1931 not 1932, 1936 not 1937; Czechoslovakia: 1921 not 1920.

‡ For eastern Europe, value in parentheses is number unemployed (000s) as percentages not available.

§ Western Europe: CPI 1914=100; eastern Europe: cost of living indices (1929=100).

¶ Belgium 1921 not 1920.

|| Numerator: current account balance; denominator: variously GDP/GNP/NNP.

** Russia: balance of trade not current account balance.

Sources:

[A] Calculated from A. Maddison, ***The World Economy: Historical Statistics*** (Paris: OECD, 2003), tables 1b, 2b, 3b.

[B] Western Europe and US: A. Maddison, ***Phases of Capitalist Development*** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), table C6; eastern Europe: B. R. Mitchell, ***European Historical Statistics, 1750–1975*** (1981), table C2.

[C] Western Europe and US: Maddison, *Capitalist Development*, table E6; Mitchell, *Historical Statistics*, table I2.

[D] Calculated from Mitchell, *Historical Statistics*, tables K1, K3; Russia: trade balance: R. W. Davies, M. Harrison, and S. G. Wheatcroft, ***The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913–1945*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), table 49.

In confronting the experience of European countries from 1929 onwards it is vital to start with their very different experiences of the 1920s. All countries grew between 1920 and 1929 and—bar civil war-affected Spain—when measured between 1920 and 1937 (Table 9.3 series A).[18] However, overall growth was slow by recent historical standards and, above all, in relation to growth potential as contemporary technological, organizational, and structural factors were all permissive. Growth rates varied hugely across both eastern and western Europe, but noticeably, in the latter, British economic performance lagged behind that of the other big economies, with unemployment a particular problem in the 1920s. In eastern Europe, rapid economic development was the prime political as well as economic goal. All attempted currency stabilizations, with most returning to the gold standard, but timings differed and, as can be seen, price trends varied—spectacularly so in the case of Germany where hyperinflation cast a huge shadow over subsequent events. Difficulties and disappointments admitted, recent work has found that over the 1913–50 trans-war period there was conditional convergence as less developed economies drew closer to more advanced economies and, generally, Europe experienced some catch-up on US productivity levels. In the 1920s, though less so in the 1930s for many European economies, conditions were generally permissive for physical and human capital accumulation, whilst the new general-purpose technologies of electricity and motor vehicles provided enormous potential for catch-up and convergence on the US, which had led in the so-called second industrial revolution. A recent growth-accounting exercise for western Europe (data problems preclude an identical exercise for eastern Europe) found capital accumulation and increased labour productivity growth to have been the key drivers of interwar growth, but GDP growth was much slower in 1929–38 than in 1922–9.[19] Another detailed growth study confirms that growth rates were lower in eastern and central Europe than elsewhere in Europe.[20]

A growth trend interrupted thus provides the backdrop. Nonetheless, 1929–32 real GDP trends are far from straightforward. The modal experience was real GDP losses of zero to less than 5 per cent (Finland, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Britain) for western Europe, but between –10 and –15 per cent for eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), with mean contractions—unadjusted for the different size of economies—of 4.5 per cent and 2 per cent respectively. Means are much affected by outliers, with the depressions in Austria and Germany very significant for central-western Europe (though US income losses were greater). Scandinavia escaped the worst of the depression, whereas in eastern Europe both Romania and Bulgaria grew rapidly, as did the USSR. Variable trends pertain also as we turn to the recovery phase (1932–7) where there was no modal experience as such, though mean growth was similar for western and eastern Europe, respectively 16.7 and 15.9 per cent. Again the summary statistics are affected by outliers, with Germany experiencing the most pronounced recovery (+53.9 per cent), followed by Greece, Sweden, and Britain within the ≥25≤30 per cent range. In eastern Europe, the onward march of the USSR (+56.4 per cent) was followed by Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia in the ≥20≤25 per cent range. Many countries had recoveries

of less than 15 per cent of GDP, notably France (+13.5 per cent), with Czechoslovakia and Romania even lower (<10 per cent). This suggests policy will be key in understanding recovery experiences, and especially given that, whether GDP fell or rose during the depression phase, all economies are likely to have been working below trend capacity. For those that did experience pronounced losses in the depression phase and weak recoveries the shortfall could be very significant, for example 21 per cent below trend by 1939 for France.[21]

Unemployment trends would be expected to mirror GDP trends, though labour market behaviour (and, in turn, labour market structure and institutions) will be important in how nominal wages respond to depression forces. We have no time series data for eastern Europe, but most west European economies saw a doubling of their unemployment rates between 1929 and 1932, and some rather more, including Benelux and above all Germany, though here also this was dwarfed by the crisis in the US economy. We see also some curiosities: both Denmark and Norway experienced no GDP loss between 1929 and 1932, but their unemployment broadly doubled, as was also the case with the French economy which suffered a 5.2 per cent real GDP loss. This suggests that national economic structure, the causes of depression, and the country's economic policies all mattered. Price trends are also very relevant, partly as a reflection of the adaptability of national economies to demand shocks but also the workings of the international transmission mechanisms (notably the gold standard). As Table 9.1 showed, world prices for food, raw materials, and manufactured goods all fell sharply between 1929 and 1932, and thereafter remained depressed, though there was a limited upturn in 1936–7 as the pace of global recovery quickened. So far as national economies are concerned, we have time series for the major western economies but there is a huge data deficit for eastern Europe. Whilst actual prices are important, so also are price expectations as policymakers believed rightly that once the downward trend of prices was established, uncertainty about future movements would impact adversely upon consumption and investment decisions. Additionally, the interaction of generally sticky nominal wages (in some countries, mainly those with highly organized labour, they adjusted little to rising unemployment) and a falling price level produced increased real wages. This goes to the heart of the economists' debate about unemployment and its remedy: for Keynesians, real wage resistance provided a floor for depressed demand, whereas for most contemporaries and what we would now call supply-siders the failure of nominal (and thus real) wages to fall constituted a labour efficiency wedge which limited employment and productivity growth.

We have shown the extent of economic recovery by 1937 in Table 9.3. There then occurred a recession which affected mainly the industrialized countries and which was comparable in intensity to the 1929–30 downturn. This was particularly pronounced in the US and Britain, but was short-lived, and by the eve of the Second World War most economies were once more growing, some very strongly, once directly stimulated by rearmament which had been ongoing in Germany and the USSR, and now involved a belated, but intense, catch-up by France and Britain.

The Depression Phase, 1929–1932

With no European boom of the later 1920s, no cyclical reaction was accordingly expected and there was no immediate reason to fear that US events, notably the Wall Street Crash of October 1929, would transmit into depression in Europe. The sequence of reference dates for upper turning-points of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) reinforces the complexity of what is to be explained, with peaks in Germany (April 1929), the US (June 1929), Britain (July 1929), and France (March 1930).[22] (The data deficit is significant here, but contemporary industrial production indices shows 1929 peaks for the other major western European economies together with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.[23]) In short, downturns began in some of Europe, whereas the Great Depression began in the US. Moreover, the global consequences of US developments lay first with the US boom (especially in financial assets) and only later with the US's developing depression, while the European consequences lay with the dependence of Germany and much of eastern Europe on inward capital flows to finance balance of payments deficits deriving from post-war reconstruction needs and the utter mess that was war debts and above all German reparations.

While Germany is key to understanding the propagation of the European depression, behind the proximate causes also lay a global factor—the over-supply of food and raw materials—which exacerbated Europe's vulnerability to demand shocks and intensified depression once initiated. The impact was felt particularly in parts of eastern Europe, where agriculture was dominant, whilst, in turn, falling primary product prices would contribute hugely to the growth of protectionism and other beggar-my-neighbour policies. The latest research suggests that the spread of trade barriers, both tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs, quotas, trade and currency blocks), 'inflicted substantial damage on world trade', accounting for about half the reduction in the early 1930s.[24] Falling primary product prices interacting with high levels of indebtedness was a toxic mix for many European economies, creating a vicious cycle in which agricultural producers increased production as prices fell in a desperate attempt to stabilize the incomes necessary to service their overseas debts.[25] This was sustainable so long as capital continued to flow to Europe and the war debts/reparations regime—one constantly being reviewed but at this point the Dawes Plan—did not implode.

With these global and broader European problems to the fore we turn thus to Germany, the key, mindful that understanding the causes of its depression and the effects of Weimar policy responses has generated a huge literature.[26] Recent scholarship rejects the idea, represented by some as a four-year post-1924 stabilization success, of Weimar 'golden years', and instead focuses upon domestic problems which meant low investment, structural unemployment, and a resulting failure to generate a sufficient current account balance of payment surplus to fund reparations, such that all such payments effectively were covered by short-term overseas borrowing. Thus, Voth argues

that 'Weimar's "golden years" already contained the seeds of the catastrophe that was to come, and that a "crisis before the crisis" beset the economy'.[27]

Ritschl begins with the Dawes Plan's flaw, for its balance of incentives and penalties actually encouraged overseas borrowing as competition arose between public and private debt (1924–9 German borrowing equated to one-third of its 1929 GNP).[28] This placed a premium on maintaining investor credibility that, in turn, reinforced austerity policies. These placed a brake on demand growth in the 1920s, but with the onset of the depression, they then intensified the downturn. Between 1924 and 1928, the Dawes regime, reparations were essentially recycled through American credits. But, with the Wall Street boom, the direction of global flow of funds reversed and US credit was no longer available,[29] forcing reparations to be funded from the German budget and this, in turn, compelling economies elsewhere and higher taxation: in short, deflationary policies just as the German economy entered into depression. Given contemporary circumstances, the deflationary policies of the Brüning administration are as understandable as they were destructive of income and employment. Behind them lay two economic orthodoxies, widely shared foundation stones of nineteenth-century international economic liberalism: that peacetime budgets should be balanced, whatever the circumstances, and the 'gold-standard mentality' that 'limited the ability of governments and central banks to respond to adversity' and 'led to the adoption of policies that made economic conditions worse instead of better'.[30] The gold standard had been credible before 1914 because of a presumption (the reality for some countries was somewhat different) that in face of balance of payments deficits and gold losses, governments would restore equilibrium by restricting credit to reduce domestic prices and costs and that the labour market, namely nominal wages, would adjust. Pre-1914 policy credibility rested on the presumption that, *in extremis*, governments would sacrifice employment and incomes to maintain the gold standard; however, with the restored gold standard of the 1920s labour markets were increasingly structured and politicized, thereby severely compromising wage flexibility. Thus 'the gold-standard adjustment mechanism no longer operated as before [but] contemporaries unfortunately found it impossible to break out of the established mindset even when this radical change in circumstances rendered ineffectual and even perverse the application of conventional remedies'.[31]

The precept of a balanced budget and the gold standard mentality form the architecture for the depression phase, but nonetheless it is very important that depression forces played out differently, as is brought into sharp relief by comparing the experiences of the two largest European economies: Britain, which experienced a relatively mild downturn, though one would not know that from the intensity of domestic politics, and Germany, where the depression was the most severe in western Europe and would bring about a major regime shift in 1933. We chart in Figure 9.1 the anatomy of the two experiences in terms of changes (expressed as a percentage of pre-depression GDP) in the composition of GDP. The base year is 1928 for Germany (panel A) and 1929 for Britain (panel C) (panels B and D feature later for the recovery phase). As is immediately clear, for Germany the greatest depressive force was the collapse of investment, closely followed by consumers' expenditure and then, at some distance, exports. Government's contribution was also negative, as is to be expected given the Brüning administration's



FIGURE 9.1 Germany and Britain: change in GDP and components (% of base year GDP), 1928–1937.

Source: Source for Germany <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ritschl/al_histdat.html>, 19 August 2013. With thanks to Albert Ritschel. For UK: J. Sefton and M. R. Weale, *Reconciliation of National Income and Expenditure: Balanced Estimates of National Income for the United Kingdom, 1920-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), table A.3.

fiscal policies.[32] In Britain, investment also fell significantly, but this was dwarfed by the fall in exports. Importantly, given its weight in GDP (nearly 80 per cent in 1929), and in complete contrast to Germany, consumers' expenditure rose, with a small contribution from government expenditure, although the overall fiscal stance was deflationary. Thus, for Britain, the depression was imported via an export downturn, and this was then exacerbated by orthodox austerity policies.[33]

The fourth-largest European economy, France, is also of interest for the interaction of generic forces and special factors. The depression began later, as the initial undervaluation of the franc made it less exposed to contracted world trade, lasted longer, and is generally judged less severe, though if assessed as a deviation from its 1920s growth path then it was anything but mild and,[34] as we shall see with the recovery phase, policy errors were to be critical. As for the USSR, the third-largest economy, the Great Depression for Europe was coterminous with the beginning of its 'great leap forward'. Nonetheless, it was not immune to the Great Depression. A command economy from 1928 onwards, the USSR was shielded from many of the external disturbances and able

to generate investment funds through domestic savings,[35] but it did need imports and these had to be resourced by exports which traded in an international economy with prices set by markets. These, as we have seen, and especially for primary products, were very depressed. Moreover, the interaction of forced collectivization of agriculture and rapid industrial development resulted in Soviet wheat exports being dumped on world markets, exacerbating price trends.[36]

It remains in this section to discuss the 1931 crisis, in which Germany and later Britain, via contagion but also special local factors, stood centre stage. This crisis was the culmination of developing depression forces, but also laid the groundwork for the recovery of those who quickly abandoned the 'golden fetter', the gold standard, to regain a measure of national monetary policy independence. For Eichengreen:

> By the end of 1930, the worldwide contraction had reached a crucial stage. France and the United States continued to absorb gold from the rest of the world at an alarming rate. Still committed to the gold standard, countries losing reserves had no choice but to redouble their restrictive policies, reinforcing the impact on their economies of the decline in exports and capital imports they had suffered previously….
>
> To avoid disaster, government officials had to act. So long as they remained committed to the gold standard, any substantial reflationary initiatives had to be coordinated internationally. The crucial question was whether policymakers could make the necessary arrangements.[37]

From the outset of the depression there were frequent attempts at regional and international coordination to secure reflation, but they all came to nought (and would end with the failure of the World Economic Conference, 1933).[38] Meanwhile, depleted financial resources and an inability to borrow were being transmitted to the real economy and thence back to the banking system, and especially so in Germany, though it was to be in Austria (highly integrated with the German economy) that we find the proximate origins of what became an international financial crisis following the collapse of the Viennese Credit-Anstalt Bank. There is somewhat technical debate about whether it was a currency or banking crisis in Germany,[39] but at heart it was the precarious external situation which was the more important factor. The story of contagion is well known: the Credit-Anstalt collapsed in May 1931, which created panic—rational panic given policy inconsistencies in face of economic realities—elsewhere in Europe. This was quickly transmitted to London, itself vulnerable as, first, one official report made clear the extent of London's liquidity difficulties and how the depression had damaged Britain's balance of payments; and, second, another two weeks later highlighted Britain's precarious budgetary situation. The then minority Labour government was unable to satisfy the markets that they had a credible plan for fiscal consolidation; an all-party national government ensued, but such were the pressures against sterling, amidst general anxieties about all exchange rates in a world of depressed economies, that sterling was forced to abandon gold in September 1931.[40] Others soon followed. All three elements of the Kindleberger thesis about the world depression thus culminated: panic, contagion, and the absence of a hegemon to take up the role previously occupied by Britain before 1914.

The Recovery Phase, 1932–1937

For many European economies recovery began soon after the 1931 crisis, 'with the timing of recovery depending on how long they clung to the gold standard', with this in turn broadly related to democratic pressures for recovery policies but also international indebtedness and inflation history.[41] The exchange rate regime was key, with a robust finding that the date of gold standard exit and the magnitude of ensuing depreciation determined the timing and extent of recovery.[42] The year 1931 saw the abandonment of gold in the two largest western European economies (Germany first, then Britain), and thereafter a series of currency blocs were formed, two formally (sterling and gold) as regional 'zones of stability' in which open currency exchange was sought, with a third group lacking formal organization but all members resorting to exchange controls. This third group included much of eastern Europe, as well as Germany which would come to dominate eastern European trade as the decade progressed: what Berend calls a 'dictated regional economic integration'.[43]

Importantly, the third-largest economy (USSR) had never subscribed to the gold standard, and thus had no external constraint to escape (similarly Spain), while the fourth-largest (France), which led the gold bloc, stayed on gold and delayed depreciation (until 1936 with the election of the Popular Front), meaning that it and other bloc members were unable to adopt more expansionary monetary and/or fiscal policies; indeed, they had to deflate their economies further to maintain the parity. Retrospectively, this appears highly misguided, but at the time French elites subscribed to a radically different interpretation of the Great Depression from their British and American counterparts, viewing it as a consequence of British and American economic irresponsibility before 1931.[44] This is somewhat ironic given that current scholarship has it that it was the gold sterilization policies of France (and the US) which made the gold standard the propagator of depression.[45] Nonetheless, this delay in devaluation explains why France along with other gold-bloc members—Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland—continued in a depressed state through the 1930s, whilst their near neighbours, especially Germany and Britain, expanded strongly from 1932 onwards, albeit the former as an increasingly militarized economy. Notably also, beginning with Sweden a week after British devaluation, the Scandinavian economies all abandoned gold and were amongst the earliest and fullest to recover,[46] benefiting as they did from bilateralism with Germany and Britain.[47] GDP recovery from the depths of the depression correlates to exchange rate regime (annual percentage rate of real GDP growth between 1932 and 1937 in parentheses from Table 9.3 column A), with Germany (7.5) the best performer in western Europe, the sterling bloc countries next (range 2.6–6.9), and with the gold bloc countries delivering by far the worst performance (range 1.9–2.7).

In the previous section we provided an anatomy of the German and British depression phases; their recovery phases (Figure 9.1 panels B and D) are also instructive as to differences in the prime movers of GDP growth. The relative magnitude of the German

recovery is immediately apparent, but this was not just because of the deepness of the depression phase, as the 1929–37 and indeed 1920–37 growth rates were high by western European standards (Table 9.2, panel A). Thus, despite its many problems, the German economy was dynamic, having the highest total factor productivity growth (1922–38) of all the western European economies.[48] The British recovery was dominated by the growth of consumers' expenditure and investment, together accounting for nearly three-quarters of GDP growth. Net exports were neutral with respect to growth, though government expenditure did make a small and, with rearmament (begun in earnest in 1935), growing contribution. By contrast, for Germany, the contribution of consumers' expenditure and investment to GDP growth was significantly less (56 per cent as against 74 per cent for Britain), but government expenditure's contribution was very much more important (29 per cent; 16 per cent for Britain) and net trade made a positive contribution, albeit small (4 per cent). Underlying these aggregates was the militarization of the German economy, with consumer choice and supply squeezed from an early point.[49]

The paths to economic recovery were thus many and the policy regime was key. Economists model policy choices in terms of trade-offs, with that between internal and external balance a central theme of post-war economic policy where, for open economies, it is axiomatic that it is not possible to achieve simultaneously more than two out of three of the 'impossibility trilemma': exchange rate stability; free international capital mobility; and national monetary-policy independence directed towards domestic goals.[50] More recently, in the context of the early 1930s, Irwin has recast the trilemma to show 'how a country's stance with regard to monetary and exchange rate policy shaped its subsequent trade policy choices'.[51] In the early to mid-1920s, with inflation (in some cases hyperinflation) a very recent experience, contemporary elites ranked very highly the nominal anchor of gold as a defence against political manipulation of monetary policy that produced price instability, and sought to lower tariffs and NTBs. By the late 1920s, however, as the gold standard transmitted price deflation internationally, and the US led on raising trade barriers, the fundamentals for navigating the trilemma were changing. Those European economies freed from the 'golden fetter' (thirteen out of twenty-four European countries by the end of 1931) were able to adopt more expansionary monetary policies, with a secondary benefit for fiscal policy as lower interest rates eased the heavy debt-management charges of their hugely enlarged wartime debts. There was, however, a generalized reluctance to adopt overtly expansionary fiscal policies,[52] partly because of the continued hold of orthodox ideas about fiscal conduct (Keynesian ideas had as yet little leverage) but also because of fears that, without the anchor of a fixed exchange rate, confidence could be adversely affected at home and abroad. The latest econometric evidence (covering twenty-seven countries, many western European, between 1925 and 1939) is that, in the few cases where it was applied, an expansionary fiscal policy did stimulate employment and incomes, though the effect was less in the most indebted countries,[53] and the magnitude of the fiscal policy multiplier was nothing like as large as Keynes and other economic progressives claimed. Nonetheless, with interest rates at zero-bound in many economies, overall fiscal 'policy

could have made a more decisive difference in the 1930s if governments had actually used it more decisively'.[54]

The 'Keynesian solution', of loan-financed public works and more generally budget deficits, was never adopted in any developed fashion, but what happened in Germany from 1933 onwards (with militarized economic dirigisme) and, very differently, in Sweden from 1932 (with a Social Democrat-led coalition 'guided' by the Stockholm school of economists) has attracted attention for showing the potential of Keynesian demand stimuli. The latest scholarship questions whether fiscal deficits were large enough in either country to explain the extent of recovery,[55] and on the former (with Italy) it is notable 'that the unique aspects of the Fascist economy do not seem to have made much impact on the aggregate statistics',[56] with Temin identifying very marked similarities between Nazi and Soviet economic planning.[57] Monetary policy explanations for recovery predominate, not least for Britain,[58] but supply-side accounts also feature strongly in many national literatures. For example, for Norway recent work has explored supply-side explanations, especially industrial transformation made possible by improved international competitiveness, but concluded that there were multiple, concurrent forces making for recovery once the golden fetter was removed.[59]

This emphasis on concurrence should have a wider currency for the European economies. Nonetheless, to the positive side of the recovery balance sheet we need to emphasize that few economies experienced export-led growth to any great extent, and that this was due to the de-globalization of the decade. As Irwin puts the trilemma, countries could abandon gold to regain national monetary policy discretion and international competitiveness whilst keeping trade relatively open, or vice versa.[60] The gold bloc countries sacrificed trade openness (tariffs, NTBs, and exchange controls) much more than those that abandoned gold, but even amongst those that did shift exchange rate regime there was a drive to protectionism, not least with Britain which by the end of 1931 had abandoned its historic commitment to free trade. In recent work, Eichengreen and Irwin contend that the drive to protectionism was not the haphazard process of beggar-thy-neighbour policies that was presented in the contemporary literature and beyond, but rather a more rational, inevitable process once the exchange-rate regime choice had been made. In short:

> The stubbornness with which countries clung to the gold standard is thus part of the explanation for why the world trading system was felled by an outbreak of protectionism. Had countries been quicker to abandon gold standard orthodoxy and the restrictive monetary policies associated with it, it would have been easier to avert the restrictive commercial policies that destroyed the network of world trade.[61]

This brings us to the modern historiography of the Great Depression with its emphasis on coordination failures, a development of the earlier focus upon failures of international cooperation that featured so strongly in Kindleberger's influential account of the Great Depression and which builds upon Eichengreen's analysis of the post-1945 success of the European economies.[62] Thus:

> Europe's Great Depression was more than the result of some misguided economy policy in any particular country. Europe could not exploit her vast economic potential after 1918, because the war had not yet come to an end—indeed it did not end before 1945. Both domestic and international institutions suffered from a lack of reciprocal trust and commitment, which can be clearly illustrated in the realm of monetary policy … but affected many other areas of policy making … These institutions in turn affected expectations and thereby the extent to which, for example, expansionary policies could be effective. [Thus] … not all options that would exist in a perfect environment were available to all policy makers at every turn, because of serious flaws in the institutional framework that led to coordination failure.[63]

Wolf identifies three fundamental obstacles to policy coordination, all a direct consequence of the First World War: the fragility of political institutions; war debts/reparations; and the 'irritating memory' of the 1920s inflations which made many policymakers in the 1930s fearful of expansionary monetary policies, even at a time of price deflation. This chimes, in part, with a much older historiography, exemplified most recently in the work of Aldcroft,[64] which ascribes to the Versailles settlement responsibility for a myriad of interwar economic and political problems, including the rise of the Nazis. More recent scholarship emphasizes the problems created by the war more than the post-war settlement, and—here the 'Great Recession' beginning with the financial crisis of 2007–8 has been a huge spur—the lessons that might be learnt for the present from the coordination failures and flaws in economic thinking that were the Great Depression. Thus, from Eichengreen to Wolf, we now understand much more about why it took so very long for policymakers to navigate the trilemma to escape from the golden fetter. As Wolf puts it: 'the risks of unilateral action were long considered too high—maybe rightly so—and multilateral action seemed impossible'.[65]

It took the 1931 crisis to unlock the trilemma, and thereafter the growth economies, be they Germany, Britain, or the Scandinavian states, showed what could be done through government activism and, to a variable degree, natural recovery. Eventually, the gold bloc followed suit, though not in a coordinated fashion, with Italy leaving de facto in 1934 and Belgium in 1935, but Poland, France, and Switzerland holding out to September 1936. However, once France did exit gold it did so in the context of the Tripartite Monetary Agreement (with Britain and the US) which marked a new and decisive phase in reconciling 'the needs for stability and adjustment in the international economy of the mid-1930s'.[66] Once they were able to devalue, recovery began quickly for the gold bloc countries. For Poland, the only debtor member of this bloc (military considerations and its relations with France were decisive),[67] the economic price of membership had been huge in terms of depressed GDP and employment: the 'most extreme manifestation' of the deflationary consequences of trying to maintain the currency's parity for so long.[68] Devaluation brought quickly the beginnings of recovery, but here, as for Italy, it was 'difficult to distinguish industrial recovery from war planning as government involvement in the economy was subsumed by preparations for national defence'.[69] More generally, as the isolation of the smallest eastern European economies drove them into the German

orbit,[70] their recovery became tied to the German military economy, meaning that it is difficult to determine the efficiency of purely recovery policies.

As it was, government was more involved in all European economies, and in eastern and central Europe in particular in managing industry. Dirigisme and autarky clearly varied, with the USSR an extreme case of both, but even in western Europe the renaissance of tariffs and NTBs brought greater government involvement and redefined government–industry relations which created new scope for rent-seeking. Whilst the historiography has tended to focus on the impact of macroeconomic policies during the Great Depression, with the Keynesian counterfactual more or less lurking in most national historiographies, what has been far less studied is the microeconomic side: both short-term policy effectiveness and longer-term consequences. Thus, for example, for Britain, where 1931–2 saw the most pronounced policy shift of any western European country, the new policy framework was both rational and quite effective in ameliorating the worst effects of macroeconomic shocks, but it established microeconomic and regulatory policies and behaviours which were, through undermining industrial competition in particular, potentially harmful to longer-term growth.[71] This was very likely also the case in other countries, and certainly we have evidence of the efficiency wedge that follows tariff lobbying.[72] If politics prevailed over technical economic efficiency in policy towards product markets, then in the labour market the equation was more finely balanced, with a number of national literatures in which the orthodoxy of interwar unemployment as a demand-side failure has been contested and instead the argument made that mass unemployment was, at least in part, due to more generous unemployment benefit systems. This case has been made particularly for Britain, though it has not fared well in face of subsequent empirical or theoretical scrutiny;[73] it features also in accounts of labour market developments elsewhere in western Europe, notably Belgium and Denmark.[74]

Conclusions

For the European economy as a whole (including the USSR) real GDP contracted by 8.5 per cent between 1929 and 1932 (11 per cent if the USSR, very much a special case, is excluded), but national experiences in western Europe varied from Germany's huge contraction to continued Danish growth, and in eastern Europe from Poland's extreme experience of depression to Bulgaria's equally impressive growth. However, in terms of depression experiences, all of this was dwarfed, relatively but above all absolutely, by the magnitude of the US GDP loss (27 per cent). Arguably, there was no 'European' Great Depression, but many national experiences situated within a global depression. That said, we have seen how national economic and political developments varied significantly: politics and policies mattered in why, when, and to what extent economies experienced the depression and were then able to recover. Similarly, politics was impacted by the depression, ranging from the collapse of a minority Labour government in Britain

amidst the 1931 crisis through to clear, empirical evidence that European political extremism grew with cumulative hard times, a finding of relevance not just for the rise of the Nazis.[75]

The European economy as a whole had by 1937 reached a real GDP level 18.3 and 29.3 per cent respectively above the 1929 and 1932 levels (respectively 10.2 and 23.8 per cent for Europe excluding the USSR). Again, there were significant variations, with the exchange rate regime (as part of the broader monetary policy regime) key, as illustrated both by the strong recovery performances of those that abandoned gold in 1931 and the prolonged depression of the French-led gold bloc countries until they eventually liberated themselves from the golden fetter. We have seen that there were a number of paths to recovery. Some, such as Nazi economic strategy, are historically highly contingent (as also the Soviet forced industrialization). Moreover, despite the Nazis' rhetoric of their economic success (especially on unemployment, 1933–5), they did not use the enlarged policy space to undertake radical economic policies: this was autarky and public works, clear and simple.[76] Other states have been judged economically much more progressive, with Sweden the exemplar for the early post-1945 generation who sought evidence of the positive power of ideas and what social democratic politics could deliver. As we have seen, the current literature on Sweden is much more sceptical; indeed, a stronger case could be made for Denmark as demonstrating the efficacy of the Keynesian solution, albeit without the claims made for economists' influence.[77] On that, we also now know much more about the slow diffusion of Keynesian ideas across the West.[78] By contrast, British policy, long criticized for its commitment to orthodoxy in the form of the supposed 'Treasury view' of the futility of deficit-financing, is now seen both as more nuanced in its formulation and as showing the benefits of a monetary expansion made possible by moderate fiscal consolidation.[79]

The interwar period had begun with relatively open economic and political systems; it ended with much less open economies and many more closed polities. Clearly, as Lutz puts it, 'The Great Depression, economic nationalism and pressures on standards of living gave rise to authoritarian movements in many countries as populations turned to strong leaders to resolve the[ir] economic problems', but as he further notes, many of these regimes—Italy, Spain, Poland, the Balkan states—predated 1929.[80] It was only for Germany that we have robust evidence of the decisive political impact of the Great Depression. With trade openness and GDP growth positively correlated for the long term, growth in Europe and elsewhere was significantly forgone as a consequence of trade policy responses to the Great Depression. This is axiomatic, though of course it poses the selection question: by what counterfactual policies should one assess actual policies?

There are also deeper questions here about the causes of the Great Depression, and responses to it by policymakers, capital, and labour. The 'coordination failures' approach of recent scholarship brings us back to the First World War as marking a decisive shift in the balance of power, not just spatially (the rise of the US, albeit—pace Kindleberger—as yet unwilling to be the hegemon needed to ensure international monetary stability), but nationally in terms of capital and labour. This was the first 'great' depression

in which labour was both organized and enfranchised.[81] Before the First World War, the gold standard had 'credibility' because markets were confident that policymakers would not privilege internal over external balance, would not forgo the necessary monetary policy adjustments for fear of rising unemployment. The redistribution of power to labour brought by the First World War fatally undermined that assumption, while 'the political threat posed by the Soviet Union raised the political bargaining power of the moderate left'.[82] As 'class conflict sharply constrained the formation of economic policy',[83] when depressive forces struck in 1929 the adjustments to wages and prices in face of demand shocks were much more difficult to accommodate. For those economists who emphasize the supply-side, real wage resistance thus exacerbated unemployment; but all can agree with Kindleberger that the fundamental issue was 'whether deflation and unemployment would saddle a major share of the load on the working class, as contrasted with the rentier'.[84] Moreover, the new distributional struggle 'slowed down investment or channelled resources into unproductive employment in preparation for another armed conflict'.[85]

It remains to comment on the legacy of the Great Depression. From the outset analyses focused on the 'lessons' to be learnt,[86] and this has had a new resonance with the Great Recession (beginning in 2007–8 and not yet resolved), not least as policymakers have sought urgent advice but been bombarded by a commentariat, many of whom have a very partial, if not wholly misguided, notion of the Great Depression. Of the lessons, primacy goes to never allowing a downturn to become deep and sustained; second, to the transformation in economic knowledge (*pace* the Keynesian solution) to prevent any downturn becoming deep and sustained; and third, that 'the economic system cannot just be left to look after itself … [and that] without international cooperation we are lost'.[87] Fortunately, today's policymaking community in Europe and the US is far better equipped to implement those lessons; indeed, in the US, Britain, and elsewhere the central bank governors (and much else of the economic policy nexus) are economists, with Bernanke a Great Depression specialist no less.[88] Whilst the Great Recession is the biggest cyclical shock since 1929, it has not acquired the depth and duration of the Great Depression. That it has not is widely attributed to bold, decisive, coordinated, and historically informed policy responses by Western governments who have sought to apply the lessons from this earlier episode. Eichengreen, noting that 'It is widely observed that the "lessons of history" were influential in shaping the policy response' to the Great Recession,[89] has gone so far as to conclude: 'This has been a good crisis for economic history'.

Of course, as with 1929, today's economists have been blamed, be it for the naive triumphalism of the market doctrine which brought about the crisis, or for Keynesian stabilization in response to the downturn when what is needed is radical fiscal consolidation to contain the Leviathan. This reminds us that the Great Depression was a contest of ideas as well as a crisis of politics. Moreover, 'The Great Depression … was not experienced at the national level. Individuals, families and communities lived through a period of great hardship'; all bore the brunt to some extent of the failure to produce a durable, prosperous reconstructed Europe after the First World War.[90]

Notes

1. 'An Economic Analysis of Unemployment', in *Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes* (London: Macmillan, 1973), xiii. 343.
2. A. O. Ritschl and T. Straumann, 'Business Cycles and Economic Policy, 1914–1945', in S. N. Broadberry and K. H. O'Rourke (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), ii. 179.
3. P. Fearon, *The Origins and Nature of the Great Slump, 1929–1932* (London: Macmillan, 1979), 59.
4. C. H. Feinstein, P. Temin, and G. Toniolo, *The European Economy Between the Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 2.
5. M. Almunia, A. Benetrix, B. J. Eichengreen, K. H. O'Rourke, and G. Rua, 'From Great Depression to Great Credit Crisis: Similarities, Differences and Lessons', *Economic Policy*, 25/2 (2010), 227; W. Galenson and A. Zellner, 'International Comparisons of Unemployment Rates', in NBER, *The Measurement and Behavior of Unemployment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), table 3 (ser. 1).
6. H. James, *The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
7. D. A. Irwin, *Trade Policy Disaster: Lessons from the 1930s* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 13–19.
8. C. P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939* (London: Allen Lane, 1973); B. J. Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
9. Kindleberger, *World in Depression* (2nd edn, 1986), xix.
10. P. Clavin, *The Great Depression in Europe, 1929–1939* (London: Palgrave, 2000); and N. Wolf, 'Europe's Great Depression: Coordination Failure after the First World War', in N. F. R. Crafts and P. Fearon (eds.), *The Great Depression of the 1930s: Lessons for Today* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 74–109.
11. H. W. Arndt, *The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944); W. A. Lewis, *Economic Survey, 1919–1939* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1949); D. H. Aldcroft, *From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919–1929* (London: Allen Lane, 1977); M. C. Kaser and E. A. Radice (eds.), *The Economic History of Eastern Europe, 1919–1975*, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985–6); Feinstein et al., *European Economy*; D. H. Aldcroft, *Studies in the Interwar European Economy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997); Broadberry and O'Rourke (eds.), *Economic History*, Vol. II, chs 6–10. From a more internationalist perspective, see P. Temin, *Lessons from the Great Depression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters*.
12. An index of the 'authority characteristics' of states in a world system on a 21-point scale, from –10 (hereditary monarch) to +10 (consolidated democracy).
13. Aldcroft, *Studies*, 164.
14. James, *End of Globalization*, 37–8.
15. Feinstein et al., *European Economy*, 173.
16. Aldcroft, *Studies*, 164.
17. P. Temin, 'Great Depression', in J. Mokyr (ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), ii. 466.
18. J. R. Rosés and N. Wolf, 'Aggregate Growth, 1913–1950', in Broadberry and O'Rourke (eds.), *Economic History*, ii. 181–207.

19. Rosés and Wolf, 'Aggregate Growth', tables 8.5–8.6.
20. But see D. F. Good and T. Ma, 'The Economic Growth of Central and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective, 1870–1989', *European Review of Economic History*, 3/2 (1999), 103–37.
21. S. Bridji, 'The French Great Depression: A Business Cycle Accounting Analysis', *Explorations in Economic History*, 50/3 (2013), 427.
22. A. F. Burns and W. C. Mitchell, *Measuring Business Cycles* (New York: NBER, 1947), table 16.
23. B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics, 1750–1975* (London: Macmillan, 1981), table E1.
24. Irwin, *Trade Policy*, 141–2.
25. Feinstein et al., *European Economy*, 101–2.
26. H. James, *The German Slump: Politics and Economics, 1924–1936* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); K. Borchardt, *Perspectives on Modern German Economic History and Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); H.-J. Voth, 'Did High Wages or Interest Rates bring down the Weimar Republic? A Cointegration Model of Investment in Germany, 1925–1930', *Journal of Economic History*, 55/4 (1995), 801–21; A. O. Ritschl, 'Reparations, Deficits and Debt Default: The Great Depression in Germany', in Crafts and Fearon (eds.), *Great Depression*, 110–39.
27. Voth, 'High Wages', 802.
28. A. O. Ritschl, '"Dancing on a Volcano": The Economic Recovery and Collapse of Weimar Germany, 1924–1933', in T. Balderston (ed.), *The World Economy and National Economies in the Interwar Slump* (London: Palgrave, 2003), 123.
29. Kindleberger, *World in Depression*, 70–6.
30. B. J. Eichengreen and P. Temin, 'The Gold Standard and the Great Depression', *Contemporary European History*, 9/2 (2000), 183.
31. Eichengreen and Temin, 'Gold Standard', 184.
32. J. D. M. Fisher and A. Hornstein, 'The Role of Real Wages, Productivity and Fiscal Policy in Germany's Great Depression, 1928–1937', *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 5/1 (2002), 100–27; and Ritschl, 'Reparations'.
33. R. Middleton, 'Can Contractionary Fiscal Policy be Expansionary? Consolidation, Sustainability and Fiscal Policy Impact in Britain in the 1930s', in Crafts and Fearon (eds.), *Great Depression*, 212–57.
34. P. Beaudry and F. Portier, 'The French Depression in the 1930s', *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 5/1 (2002), 73–99.
35. P. R. Gregory and J. W. Sailors, 'The Soviet Union during the Great Depression: The Autarky Model', in Balderston (ed.), *World Economy*, 191–210.
36. Kindleberger, *World in Depression*, 93–4.
37. Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters*, 257.
38. P. Clavin, *The Failure of Economic Diplomacy: Britain, France, Germany and the United States, 1931–1936* (London: Macmillan, 1996).
39. A. O. Ritschl and S. Sarferaz, 'Currency vs. Banking in the Financial Crisis of 1931', *International Economic Review*, 55/2 (2014), 349–73.
40. R. S. Sayers, *The Bank of England, 1891–1944* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), Vol. II, ch. 17; Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters*, 279–85.
41. Almunia et al., 'Great Depression', 234.
42. B. J. Eichengreen and J. Sachs, 'Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the 1930s', *Journal of Economic History*, 45/4 (1985), 925–46.

43. I. T. Berend, *An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 124; Feinstein et al., *European Economy*, ch. 8.
44. K. Mouré, *The Gold Standard Illusion: France, the Bank of France and the International Gold Standard, 1914–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); J. Jackson, *The Politics of Depression in France, 1932–1936* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
45. Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters*, 203–7.
46. J. T. Klovland, 'Monetary Policy and the Business Cycle in the Interwar Years: The Scandinavian Experience', *European Review of Economic History*, 2/3 (1998), 309–44.
47. S.-O. Olsson (ed.), *Managing Crises and De-globalisation: Nordic Foreign Trade and Exchange, 1919–1939* (London: Routledge, 2010).
48. Rosés and N. Wolf, 'Aggregate Growth', table 8.5.
49. Clavin, *Great Depression*, 178.
50. M. Obstfeld, J. C. Shambaugh, and M. Taylor, 'The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies and Capital Mobility', *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 87/3 (2005), 422–38.
51. Irwin, *Trade Policy*, 36–7.
52. P. A. Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).
53. Almunia et al., 'Great Depression', 223, 234–49.
54. Almunia et al., 'Great Depression', 249.
55. A. O. Ritschl, 'Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933–1938: A Critical Reassessment', *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies*, 16/4 (2002), 559–82; A. Rathke, T. Straumann, and U. Woitek, 'Overvalued: Swedish Monetary Policy in the 1930s', *CESifo Working Paper*, 3692 (2011); Almunia et al., 'Great Depression', 235.
56. Feinstein et al., *European Economy*, 173.
57. P. Temin, 'Soviet and Nazi Economic Planning in the 1930s', *Economic History Review*, 44/4 (1991), 573–93.
58. Middleton, 'Fiscal Policy'.
59. C. Venneslan, 'Norway's Recovery from the Great Depression: An Act of Balancing?', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, 58/2 (2010), 119–38.
60. Irwin, *Trade Policy*, 38.
61. B. J. Eichengreen and D. A. Irwin, 'The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?', *Journal of Economic History*, 70/4 (2010), 872.
62. Wolf, 'Great Depression'; Kindleberger, *World in Depression*; B. J. Eichengreen, 'Institutions and Economic Growth: Europe after World War II', in N. F. R. Crafts and G. Toniolo (eds.), *Economic Growth in Europe since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 38–72.
63. Wolf, 'Great Depression', 74.
64. Aldcroft, *Studies*, ch. 1.
65. Wolf, 'Great Depression', 100.
66. S. V. O. Clarke, 'The Influence of Economists on the Tripartite Agreement of September 1936', *European Economic Review*, 10/3 (1977), 376.
67. Wolf, 'Great Depression', 97.
68. Aldcroft, *Studies*, 176.
69. Clavin, *Great Depression*, 182.
70. Clavin, *Great Depression*, 179–80.

71. R. Middleton, 'Economic Policy and Management', in R. C. Floud, P. Johnson, and J. Humphries (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), Vol. II, 474–502.
72. For example, H. Espeli, 'Protectionism, Lobbying and Innovation: Perspectives on the Development of the Norwegian Textile Industry, especially since 1940', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, 45/3 (1997), 257–75.
73. Middleton, 'Economic Policy'.
74. M. Goossens, S. Peeters, and G. Pepermans, 'Interwar Unemployment in Belgium', in B. J. Eichengreen and T. J. Hatton (eds.), *Interwar Unemployment in International Perspective* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 297; and N.-H. Topp, 'Unemployment and Economic Policy in Denmark in the 1930s', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, 56/1 (2008), 71–90.
75. A. de Bromhead, B. J. Eichengreen, and K. H. O'Rourke, 'Political Extremism in the 1920s and 1930s: Do German Lessons Generalize?', *Journal of Economic History*, 73/2 (2013), 371–406.
76. H. James, 'Innovation and Conservatism in Economic Recovery: The Alleged "Nazi Recovery" of the 1930s', in W. R. Garside (ed.), *Capitalism in Crisis: International Responses to the Great Depression* (London: Pinter, 1993), 70–95.
77. N.-H. Topp, 'Fiscal Policy in Denmark, 1930–1945', *European Economic Review*, 32/2–3 (1988), 512–18.
78. P. A. Hall (ed.), *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
79. Middleton, 'Fiscal Policy'.
80. J. M. Lutz, 'Trade Openness in the Interwar Period', *Global Economy Quarterly*, 2/2 (2001), 117–18.
81. C. S. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade after World War I* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).
82. Wolf, 'Great Depression', 80.
83. Good and Ma, 'Economic Growth', 112.
84. Kindleberger, *World in Depression* (2nd edn), 323.
85. Rosés and Wolf, 'Aggregate Growth', 207.
86. Contemporaneously, Arndt, *Economic Lessons*; most recently, Crafts and Fearon (eds.), *Great Depression*.
87. Lewis, *Economic Survey*, 200.
88. B. S. Bernanke, 'Economic Policy: Lessons from History', Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, Washington DC, 8 April 2010.
89. B. J. Eichengreen, 'Economic History and Economic Policy', *Journal of Economic History*, 72/2 (2012), 289.
90. Feinstein et al., *European Economy*, 125.

CHAPTER 10

'A LOW DISHONEST DECADE'?

*War and Peace in the 1930s**

ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

From a dive on 'Fifty-second Street' in the 'neutral air' of New York W. H. Auden dubbed the 1930s 'a low dishonest decade'—a hollowing-out and betrayal of 1920s ideals.[1] Though periodization helps to make sense of the past, it also caricatures and falsifies. There was no sharp contrast between the internationalism of the twenties and a Gadarene rush to war in the thirties. Attempts to explain the Continent's rapid descent into savagery have skewed the narrative. The wars and rumours of wars—Italo-Ethiopian War, Rhineland crisis, Spanish Civil War, *Anschluss*, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig—appear as way stations on a road to destruction. Some accounts try to get the European phase of the Second World War started sooner by suggesting that the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War of July 1936 offers a more convincing beginning for the catastrophe. What Winston Churchill called 'the unnecessary war' was preventable. Over-preoccupation with the coming of war has obscured the strength of internationalism. As late as July 1935 a large swathe of British opinion supported sanctions and even the use of force to stop aggression. As well as a prelude to the most savage war in history, the 1930s were a laboratory for ideas and institutions that came to fruition after 1945 and continue to influence international society.

Why did a second European war follow so quickly on the first? Almost everyone in 1945 blamed Adolf Hitler. The beginnings of the two world wars were perceived differently: 1914 seemed more accident than design—in British prime minister David Lloyd George's words, the nations 'slithered' into war; 1939, by contrast, appeared to be an open-and-shut case of wilful aggression. The Nuremberg war crimes trials charged Nazi leaders with launching a premeditated war of aggression. For nearly two decades after 1945 Germany's culpability went unquestioned, as did the role of British and French appeasers, the so-called 'guilty men', accused of whetting Hitler's appetite for conquest by shameful surrenders. Academic reflection—Rohan Butler's *The Roots of National Socialism* (1941) and A. J. P. Taylor's *The Course of German History* (1945)—assumed a

one-way street from Frederick the Great to Hitler. 'German thought and German practice', wrote Butler, 'have for the last century and a half been undermining the civilization of the West … civilization is confronted face to face with barbarism.'[2]

A. J. P. Taylor's *The Origins of the Second World War* (1961) still provides the best starting point for an understanding of the alarms and excursions of the 1930s. For the first time a leading historian contested Hitler's culpability. The shock waves rocked academe and the media, sparking acrimonious debates. It was a brilliant achievement. Writing perilously close to events and without full access to British and French archives, Taylor effectively challenged what many regarded as obvious truths. 'Hitler', Taylor argued, 'was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all.' 'The vital question' was why Britain and France did not resist Hitler before 1939.[3] Distinguished colleagues like Hugh Trevor Roper, author of *The Last Days of Hitler* (1947), denounced Taylor's iconoclasm—the available evidence pointed to Hitler's guilt. As the Reich crumbled, search teams seized a huge treasure trove of secret documents, supplying prosecutors with evidence for war crimes trials. The inaccessibility of Allied records deterred challenges to the assumption of Nazi guilt. Until the Public Records Act of 1968 established a thirty-year rule of access researchers could not inspect the British archives. French and Soviet records were locked away—no French documents for the 1930s appeared until 1963.

Hitler's ghost kept Nazism centre stage. It stays sexy, hogging Amazon.com listings; by 2000 the score totalled 37,000 publications on the history of Nazi Germany—12,000 of them since 1995. New Kindle editions of *Mein Kampf* sell like hot cakes.[4] The tally reflects much more than a media obsession with wickedness. Academics have devoted entire research careers to the study of the Führer and his regime. In the United Kingdom a school watchdog warned in 2005 of the Hitlerization of the nation's history teaching. The German ambassador in London complained of the country's obsession with Nazism. The fixation with Hitler and the Holocaust helped sustain popular views of the war as 'Hitler's war'.

The onset of the Cold War buttressed the authorized version. Former British prime minister and foreign secretary Sir Anthony Eden described the theme of his memoirs as 'the lessons of the thirties and their application to the fifties'.[5] The lesson drawn was that dictators should be contained, not appeased. This was the rationale of the Truman Doctrine of 1947. After the establishment of the two Germanies in 1949 the West, in order to maintain a loyal Federal German Republic, magnified the role of Hitler and his minions. Germans described the Nazi period as 'the unconquered past'—too recent and traumatic for stocktaking. America's Cold War ideology lumped Hitler and Stalin together. Political scientists conferred academic respectability on the notion by merging Nazism and communism in a totalitarian model.[6] Washington's intervention in Korea and Vietnam assumed that containment offered the only realistic and honourable strategy. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, US media denounced Adlai Stevenson, American ambassador to the United Nations, as an appeaser who 'wanted a Munich'.[7]

The image of a Hitler bent on world conquest and emboldened by Western appeasers endured for another reason—it legitimized wartime and post-war regimes in Britain and France. *Guilty Men* (1940) was prefaced by Churchill's words, 'the use of recriminating about the past is to enforce effective action at the present'.[8] Britons regarded VE Day

as validating national values and ratifying the promise of a welfare state. In Churchill's words, 'their finest hour' heralded a new age of hope and opportunity. France's regeneration found its legend in the Maquis. Rulers and citizens colluded in manufacturing a myth of a country that had liberated itself—with some aid from allies. But Hitler's aggression did not adequately explain the speed of the Republic's collapse or the survival of its British ally. As a result, Anglo-Saxons became convenient fall guys for pre-war foreign policy failures. The script ran as follows. Starting with the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Britain and the United States cheated France by blocking demands for a separate Rhineland and Saar, offering as a sop a Treaty of Guarantee which collapsed within months, leaving France the lone gendarme of an unpopular peace. The retreats of the 1930s and the coming of war originated in British misjudgements. 'The Munich Agreement', affirmed a former ambassador to Berlin, 'was the logical consequence of the policy practiced by Britain and France, but principally inspired by Britain.'[9] After bullying her ally into war, the story continued, Britain contributed to defeat by holding back desperately needed RAF fighters in the Battle for France, and prioritizing the evacuation of British troops at Dunkirk. Worse followed with Britain's attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940. Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt ganged up against General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French, plotting to replace him by General Giraud, and when this failed excluded him from Allied wartime summits.

Taylor's claim that Hitler did not plan for war but seized opportunities provided by others triggered the first phase of the debate on origins: Hitler a planner or opportunist? Hugh Trevor Roper, Regius professor of modern history at Oxford University, staunchly defended the planner thesis.[10] The planner v. opportunist polemic assumed a monolithic Nazi state, allowing Hitler full power of decision. By the 1970s research uncovered a different picture of the Third Reich—a jungle of competing power centres and warring barons. As a result, a new phase opened: intentionalists v. structuralists—intentionalists asserted the primacy of Hitler's ideas and intentions; structuralists insisted on the decisive dynamic of rival stakeholders. West German historian Hans Mommsen declared that Hitler was 'in all questions which needed the adoption of a fundamental and definitive position, a weak dictator'.[11] Agreement has emerged on the Third Reich's racial and foreign policies. The missing link in the literature was the lack of a comprehensive and authoritative economic analysis. At last, we have what are likely to become definitive works on Hitler, the economy, and the functioning of the state.[12] Hitler commanded foreign policy decisions. He had an agenda and an itinerary, which he pursued opportunistically. Since the 1990s studies have successfully reinserted the centrality of economics, ideology, and Hitler's leadership.

Hitler was not responsible for the Second World War in the sense of deliberately planning or intending a world conflict. Nor did he intend a European war in 1939. Yes, he pondered a big war but was quite unready for one in 1939. Commitment to force did not exclude gaining his ends by negotiation. He planned local conflicts—against Czechoslovakia in 1938, against Poland in September 1939. European war began by miscalculation—the invasion of Poland assumed that Britain and France would accept a fait accompli and discuss peace. It ignored a decisive shift in Anglo-French attitudes from

the divisions of Munich 1938 to a determination to stop Germany—'let's finish this once and for all' (*il faut en finir*).

Taylor's contention that the war had 'little to do with Hitler' and that the 'vital question' was why Britain and France failed to resist Germany before 1939 rekindled debates on appeasement. Spurred by the release of official papers, scholars revised earlier assessments and reached much more sympathetic conclusions about the 'guilty men', especially British prime minister Neville Chamberlain. Appeasement, argued the revisionists, far from being a diplomacy of fear and cowardice, represented a realistic search for détente, propelled by a broad mix of motives: popular support; deep detestation of war; the conviction that Germany had genuine grievances; distrust of communism; a sense of Anglo-German affinity. Above all, military unpreparedness for a triple threat from Germany, Italy, and Japan left no alternative but conciliation. 'Hope for the best and prepare for the worst' is how one historian epitomized the process.[13] In short, the only practical policy was the one pursued.

Post-revisionists, notably R. A. C. Parker, counter-attacked in force. They interpreted the evidence differently. Chamberlain, they emphasized, neglected alternative options such as accelerating rearmament, giving a clear pledge to France, and seeking the support of the Soviet Union. Instead, the search for agreement with Hitler 'strengthened both Hitler's ambitions and his internal authority'. After March 1939 enough support in Parliament and country might have been mobilized for a strong alliance with France and a strategy of containing Germany within a League framework. Sadly, the government 'rejected effective deterrence', thereby losing any hope 'of preventing the Second World War'.[14] The decision in March 1939 to guarantee the independence of Poland and Romania came too late to persuade Hitler that Britain and France meant business. Appeasement feelers continued to reach him. He invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, convinced that after the German–Soviet non-aggression treaty of August the democracies could not stop him and would quickly offer a second Munich. British and French leaders, like Hitler, made a serious miscalculation. Misled by faulty intelligence of flagging morale, economic tensions, and indecision in the Nazi hierarchy, they decided to stand firm. Hitler, it seemed, might be bluffing. However, the invasion of Poland left them with no choice but to declare war on Germany in fulfilment of the guarantee of independence given to Poland. The hardening of British and French opinion left no wiggle room—reneging on the guarantee would have signified abdication as great powers and political suicide.

Was Hitler deterrable? Did practical alternatives to appeasement exist? Revisionists have not fully addressed a fundamental criticism of appeasement, namely that it ignored the irrationality of Nazism and Italian Fascism. Western leaders assumed Hitler and Mussolini were sensible, reasonable men who would keep their word. 'I have the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word', wrote Chamberlain after meeting Hitler. 'Hitler', he told colleagues, 'would not deliberately deceive a man whom he respected … he had now established an influence over Herr Hitler.'[15]

Appeasement was pursued single-mindedly and in great secrecy. Ministers then and later asserted that the citizenry would not support a war to stop Germany. Older histories endorsed the claim. In truth, opinion split sharply over approaches to Germany. Indeed, a February 1938 poll recorded a large majority opposed to Chamberlain's policy. Aggressive news management muzzled criticism and suppressed inconvenient news items. A different lead from the top could have constructed a strong majority for resisting Hitler. After Munich a senior BBC official commented: 'to my mind one of the serious features of … the crisis … was the ignorance of the people of this country … of much of the essential knowledge they should have had … We have, in fact, taken part in a conspiracy of silence.'[16] If British and French opinion was more malleable than supposed, so too was the international situation. 'The outstanding feature' of the international situation, noted Foreign Secretary Eden in late 1937, was 'its extreme fluidity'.[17] That Hitler wanted war from 1933 does not mean he could not have been stopped. Opportunism and flexibility characterized his approach. Unprepared for a big conflict, he might well have retreated in the face of a determined democratic front in 1937–8.

The jury is still out on France's responsibility for the decisions that led to war. Contrary to older histories that portrayed Marianne as an also-ran, reluctantly in tow to Britannia, the Third Republic was a pivotal player in international affairs, and its military collapse dramatically transformed European and world politics. Opposing Hitler's bid for her Czechoslovak ally in 1938 could have prevented the outbreak of European war in September 1939, and a French victory in 1940 would have ended the war before it became global, preserving Europe's primacy. Researchers did not probe France's choices, partly because of closed archives, partly because the state prioritized research on the Resistance, and partly because the course of events seemed crystal clear. Demoralized by a series of diplomatic reverses, an ailing Republic without a powerful Continental ally succumbed to defeat and occupation.

Archival releases infused new life into the study of French policy. Scholars constructed fresh narratives. Yet the reasons for the failure of French diplomacy to prevent war and for the subsequent debacle are still controversial. Robert Young's *France and the Origins of the Second World War* (1996) sought to rehabilitate the governing elite, arguing that the retreats from power reflected not moral or political ineptness but genuine doubts and uncertainties. The challenges of international politics overwhelmed well-intentioned leaders. Vacillation was both understandable and unavoidable. They did the best they could: 'contradiction or ambivalence is inherent in the human condition … the trick … is neither to inculpate nor exonerate. It is to explain.'[18] True, historians should not rush to judgement. But can explanation be separated from assessment of responsibility? Avoiding judgement leaves us with little more than a truism, namely that the French wrestled with dilemmas common to decision makers everywhere. Demonstrably, ambiguity and uncertainty belong to the human condition. But why did France's rulers perform so miserably for much of the decade and succeed so well after 1958? Clearly, individual decision makers, state structures, and the economy made a crucial difference. By the spring of 1939 a reviving economy translated into a more confident and assertive diplomacy.

Understandably, the trauma of 1940 made the decade seem like a one-way street to Vichy. Given, however, what we know today about the Battle of France, it makes sense to disentangle the political and military stories: 1940 was primarily a military disaster, not the product of a terminally sick state and society. Moreover, it was an Allied disaster, outcome of a shaky Franco-British alliance and divided counsels. Nevertheless, as Ernest May argued, Germany's victory, far from being a foregone conclusion, was a risky gamble that might easily have gone wrong.[19] While not everyone accepts May's thesis on 1940, it's a salutary reminder of the chanciness and openness of events. Individuals could and did make a critical difference. In 1938 Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet battled successfully to keep France out of war. Though French historians blamed the 'English governess' for their country's misfortunes, French appeasement was as much a home-grown product as its British counterpart.[20] As much as detestation of war and fear of Germany, it expressed a genuine desire for Franco-German reconciliation and a European settlement. The domestic context of appeasement mattered. Popular Front leaders required international détente in order to minimize domestic strife and safeguard the social reforms of 1936. British tutelage was deliberately fostered to shield disengagement from central and eastern Europe. Publicly, politicians solicited commitments for France's east European allies; privately, they invited a lead. Far from being hijacked by cross-Channel appeasers they wanted conciliation, cherishing the illusion that Franco-German economic agreements would advance political rapprochement. Alternatives to appeasement existed. Consider the robust revival of French diplomacy in the spring of 1939: instead of taking orders from 'the English governess', Paris demanded and got British conscription and a guarantee for Romania. More's the pity, firmness came too late. If London and Paris had opted for deterrence, could they have counted on Moscow? Russia was the joker in the pack. A veritable mountain of evidence and analysis surrounds British, French, and German intentions. Much of the commentary now wears a distinctly faded look. The fire has gone out of the old controversies. By contrast, tracking Russia's involvement still sparkles with unresolved controversy. Moscow's importance as a player is incontestable. The Nazi–Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939 rendered the coming of war inevitable. Without it Hitler would have hesitated to invade Poland and risk a two-front war. Two questions are very much alive: might Russia have been corralled into an Anglo-French containment front before the Munich Agreement of September 1938? What chances of alliance remained in the winter of 1938–9?

Russia's role stays problematical because so little is known about Stalin's inner thinking. His grip on policy was firm. The lack of hard evidence has spawned several interpretations. Soviet historians of the Cold War era stressed Stalin's commitment to collective security as the main foreign policy goal in the 1930s. The failure of this policy forced him to turn to Germany and conclude a non-aggression pact. Western historians, however, have emphasized the 'war-revolution' concept as the main motor, insisting that the pursuit of collective security was really a device to provoke a world war and a revolutionary situation, affording Soviet communism a second chance to champion world revolution. Others suggest that the main objective was to restore German–Soviet political and

military cooperation inaugurated by the Rapallo Treaty of 1922. None of these readings is airtight. Geoffrey Roberts contends that security came first for the Soviet ruler.[21]

The last thing Stalin desired was a big conflict. Ever present was the fear of a great capitalist coalition aimed at smashing the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s the search for collective security through the League of Nations, popular fronts, and cooperation with Britain and France offered the most promising path. But Anglo-French commitment to non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War, followed by surrender to Hitler's demands on Czechoslovakia, deepened Stalin's distrust of the democracies. Was an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance still negotiable after Munich? Doubtful to say the least. When France's ambassador attempted to explain his country's acceptance of Munich, a Soviet apparatchik responded: 'my poor friend, what have you done? For us I see no other outcome than a fourth partition of Poland.'[22]

Benito Mussolini's adventures brought European war closer: invading Ethiopia in 1935, enabling Franco's victory in Spain, brokering the Munich agreement on Czechoslovakia, attacking Albania in April 1939, and helping Hitler to finish off France in June 1940. Quite an achievement for a courtesy great power without real clout. Scholars differ sharply on the motives and nature of Fascist policy. The evidence supports several interpretations. Pride of place goes to the Duce's collected works—forty-four volumes, together with Renzo De Felice's eight-volume biography. The problem is what to make of it all. The chameleon-like quality of leader and movement makes it hard to find coherence and consistency. Novelist Ernest Hemingway attended one of Mussolini's press conferences. The Duce sat at his desk apparently reading intently before raising his head to greet journalists. Hemingway edged forward to see the book. It was a French–English dictionary—turned upside down.

Chaplin's *Great Dictator* (1940) captured the comic elements of the Rome–Berlin Axis. Similarly, mid-twentieth-century British historians treated Mussolini as light relief after the nastiness of Hitler and Stalin. True, Mussolini seemed more moderate—considerably less internal repression (though not in Africa), much dysfunctionality, especially in the army and police, a strong Church and monarchy, and roller-coaster relations with Hitler. Biographer Denis Mack Smith considered Mussolini an opportunist living 'in cloud cuckoo land', improvising foreign policy 'almost daily'.[23] In contrast Italian historians, notably Renzo De Felice, viewed Mussolini and his regime sympathetically, asserting that he wanted to avoid war and stressing the continuity of Fascist diplomacy with that of Italy's pre-1914 governments. According to De Felice, Mussolini, like his Liberal predecessors, exploited his country's nominal great-power status by playing a balancing role among heavyweights in order to gain empire and leverage. In particular he sought France's recognition of Italy as a great power with an African empire. For De Felice, Mussolini was a benign dictator: 'mean spirited, if you will, but far from the cold fanaticism and the ferocious determination of a Hitler, of a Stalin, or of a Churchill'.[24] Was Mussolini therefore little more than a fence sitter who, failing to get what he wanted from London and Paris, fell into Hitler's embrace? De Felice would not accept this verdict but conceded that a new ideological Mussolini emerged in the 1930s.

The dominant voice, however, in the debate is historian MacGregor Knox.[25] Mussolini was from the beginning a programmatic dictator, ideologically wired and intent on war. He aimed at making Italy a truly great power by breaking the British and French hold on the Mediterranean and North Africa. The prerequisite was alliance with Germany. The interpretation is forcefully presented but not entirely persuasive. Showman and supreme opportunist, or war-hungry revolutionary ideologue? Mussolini is best seen as a mix of conflicting tendencies. Increasingly attracted to Germany after 1935, he sought the best of both worlds—ideological solidarity with Hitler with autonomy and benefits for Italy. Thus he brokered a deal at Munich because he was unready for war and attempted to do the same in September 1939. In 1940 he waited for confirmation of France's defeat before, jackal-like, moving in for the spoils.

Because the two world wars originated in a European conflict some historians argue that the years 1914–45 are best understood as a thirty years war, and 1919–39 as a European civil war. 'To very many people who lived through the years of the 1930s what seemed to be in train was not the approach of another war between states', wrote one analyst, 'but the preliminary stages of a civil war between the forces of oligarchy, aristocracy, authoritarianism, fascism and those of popular democracy, socialism, revolution.'[26] The rise of paramilitary leagues prepared to use violence to gain their goals had produced by the mid-1930s 'in most countries of Europe a dissolution of the normal social and political process into civil disorder or civil strife'. Militarization as a result of the First World War, it is alleged, dissolved the idea of a common European society, engendering violence and political extremism.

Did an ideological civil war rage across the Continent? On closer inspection the notion of a European civil war is not as helpful as it might seem. By 1922 the Irish, Finnish, and Russian civil wars had ended; Mussolini and Hitler both came to power without large-scale violence. It is not true that by the mid-1930s most European countries faced the threat of civil dissolution or disorder. French right-wingers clashing with police in the Stavisky riots of 6 February 1934, Mosleyites and Communists battling in London's East End did not make a revolution. Diversity and complexity characterize interwar Europe. The neat binary categorizations of democrats versus fascists are misleading. It's remarkable just how much stability and modernization Britain and France enjoyed through the interwar years, as indeed did Scandinavian and Benelux countries and parts of independent central and eastern Europe.

Surely, however, the Spanish war and the paroxysms of the French Popular Front confirm a European civil war? Picturing the Continent as a left v. right battleground ignores important nuances. There were several Spains in 1936–9: Republicans v Nationalists; would-be mediators; those like Salvador de Madriaga who opted out of the conflict; reluctant conscripts—the 'forest people' of Javier Cercas's *Soldiers of Salamis* (2008) arranging informal truces and deserting as quickly as possible. Neutrality in 1914–18 shielded Spain from mainline European tensions. Its peculiarities—peripheral nationalism, anarchism, the land problem, the weakness of the state, the role of the military, and the effects of colonial warfare in Morocco—weighed more than wider European concerns in the breakdown that led to civil war.

To be sure, the sit-in strikes and demonstrations of Popular Front Paris in May–June 1936 gave it a bear garden look. Socialist Marceau Pivert's utopian slogan 'everything is possible' frightened many of the well-heeled into leaving town. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July ratcheted up tensions. In July 1936 Socialist prime minister Léon Blum, after promising military aid to the beleaguered Spanish Popular Front, opted for non-intervention. 'Before any foreign war', he argued in 1942, 'France would have had civil war, with precious little chance of victory for the Republic.'[27] At the time, Blum did not voice this fear publicly. Nor did diplomatic observers signal concern about the risk. While Blum and others of the governing elite may have feared civil war, there is no hard evidence that it posed an immediate and significant threat. The danger of civil war in France was more apparent than real. Midsummer madness passed. State and society possessed stamina and resilience. Only two episodes endangered public order—the Stavisky riots of 1934 and the Clichy incident in March 1937 when police fire killed six demonstrators. To be sure, as George Orwell's train to Irun steamed through the French countryside in December 1936, peasants working in the fields turned and gave the anti-fascist salute but as a gesture of solidarity, not a call to revolution. In the Czech crisis of September 1938, with opinion fiercely split on the pros and cons of defending France's ally, the Daladier government mobilized a million reservists without protest or incident. Despite sympathy in the French officer corps for rebel Nationalist leader General Francisco Franco, military leaders since the Dreyfus Affair at the turn of the century had shunned intervention in politics. No firm evidence of military plots against the Popular Front has surfaced and there is no reason to think that the general staff would have intervened *pronunciamento* style.[28]

At first glance, lumping together the two world wars makes sense. 'A powerful thesis, resting on much solid evidence and strong internal logic', conceded historian Philip Bell.[29] After all, Germany's bid for power provides continuity. Writer Stefan Zweig's memoir *The World of Yesterday* (1942) evokes the pain of a world shattered by the war of 1914. However, the 'thirty years war' interpretation, outwardly so plausible, underwhelms. True, 1914–18 left a fractured world, but not necessarily a doomed one. Responses to the cataclysm depended on generations and vantage points. To someone, like Zweig, reaching maturity before 1914, the losses must have seemed irretrievable; for others, however, peace promised a fresh start—the chance to achieve the reconciliation and disarmament that had eluded the old world. Of course, German ambitions fired both conflicts, but there were significant differences between 1914 and 1939. Hitler's racist genocidal mission presented a new phenomenon. Yes, Hitler shared Kaiser Wilhelm II's aim of making Germany No. 1 in Europe, but he also contemplated a bid for world power. Philosophically, the 'thirty years war' concept implies a determinism that denies the intrinsic contingency of events. If Europe's history ran on tramlines, what agency did leaders, ideologies, and economic forces have? And why stop with a thirty-year span? Why not settle for Philip Bobbitt's long seventy-six-year epochal war—'the war that began in 1914 must properly be seen as having continued until 1990'.[30] The trouble with catch-all explanations is that, like original sin, they appear to explain a lot but in fact explain little. They do not tell us why an international war started in Europe in

1939 rather than 1936 or 1945. Most importantly, the 'thirty years war' concept, as well as being overly deterministic, does not square with the evidence of renewal and stabilization in the 1920s. In *The Lights That Failed* (2005) Zara Steiner argues forcefully that the 1920s constituted a new beginning in international relations, not just marking time on the road to a second war.

The Hitlerization of international relations in the 1930s obscures a fundamental truth. Germany and other state actors operated within a weak multipolar system. Systemic instability gave Hitler and Mussolini their opportunities. Among the 'usual suspects' for the coming of war the Versailles Treaty ranked high. Yet there is much more to be said for the treaty and the peace as a whole than older interpretations allowed. A flawed settlement yes, but not a punitive peace. In fact, all things considered, a considerable achievement. The negativities of the peacemaking sprang from the disarray of the victors. The problem was not so much the treaties as the fragility of the makeshift settlement. The First World War shattered a self-confident, self-sustaining Eurocentric world order, replacing it with a volatile transitional arrangement—flawed by Russia's absence and America's withdrawal. Nevertheless, the Locarno treaties of 1925 registered a real sense of stabilization and promise for the future. Two mega challenges swamped the system: the economic tsunami of 1929 and the rise of ideologies that did not share liberal democratic assumptions.

The world economic crisis devastated the domestic and international landscape, fuelling the rise of extremist political movements and the likelihood of war. 'No single factor', writes Richard Overy, 'was more important in explaining the breakdown of the diplomatic system in the 1930s than the world economic crisis.'[31] Though economic historians differ over the causation of the great crash, they agree on the consequences. By pulling the plug on the international economy and exacerbating social conflict within states, the Depression undermined the territorial status quo. Collapsing stock markets, bank failures, and mass unemployment brought political upheaval, which in turn hobbled international cooperation. Protectionism and beggar-my-neighbour policies destroyed trust and confidence. As well as nurturing Hitler's rise to power, the crash provided neighbouring states with cogent reasons for conciliating him. War, it was feared, would destroy the prospects of recovery. Deflation and the fear of economic aftershocks delayed rearmament. Capitalism itself appeared threatened. 'Men and women all over the world', wrote the editor of *The Survey of International Affairs 1931*, seriously contemplated 'the possibility that the Western system of Society might break down'.

Marxists fitted the Great Depression into an economic explanation of the Second World War that became part of Soviet historiography. With capitalism on the skids imperialist powers allegedly fought each other for markets, resources, and territory—much as Vladimir Lenin had diagnosed the war of 1914. German big business had Hitler on the payroll and called the tune. The Third Reich's economic troubles in the late 1930s, it was argued, drove Hitler into a war for plunder.[32] But these perspectives never dominated mainstream historical writing. The pragmatism of non-Marxist scholars resisted thesis-driven history whether Marxist or of the Spengler-Toynbee variety. Like the 'thirty years war' thesis the economic interpretation is a catch-all that tells us next to

nothing about the specificity of 1939–45. Adam Tooze's investigation of the German economy refutes the idea of a domestic economic crisis in 1938–9. As for big business, while it certainly bankrolled Hitler at times, the analyses of Ian Kershaw and Richard Evans suggest a partnership—with Hitler in the driving seat.[33]

The clash of utopian ideologies created a dystopian international system. The very bitterness of the war of creeds supplied a rationale for appeasement. Liberal democratic leaders aimed to bridge the divide between dictatorships and democracies with a so-called realistic, pragmatic diplomacy. 'It was necessary to get rid of ideological prejudice', asserted the French foreign minister, and 'employ the type of diplomacy which seeks … useful relations … with every country'.[34] Taking sides, it seemed, would only divide Europe into armed camps and recreate the international anarchy of 1914. Conference diplomacy, which had proved itself in the First World War and in the 1920s, seemed to offer a possible solution to the ideological gap. French prime minister Pierre Laval had an almost mystical faith in face-to-face contact: 'he himself would certainly convince the Führer if only he could speak to him personally. Admittedly he spoke no German but the Führer would see that his intentions were honest.'[35] Unfortunately, the difference in values between democracies and dictatorships went much deeper than supposed. Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin had no interest in cooperating with the international community to achieve lasting outcomes.

By contrast, liberal leaders assumed that there could be no final incompatible aspirations, where the wishes of one leader are wholly irreconcilable with those of another. The war of ideologies disadvantaged liberal elites in other ways. Inability to compete with the dynamism and projects of the dictatorships threw them on the defensive, as did the conviction that the peace settlement had to be revised. The assumption was that Germany and Italy had the initiative and must be placated. 'The man in possession when challenged', acknowledged a British junior minister, 'must eventually part with something.'[36] The dynamics of a failing international system made decision-making much more difficult and hazardous. As in the run-up to the First World War, the cumulative effect of frequent crises was increased turbulence. An effect became a cause, reinforcing the original cause. The rapidity of change blurred the distinction between war and peace. 'We are already in a state of mobilization and at war, the only difference is that there is no shooting yet', announced Hitler's air force chief Hermann Göring in 1936.[37] President Roosevelt condemned 'a reign of terror and international lawlessness'.[38] Extra-European events heightened tension. The Sino-Japanese War began in July 1937 without a Japanese declaration of war.

The elephant in the room was the United States. It's hard to believe that a hegemonic world power from 1945 to the present stayed at home, leaving Europeans to manage most of the planet. Washington's political withdrawal from Europe after 1919 left it with a strong economic, financial, and cultural presence. Anglo-American cooperation in the 1920s shaped European stabilization,[39] while foundations like Carnegie and Rockefeller funded the League of Nations as membership, and credibility, slipped. 'It is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans except words', wrote Chamberlain in December 1937.[40] But words were enough for Anglo-French leaders—they sought

American endorsement, not leadership or interference. There is no evidence that President Franklin Roosevelt's appeal to Hitler in September 1938 for a conference swayed the Führer, but the appeal's significance, together with previous messages, lay in its impact on world opinion. The moral authority and prestige of the United States unequivocally supported conciliation and compromise. Witness the president's cable to Chamberlain after the premier accepted Hitler's invitation to a conference in Munich: 'Good man.'[41]

Nazism's role as a driver of German expansion highlights another weakness of the 'thirty years war' concept. It is now generally agreed that despite continuities like the pursuit of empire in eastern Europe and European hegemony, the discontinuities count for more. In effect the Third Reich concocted a new menu. Fired with a racial and ideological brew, it reached out for much more than Wilhelmine Germany had attempted. Hitler targeted the United States as chief enemy because of its economic might and as the centre of world Jewry. True, a powerful mix of social Darwinism and nationalism fuelled imperial Germany's expansionism, but elites accepted the international system. Nazism, however, as Hitler insisted in 1936, was a 'doctrine of conflict'. Violence was of its essence—internal terror, external conquest, and genocide. Nazi diplomacy established a continuity between peace and war where 'subversion, propaganda, diplomatic and economic pressure, war of nerves, threat of war, localized war and general war itself all merged into a single spectrum'.[42] Recent writing re-emphasizes the force of ideology for racial policy and territorial expansion. Ideology furnished the ultimate aim of world domination based on the rule of an Aryan master race. The Second Reich germanized non-Germans but did not murder them; the Third Reich made anti-Semitism an official state doctrine for the first time in modern history.

As war loomed, internationalism lost ground. While membership of the League of Nations Union (LNU) stayed steady at 200,000 in 1939, the circulation of its journal slumped from 100,000 at its peak to 8,000. Thirty-eight per cent of Britain's adult citizens took part in the LNU's 'Peace Ballot' of 1935. At its zenith in 1931 the organization had 400,000 members organized in 3,000 branches. What happened to internationalist aspirations? Only recently have scholars started to engage with such a profoundly important theme. The history of the LNU, one of the largest interwar voluntary associations, illuminates the movement's difficulties. Nationalism and class trumped internationalism. 'The Poshocracy', as Susan Pedersen terms it, that led the organization prioritized social harmony at home and abroad. Members assumed that 'Britain was the League's strongest supporter because it was the most selflessly internationalist power'.[43] The interests of Britain and humanity conveniently coincided. In short, domestic political culture prevailed. It's very easy to follow older histories in writing off the League and internationalism as failures. This would be a great mistake. Partial failure, yes. The League—more accurately the great powers—did not deliver disarmament and collective security. Over a longer perspective, however, the continuity of internationalism in its Victorian, interwar, and post-1945 phases contributed hugely to world politics. The United Nations, as Mark Mazower argues, grew out of the League and interwar aspirations.[44]

The failure of internationalists to stop war has to be understood in the context of citizenry and democracy. The British state had a long way to go to reach maturity—late twentieth-century buzzwords like accountability, consultation, and transparency had yet to be invented. At this time and for many decades governing elites considered external policymaking and foreign affairs as arcane matters, the preserve of the foreign secretary and Foreign Office old Etonians. Rank-and-file internationalists, citizens generally, and even Parliament were perceived as intruders. This class barrier connects with the issue of public attitudes towards appeasement. Starved of reliable information and discussion, citizens acquiesced in top-down initiatives. The BBC, with a monopoly of broadcasting, neglected world affairs, as officials admitted. Few academics wrote on international affairs—historians considered the causes of the First World War contemporary enough. True, this was still an age of newspaper reading, but press treatment of key foreign events, including their dating, was unreliable. Writing in 1940 Robert Graves and Alan Hodge discovered 'widespread disagreement in the Press about even so recent and important an event as the German re-occupation of the Rhineland'. They concluded: 'the more newspapers people read, the shorter grows their historical memory; yet most people read little else'.[45]

'A low dishonest decade?' Not so. Literary critic Walter Benjamin imagined the face of Paul Klee's angel of history turned towards the past, viewing it as a single great catastrophe. A storm catches the angel's wings, pushing him backwards into the future. Gulag, Holocaust, Hiroshima, and the Cold War threat of nuclear Armageddon deformed perceptions of the 1930s. The title of Zara Steiner's international history, *The Triumph of the Dark*, conveys the era's disillusionment. The absence of subversive laughter thickens the sense of growing darkness—no Monty Pythons and Blackadders, alas. Leaders and followers took themselves all too seriously. Surprisingly, however, on one occasion Hitler hinted at humour. Questioned by Britain's ambassador about the role of the paramilitary SS (*Schutzstaffel*) and SA (*Sturmabteilung*), Hitler denied their military character, saying they were just like the Salvation Army in England. At that point the ambassador burst out laughing. Yet the dark did not prevail. In many ways—political and social reform and international experiment—the period proved positive and foundational for the second half of the century.

Has everything that matters been said about the decade? Far from it. Seventy-five years on, many issues remain unexplored. The discipline of international history is finally emerging from a long fixation with elites and nation states. Enough said on Hitler, appeasement, and the foreign policies of the great powers; too little on many key questions. Greatly needed are comparative transnational studies of central concerns. High on the list are internationalism, pacifism, public opinion, news management, political cultures, 'fringe' diplomacy, ideological mobilization of Germans, Italians, and Russians, intelligence, relationships between business organizations and governments. Mental maps and prosopography promise a rewarding methodology for the discipline. We need a study of the British Foreign Office in the 1930s comparable to Zara Steiner's work on the pre-1914 Office; a full investigation of British opinion in the 1930s is long overdue. Intelligence data presents another challenge. The large releases in recent years have yet to be incorporated into the narratives. One growth area in the historiography

has been the investigation of German-based businesses in the Nazi period. The relationship between foreign policy and business in the democracies deserves similar scrutiny. Missing, too, is an analysis of the ideological mobilization of ordinary Germans, Italians, and Russians. As well as studies of national pacifist movements, analyses of transnational interactions are needed. The same applies to internationalism. The grassroots movements that helped sustain the League of Nations and its agencies are only now emerging from the shadows. New questions and themes will continue to reshape perspectives. This is the nature of history. In Bertolt Brecht's words:

> Indeed it is a curious way of coping:
> To close the play, leaving the issue open.[46]

Czesław Miłosz's 'Old Jew of Galicia' should have the last word:

> WHEN *someone is honestly 55 percent right, that's very good and there's no use wrangling. And if someone is 60 percent right, it's wonderful, it's great luck, and let him thank God. But what's to be said about 75 percent right? Wise people say this is suspicious. Well, and what about 100 percent right? Whoever says he's 100 percent right is a fanatic, a thug, and the worst kind of rascal.*[47]

Notes

* This chapter draws on my chapter, 'Historians at War', in Frank McDonough (ed.), *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Continuum, 2011), 507–24.

1. 'September 1, 1939', <http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/15545>.
2. Butler, *The Roots of National Socialism* (London: Faber & Faber, 1941), 196–7.
3. A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 218; *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963), 9.
4. *The Times*, Thursday 9 January 2014, 35.
5. *The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden*, Vol. II: *Facing the Dictators* (London: Cassell, 1960), Foreword.
6. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski and Carl J. Friedrich, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956).
7. Dominic D. P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, *Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 120.
8. Cato (pseudonym, M. Foot and M. Howard), *Guilty Men* (London: V. Gollancz, 1940).
9. André François Poncet, *Souvenir d'une ambassade a Berlin* (Paris: Flammarion, 1946), 314.
10. A. J. P. Taylor, 'How to Quote: Exercises for Beginners' and H. R. Trevor-Roper, 'A Reply', both in Esmonde M. Robertson (ed.), *The Origins of the Second World War: Historical Interpretations* (London: Macmillan, 1971), 100–4.
11. Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (London: Edward Arnold, 2000), 70 n. 5.
12. Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (New York: Viking, 2006); Ian Kershaw, *Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris* (New York: Norton,

1999); *Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis* (New York: Norton, 2000); Richard J. Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich* (New York: Penguin, 2004); Evans, *The Third Reich in Power* (New York: Penguin, 2005); Evans, *The Third Reich At War* (New York: Penguin, 2009).

13. David Dilks, '"We must hope for the best and prepare for the worst": The Prime Minister, the Cabinet and Hitler's Germany 1937–1939', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 73 (1987).
14. Ruth Henig, *The Origins of the Second World War 1933–1941* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 91; starting points for the revisionist argument are: R. A. C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement* (London: Macmillan, 1993); Frank McDonough, *Neville Chamberlain: Appeasement and the British Road to War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).
15. Anthony Adamthwaite, *The Making of the Second World War* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977), 62–3.
16. Anthony Adamthwaite, 'The British Government and the Media, 1937–1938', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 18 (1983), 291.
17. *Eden Memoirs*, ii. 520.
18. Robert Young, *France and the Origins of the Second World War* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), 150.
19. Ernest R. May, *Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2000).
20. F. Bédarida, 'La Gouvernante anglaise', in René Rémond and J. Bourdin (eds.), *Édouard Daladier, chef de gouvernement (Avril 1938–September 1939)* (Paris: Presse de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977), 228–40.
21. Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 7.
22. Anthony Adamthwaite, *France and the Coming of the Second World War* (London: Cass, 1977), 264.
23. Frank McDonough, *The Origins of the First and Second World Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 98.
24. MacGregor Knox, 'In the Duce's Defence', *TLS*, 26 February 1999.
25. MacGregor Knox, *Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); *To The Threshold of Power 1922/33: Origins and Dynamics of the Fascist and National Socialist Dictatorships* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
26. D. C. Watt, *Too Serious a Business* (London: Temple Smith, 1975), 15.
27. C. Audry, *Léon Blum ou la politique du juste* (Paris: René Juillard, 1955), 126–7.
28. For the French officer corps and military responses to Spain see Martin S. Alexander, 'Soldiers and Socialists: The French Officer Corps and Leftist Governments, 1935–1937', in Martin S. Alexander and Helen Graham (eds.), *The French and Spanish Popular Fronts: Comparative Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 62–78; Peter Jackson, 'French Strategy and the Spanish Civil War', in Christian Leitz and David J. Dunthorn (eds.), *Spain in an International Context 1936–1959* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 55–79.
29. P. M. H. Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War in Europe* (Harlow: Pearson, 2007), 32.
30. Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History* (New York: Anchor, 2003 edn), 571.
31. McDonough, *The Origins of the First and Second World Wars*, 103.
32. Tim Mason and R. J. Overy, 'Debate: Germany, "Domestic Crisis" and War in 1939', in Patrick Finney (ed.), *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Arnold, 1997), 90–112.

33. Kershaw, *Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris*; *Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis*; Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich*; Evans, *The Third Reich in Power*; Evans, *The Third Reich At War.*
34. Adamthwaite, *Making*, 44.
35. Adamthwaite, *Making*, 44.
36. Adamthwaite, *Making*, 61.
37. Adamthwaite, *Making*, 47.
38. Adamthwaite, *Making*, 47.
39. Patrick Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilization of Europe, 1919–1932* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
40. Cited in Kevin Smith, 'Reassessing Roosevelt's View of Chamberlain after Munich: Ideological Affinity in the Geoffrey Thompson–Claude Bowers Correspondence', *Diplomatic History*, 33/5 (2009), 839–40.
41. Roosevelt to Kennedy, 28 September 1938, in Donald B. Schewe (ed.), *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Sept. 1938–Nov. 1938* (New York: Garland, 1979).
42. J. P. Stern, *Hitler, the Führer and the People* (London: Fontana, 1975), 216.
43. Susan Pedersen, 'Triumph of the Poshocracy', review of Helen McCarthy, *The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism, c.1918–1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), *London Review of Books*, 8 August 2013, 19.
44. Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 15.
45. *The Long Week-End* (Harmondsworth: Penguin edn, 1971), 6–7.
46. 'The Good Person of Szechwan', Epilogue, in Bertolt Brecht, *Collected Plays*, vi, ed. John Willett and Ralph Manheim (London: Methuen, 1994), 111.
47. Czesław Miłosz, *The Captive Mind*, epigraph (New York: Penguin Books, 1985).

Further Reading

Steiner, Zara, *The Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919–1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Steiner, Zara, *The Triumph of the Dark: European International History, 1933–1939*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

CHAPTER 11

INTERWAR CRISES AND EUROPE'S UNFINISHED EMPIRES

MATTHEW G. STANARD

Europe's relations with the wider world in the first half of the twentieth century were paradoxical. Despite its comparative decline, Europe ruled more territory overseas than ever. European states emerged diminished from the Great War and faced growing opposition in their colonies yet achieved tremendous feats of domination, exploitation, and development. One reason Europe played such a disproportionate role on the world stage is because two looming giants, the United States and Russia, both turned down global protagonist roles until later in the century. A third colossus, China, had declined as a political, manufacturing, and trading power and did not reclaim that position until late in the century. Thus other cast members took centre stage, primarily western European states and Japan. What emerged were globe-spanning imperial formations.

It is hard today to place oneself in the mindset of the organizers of Paris's 1931 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, an unambiguous celebration of empire. Although focused on France's empire, other countries built pavilions for the fair including Portugal, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United States, and Belgium. The event's 8 million visitors made it the most successful exposition since Paris's massive 1900 universal exposition. Although challenges to European rule were apparent by 1931, empire's future seemed assured. Successes born from large-scale anti-colonial movements were few and halting, for example the non-cooperation movement in India, including the Salt March that took place the year before the Paris fair. Those ambivalent towards imperialism had to contend with the fact that Europe's presence overseas by the early 1930s was more extensive than ever. Empire was the past, the present, and the future, and the future looked bright.

With greater distance from the era, the five decades after 1900 stand out not merely as the zenith of European imperialism, but indeed as a time of empire-building, and not only of the British and French but also of the Italian, Belgian, and to a lesser extent Portuguese empires. (This is not to mention Japan's empire, which expanded

dramatically, if briefly.) Traditionally many situated the apogee of empire much earlier, during the late nineteenth-century era of so-called high imperialism. Although it is true that by 1900 more people called themselves emperor than ever before and that this ceased to be the case by 1919, this was not because of imperialism's demise but because the Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German land-based empires disappeared (the Manchu Empire preceding them by a few years). More of the world's land and population was colonized by 1938 than ever before; more than in 1900, more than in the 1760s at the apex of European rule in the Americas.[1] After Atatürk's secular, Western-oriented Turkish republic had established itself, Europe had effectively recreated a Mare Nostrum in the Mediterranean. After Italy's 1935–6 conquest of Ethiopia, a handful of European states ruled all Africa, an area three times the size of the continental United States (except Liberia, basically a colony of US rubber firm Firestone). Aside from nominally independent Persia, Afghanistan, and Thailand, Europeans ruled across South Asia to Oceania (except the Philippines, a US colony). Many studies of decolonization that root it in the interwar period point to the multiplication of nationalist uprisings, work stoppages, riots, and such in Europe's empires during that time. Seen differently, such increased troubles were to be expected considering Europeans ruled more areas and populations than ever.

History writing largely fell silent about this apex of empire after the winds of change swept the world in the 1960s, the fear being that merely pointing it out might be seen as celebrating it. Today imperialism's cruelties, failed promises, inequalities, and ultimate collapse are routinely, sometimes virulently criticized.[2] Some scholars 'convey the impression that writing against empire is an act of great courage: as if its agents lie in wait to exact their revenge or an enraged "imperialist" public will inflict martyrdom on them'.[3] Few are those, such as Niall Ferguson, who openly praise aspects of imperialism. The common view that Europeans hypocritically imposed authoritarian regimes on non-European peoples arises in part from the mistake of projecting 'our considerably more refined contemporary standards' back into the past, as Martin Wiener puts it.[4] In 1914, Europe itself was a world of empires and kingdoms, a place of subjects more than citizens. In several Western so-called democracies fully half the population—women—had to wait until mid-century to get the vote. After the fall of the Habsburg, Russian, and German empires, the only state to remain democratic in eastern Europe to the Second World War was Czechoslovakia. Elsewhere there were Spain's military regimes, Fascist Italy, Portugal's Estado Novo, Wilhelmine (pre-1918) and National Socialist (1933–45) Germany, and Vichy France (1940–4). One needs to neither condone nor condemn conquest and foreign rule to recognize that, in the long view, European overseas empire in the first half of the twentieth century was no anomaly. As John Darwin reminds us, empire is the most prevalent way in which humans have been organized throughout recorded history.[5]

Unfinished Empires

Neither individual colonies nor whole European empires were fixed entities during the interwar years. Some areas that today one reflexively understands as part of Europe's

overseas empires—resulting partly from overly simplified maps with neatly coloured-in colonial territories—had just been acquired by European powers on the eve of the First World War. Belgium took over the Congo in 1908. The French and Spanish divided up Morocco only in 1912, the same year Italy seized Libya from the Ottomans. Less visible but more significant was the increase in real control over lands and peoples overseas. Consider the Philippines, won by the US from Spain in 1898: despite more than a third of a millennium of Spanish colonialism, vast areas of the Philippines had remained beyond Spain's grasp, and those parts only came under colonial control after the US defeated a major Filipino resistance movement. Portugal had controlled merely the coastal zones of the massive territories it claimed in Mozambique and Angola, and its control extended into the interior only fitfully after 1900. The Dutch had been involved in coastal trade in South East Asia for centuries, but their hold over the interior of the Dutch East Indies was a comparatively new thing in 1914. France had been a long-standing power in Algeria and in smaller colonies like Guadeloupe and French Guiana, but territories such as French Congo were just beginning to show signs of a significant colonial presence by 1900. The British, French, and Belgians added what were for them entirely new territories after 1919: Germany's former colonial possessions.

After 1900, intensification of overseas rule and imperialistic sentiment was general. The most infamous example is Italy's brazen conquest of Ethiopia, which followed Italy's less well-known reconquest of Libya after that colony escaped its control during the First World War. A seldom-recognized instance of imperial intensification took place in Spain, often considered an erstwhile imperializing power after 1900. Because defeat in 1898 effectively shut them out of the Americas, the Pacific, and Asia, the Spanish turned their attention closer to home, to the Maghreb.[6] One military publication rhapsodized in 1909 that Morocco was 'a fatal attraction, an irresistible urge, a mysterious calling, whose voice of enchantment is heard, from time to time, leading us fatally and irremediably, shackling our will, forcing us sometimes against our own desires, towards the fields of Africa'.[7] One might scoff at such sentiments today, yet they contributed to long-standing holds on African territories. Equatorial Guinea only gained its independence in 1968, and Spain began to disentangle itself from Western Sahara only in 1974–5, contributing to its status today as one of the world's rare spots devoid of recognizable sovereignty. The Canary Islands remain one of Spain's autonomous regions, as are the last European possessions on the African continent, Ceuta and Melilla.

All European states with overseas empires tried almost continuously to build, remake, and rejuvenate their colonial holdings after 1900. This impulse was revealed in another scramble for empire at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where the war's winners divided up victory's spoils. France, Britain, Belgium, Portugal, and British South Africa grabbed German possessions in Africa; Japan took Kiautschou and, along with British dominions New Zealand and Australia, pocketed Germany's Pacific islands; the French and British seized Ottoman lands; and Italy cemented its control over the Dodecanese. Greece's attempt to dissect the decomposing Ottoman Empire was thwarted only by defeat in the Graeco-Turkish War (1919–22). After the First World War, the only European power to rule fewer peoples and lands overseas was Germany. The Ottoman,

Austro-Hungarian, and Russian land-based empires disappeared after the First World War, although the Nazis and Bolsheviks turned to colonization in their Easts.[8]

The French and British viewed imperial reconstruction as imperative considering the diversity and depth of the challenges they faced. France's empire showed signs of fracture right to the eve of the Second World War. It entered that conflict divided, and come war's end was once more in need of remaking in the eyes of French statesmen.[9] After the debacle of 1940 and the Vichy era, it was an unstated presumption in the Fourth Republic that France must remain an imperial power, and French leaders re-envisioned the empire as the French Union. Considering such ill-fated plans, the French have long been held up as deluded, especially compared to the more pragmatic British. But the latter likewise re-envisioned their empire, sometimes to the point of fantasy. The Government of India Act (1935), long considered a somewhat cynical staying measure, 'can also be seen as an attempt to reassert British interests by reinforcing India's role within the imperial system … Consolidation, rather than retreat, seemed to be Britain's fundamental aim.' In truth Britain's post-Second World War outlook was nearly as unrealistic as that of the French. Notwithstanding titanic wartime losses, British imperialism was still quite alive after 1945, seen in British plans to reconstruct its empire in Asia after Japan's defeat. Even India's 1947 independence was viewed not as a retreat but as a strategic reinforcing move.[10] Despite massive setbacks and manifest challenges, the French and British remained committed imperialists.

Formal colonial rule after the First World War was supposedly more reformist, developmentalist, and humane than the violent conquest that was the scramble for Africa and Asia. The years 1870–1914 were indeed marked by a litany of violence: disproportionate blood baths like the Battle of Omdurman (1898); Leopold II's 'red rubber' regime in the Congo; genocide in German South West Africa. Britain dispatched half a million troops to South Africa for the Boer War and built concentration camps in which thousands of civilians died. Such camps were not new, since Spanish governor General Valeriano Weyler had used their equivalent during the Spanish–American War to intern much of the rural Cuban population, with much the same result. Americans also placed civilians in camps in the Philippines, adding to the death toll of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos killed by 1902. Violence, wars, and scandals led to calls for colonial reforms, prefigured by Multatuli's (Eduard Douwes Dekkert's) *Max Havelaar* that drew attention to abuses in the Dutch East Indies in the late 1800s. Around the turn of the century, E. D. Morel's Congo campaign awakened international outrage at abuses in the Congo Free State that contributed to the end of Leopold II's rule there. Portuguese administrative reorganizations soon followed, for example in Mozambique in 1907, the same year that Germany initiated reforms under Colonial Secretary Bernhard Dernburg. King Albert I, speaking at the inauguration of Belgium's new museum of the Congo in 1910, criticized past abuses such as the importing of arms and liquor into Africa and called for a renewed colonialism that focused on the well-being of subject populations.

Despite the king's speech, Europe continued to export violence to the wider world between the world wars. No colonial power escaped rebellion nor failed to meet it with force, oftentimes with surplus arms and munitions from the First World War, including poison gas. The Portuguese faced the Barue rebellion beginning in March 1917 in

Mozambique. From 1909 to 1927, Spain was engaged in an almost continuous conflict in Morocco that included the Rif War, which they won with French help. The Dutch suppressed a rebellion in Java and Sumatra in 1926. France faced the Yen Bay mutiny in Indochina in 1930 and the following year Belgians crushed the Pende uprising. The 1919 massacre at Amritsar is well known, where British Captain Dyer's Indian troops killed some 400 unarmed people and injured hundreds more, offering no assistance to the wounded. Less well known is the September 1930 aerial bombing of a peaceful demonstration in Vinh, in colonial Vietnam, that killed some 200 demonstrators.[11] As Martin Thomas puts it, 'the new phase of French imperial expansion', after the First World War, 'was no less brutal than the earlier era of colonial conquest'.[12] Italy's defeat of Ethiopia with the use of mustard gas is well known, but seldom acknowledged is how the colonial rule that followed led to massacres such as the spring 1937 reprisal attacks after someone bombed an Italian ceremony in Addis Ababa. One eyewitness described how his fellow Italians

> would set fire to a Tucul [Ethiopian house] with petrol and then throw hand grenades at the people trying to get out. I heard one man bragging that he had 'done ten Tuculs' with only one jerry can of petrol. Another complained how tired his right arm was with all the grenades he had thrown.[13]

Italian viceroy in Ethiopia Rodolfo Graziani also ordered an attack on the convent of Debre Libanos that killed hundreds. By May 1937 Italy's retaliatory savagery had killed as many as 20,000 people.[14]

Such violence demonstrated the limits of Europe's hold over its overseas territories. Portugal was long viewed as the weakest and poorest of the European colonizing powers, evidenced by violence, forced labour, and military operations in its colonies. But routine violence was not limited to Portugal's empire, suggesting the bounds of colonial power of which resorts to violence were a symptom. The 'collective violence and security force repression [that] were more or less constant features in the political landscape' between the wars laid bare colonial powers' weakness, even after years of colonial control. In short, 'colonial coercion derived from a lack of authority, not from the capacity of a powerful state to act without restraint'.[15] Although European empire in the wider world reached new heights after 1900, Europeans did not exercise anything like complete control in their colonies.

Europe's Post-War Cultural Crisis and Enduring Self-Assurance

There was widespread and growing ambivalence after the First World War not only about violence but about much else that Europeans imposed on their colonies. For many Europeans, the war shattered the idea of progress and the onward march of civilization.

Emblematic of this shift was Dada, a movement of the avant-garde that emerged in Zurich in 1916. So disturbing was the war's senselessness and destruction that Dada did not merely object to bourgeois society, positivism, and aesthetics, it refused them, making Dada not an art movement, but rather anti-art. Some African, Asian, and Indian veterans of the war may have returned home with a higher degree of loyalty, but they also brought with them stories of their experiences at the war front that eroded the myth of white superiority and that suggested European folly. Back in Europe, a world turned upside down and frustrated longings for a return to 'normalcy' fed fears of decadence and decline, some of which channelled into Fascist movements in the 1920s.

Doubts about European culture translated into misgivings about intrusions that were integral to colonial rule. *Paysans noirs* (1931) by colonial administrator Robert Delavignette—later head of France's École Coloniale—conveyed appreciation and respect for West African traditions, suggesting ambivalence about the civilizing mission. 'Colonial humanism' developed among (some) French colonial administrators, including Delavignette, who advocated reforms because they recognized the value of native cultures and questioned the imposition of their own.[16] Concerns about the possibility or advisability of assimilation led the French to embrace associationism: to allow room for African cultures to thrive rather than impose supposedly universal values; to develop the colonial economies of Africa rather than exploit them. In the case of the Belgian Congo, some Belgians developed an ambivalence regarding the soundness of their activities in central Africa.[17] Psychoanalysis in the British Empire brought into question European conceptions of Asians, Africans, Indians, and Australasians as primitives and raised the possibility that imperialism was a 'damaging psychological force'.[18] Post-war cultural crisis in Europe thus manifested itself in a more diffident colonialism.

Nevertheless, our understanding of the doubts raised by the Great War has resulted to a large extent from the disproportionate attention paid to French and British experiences. Stripped of their colonies, Germans did not face any colonial demons and assumed a more strident tone. Mussolini's Fascist state legitimized itself through conquest and empire. German occupation and exploitation shaped Belgium's wartime experience more than trench warfare, and Belgians emerged in 1919 in some ways more confident. Colonial settlers and administrators, for example Anglo-Indians, developed cultures distinct from those of the metropole and experienced the war differently than those on the western front. The Portuguese also escaped the devastation of a war that provoked so much soul-searching in France and Britain and called for the renewal of empire during Salazar's dictatorship (1926–68). As Thomas Henriksen explains,

> The New State [Estado Novo] nurtured a growth of interest and pride in the colonies. The goal was Portugal's rejuvenation. Without the wealth and prestige of a colonial empire, Portugal was only a tiny, impoverished nation in Europe. Historically, the reliance on colonial possessions as a means to a national regeneration was as old as the decline of the empire in the sixteenth century; but the systematic amplification of Portugal's heritage and mission belonged to the New State.[19]

Some turned fears of decadence around in such a way as to promote colonialism rather than question it. In the fight against decadence, Salazar and Portuguese conservatives viewed anti-colonialism as part of the problem: an aspect of decadent thought. They tried to reverse trends of the Republican period (1910–26), which to their minds had included 'negative interpretations of Portuguese colonialism'.[20]

A focus on wavering faith in European culture obscures the persisting belief in the civilizing mission after the war. In certain places, especially sub-Saharan Africa, the colonial world became an exclusive domain where Christian churches embraced a special role in the privileged *champ d'action* (sphere of activity) that the colonies offered, especially compared to secularizing Europe. The number of Belgian missionaries in the Congo jumped dramatically after the First World War, to point to one example. There was widespread political consensus in Europe about imperialism, including on the Left, where socialist opposition to empire had long been nominal. When after the turn of the century Social Democrats in Germany attacked the empire, they 'were arguing for a different type of colonialism, not for alternatives'.[21] What little socialist resistance existed at the time of the 1908 Belgian takeover of the Congo from Leopold II vanished after the war. Looking back in 1920, socialist Jules Mathieu said, 'Twelve years ago our party still fought over the appropriateness of a Belgian colonial policy. But I think that all now consider the Belgian colonial endeavor as a done deal and that we ought not have any other concern other than to get through it with honour.'[22] There were no major European anti-colonial movements. Consider the 1931 Paris colonial exhibition mentioned earlier and the famous counter-exposition by the Confédération Général du Travail and the Surrealists that declared 'Do not visit the Exposition!' The latter attracted 5,000 visitors compared to the 8 million who visited the colonial fair.[23]

The Great Depression and Development

The Great Depression was felt most strongly in the most highly industrialized nations, but it also severely affected non-industrialized areas of the world, particularly in the form of lowered commodity prices. European colonial powers exacerbated the situation by exporting the downturn overseas and foisting its costs onto the backs of colonial workers and agriculturalists. Because the era of formal conquest was over, the age of development had arrived—the 'mise en valeur des colonies' as Albert Sarraut put it. Development became a key byword during the interwar years, although it is important to stress that hand in hand with development schemes came intensified extraction of resources. In short, colonies would not only have to pay for themselves but also pay back those who had made them.

The weakened state of European economies and the decline in international commerce following the war drove this increased exploitation more than anything else.

Europe's economies were undermined because they had just spent four years investing in destructive rather than constructive capacity; because belligerents had printed money and borrowed heavily; and because of dislocations resulting from the transition from wartime to peacetime production, even in countries indirectly involved in the war, like Spain. The drop in international commerce had numerous causes, from disruption of trade between two of the world's biggest producers, Germany and France, to the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. (A clunky political grouping, Austria-Hungary had worked well as an economic unit.) There was also the Bolshevik disavowal of Tsarist debts and their withdrawal from much international trade and finance, as well as other powers' retreat into isolationism, protectionism, or imperial preference, all of which only accelerated once the Depression hit.

Depression drove European imperial states to take advantage of colonial resources, intensifying exploitation. Consider the Federated Malay States where Britain imported Indian labourers to work on rubber estates, rubber being the main export. When commodity prices dropped in the 1920s on weak worldwide demand, authorities slashed worker compensation and housing expenditures to keep exports profitable and the colonial budget in balance. The terrible living conditions, exorbitant workloads, and slashed wages that resulted were so bad they drove some workers to suicide: forty-three on rubber estates in 1928 and forty-five in 1929, neither year of which was anomalous.[24]

In some areas the downturn in prices meant fewer investments in agriculture and more colonial state interference. In Bengal, 'The agrarian sector as a whole suffered a massive process of disinvestment during the depression decade.'[25] Producers were trapped in a double bind: on the one hand, because they were ever more dependent on commodity crops, price drops were devastating; on the other hand the authorities, dependent on exports to balance colonial budgets, pressurized farmers and plantation workers to increase production. The crisis was so severe in some hinterlands that it led to a more interventionist colonial state, for example in the Belgian Congo. As Bogumil Jewsiewicki puts it, 'The administration transformed rural societies into vast work camps rationally managed to meet exterior needs.'[26] The Belgian administration was recentralized on Leopoldville and authorities enacted compulsory planting schemes, doing away with shifting agriculture and leading to soil exhaustion, which only compounded the problem.

Greater intervention meant intensified development, which took place sometimes because of European intentions, at other times in spite of them.[27] Europeans invested in new technologies to increase profits, such as train tracks built not to serve colonial populations but to carry export goods from interiors to the coasts. Consider the Compagnie de Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga, one of the largest colonial enterprises in the Belgian Congo, which built the Port Francqui–Bukama railway, the *raison d'être* of which was to connect the copper mines of Katanga to the colony's Atlantic outlet at Matadi, many hundreds of kilometres away. Camara Laye's family's experience with railways in French Guinea reveals the ambivalence of this kind of development. In Camara's home village, the railway was most noticeable as an intrusive, sometimes threatening presence. 'We lived beside a railroad. The trains skirted the reed fence of the concession

so closely that sparks thrown off from the locomotive set fire to it every now and then which had to be quickly extinguished so that the whole concession would not go up in smoke.'[28] Villagers' primary interaction with advanced transportation was seeing trains pass by, throwing off occasional sparks. Yet when Camara later left home for Conakry, he travelled by train, and the story of his childhood ends with his departure for France on an aeroplane, a sign that Europe's rhetoric about development was more than just words. Europeans also invested in medical infrastructure, again the underlying motive being the manpower needs—and balance sheets—of colonial enterprises and the colonial state. A case in point is the Belgian Congo, where fears of population decline were rampant in the 1920s. The Belgians rightly pointed to the medical advances they brought to central Africa even if this included intruding into private matters like breastfeeding and birth spacing in order to make African cultures conform more closely to European norms.[29]

Europeans' investments in education were limited, especially in black Africa where they viewed education as particularly dangerous. Fourah Bay College, founded in 1827 in Freetown, Sierra Leone, remained the only English-speaking college for Africans until the Second World War. The most prestigious such school in French West Africa was the École Normale William Ponty, founded in Gorée in 1918. Equivalent to a junior high school, it took in gifted African students from throughout French West Africa. From 1918 to 1945, the school graduated only 2,000 students. The only universities in French Africa were Muslim ones along the Sahara's edge. It is telling that the percentage of people in francophone Africa who spoke French *increased* after independence, a sign of the limits of colonial education.[30]

Europeans also invested in cities and urban design, from Tripoli on Italy's Fourth Shore, to Edwin Lutyens's New Delhi, to gleaming Algiers, to France's rebuilding of cities in Morocco, Madagascar, and Indochina. European investments in urban areas, as elsewhere, were mixed in both origin and legacy. Several French colonial spas were not so much new constructions as they were appropriations of existing local spas.[31] Belgians drafted grand plans to remake Leopoldville, including a new Governor General's palace mirroring colonial edifices in Belgium like Tervuren's Congo museum, but the Depression delayed them. Georges Ricquier's and Lucien Strapaert's subsequent redesigns remained unrealized, and it was not until architect Marcel Lambrichs—only 33 years old in 1950—that the new Governor General's residence was built, and it was unfinished at the time of Congo's independence in 1960. Meagre funds for municipal development meant Leopoldville developed in patchwork fashion rather than as a planned urban area.[32] The case of Leopoldville is instructive because after 1929 European development was nugatory. Put simply, France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal had limited funds for sustained, elaborate development projects. Sarraut's *mise en valeur* remained a dead letter because of a lack of funds.

It therefore comes as no surprise that whether it was in railways, cities, medical care, education, or otherwise, development was paid for by colonial subjects. As Marc Frey points out, in the Dutch East Indies 'colonial development was financed by taxes and tributes extracted from the local population'.[33] Belgium's ambitious Ten Year Plan

implemented after the Second World War was paid for by Congolese.[34] In India, one of the great bequests of the British Raj was a massive railway system. Already by 1914, the British had built some 40,000 miles of rail lines in India, nearly twice as many as in Britain itself. Indian taxpayers financed the network and Britain kept India reliant on the metropole for all construction and operations materials, from locomotives to rolling stock to rails, even signalling equipment.[35]

Moving People and Exporting Conflicts

The massive outflow of population from Europe to its colonies, the United States, Argentina, and elsewhere dating back to the 1840s that had been part and parcel of European expansionism during the New Imperialism slowed significantly during the interwar years, in particular in the 1930s. This was a result in part of the demographic shock of the First World War, not only in countries like France, which lost 1,400,000 people, but also in countries like Serbia, which was the hardest hit demographically of any belligerent. Added to this were economic upheaval, disrupted international networks, and immigration restrictions such as US legislation of the 1920s. Emigration's deceleration can be seen in the British case where, despite the 1922 Empire Settlement Act (renewed in 1937), 'during the worst years of the Depression migrants entering Britain outnumbered those leaving it'.[36]

Emigration continued nonetheless, appearing diminished only in comparison to the high levels of long-term migration in the period 1880–1914. There were exceptions where European colonial populations declined between the wars, such as in Nyasaland or the Belgian Congo. In the latter, the population of 'whites' dropped from 25,679 in 1930 to 18,683 in 1936.[37] Elsewhere migration and settlement continued apace, in particular in settler colonies. The European population in Algeria increased from 715,000 on the eve of the First World War to 1,200,000 by mid-century. If post-First World War settlement in Kenya was modest, the white population reaching just 15,290 by 1931, it nevertheless set the stage for a tripling of the settler population after 1945.[38] A growing percentage of emigrants were women and children, signifying a belief in a more durable European presence. British emigration shifted towards the empire after 1900 and away from the United States and other foreign shores, suggesting 'the maintenance, even intensification, of Imperial connections'.[39]

Empire moved not just Europeans but colonial subjects as well, one result of stepped-up extraction of resources. Neither short- and long-term migration nor extended labour and trade networks were anything new to Africa and Asia, yet there is no doubt European imperial formations put people on the move on a grand scale. Forced labour, indentured servitude, and land seizure in European colonies uprooted populations well into the twentieth century, for example in Angola where forced labour was, according

to Basil Davidson, 'the flywheel of the country's whole economy' into the 1950s.[40] The Dutch arranged for many tens of thousands of Chinese, Javanese, and Indians to be sent to labour-intensive plantations in Java or Suriname.[41] In Britain's empire,

> Africans too were prompted or provoked to migrate by the Imperial presence. Modern communications (by rail, road, and eventually by air) spread knowledge of opportunities and facilitated movement, but as elsewhere, localized population growth, land confiscations, and increased colonial taxation also drove many workers into the cash economy and into long-distance migration.[42]

Migration across southern Africa—among Mozambique, South Africa, the Belgian Congo, and the Rhodesias—was driven by mining in the copper belt in Katanga and northern Rhodesia and gold mining on the Rand. The post-1945 influx of guest workers and others from Africa, the West Indies, India, and Pakistan into European countries like Britain and France only continued long-established trends of labour demand and mobility.

The largest component of labour migrants was made up of Indians, who ended up populating areas across the globe as a result of British labour recruitment. Compare the number of whites in Kenya mentioned earlier—15,290 by 1931—with the number of Indians there the same year: 39,644. In 1931, also, 'In Tanganyika only 4,651 residents were of British origin, and 23,422 were Indians'.[43] The shuttling of Indians across British, Dutch, and other territories counters the view of a colonial state with a limited reach. Consider just one corner of the British Empire: 'From August 1925 the British India Steam Navigation Company was contracted by the British government to ferry up to 2,100 southern Indian labourers per fortnight from Avadi and Negapatam in the southern state of Tamil Nadu to the Malayan ports of Penang and Port Swettenham.'[44] Mahatma Gandhi's career illustrates how British imperial activities produced long-standing and profound movements of people. Born in 1869 and raised in Porbandar in western India, Gandhi departed in 1888 for London, where he received law training. From London he went to South Africa, where he developed his approach of satyagraha to defend Indians' rights. He left South Africa again for London, and then on to India, where he took satyagraha, which revolutionized the Indian National Congress and the course of Indian affairs.

India was for Britain an incredible labour resource, and in fact colonies were perhaps most important as sources of manpower for Europe's armies. Paradoxically, it was a great naval power that realized this asset to its greatest extent. After the 1857 Indian rebellion, Britain maintained some 65,000 British and 125,000 Indian troops in India, all paid for by the Indian taxpayer. The First World War proved to Europeans the usefulness of colonies, and it also showed how Europe 'exported' its crises overseas. The First World War led to the mobilization of many hundreds of thousands of colonial troops to fight, making a local conflict that began in Sarajevo spread around much of the world. Many know how the French used non-European soldiers after the war to occupy the Ruhr in 1923, but Europeans also used colonial troops to maintain order in, and even extend,

their colonial holdings. This had long been the case. Britain's dominance in South and East Asia was not due to British sea power or military might but rather to *Indian* manpower.[45] Between the wars, the French mobilized Moroccan soldiers to put down resistance in Morocco itself, to the point that French repression there changed 'from a war against Moroccans to a war among Moroccans'.[46] When war threatened in the late 1930s, European powers again turned to their colonies for assistance. France's War Ministry, for example, ordered large numbers of soldiers to be recruited in the Indochinese federation.[47] Perhaps as many as 250,000 French colonial troops fought during the Second World War, and it was until recently largely forgotten that some 50,000 colonial troops landed in France in August 1944 to participate in the Liberation.[48]

Colonial Webs in an Age of Ideologies

Another conflict Europe exported to the colonial world was the Cold War, which began not in 1945 as is so often restated but rather at the time of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and the Bolshevik victory in Russia's 1917–21 Civil War. Although the First World War raised doubts about the substance of European civilization, many thought the conflict might lead to a new, improved, and chastised West. Woodrow Wilson's role in 1919 cannot be overstated, and people came to believe the US might 'bridge' East and West. They took Wilson's somewhat radical rhetoric of self-determination seriously, believing humanity could change. Wilson loomed larger in 1919 than Lenin.[49] All the same, the instability and uncertainty of post-war Europe led many to fear that Bolshevik-style upheavals were in the offing, and such fears shaped perceptions in the extra-European world, including the colonies. Colonial officials blamed riots and labour protests on 'outside meddlers', including supposed Communists, rather than taking stock of the exploitation and oppression that triggered protests. Officials expressed profound concern with Communist activity in the colonies from the 1920s, and French interwar colonial economic planning was driven in part by fears of Communist subversion, as opposed to *mise en valeur* for the sake of development.[50] As Martin Thomas puts it, 'new colonial policies to assure the empire's survival were increasingly animated by an anti-Communism that meshed recent colonial experience with the domestic ideological ferment in 1920s France'.[51]

Even if European colonial powers suffered self-imposed blindness regarding poor colonial conditions, their fears of communism were not totally misplaced. Soviet Russia used the Comintern to offer guidance and support for nascent anti-colonial movements, for example to black anti-communist groups in Germany in hopes that the Weimar Republic's lack of colonies would lend anti-colonial messages emanating from Germany greater legitimacy.[52] The Indochinese Communist Party in northern Vietnam was challenging the colonial state by the 1920s, and some nationalists worked through Communist networks in the 1920s to raise international awareness of Indonesia's plight and used those networks to make connections outside the Dutch–Indonesia imperial network.[53]

This involvement of the wider world in Europe's ideological competition of the 1920s and 1930s can be seen as part of the larger process of Europe's justification of empire, which was premised in part on connecting non-European lands and peoples globally, summed up by Livingstone's famous formulation 'Christianity, Commerce, and Civilization'. By the first half of the twentieth century, Europeans were reaping what they had sown. As more Africans, Indians, and Asians came into contact with different peoples, ideas, religions, and so forth, they were increasingly influenced by them. The more that Europeans pushed to make their colonies pay, the more they mobilized colonial populations, and the more that the latter criticized the colonial state for not meeting expectations it had itself established.

Moving people around, mobilizing imperial subjects, and linking colony and metropole produced networks that colonial subjects used to refine their ideas, contributing to the 'webbedness' of empire, as one author puts it.[54] An example is Jomo Kenyatta, who studied in Moscow and spent a considerable amount of time in England; another is Ho Chi Minh, who travelled from Indochina to Moscow, New York, and Paris (where he was present for the Peace of Paris negotiations) and who used rhetoric from the US Declaration of Independence to assert Vietnamese independence in 1945. Messali Hadj and other pro-Algerian leaders made Paris their centre of action. Those who ultimately rejected assimilation to French culture, such as Aimé Césaire, framed their rejection in French terms.[55] Mohammed Hatta, Indonesia's first vice-president, studied in the Netherlands in the 1920s, participated in congresses, and through his leadership role in the Ligue Contre l'Impérialisme et l'Oppression Coloniale worked with figures like Jawaharlal Nehru, Henri Barbusse, and Messali Hadj.[56] Although these future leaders' influence over contemporary European politics was negligible, the time they spent in Europe, the United States, or the Soviet Union was critical to their future leadership of independence movements and self-governing states.[57] This is not to say European cultures and political ideologies overwhelmed cultures in the wider world. A great example of the power of indigenous thought is Gandhi's conceptualization of Western civilization, Western Christianity, and national self-rule or *hind swaraj*.[58] Indeed, the colonial era represents but an episode in the much longer histories of Asia and Africa. All the same, cultures, political traditions, and world views changed in the wider world from 1900 to 1950 as a result of European ideas and ideologies.

In addition to communism, discussed earlier, other ideologies that exercised particular influence in the wider world were nationalism and British and French ideas of universal rights. Indians, Indonesians, Africans, and others used webs of ideas and networks of people and organizations to assert claims against foreign regimes in the very terms Europeans used to justify their colonial rule in the first place. Frederick Cooper more than anyone else has shown how France's colonial subjects claimed resources and rights by using the rhetoric and principles the French relied on to rationalize imperialism.[59] Cooper's research has focused mainly on West Africa, but further work has shown how this development was general across the European colonial world in the first half of the twentieth century. For example, even though the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme did not place a high priority on addressing colonial abuses in Gabon, Gabonese used

that organization's ideas and rhetoric to reject colonial impositions and claim rights for themselves.[60] Elites in Indochina became knowledgeable of French republican ideals, realized the hypocrisy of colonialism in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and used French ideas of rights to oppose French rule.[61]

Europeans saw the growing webs of peoples and exchanges of ideas and tried to control them. Germany feared the influence of colonial subjects in the metropole and restricted their ability to move to Europe, for example Cameroonian Mpundu Akwa who lived in Germany from 1902 to 1911 and who supported protests against German dominion over Duala. The colonial authorities saw in Mpundu Akwa 'a dangerous political opponent', and tried to control him.[62] He had a kind of parallel in Paul Panda Farnana, a Congolese living in Belgium on the eve of the First World War who fought for Belgium and spent most of the war in a German POW camp. Afterwards, Panda Farnana founded the Union Congolaise to organize fellow veterans and became known for speaking out in Belgium and abroad for African rights. The Belgians enacted a policy of isolation for the Belgian Congo in order to prevent dangerous ideas, specifically socialism and communism, from spreading among Congolese. French authorities restricted not only the emigration of colonial subjects to France but also the movement of subjects and outsiders inside colonial territories, illustrated by the case of Prince Kojo Tovalou-Houénou (formerly Marc Tovalou Quénum). Tovalou-Houénou, who spoke fluent French and was steeped in French and classical history, became a chief critic of European colonialism, was harassed, arrested, and then died of typhoid fever in a Dakar prison in 1936, not even 50 years old.[63] Controls and harassment were multi-directional. Belgian officials, for instance, closely monitored whites in the Congo and restricted emigration to skilled or affluent Belgians.

Webs did not necessarily centre on Europe and extend unidirectionally outwards, and the wider world profoundly affected Europe's societies and cultures. The debate has maximalists and minimalists, the former seeing manifestations of empire everywhere, from colonial-themed comic strips to everyday practices like (in Britain) drinking tea from India sweetened with sugar from the Caribbean. Scholars have also traced the colonial foundations of the sciences in Europe. According to Fenneke Sysling, for example, 'Dutch anthropology was shaped above all by its empire in the east…. The first half of the twentieth century may well be considered the heyday of Dutch anthropology, partly thanks to the colonies that provided opportunities for more research in this period.'[64] The argument goes that whole disciplines, including physical anthropology, did not emerge from Europe and project outwards, rather they were constituted in part by empire-building. There were colonial influences on poetry, theatre, and art, such as the Generación del 98 in Spain, a soul-searching literary movement provoked by the losses of 1898. Some have linked Germany's overseas rule to Nazism and the Holocaust, drawing connections between, for example, Lothar von Trotha's *Vernichtungsbefehl* in South West Africa and German actions in eastern Europe beginning in 1939.[65] Some maximalists believe empire helped constitute European nations and states by shaping, for example, French definitions of citizenship or the nature of French republicanism,

or by 'constituting' Britain and Britons. Minimalists inversely downplay empire's cultural importance to Europe, characterizing abundant signs of supposed effects in film, literature, museums, expositions, missionary work, art—think of Picasso and African masks—as evidence of superficial influence. In this vein, a scholarly consensus has emerged that there was in fact no causal connection between German colonial wars and the race war Nazi Germany launched in the late 1930s.[66] For Britain, John Darwin asserts,

> contrary to what is sometimes suggested, Britain was not in any obvious way a product of empire. It was not 'constituted' by empire … its English core was already an exceptionally strong and culturally unified state (taking language and law as the most obvious criteria) long before it acquired an empire beyond Europe.[67]

In any case, at the apex of empire, when Europeans' belief in empire was shaken but not diminished, mobilizing workers, soldiers, and colonial taxpayers in the wider world to benefit Europe's peoples and economies spun webs of ideas and contacts and moved a great many people around, hastening empire's swift demise after 1950.

Notes

1. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 288.
2. Timothy Parsons, *The Rule of Empires* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
3. John Darwin, *Unfinished Empire* (New York: Penguin, 2012), xi.
4. Martin J. Wiener, 'The Idea of "Colonial Legacy" and the Historiography of Empire', *Journal of the Historical Society*, 13/1 (2013), 29.
5. John Darwin, *After Tamerlane* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2008).
6. Sebastian Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire 1898–1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 184.
7. 'España en Africa', *El Ejército Español*, 24 July 1909, quoted in Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire*, 185.
8. Shelley Baranowski, *Nazi Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Anne Applebaum, *Gulag* (New York: Doubleday, 2003).
9. Martin Thomas, 'European Crisis, Colonial Crisis? Signs of Fracture in the French Empire from Munich to the Outbreak of War', *International History Review*, 32/3 (2010), 389–413.
10. Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, and L. J. Butler, *Crises of Empire* (London: Hodder Education, 2008), 26–7.
11. Martin Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 160.
12. Martin Thomas, *The French Empire between the Wars* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 46.
13. Angelo Del Boca, *Gli italiani in Africa orientale III* (Milan: Mondadori, 1992), quoted in Giuseppe Finaldi, 'Method in Their Madness: Understanding the Dynamics of the Italian Massacre of Ethiopian Civilians, February–May 1937', in Philip G. Dwyer and Lyndall Ryan (eds.), *Theatres of Violence* (New York: Berghahn, 2012), 247.

14. Finaldi, 'Method', 248–9.
15. Thomas, *Violence*, 8, 74.
16. Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
17. Jean-Luc Vellut, 'Matériaux pour une image du blanc dans la société coloniale du Congo belge', in Jean Pirotte (ed.), *Stéréotypes nationaux et préjugés raciaux aux 19ème et 20ème siècle* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Collège Erasme et Leuven, Editions Nauwelaerts, 1982), 91–116.
18. Erik Linstrum, 'The Politics of Psychology in the British Empire, 1898–1960', *Past & Present*, 215 (2012), 213.
19. Thomas H. Henriksen, *Mozambique* (London: Rex Collings, 1978), 113.
20. David Corkill and José Carlos Pina Almeida, 'Commemoration and Propaganda in Salazar's Portugal: The *Mundo Português* Exposition of 1940', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 44/3 (2009), 391.
21. Sebastian Conrad, *German Colonialism*, trans. Sorcha O'Hagan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 35.
22. Guy Vanthemsche, 'De Belgische socialisten en Congo 1895–1960', *Brood & Rozen: Tijdschrift voor de geschiedenis van sociale bewegingen*, 2 (1999), 35.
23. Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard, and Françoise Vergès, *La République coloniale* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2003), 112, 116.
24. Thomas, *Violence*, 191.
25. Sugata Bose, 'Starvation amidst Plenty: The Making of Famine in Bengal, Honan and Tonkin, 1942–1945', *Modern Asian Studies*, 24/4 (1990), 709.
26. Bogumil Jewsiewicki, 'Rural Society and the Belgian Colonial Economy', in David Birmingham and Phyllis Martin (eds.), *History of Central Africa*, Vol. II (London: Longman, 1983), 113.
27. See David B. Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).
28. Camara Laye, *The Dark Child*, trans. James Kirkup and Ernest Jones (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1954), 21.
29. Nancy Rose Hunt, '"Le Bébé en brousse": European Women, African Birth Spacing and Colonial Intervention in Breast Feeding in the Belgian Congo', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 21/3 (1988), 401–32.
30. Patrick Manning, *Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880–1995* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
31. Eric T. Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
32. Johan Lagae, 'Aller/Retour? Bouwen en plannen in Kinshasa en Brussel', in Vincent Viaene, David Van Reybrouck, and Bambi Ceuppens (eds.), *Congo in België* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2009), 95–113.
33. Marc Frey, 'Control, Legitimacy, and the Securing of Interests: European Development Policy in South-East Asia from the Late Colonial Period to the Early 1960s', *Contemporary European History*, 12/4 (2003), 397.
34. Guy Vanthemsche, *La Belgique et le Congo* (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 2007).
35. Darwin, *Unfinished Empire*, 187.
36. Thomas, Moore, and Butler, *Crises of Empire*, 21.
37. Vanthemsche, *Belgique et le Congo*, 353–4.

38. Marjory Harper and Stephen Constantine, *Migration and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 116.
39. Stephen Constantine, 'Migrants and Settlers', in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. IV: *The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 164–7.
40. Basil Davidson, *The African Awakening* (London: Cape, 1955), 197.
41. Remco Raben, 'A New Dutch Imperial History? Perambulations in a Prospective Field', *Low Countries Historical Review*, 128/1 (2013), 15.
42. Constantine, 'Migrants and Settlers', 179.
43. Harper and Constantine, *Migration and Empire*, 116.
44. Thomas, *Violence*, 189.
45. Darwin, *Unfinished Empire*.
46. Daniel Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution du protectorat français au Maroc*, Vol. II (Paris, 1988), 79, cited in Moshe Gershovich, 'Collaboration and "Pacification": French Conquest, Moroccan Combatants, and the Transformation of the Middle Atlas', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 24/1 (2004), 140.
47. Thomas, 'European Crisis', 401.
48. Alice Conklin, Sarah Fishman, and Robert Zaretsky, *France and Its Empire since 1870* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 244.
49. Erez Manela, 'Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East–West Harmony and the Revolt against Empire in 1919', *American Historical Review*, 111/5 (2006), 1327–51.
50. Thomas, *Violence*, 248.
51. Martin Thomas, 'Albert Sarraut, French Colonial Development, and the Communist Threat, 1919–1930', *Journal of Modern History*, 77 (2005), 918–19.
52. Andreas Eckert, 'Afrikanische Intellektuelle und Aktivisten in Europa und die Dekolonisation Afrikas', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 37 (2011), 253–5.
53. Klaas Stutje, 'Indonesian Identities Abroad: International Engagement of Colonial Students in the Netherlands, 1908–1931', *Low Countries Historical Review*, 128/1 (2013), 151–72.
54. Raben, 'A New Dutch Imperial History'.
55. Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*.
56. Stutje, 'Indonesian Identities Abroad'.
57. Eckert, 'Afrikanische Intellektuelle und Aktivisten in Europa', 246.
58. M. K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings*, ed. Anthony J. Parel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
59. Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 204–30.
60. Jeremy Rich, 'Gabonese Men for French Decency: The Rise and Fall of the Gabonese Chapter of the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, 1916–1939', *French Colonial History*, 13 (2012), 25.
61. Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery, *Indochina*, trans. Ly Lan Dill-Klein, with Eric Jennings, Nora Taylor, and Noémi Tousignant (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009).
62. Eckert, 'Afrikanische Intellektuelle und Aktivisten in Europa', 254.
63. Manning, *Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa*, 102.
64. Fenneke Sysling, 'Geographies of Difference: Dutch Physical Anthropology in the Colonies and the Netherlands, ca. 1900–1940', *Low Countries Historical Review*, 128/1 (2013), 108, 111.

65. Jürgen Zimmerer, *Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz?* (Münster: LIT, 2011).
66. Conrad, *German Colonialism*, 153–68; Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, 'L'Antichambre de l'Holocauste? A propos du débat sur les violences coloniales et la guerre d'extermination nazie', *Vingtième siècle: Revue d'histoire*, 99 (2008), 143–59.
67. Darwin, *Unfinished Empire*, 399.

PART IV

POLITICS, SOCIETY, AND IDEOLOGY BETWEEN THE WARS

CHAPTER 12

RURAL SOCIETY IN CRISIS

LAIRD BOSWELL

While much of Europe's working population still toiled on the land between 1914 and the aftermath of the Second World War, the countryside has not figured prominently among the concerns of the era's historians. The first half of the twentieth century remains dwarfed between two transformative moments in Europe's rural history. For many historians, the First World War marked the culmination of profound changes in the countryside and cemented, in the words of Jerome Blum, the end of the 'old order' in rural Europe—a process that began in the late eighteenth century and resulted in the gradual emancipation of the peasantry. As the aristocratic landed order gave way, it was replaced by one founded on social class and by a peasantry whose economic prosperity and access to landownership varied considerably across the Continent. Other historians, who have placed less emphasis on changing landholding structures, argued that by the Great War peasants had become integrated into the nation state, thus marking the end of the peasant cultures that had been central to European society—a case famously made by Eugen Weber in his 1976 *Peasants into Frenchmen*.[1] The second half of the twentieth century has likewise been interpreted as marking a seismic shift in European agriculture. The mechanization of farming transformed the landscape while the large-scale commercialization of agriculture, propelled by the disappearance of customs barriers between members of the Common Market, turned peasants into farmers. As the twentieth century came to a close, the growing influx of urban dwellers in search of rurality blurred the dividing lines between urban and rural society. The first half of the twentieth century was thus sandwiched between a social revolution in the nineteenth century and a rural revolution post-war that transformed the countryside into a site where those who worked the land were a minority.

In contrast to these two formative moments, the interwar years remain in search of an interpretation. The European countryside did not undergo the intense social and economic transformations that characterized the periods preceding and following it. The historical literature reflects these developments and, as a result, overarching arguments are hard to find. The historiographical traditions in rural history remain stubbornly national and pose a barrier to larger interpretations.[2] Did these decades constitute a bridge between

two fundamental periods in Europe's past? Did they connect the traditional rural societies of the nineteenth century with those that witnessed the disappearance of the peasantry in the late twentieth century? Or did the importance of this era lie elsewhere?

The first half of the twentieth century did more than just link the decisive transformations of the nineteenth century and the rural revolution of the post-war period. The European countryside became a crucial staging ground for radical politics of the Left and the Right, a laboratory for the eradication of peasant society in the Soviet Union, a setting for growing state intervention in times of war and economic crisis, and a site where landscape became a key marker of national identity.

Survey histories of the twentieth century have downplayed the centrality of the countryside. The remarkable diversity of European rural society has been a barrier to crafting a larger narrative. Long fascinated by the rural world, historians have moved on to other questions, and for few periods is this more visible than the interwar years. Historians seeking the roots of transformative social and cultural change have shifted their gaze to urban areas and the social groups linked to industrialization; more often than not, the countryside appears to be more acted upon than an agent in its own right, a site of tradition rather than of modernity, and a reservoir of men and women who could be mobilized for war and politics. The countryside's demographic and economic weight, however, makes it difficult to ignore.

Social Structure

To understand interwar Europe's rural nature and its geographical variation, there is no better place to start than social structure. The agricultural work force comprised some 70 million people in 1930, the majority of whom (67 per cent) lived in eastern and southern Europe.[3] In the eastern part of the Continent—Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Yugoslavia—over three-quarters of the active population still toiled on the land. Contemporary observers wrote of the timeless 'peasant lands' in the East, whose docile, conservative, and hard-working inhabitants were united by a 'common fate'.[4] Agriculture remained central to the western part of the Continent as well. At the Great War's end, only in Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands did under 40 per cent of the active population work on farms. Great Britain, where farmers accounted for only 7 per cent of the working population in 1921, was the outlier—much as it had been throughout the nineteenth century (Table 12.1). It would take another fifty to sixty years for western Europe's agricultural population to fall to British levels.

The decline of Europe's farming population was consistent across neither countries nor decades. Poland and Italy, two large agricultural nations, saw 10-point drops in farm employment in the 1920s, and Sweden experienced a more significant downturn during the interwar period. Throughout the greater part of Europe, however, stability more

Table 12.1 Active population in agriculture, 1920s–1950s (percentages)

	Early 1920s	Early 1930s	Late 1940s–1950s
Belgium	21	17	13
Bulgaria	82	80	76
Czechoslovakia	40	37	38
Denmark	35	35	25
France	42	36	36
Germany	31	29	29
Italy	56	47	42
Greece		54	
Great Britain	7	6	5
Hungary	58	53	52
Netherlands	24	21	19
Poland	76	65	57
Romania		79	70
Spain	56		49
Sweden	41	36	20
USSR		86	
Yugoslavia	82	79	78

Source: T. Deldycke et al., *The Working Population and Its Structure* (Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1968), 83–120. Figures have been rounded. Statistics are for those active in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing.

than transformative change characterized the size of the agricultural workforce. In the wake of the Depression, outmigration from the countryside stagnated and Europe's rural population stabilized. In France, the agricultural population grew older—part of a complex trend that saw migrants return to the countryside to survive during old age. The agricultural labour force declined during the Second World War and its aftermath, reaching 62 million in 1950. By the early 1950s the number of those who worked the land was falling in ever increasing numbers.

The countryside, however, was home to more than just peasants. Blacksmiths and shoemakers, bakers, butchers and small shopkeepers, workers and local notables all contributed to the economic and social vitality of rural society. Small industrial firms and artisanal workshops played a vital role in the countryside well into the twentieth

century. And the agricultural world harboured an astonishing array of itinerant ragpickers, tinsmiths, tailors, and labourers (among others) who survived by going from farm to farm to earn a meagre income. Examining the state of the rural (as opposed to the agricultural) population thus provides a more accurate assessment of the countryside's weight. In 1910, 59 per cent of Europe's population lived outside urban areas—a figure that had dropped to 49 per cent some four decades later. While these figures masked significant variations across the Continent, on the eve of the Great War over 50 per cent of the population resided in the countryside in most European nations, including Germany. In Mediterranean and eastern Europe, the decline of the rural population took place only after the Second World War. In France, the most agrarian of Europe's industrialized nations, the balance shifted slightly in favour of urban areas in the early 1930s, though by the 1950s 45 per cent of the population still resided in the countryside. Even Great Britain retained a notable rural population well into the twentieth century (20 per cent in 1950). Europe thus remained a rural Continent throughout the interwar period.[5] Most citizens, consumers, and voters lived outside large urban areas.

The Impact of War

The Great War marked a crucial turning point in the history of Europe's countryside. Peasants and agricultural workers, who unlike skilled workers did not benefit from exemptions to work in armaments factories, were called up in great numbers. While the data on casualties is not always of great precision, most indicators suggest that those who farmed the land paid a disproportionate toll at the front. In France, where the army drafted close to half of those engaged in agriculture, some of the highest casualty rates came from the country's most agricultural regions. Peasants paid a higher price because they tended to serve in the infantry. In the region of Basilicata, located in the instep of Italy's 'boot', 21 per cent of those mobilized in rural areas died at the front lines. In Germany, estimates of the number of men working in agriculture who were called up range from two-thirds nationally to 25 to 50 per cent in the Rhineland and Westphalia.[6] The long-term impact of casualties was significant: between 16 and 22 per cent of the French peasant population either perished in combat or was wounded.[7] The long lists of names engraved on monuments to the war dead in the smallest of French villages are testimony to the war's brutal demographic effect. Farm work proved arduous for those who had lost limbs or had been injured in gas attacks. After the 1918 armistice, the conviction that peasants had paid a disproportionate 'blood tax' during the war fuelled resentment, demands for land, and campaigns for radical political change.

The war had wide-ranging consequences on agricultural production and the availability of foodstuffs, notably in Germany and Austria. Throughout Europe, the extensive use of female labour, and the mobilization of migrants and prisoners of war, could not compensate for the men at the front. Relative to the pre-war years, agricultural output fell by one-third in France, Germany, and Austria, by one-fifth in Russia, and one-sixth

in Italy.[8] German yields, which had been among the highest in pre-war Europe, collapsed due to the lack of fertilizers, and shortages of fodder led to dwindling meat supplies. Rye production declined by 35 per cent during the war and potato output sank by 45 per cent.[9] Before the war, Germany had been a net importer of agricultural goods. The Allied blockade, however, brought vital grain imports to a halt. During the war's last three years, rationing and shortages of foodstuffs led to malnutrition and episodes of hunger. For both the Allies and the Germans, food became a weapon and agricultural production was crucial to final victory.

Both wars fuelled animosity between rural and urban areas, especially when town dwellers faced extensive food shortages. One year after the Great War's outbreak, in 1915, the conflict between peasants and urban consumers represented one of the key threats to social peace in Germany. Resentment between urban workers, the middle classes, and the peasantry ran deep. The growth of the black market further fanned the flames of resentment among urban consumers, while price controls, delivery quotas, and the confiscation of livestock and produce generated hostility among peasant producers.[10] Other countries kept the tensions between urban and rural areas in check. France made up for declining yields and agricultural production by importing large quantities of grain and meat to keep troops and city dwellers fed. Compared to Germany, food restrictions proved minimal and state pressure on peasants, left to fend for themselves, remained modest.[11] And yet, urban inhabitants, while recognizing the peasantry's sacrifice at the front, held those who worked the land responsible for the high cost of living. In Italy, agricultural output was not seriously impaired by the call-up of some 2.5 million peasants and agricultural labourers. Thanks to imports, food consumption increased in Italy.[12] The Italian peasantry profited from the war years because inflation had reduced the value of their agricultural debts.

The Second World War's impact on the countryside paralleled that of the Great War. Peasants constituted the majority of the Soviet Union's enormous casualties. As a result, one year after the war's end, women accounted for three-quarters of the labour force on kolkhozes, Russia's collective farms. The men had either died at the front or had chosen not to return to the kolkhozes.[13] Agricultural production declined throughout occupied Europe (20 to 30 per cent in France and Italy) although Germany managed to maintain production into 1944.[14] Urban consumers faced more difficulties than during the Great War, however. Germans requisitioned crops and livestock on a large scale throughout their conquered lands; as a result rationing was instituted and the resulting calorific value of food rations fell to 1,320 in Belgium, 1,080 in France, and 855 in German-occupied Poland, compared to 1,920 in Germany.[15] Tensions erupted between poorly provisioned urban areas and a peasantry that could usually make ends meet through barter and the black market. In the winter of 1941, the Parisian glove maker Georges Mazeaud wrote to a long-lost wine-growing cousin in the Loire Valley, asking him to send *anything* that could be eaten, and over the war he pressed him to send a dizzying array of foodstuffs.[16] His example was followed by many urban dwellers whose survival depended on their extended families in the countryside. While the German 'cut' fostered a lingering animosity between urban and rural areas, resistance to German

occupation strengthened solidarity between the two. Urban resentment towards the peasantry could only go so far: in Yugoslavia, France, Italy, and Russia the countryside constituted the heart of European resistance to the Third Reich.

The growing number of female-headed farming households during the Great War upended gender relations. When Pierre Jakez Hélias's father returned from the trenches to his village in Brittany, he let his wife keep the sickle because he no longer considered himself its master. From then on, she reaped the harvest.[17] Female labour had long been central to the rural economy. In parts of Italy where men migrated to work in construction and industry, women's labour kept the farms functioning. In other regions (Apulia and Sardinia) women had traditionally stayed in the home and men's wartime absence created tensions within families.[18] Female labour remained critical to the agricultural economy throughout the interwar period. As late as 1925, agriculture was still the principal employer of German women whose work, less impacted by mechanization than men's, had changed little since the late nineteenth century. While the state unsuccessfully attempted to rationalize women's farm work, right-wing *Völkish* agrarian parties appealed, at times effectively, to gain the support of overburdened farm wives whose position as mothers was considered key to the nation's future.[19]

Finally, both wars scarred the European landscape. Environmental destruction has been one of the Great War's most long-standing, and least studied, consequences. On the western front, the fighting took place on some of the richest agricultural lands in France and Belgium. On a broad swathe of territory that paralleled the front lines from the Swiss border to the Channel, the land had been so devastated by shelling that it was no longer fit for agriculture. After the armistice, the state purchased some of these moonlike areas and planted them with forests. The French estimated that military operations had destroyed the equivalent of sixty years' worth of tree harvests. Throughout the European theatre the presence of unexploded ordnance hampered farming. Heavy metals, arsenic, and other chemicals infiltrated soils and water to the indifference of authorities. It took the French state close to a hundred years to bar access to a tundra-like zone near Verdun that had been used as a dump for chemical shells after the First World War. But armies—and this was a new development—were not insensitive to the land they occupied. At the beginning of the war they requisitioned crops and draught animals, used fields as training grounds, and billeted troops in farms. By 1918, the British Expeditionary Force in northern France and Belgium kept seizures to a minimum, and made a concerted effort to provide local farmers with machinery and even military labour to harvest crops. There was more at stake than preserving the morale of the farming population; the army was now engaged in the provisioning of foodstuffs that were essential to the war effort.[20]

During the Second World War environmental destruction was less concentrated than it had been under trench warfare. In the East, the German war of plunder stripped farms of livestock, fodder, and crops. Fighting, following the 1944 Allied landings in Normandy, destroyed some 10,000 farms and left the countryside littered with mines and unexploded shells. Rehabilitation, which was not completed until the mid-1950s, was an arduous, dangerous undertaking, though in the end the French rebuilt

modern farms and consolidated landholdings, thus contributing to a modernized rural economy.[21]

A Stagnating Economy

In 1935, the writer Carlo Levi was banished by Mussolini's Fascist regime to an isolated village in southern Italy. Arriving in Aliano (to which he gave the fictional name 'Gagliano' in his book), Levi found nothing but grinding poverty, ignorance, isolation, and malaria. Western civilization had never made it to the village, and neither had Christ who, to use the title of Levi's famous memoir, had 'stopped at Eboli' some 50 kilometres to the north. The village's peasants, cut off from the market economy, eked out a living on the barren landscape and found themselves caught between absentee owners in Rome, Naples, and Palermo, 'middle class village tyrants', and a state which had little understanding of the problems of the southern peasantry.[22] While such isolation was unusual in 1930s Continental Europe, poverty was not. Beggars of all types regularly knocked at the door of the farm of Pierre Jakez Hélias's parents in southern Brittany; to save on matches, older women filled their clogs with hot coals from their neighbours' fires.[23] On the eve of the First World War, Ephraïm Grenadou, a small peasant from the agriculturally rich Paris basin, wrote that a shared life of poverty united his village's peasantry. An enterprising peasant, Grenadou's situation improved in the 1920s only to decline precipitously with the advent of the Depression.[24] His experiences mirrored those of numerous rural dwellers.

Prosperity did not characterize the interwar agricultural economy, even if certain sectors (for example, dairy- and bacon-exporting Danish agricultural cooperatives) stood out. The key problems that obstructed agricultural development remained unchanged from the pre-war years: properties were too small to be economically efficient, farmers lacked funds to invest in land and machines, and state financing for infrastructure lagged. In eastern and southern Europe, the poor state of agriculture, and the concomitant low standard of living, slowed economic growth. By the late 1920s most European nations had returned to protectionism and instituted high tariffs (ranging from 15 to 50 per cent) to shield producers. Mussolini's Italy had set the example in 1922 by passing a tariff designed to reduce the country's reliance on foreign grain. As Patricia Clavin points out, the Fascist regime's Battle for Wheat fused 'agricultural crisis and nationalism' in a fashion that would later be emulated throughout the Continent.[25]

European rural society was still rebuilding from the Great War when the Depression hit. As prices collapsed and agricultural income dropped, states scrambled to protect their markets behind a protectionist wall. Eastern European nations, more highly dependent on agriculture, suffered the most and the declining value of their exports made it difficult to pay off foreign debts. Under pressure from farmers, northern and western European nations set up quotas to limit imports of eastern European farm products. Tariffs and quotas marked the growth of state intervention in agricultural markets,

a trait shared by authoritarian and democratic regimes alike. Throughout the Continent, farmers, who could no longer afford industrial goods, cut back on their investments and postponed their debt repayments. They ramped up production to maintain their incomes, but the ensuing surpluses only further depressed markets. Peasants were hard hit by the phenomenon of price scissors: the sale price of their produce and livestock declined more rapidly than the cost of the industrial goods they wished to purchase.[26]

The Depression's impact varied across Europe. It accentuated the gulf between an eastern part of the Continent heavily dependent on agriculture, and a western and northern part that relied more on industry and the service sector. In France, the downturn in prices was mitigated by a rise in production and farm income. Overall the crisis in the French countryside was not as grave as has often been argued. Low levels of indebtedness and high levels of protection characterized the agricultural economy. Agriculture remained a world apart whose lack of connection to the rest of the economy explains why it was less dramatically impacted by economic slumps than industry.[27] The widespread perception that agriculture was hardest hit by the economic downturn, however, fuelled the rise of parties that denounced the state's 'abandonment' of the peasantry.

Throughout the 1930s investments remained modest and productivity (as in France) increased slowly, if at all. In eastern Europe, low productivity hampered agriculture. With little money to invest, most peasants opted for manure rather than fertilizer. Tractors remained an unwieldy novelty throughout Europe well into the 1930s and supplanted horses only a decade after the Second World War. Combine harvesters were a rare sight. Humans, oxen, and horses constituted the main sources of power on farms up until the middle of the century.[28]

While agriculture continued to employ a significant percentage of the working population, its contribution to the economy trended downward in more prosperous nations of northern Europe such as Great Britain, where agriculture's share of the GDP dropped from 6.3 per cent in the mid-1920s to a mere 3.6 per cent later in the decade. In western Europe, agriculture still remained central to the economy: it accounted for 16 per cent of GDP in Germany in 1925, 20 per cent in France in the second half of the 1930s, and 25 per cent in Italy on the eve of the Second World War. But there was more to the countryside than agriculture: those regions blessed with strong rural artisanal and industrial cultures had a more substantial impact on the economy. In parts of eastern Europe, however, agriculture remained the main employer and the principal contributor to the economy. In the Baltics, agriculture contributed close to 80 per cent of the GDP, and in Romania and the Balkans this figure reached even higher.[29] There was thus a chasm between those parts of the Continent that benefited from diversified economies, and those that relied almost exclusively on agriculture and were thus at higher risk from market downturns.

The most significant development, one with long-term implications, was the realization that agriculture was unlike other sectors of the economy, and that state intervention was indispensable to support producers and markets.[30] And it was a realization that was coupled to an understanding that the landscape and its inhabitants were intimately bound to the nation's identity and, on those terms alone, worth defending.

Collectivization and Peasant Resistance

Nowhere were the transformations of the countryside as radical and extensive as in the Soviet Union. Soviet agriculture was completely restructured by collectivization and Stalin's civil war against the peasantry. Collectivization destroyed traditional peasant life and the Russian village. Nowhere else in Europe was landholding so profoundly remodelled and the social structure of the peasantry so transformed. And nowhere did resistance to the state occur on such a large, albeit unsuccessful scale. Stalin's unprecedented assault on the peasantry had no equivalent in the twentieth-century countryside. While most European nations celebrated the virtues of the peasantry and its organic link to the nation, and sought to defend the interests of the small peasant, the Soviet regime chose to eliminate the traditional peasantry entirely.

Collectivization has been aptly termed the 'second and last act' of a divisive conflict that pitted the Bolshevik regime against the peasantry.[31] Faced with intense peasant resistance, Lenin, in the first act, had backed away from the requisitions of war communism and instituted a form of market socialism called the New Economic Policy. Collectivization was a response to the insurmountable difficulties that the Soviet state faced collecting sufficient grain to support the country's industrialization. Poor grain harvests were not initially to blame. Rather, beginning in 1927, shortages of consumer goods in rural areas spurred peasants, who could purchase little with their cash, to withhold grain from the market. The state responded by cracking down on traders, intercepting and requisitioning grain. Authorities accused middle peasants, better known as kulaks, of hoarding grain. The campaign against the kulaks expanded rapidly and was soon transformed into a 'reign of terror'.[32] Over the next two years, repeated attempts by the state to requisition grain by pitting various elements of the peasantry against each other met with failure.

Collectivization was launched by surprise in late 1929. Its objective was to prevent peasants from withholding agricultural products from the market while strengthening the state's ability to access grain. Peasants were stripped of their land and grouped together in collective farms known as kolkhozes. The kulaks were to be 'liquidated' as a class. The Soviets pursued collectivization at breakneck speed—in the five months between October 1929 and March 1930 the percentage of collectivized peasant households soared from 7.5 to 56. Such a result could only be reached by force.[33]

Violence was the hallmark of the collectivization campaign. Teams of urban workers and Communist cadres descended upon rural areas and imposed collectivization from above: they beat kulaks and stole their possessions, livestock, and grain. 'Dekulakization'—ridding the countryside of kulaks—walked hand in hand with collectivization, and it entailed the expropriation of kulak farms and the seizure of their goods and livestock. But there was more to dekulakization than the eradication of the amorphously defined 'middle peasants'; the objective was also to dismantle the power of rural elites, crush political opposition, and force the kulaks into collective farms. Depending

on the nature of their 'crimes', kulaks could be interned in concentration camps, deported to remote regions beyond the Ural Mountains, or resettled in their home regions. In the end, the Soviet state brutally deported an estimated 1 million peasant families, or 5 to 6 million people; many perished in the process—the death rate likely reached 10 to 14 per cent per year.[34] Despite poor harvests in 1932–3, the state continued to squeeze the countryside by seizing large quantities of grain, leaving a destitute peasantry with little to eat. The ensuing famine of 1932–3, centred in the breadbasket of the Ukraine, was of enormous proportions. Low-range estimates place the number of famine-related deaths at 4 to 5 million in the Ukraine and Russia, while higher estimates propose a figure of 7 to 8 million for the entire USSR in 1933.[35] By 1935 the state directly levied, at rock-bottom prices, 45 per cent of agricultural production, three times as much as in 1927.[36] By the mid-1930s kulaks had disappeared from the countryside, and the peasantry, in the words of Lynn Viola, were 'transformed into something akin to a subject population'.[37]

Collectivization gave birth to the most widespread instance of peasant resistance in twentieth-century Europe. For the peasants there was more at stake than unjust crop and land seizures. From their perspective, collectivization was a civil war designed to subjugate those who worked the land, and to destroy their culture, their religion, and their villages.[38] Beyond multiple forms of passive resistance (theft on collective farms, for example), the peasantry also turned to violence. In 1930, some 2 million peasants took part in over 13,000 'disturbances' and the secret police catalogued some 22,887 'terrorist acts' including 1,100 murders.[39] Episodic and localized in nature, however, and lacking national coordination, peasant resistance was no match for Soviet power.

While collectivization had disastrous consequences for the Russian economy and destroyed the social and cultural networks that were at the heart of peasant life, it did enable Stalin to keep close control over agricultural production during the Second World War. During the First World War, peasants had withdrawn their goods from the market, something that kolkhoz members who had been dispossessed of their land were in no position to do. Collectivized farms allowed the state to control the distribution of foodstuffs to favour those deemed most essential to the war effort: soldiers and industrial workers.[40]

Some historians have argued that collectivization 'was tantamount to the colonization of the countryside'.[41] Colonizing itself was not new: the Soviet regime, with the backing of the secret police, had been inspired by the past practices of the Russian state which had long extracted resources from rural areas. In this sense, collectivization can be understood as fitting within a broader history of the colonial relationship between European states and the countryside, a relationship that in France and Italy had run its course by the eve of the Great War.

Peasants, Land, and Politics

At the Great War's end, peasant discontent was pervasive across the Continent. In return for their sacrifices at the front, peasants demanded land, particularly in areas of large

landholding such as southern Italy and eastern Europe, and they would later push for protected markets to shield their declining incomes. Access to land remained a crucial issue in interwar Europe. Joined by peasants whose properties were not economically viable, the landless in southern and eastern Europe demanded land redistribution. Seeking to bolster their legitimacy and stave off social unrest, the remodelled nations of eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the Balkans enacted land reform and parcelled out large estates.

Land reform in eastern Europe was an enormously complex undertaking that varied by region and produced contrasting results. In some regions, land reform constituted retribution against ethnically 'alien' landowners while it created a class of small owners who became pillars of the established regimes. In the Baltics, where ethnic Germans figured prominently among the large owners, property restructuring was extensive. It was more difficult in nations where ethnicity could not be instrumentalized to challenge the legitimacy of landlords.[42] Land reform was most far reaching in Romania and Yugoslavia where the state dismantled large estates. In Yugoslavia, land redistribution had a nation-building objective insofar as it sought to create greater uniformity between the different property structures of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Hungarian types of estate systems in Croatia. In the process of trying to provide land to every family, however, the authorities ended up creating numerous micro-farms that could barely support their owners. Agrarian reform was less extensive in Poland and Czechoslovakia. In interwar Poland, 10 per cent of the arable soil was redistributed during the interwar years, and about one-quarter of the surface of the largest estates was expropriated. But the growth of the landless peasant population was such that it outstripped the Polish state's ability to create new plots of land and distribute them.[43] Hungary distinguished itself by the lack of meaningful agrarian reform. The gentry owned 40 per cent of the cultivable soil during the interwar period, and the Catholic Church possessed extensive landholdings as well. In 1941, over 65 per cent of the rural population owned less than 3 hectares or no land at all. Serious agrarian reform did not come until 1945 when, under pressure from the Communist Party and the National Peasant Party, the National Assembly eliminated 'feudal estates' and redistributed land to agricultural workers and estate servants.[44]

The long-term consequences of land reform are the subject of debate. Some historians argue that land redistribution constituted one of the Great War's most dramatic outcomes in rural areas.[45] The expropriation of large estates was a radical act, undertaken from above, to pre-empt an extensive social revolution of the Russian kind. While in western Europe the landed power of the aristocracy had been substantially diluted before the Great War, in parts of eastern Europe this transpired only during the interwar years. By and large, however, land reform met with mixed results: it did not fully cut back on the power and influence of large owners, it created too many unsustainable smallholdings whose owners lacked the means to invest in farms and machinery, and it failed to establish a group of moderately prosperous peasants who would have been the lynchpins of social and political stability.

The interwar period constituted the last moment when the peasantry played a decisive role in supporting and challenging democratic and authoritarian regimes.

In eastern Europe, a plethora of agrarian parties dotted the political landscape, and their presence was also visible in the western part of the Continent. Agrarianism was a malleable ideology that sought to shield the peasantry from cultural and economic change. Agrarianists argued for the centrality of family farms and traditional rural society in the development of nations. The peasantry's moral values, its religious beliefs, and its adherence to traditions stood at the core of society. Often wary of democracy because of its failure to represent the true interests of the peasantry, agrarian parties proposed models of agrarian reform centred on cooperatives and the family farm. What distinguished them from mainstream political parties was the belief that the peasantry incarnated the nation. For some, agrarian parties represented the interests of a social category, while others suggest that they incarnated a 'third way' between fascism and communism, collectivism and capitalism.[46] The interwar period marked the apogee of agrarian parties. By the late 1940s they had lost much of their influence.

The defence of agrarian interests took a multitude of forms, however, ranging from anchoring democracy to challenging parliamentary regimes by supporting fascist and communist alternatives. In this regard, France is of interest because of its position as a democratic nation with a large rural population. The Third Republic relied on strong rural support to survive and flourish. Even during the bleak years of the Depression, rural areas, which had long been one of the Third Republic's anchors, never turned against the regime. Local notables and large landowners did not throw their weight behind those who confronted democracy (as they did in Italy), and while the Republic faced numerous crises it was never in danger of collapse. Compulsory education, in place for close to half a century, had done much to solidify the peasantry's allegiance to republicanism. An extensive network of agricultural organizations that represented the interests of those who worked the land also reinforced the peasantry's allegiance to the existing social order. France, however, was also home to a rural socialist and communist movement that challenged the established order. This was not the first time that the Left had crafted a significant base of support in the countryside. In southern Spain, rural anarchism (in the early years of the century) and socialism (under the Second Republic) had also forged strong roots.[47]

French rural communism developed in the aftermath of the Great War in poor, isolated areas of central France, and along the Mediterranean coastline. At the polls, support for Communist candidates did not come from the poorest sectors of rural society (sharecroppers) or from workers who lived in the countryside, but from small property owners, tenant farmers, agricultural workers, and village artisans and shopkeepers. While peasant enthusiasm for the Russian Revolution was strong in the countryside—in part because Lenin brought peace and gave land to the peasants—collectivization, about which little was known, was not on the agenda of the Communist Party or the peasantry and neither was cooperation. Land was the key issue, and the Communists successfully adapted their discourse to a broad array of constituencies. Running under the slogan of 'land to the one who works it', the

Communist Party promised land to those who had none and pledged to expand the property holdings of small owners, while protecting them from the vicissitudes of the marketplace and the reign of large landholders. It was a dream of a socially egalitarian democracy of small property holders. But communism did more than this: it created strong sociability networks in areas destabilized by emigration, and replaced the old politics of patronage with practices of militancy and electioneering that cemented democracy.[48] Following the Second World War, rural voters flocked to communism in ever-greater numbers. Communism found even more fertile ground in the Italian countryside where the issue of land was more critical than on the other side of the Alps. The Italian Communists reconciled the diverging interests of sharecroppers, landless labourers, tenant farmers, and small owners, both in southern Italy and in the northern part of the country.[49]

If rural communism in western Europe was never in a position to challenge the status quo, peasant fascism did. In both Italy and Germany rural areas played a key role in the development of Fascist grass-roots politics. At the end of the war, Italian peasants, who had paid a heavier price on the battlefields than any other social group, mobilized to obtain land or, in the case of sharecroppers and agricultural workers, better contracts with landowners. South of Rome, peasants occupied large landholdings. In northern and central Italy, Socialists organized agricultural workers in the Po Valley and sharecroppers (*mezzadri*) in Umbria and Tuscany. But little coordination existed between the rural socialist movement in the north and the revolutionary land seizures in the south.

In the Po Valley, socialists appeared to have won a major victory in 1920 when they compelled landowners to hire landless labourers (*braccianti*) through socialist-controlled labour exchanges. But local landowners, fearing higher costs and the militancy of labourers, fought back by engaging the help of Mussolini's Fascist movement. Mussolini promptly dispatched his blackshirts who beat up socialist organizers, made them drink castor oil, and threatened their families. Mussolini's squads also destroyed the labour exchanges. Paralysed by the violence, and disarmed by the indifference of the police, the socialists failed to react. Within a few months Ferrara had been transformed from a 'red province' to a 'fascist province'.[50] While violence and intimidation had much to do with the peasantry's quick conversion from socialism to fascism, so, too, did the Fascists' exploitation of the widespread fear of collectivization and a shrewd agrarian policy that enticed peasants to leave socialist unions by offering them land. By 1921, Mussolini's Fascists largely controlled the northern and central provinces of Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany. The plasticity of rural fascism had much to do with its success: in the northern part of the country it positioned itself as a populist movement of the Right, while in areas such as Tuscany it represented the interests of landlords.[51] Mussolini's breakthrough in the countryside and his alliance with landowners was critical to his later success. Once in power, however, Mussolini's regime pursued policies favourable to large landholders.[52]

The peasantry also formed a major component of the cross-class coalition that supported German National Socialism in the early 1930s. While Hitler's party had paid little

attention to farmers and the rural world before the 1928 elections, the collapse of agricultural prices and the advent of the Depression gave it an opening. In the 1932 elections, the National Socialist Party, pushing aside long-established conservative parties, obtained 51 per cent of the vote in the agricultural province of Schleswig-Holstein bordering on Denmark, and it also obtained strong support in Pomerania and East Prussia. Hard hit by the drop in prices, and unable to face up to debts and foreclosures, dissatisfied cattle farmers in Schleswig-Holstein turned to Nazism. Thanks to their participation in protests, the National Socialists consolidated their influence in the countryside and contributed to the growing political violence that led to the Weimar Republic's collapse. In 1931 and 1932, Schleswig-Holstein Nazis in tandem with the Rural Farmers' League provided muscular opposition to forced tax collections and the compulsory auctions of indebted peasants' crops, machinery, and property. They threatened bailiffs and creditors, intimidated prospective buyers, and, with the help of the SA (*Sturmabteilung*) and the SS (*Schutzstaffel*), assembled large crowds at courthouses leading to violent clashes with the police.[53]

How important was rural support to Hitler's rise to power? There has been considerable disagreement among scholars over who, exactly, voted for Hitler though much of the recent quantitative research suggests that the countryside played a fundamental role in the critical elections of 1932 and 1933. According to Jürgen Falter, by the early 1930s the Nazi Party had captured more support among the self-employed (which included those who worked the land) than any other party. This rural vote, which cannot be pinned down to specific groups within the farming population, was restricted to Protestant areas of Germany (the north and east).[54] The political scientist Gary King has proposed that the working poor, a category that included small farmers and shopkeepers located in Protestant (but not Catholic) areas of the country, gave disproportionate support to National Socialism in the crucial years of 1932 and 1933. Hard hit by the Depression and receptive to the Nazi programme, the farming population turned to National Socialism. The backing of agricultural workers in Protestant districts also boomed.[55] More recently, scholars who have moved away from estimating individual voter behaviour have maintained that it is possible to draw links between certain sectors of the farming population and the Nazi vote. They argue that, beginning in 1932, middle peasants—those who owned plots of land between 5 and 20 hectares in size—were the key variable: in Germany as a whole, the higher the share of middle peasants in the population, the greater the Nazi vote. Rural areas, particularly those with a high proportion of middle peasants, played a decisive part in the Nazi Party's rise.[56] Disappointed by traditional conservative and right-wing parties, and seduced by a platform that promised to curtail food imports and cut back taxes, middle peasants proved receptive to Nazi propaganda.

Rural fascism's appeal ranged beyond Italy and Germany. In France, the greenshirts, led by Henry Dorgères, a gifted peasant agitator who had no lack of charisma and oratorical skills, garnered considerable support from farmers and agricultural workers in western and northern France during the agricultural crisis of the 1930s.[57] Like the Nazis in Schleswig-Holstein, he built up his political capital by opposing the auctioning of

farms that belonged to peasants who could not pay their debts (the Communists pursued analogous tactics in other parts of the country). But Dorgères's movement was limited in time and scope: it could not expand in southern parts of the country where dissatisfied peasants were more likely to support Communists and socialists, and it faced the opposition of a strong state that had little patience for radical movements whose actions impeded agricultural production.

The peasantry's place in interwar politics challenges earlier literatures that argued that modern politics filtered down to rural society in a top-down process of acculturation and integration. Less instrumentalized by elites, a significant swathe of the European peasantry engaged in the political process and used it for its own purposes in the years following the Great War. Communism and fascism, often considered to be urban movements, depended on peasant mobilization for their success. The peasantry's expanding public voice, however, was cut short by dictatorship in Italy and Germany, and in much of eastern Europe it faced considerable limits. The irony is that the peasantry's political savviness developed just as the countryside's economic and demographic weight began to decline. This downturn accelerated after the Second World War and, over time, condemned the farming population to political irrelevance.

Conclusion

The first half of the twentieth century marked the last moment in European history when those who worked the land constituted a powerful constituency, courted by parties and organizations of all leanings, and when the countryside remained an intense site of conflict—one that, in the Soviet case, was crucial to the regime's power and consolidation. Growing intervention in agricultural markets, and an expanding state presence in the countryside, would serve as a model for the future. The extensive reforms undertaken after the Second World War—land consolidation and market transformations—all sought to stabilize the rural world, anchor it firmly within the democratic system, and thus prevent the re-emergence of radical threats to the established order. In the second half of the twentieth century, first in Western Europe and later in southern Europe, the declining numbers of those engaged in agriculture, combined with the influx of new inhabitants, transformed rural society into a site no longer mainly populated by farmers. Today's countryside remains symbolically important but it bears less and less resemblance to its predecessor of times past.

Seen from the present, the history of the European twentieth century appears like a drawn-out parting with a society where the rhythm of farming structured rural life, the peasant family incarnated the nation, and oral traditions preserved a distinct peasant culture. Seen from 1945, however, when this volume ends, the perspective is rather different. At the end of the Second World War, rural society was still fundamental to the political and social stability of European societies, and agriculture vital to national economic development.

Notes

1. Jerome Blum, *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976).
2. See the introduction to Jean-Luc Mayaud and Lutz Raphael (eds.), *Histoire de l'Europe rurale contemporaine* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2006).
3. See table 3.6 in Gerold Ambrosius and William H. Hubbard, *A Social and Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 173.
4. H. Hessell Tiltman, *Peasant Europe* (London: Jarrolds, 1936), ix, 273–4.
5. For statistics on the European rural population, see Fernando Collantes and Vicente Pinilla, *Peaceful Surrender: The Depopulation of Rural Spain in the Twentieth Century* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2011), 15–21. Rural encompasses all areas of low population density along with small towns and villages under 5,000 inhabitants.
6. For Rhineland and Westphalia, see Robert Moeller, *German Peasants and Agrarian Politics, 1914–1924* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 47; Avner Offer, *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 62–3.
7. Annie Moulin, *Les Paysans dans la société française* (Paris: Seuil, 1988), 175.
8. Giovanni Federico, *Feeding the World: An Economic History of Agriculture, 1800–2000* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 191.
9. Offer, *The First World War*, 62–3.
10. Moeller, *German Peasants*, 43–57.
11. Moulin, *Les Paysans dans la société française*, 170–4.
12. Federico, *Feeding the World*, 191.
13. Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 314.
14. Federico, *Feeding the World*, 196.
15. Steven Broadberry and Kevin H. O'Rourke (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), ii. 218.
16. Robert Gildea, *Marianne in Chains: Daily Life in the Heart of France during the German Occupation* (New York: Picador, 2002), 92.
17. Pierre Jakez Hélias, *Le Cheval d'orgueil: Mémoires d'un Breton du pays bigouden* (Paris: Plon, 1975), 47.
18. Martin Clark, *Modern Italy: 1871 to the Present* (3rd edn, Essex: Longman's, 2008), 233.
19. Elizabeth Jones, *Gender and Rural Modernity: Farm Workers and the Politics of Labor in Germany, 1871–1933* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009).
20. Craig Gibson, 'The British Army, French Farmers and the War on the Western Front 1914–1918', *Past and Present*, 180 (2003), 175–239; Chris Pearson, *Mobilizing Nature: The Environmental History of War and Militarization in Modern France* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).
21. Hugh Clout, 'Beyond the Landings: The Reconstruction of Lower Normandy after June 1944', *Journal of Historical Geography,* 32 (2006), 127–48.
22. Carlo Levi, *Christ Stopped at Eboli*, trans. Frances Frenaye (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1947).
23. Hélias, *Le Cheval d'orgueil*, 349–56.

24. Ephraïm Grenadou and Alain Prévost, *Grenadou, paysan français* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), 60.
25. Patricia Clavin, *The Great Depression in Europe, 1929–1939* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000), 82.
26. Steven Broadberry and Kevin H. O'Rourke, *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), ii. 217.
27. Gilles Postel-Vinay, 'L'Agriculture dans l'économie française: Crise et réinsertion', in Jean-Claude Casanova and Maurice Lévy-Leboyer (eds.), *Entre l'état et le marché: L'Économie française des années 1880 à nos jours* (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 80–4.
28. Postel-Vinay, 'L'Agriculture dans l'économie française', 75–80; David Grigg, *The Transformation of Agriculture in the West* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 41–2, 48–57.
29. For Italy and Germany, see Gustavo Corni, *Hitler and the Peasants: Agrarian Policy of the Third Reich, 1930–1939* (New York: Berg, 1990), 270. Robert Moeller provides a higher figure (20.5 per cent) for the weight of German agriculture in the GDP in the early 1930s: Moeller (ed.), *Peasants and Lords in Modern Germany* (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 4. For eastern Europe, see Broadberry and O'Rourke (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe*, ii. 216; data on France in Pedro Lains and Vincente Pinilla (eds.), *Agriculture and Economic Development in Europe since 1870* (London: Routledge, 2009), 230.
30. Michael Tracy, *Government and Agriculture in Western Europe, 1880–1988* (3rd edn, New York: New York University Press, 1989), 129.
31. The expression is Andrea Graziosi's, cited in Nicolas Werth and Alexis Berelowitch, *L'État soviétique contre les paysans* (Paris: Tallandier, 2011), 243.
32. C. J. Storella and A. K. Sokolov, *The Voice of the People: Letters from the Soviet Village, 1918–1932* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 295.
33. Storella and Sokolov, *Voice of the People*, 318.
34. Werth and Berelowitch, *L'État soviétique contre les paysans*, 293.
35. Storella and Sokolov, *Voice of the People*, 364.
36. Werth and Berelowitch, *L'État soviétique contre les paysans*, 293.
37. Lynn Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 29. See also Lynn Viola et al., *The War Against the Peasantry, 1927–1930: The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005).
38. Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin*, 14.
39. Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin*, 238.
40. Broadberry and O'Rourke (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe*, ii. 147.
41. Viola et al., *The War Against the Peasantry*, 325.
42. Anu Mai Köll, 'The Agrarian Question in Eastern Europe: Some Answers from the Baltic Region', in Jean Batou and Thomas David (eds.), *Uneven Development in Europe: The Obstructed Growth of the Agricultural Countries 1918–1939* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1998), 201–27.
43. Iván T. Berend and György Ránky, *Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 186–93; Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), ii. 411–13.
44. N. G. Papp, 'The Political Context of the Hungarian Land Reform of 1945: A Reassessment', *The Historian*, 46 (1984), 380–96.

45. Derek W. Urwin, *From Ploughshare to Ballotbox: The Politics of Agrarian Defense in Europe* (Oslo: Unversitetsforlaget, 1980), 69–70.
46. Dietmar Müller and Angela Harre, 'Agrarianism as Third Way', in Müller and Harre (eds.), *Transforming Rural Societies: Agrarian Property and Agrarianism in East Central Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2011), 7–13.
47. George A. Collier, *Socialists of Rural Andalusia: Unacknowledged Revolutionaries of the Second Republic* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978).
48. Laird Boswell, *Rural Communism in France, 1929–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); John Bulaitis, *Communism in Rural France: French Agricultural Workers and the Popular Front* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008); Jean Vigreux, *La Faucille après le marteau: Le Communisme aux champs dans l'entre-deux-guerres* (Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2012).
49. Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967).
50. Paul Corner, *Fascism in Ferrara, 1915–1925* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 138.
51. Frank M. Snowden, *The Fascist Revolution in Tuscany, 1919–1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 207.
52. Robert Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York: Vintage, 2004), 58–64; Corner, *Fascism in Ferrara*, 283–8.
53. Alex Otto-Morris, '"Only united can we escape certain ruin": Rural Protest at the Close of the Weimar Republic', *Rural History*, 20 (2009), 187–208.
54. Corni, *Hitler and the Peasants*, 31–2; J. H. Farquharson, *The Plough and the Swastika: The NSDAP and Agriculture in Germany, 1928–1945* (London: Sage Publications, 1976); Jürgen W. Falter and Reinhart Zintl, 'The Economic Crisis of the 1930s and the Nazi Vote', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 19 (1988), 74; Jürgen W. Falter, *Hitlers Wähler* (Munich: Beck, 1991), 256–62.
55. Gary King, Ori Rosen, Martin Tanner, and Alexander Wagner, 'Ordinary Economic Voting Behavior in the Extraordinary Election of Adolf Hitler', *Journal of Economic History*, 68 (2008), 951–96.
56. Paul W. Thurner, Andre Klima, and Helmut Küchenhoff, 'Agricultural Structure and the Rise of the Nazi Party Reconsidered', *Political Geography*, 44 (2015), 50–63.
57. Robert Paxton, *French Peasant Fascism: Henry Dorgère's Greenshirts and the Crises of French Agriculture, 1929–1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

CHAPTER 13

INTERWAR DEMOCRACY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ANDREA ORZOFF

Democracy's steady presence during the interwar years is both fascinating and surprising, given that some of the ideals underpinning the Wilsonian era were close to what one historian has appropriately dubbed 'radical Enlightenment':

> democracy; racial and sexual equality; individual liberty of lifestyle; full freedom of thought, expression and the press; eradication of religious authority from the legislative process and education; and full separation of church and state … that all … have the same basic needs, rights, and status irrespective of what they believe or what religious, economic or ethnic group they belong to, and that consequently all ought to be treated alike, on the basis of equity, … that all deserve to have their personal interests and aspirations equally respected by law and government.[1]

Europe's long-lived autocratic empires had loosened their grip in the previous two generations, but few resembled this portrait. Contemporary observers experienced their own version of shock. Initially written into constitutions across the Continent, this set of dreams was abandoned or whittled away at by leaders almost everywhere. In some countries touting their democratic credentials, these ideals fell away even in the process of drafting constitutions. By the 1930s 'illiberal democracy' had become a useful oxymoron to describe various European states.

The failings of the democracies themselves—or failures of their leaders' imaginations—were matched by the number and luck of their opponents. Almost every European democracy of the era faced radical movements that challenged democratic legitimacy, whether from the Right or Left. A more profound challenge occurred in the case of established political parties that worked from inside the system to destroy democracy. In many countries, minority ethnonationalist groups worked against parliamentary consensus, and organized internationally to embarrass and weaken their home states. Many of these groups were themselves anti-democratic.[2] And the Great

Depression's economic impact, particularly in central and eastern Europe, presented another blow to democratic legitimacy.

Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' envisioned a universal 'national self-determination', creating a world of equal—presumably democratic—nation states, supposedly sharing principles of operational ethics and administrative practices, accountable to an interdependent set of democratic publics. The map of Europe famously refused to cooperate: most European states lacked the *jus soli* principles of assimilationist citizenship or ethnic homogeneity that might enable them to emulate the Wilsonian ideal. Nor did the imperial powers plan to extend Wilson's democratic citizenship to their colonial subjects.[3]

Many commentators then and since have understood 1918, in the context of the history of democracy, as a 'false dawn'.[4] Europe's allegedly long-standing devotion to the causes of democratic politics and universal human rights, particularly during the vexed interwar decades, proved far less than durable. Mark Mazower, the best-known proponent of this line of reasoning, states simply,

> Triumphant in 1918, [democracy] was virtually extinct twenty years on.… In its focus upon constitutional rights and its neglect of social responsibilities, it often seemed more fitted to the nineteenth than to the twentieth century. By the 1930s the signs were that most Europeans no longer wished to fight for it …[5]

This pessimistic generalization ignores some relatively significant exceptions, among them democracies both old and new, West and East: the Scandinavian monarchies, Finland, France, Britain, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. This chapter will focus on them, with somewhat greater attention paid to the great-power democracies of France and Britain in the West and Czechoslovakia, one of the touchstones of the Versailles order, in the East.

What did democracy mean in interwar Europe? Like many other useful historical portmanteau terms—'intellectuals' and 'fascism' come to mind—democracy, as a concept or idea, is notoriously difficult to define. Political scientists often invoke a set of political attributes: universal suffrage; relatively free and fair elections; a legislative free from executive domination or meddling; and the guaranteed exercise of basic civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, assembly, and religion. Yet the range of twentieth-century democratic case studies lends itself to thinking about 'democracy with adjectives': oligarchical democracy, de facto one-party democracy, illiberal democracy (this last intended to describe an electoral democracy in which civil liberties are often denied). Some of these latter descriptors shade into what might be more appropriately dubbed 'inclusive authoritarianism' or 'facade democracy'—that is, authoritarian regimes which simply adopt democratic trappings.[6]

At different moments, in different places, interwar European democracy took many of these forms. The mechanics of interwar democracy were imperfect. Many of the Continent's most noted democracies afforded relatively little emphasis to democratic institutions and decision-making. Yet democratic ideals undergirded interwar Europe's

and the world's international relations; Europe's most powerful states retained democratic parties, practice, and institutions; even Europe's new dictators felt it necessary to maintain facades of democratic legitimacy to varying degrees. In contrast to the disappointed 'false dawn' perspective on interwar democracy, perhaps we might do better to consider interwar Europe a democratic laboratory, and pay attention to which experiments succeeded and why.

The 1920s and Liberalism's Legacy

While all Europe hailed Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference, giving rise to what historians have called a 'Wilsonian moment', Europe's move towards democratic constitutionalism in Europe predated Wilson's transnational impact by at least sixty years. Classical European liberalism's emphasis on limiting arbitrary monarchical power, and its accompanying extension of political rights and responsibilities to those outside Europe's aristocratic class, had developed its influence even before the French Revolution. In the Revolution's aftermath, some degree of popular consensus slowly became central to the legitimate exercise of power. Since 1848, enthusiasm for constitutions had become widespread: even Bismarck and Cavour had acceded to them, despite their authoritarian proclivities. Throughout the Continent manhood suffrage had been slowly extended. Certainly socialism challenged liberalism, most prominently toward the war's end, manifested by the Bolshevik Revolution. Yet after short-lived post-war Bolshevik-style revolutions in areas of Germany, northern Italy, Slovakia, and Hungary, Lenin's influence retreated behind the USSR's borders. Wilson—and the American political and economic model—had seemingly prevailed.

That is, to an extent, and in some places more than others. Creating democracies out of whole cloth, in circumstances very different from any that had prevailed in Europe's past, meant a certain degree of improvisation. The role of the executive, especially the presidency, was central—whether and how much European countries should emulate the United States' 'imperial' presidency, or the powerful influence of the monarchical past. Most would-be presidents preferred this; most post-imperial states eschewed it and tried to limit their leaders, allocating more power to directly elected parliaments. In developing the latter, Great Britain's autonomous Parliament was an important model.

Even politicians dedicated to democracy had doubts about the system, and sometimes worked to subvert it. For example, Tomáš Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia, considered establishing a brief dictatorship led by himself in 1919. Reflecting years later, he claimed that dictatorship could be more truly populist than parliamentary rule. 'When the war ended, I thought: we will have a republic, but at the beginning [it would have] dictatorial tendencies…. I [was] not worried [about it]…. Dictatorship interrupts Parliament, but makes possible the rule of the people; therefore it makes democracy possible.'[7] Similarly, Great Britain's David Lloyd George created a coupon system at the end of the Great War to denote parliamentary candidates he deemed acceptable: 483 of

550 'couponed' candidates won their elections in 1919, granting Lloyd George an unusual degree of control over a Parliament he had hand-picked.[8] These are only two possible examples out of many.

Giovanni Capoccia notes the significance of the head of state particularly at moments of political challenge by extremist parties: the head of state generally has a greater frame for independent action, he can exert influence on party leaders, and he can reach out to public opinion.[9] Czechoslovak and German politics provide intriguing counter-examples of presidencies that sustained and undid interwar democratic systems. The German constitution allowed for direct election of the president; the Czechoslovak parliament elected their country's president. In the first, provisional constitution, the Czechoslovak president was a figurehead, easily controlled by the National Assembly and even the cabinet. His veto could be overridden. A cabinet minister had to sign on to any executive act by the president. But the 1920 revised constitution, written in part by Masaryk's allies, granted Masaryk greater power. Masaryk could appoint and dismiss ministers, even the prime minister. He could dissolve parliament. He could appoint large groups of civil servants. These legal powers, combined with his combative, engaged personality, long-standing political networks, and considerable financial resources, led Masaryk to easily subvert most constitutional limitations.[10] Yet Masaryk was hailed as a great democrat, and tended to support the political system he had helped create. The German constitution also created what was in theory a figurehead president, who could use the infamous Article 48 to rule by decree, overruling parliament and the chancellor, only in dire circumstances. Yet with the election of war hero Paul von Hindenburg in 1925, the German democratic system was led by a president eager to undo it. Political deadlock and economic strife made that possible. At issue here are the internal tensions of any democracy, not just those of interwar Europe.

Many democracies' early interwar experiences were marked by violent conflict. In addition to the red revolutions already mentioned, Ireland and Finland were riven by civil war. These conflicts did not necessarily spell doom for the young republics: in the Finnish case, for example, the experience of parliamentarism and relative autonomy under the Russian Empire proved far more significant. The Finnish assembly, the Eduskunta, dated back to 1906, and was elected by universal suffrage. The most powerful party, the Agrarians, similarly could draw on an extensive history of cooperation with the Finnish Social Democrats: despite policy differences this practice continued throughout the 1920s.[11]

Class conflict determined democratic structure and habits as well. Historian Ross McKibbin has argued that interwar British democracy was shaped by the post-war victory of the middle classes, anti-socialist and supporters of the Conservative Party, against the organized working class. Notwithstanding two short-lived MacDonald prime ministerships, by 1939, *pace* McKibbin, this understanding of British democracy—based on an apolitical popular culture, highly individualist, harking back to nineteenth-century liberalism, concerned about modernity—essentially supplanted any other form, especially the social democratic variant that would briefly reign from 1945 to 1951.[12] More recent studies arguing for broadly democratic habits of political socialization have

pointed to greater British involvement after the war in voluntary organizations, including the League of Nations Union and Rotary International.[13] In contrast, the shift within Swedish and Danish social democracy to a consistently reformist approach is generally regarded by historians as the decisive factor for the establishment of Scandinavian parliamentary democracy between the wars. Thanks in part to influence by the Bolshevik and German Communist parties, the Norwegian Labour Party retained a revolutionary platform until the early 1930s, despite having left the Comintern.[14]

The question of how and whether to integrate national minorities remained problematic for democracies across the Continent. Constitutions did not guarantee equal access to the rule of law for all citizens, St Germain and the League of Nations' Minority Treaties aside. For example, both Czechoslovakia and Poland worked to ensure steady parliamentary majorities for the 'state-forming' nationalities and to minimize the political contribution of their ethnic minorities until roughly 1925, a tendency one commentator termed 'ethnic democracy'.[15] Both Czechoslovakia and Poland began their interwar existence with at least a 35 per cent minority population; political parties divided not just along ideological but also ethnonational lines. Moreover, the creation of these new post-war states represented a reversal of fortune for formerly dominant groups such as Czechoslovakia's Germans and Poland's Russians.[16] These 'nationalizing' states had the combined challenge of crafting a unitary nation-state sensibility while also reconciling or containing their national minorities, who sometimes strove for contact with large co-ethnic populations across a national border, as with Czechoslovakia's Hungarian minority.[17] Czechoslovakia's first 'revolutionary' provisional assembly granted only 40 out of 256 seats to Slovaks, and none at all to Germans, Hungarians, Poles, or Ruthenians. The provisional assembly then passed important legislation, and did not hold a referendum on the country's constitution after its drafting.[18] Czechoslovakia shifted to a more inclusive footing after the 1925 elections brought German parties into the cabinet, although German complaints about access to German-language schooling and land reform continued throughout the interwar decades, as did the growing Slovak desire for autonomy and resentment over perceived Czech colonialism in the Slovak lands.[19]

The challenges presented by ethnic diversity reached beyond the successor states. Belgium's three main political parties—the Catholics, Socialists, and Liberals—had strong internal factions based at least in part on Flemish and Walloon wings, not to mention other sources of disequilibrium. Flemish efforts at forming an ethnonational party by the 1930s tended towards the radical right, supporting the creation of an authoritarian system and perhaps even a militarized effort to create a pan-Flemish state involving Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.[20] In addition to indigenous populations, Europe's democracies struggled with how to address minority immigrants. France's overall immigrant population between the two world wars was estimated at 3 million people; immediately after the First World War, anti-Semitic activity in eastern Europe brought tens of thousands of Jews to France, to grow to a population of 300,000 by the 1930s, with almost 80 per cent of those in greater metropolitan Paris. In the 1930s, refugee German Jews arriving in France were greeted with xenophobic paranoia, not

just from the far Right: *Le Figaro* called for concentration camps to contain the 'Jewish Bolsheviks'.[21]

Women were a new democratic constituency after the war. The first female parliamentary delegate in German history was elected in 1918; Czechoslovak women were enfranchised in 1918, although leading politicians worried behind closed doors that women would vote en bloc for religious parties, or otherwise do as commanded by their pastors and priests. The Czechoslovak constitution simultaneously guaranteed equal rights with men and the sovereign status of the traditional family unit. Judicial precedent established over the course of the interwar period threw the support of the state to the latter, rather than the former.[22] Britain's post-war enfranchisement of all men over 21 and most women over 30 almost trebled the electorate, from some 8 to 22 million voters. At the same time women were granted the right to higher education and professional attainment. In 1928, all women over 21 were enfranchised. In both instances, women tended to vote Tory throughout the 1920s, strengthening the traditional parties.[23] Yet women's emancipation remained uneven, and did not necessarily correlate to wartime contributions. While post-war French political leaders were able to gain early majorities in the Chamber of Deputies on behalf of women's suffrage, the initiative died in the back rooms of the Senate by November 1922. As in the Czechoslovak case, politicians dismissed French women voters as a gift to the Right thanks to their supposedly dogged adherence to Catholicism, while Radical senators noted that women's hands were not for 'ballot papers but for kisses'.[24]

Variations on a Democratic Theme

To take Tolstoy quite freely, each successful interwar democracy was successful in its own way. Many of Europe's successful interwar democracies saw relative continuity among their major political parties. In France, the interwar years' strongest parties were the socialist SFIO (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière); the Radicals, numerically the Republic's largest party, who began as centre left but moved to the right; the centre-right Alliance Démocratique; and the more conservative Fédération Républicaine. Neither communist nor fascist challenges much dislodged the strength of these groups. French communism voted to join the Third International and take orders from Moscow in 1920; this and the success of the Left in the 1924 elections awakened a radical-right response, in the formation of various semi- or fully fascist movements, like Pierre Taittinger's Jeunesses Patriotes and Georges Valois's Faisceau. But the devaluation and stabilization of the franc in 1926, and the economic recovery it engendered, decreased these groups' popular appeal.[25] Czechoslovak politics too remained strikingly stable through the interwar years, although Slovak, German, and Hungarian parties entered and left governing coalitions. The parties included the rightist National Democrats, the successor party to the nineteenth-century Young Czechs; the centre-right Agrarians (also called the Republicans), the largest Czech party, led by long-time

prime minister Antonín Švehla; the small Catholic Czechoslovak Populists on the centre right; the National Socialists and the Social Democrats on the moderate left, although the National Socialists moved hard right; and the Czechoslovak Communist Party.[26]

Other democracies saw more change. The interwar years in Great Britain saw the slow decline of the once-powerful Liberal Party and its speedy replacement by the Labour Party, a mass working-class movement and moderate socialist party. Labour engaged in skilful wartime self-fashioning, creating a non-Bolshevik version of European social democracy, and positioning itself as a secular, patriotic force with the strong backing of Britain's trade unions. Just after the war, David Lloyd George was returned to power with a strong Tory–Liberal alliance, but this ebbed by 1922. Throughout the rest of the decade the vote swung from Labour to the Conservatives, with the fading Liberals making common cause with both parties. Unstable three-party politics gave way in 1931 to another bipartisan government between Labour and the Tories, with the latter possessing a solid majority, as a response to the Great Depression. British extremist movements existed, but both the Communists and Fascists were marginal.[27]

The success of interwar democracy did not seem to correlate neatly with national wealth or prior democratic experience. The Scandinavian countries were small, relatively poor, and strategically vulnerable to more powerful neighbours: their late and hasty industrialization, especially in Sweden and Norway, left them with substantial social polarization. The Swedish monarchy and political establishment were disinclined to welcome democratic reforms, and held to older dreams of great-power status. Sweden and Norway retained some residual hostility to one another. The new Czechoslovak state's western Czech-speaking lands were relatively industrially developed, but the economy of Slovakia—Upper Hungary for the previous millennium—was largely agricultural: Slovak literacy was lower than the Czech half of the country, as was Slovak experience with parliamentary democracy in local imperial diets prior to the war.

Wartime memory shaped democratic politics, sometimes in unpredictable ways. In Britain as elsewhere, a flood of post-war memoirs was published, some forty in 1919 alone, leading one critic to cavil about 'the stream of war chronicles that has been poured out in recent years'. Those memoirs, and the battles fought over commemorating the war, strengthened the pacifist cause through the thirties.[28] Similarly, the post-war commemoration of the poilu (French infantry soldier) helped deepen French society's post-war pacifism.[29] French politics during the 1920s was marked by polemics over the war as a metonym for French nationalism more generally: in the press and in books, the Left and Right argued over the war's leaders, developments, and origins.[30] Meanwhile, throughout the interwar period, the French Right remained focused on the war as a source of national pride. 'Men were proud of being "old soldiers" and decorated; those who had served were honoured, pushed to the fore, glorified …'[31] Fascist leaders across the Continent hailed the 'front generation' as a political grouping unique unto itself, but only in a few prominent examples did former veterans throw their weight en masse behind anti-democratic forces. The Czechoslovak Legionnaires' post-war political divisions mirrored those of the parliamentary parties, and made it difficult for any one political grouping to claim to speak for veterans.[32]

Britain and France struggled with the inconsistencies of democracy and empire. The French concern about demography in the face of a larger German population led to an internal contradiction within French and 'greater French' politics. Even the previously anti-imperialist PCF (Parti Communiste Français) shifted to advocating for the 'civilizing mission' in the colonies, yet the majority of colonial peoples lacked anything like the rights of citizens. Algeria had been treated as part of France since the 1860s, yet full political rights were granted to a tiny proportion of the population and were confined to non-Muslims until the Blum–Violette Bill of 1936, which extended civil rights only to 0.5 million Muslims out of 9 million.[33] Britain's empire, the envy of its European competitors, was both a source of prestige and reputation ('the sun never sets over the British Empire') and 'a constant drain on British resources'.[34] India and Ireland—the famed Raj and England's nearest colony respectively—were riven by political unrest. The increasing prominence of Sinn Fein, the Irish nationalist party, and the outbreak of civil war in Ireland proved difficult to quell, resulting in a divided country.[35] In India, the 1919 creation of 'diarchy' or shared rule with Indian legislative councils indicated eventual readiness to decolonize, and spurred nationalist movements to call for it to happen sooner. The Amritsar massacre of unarmed demonstrators that same year, and Mohandas Gandhi's eventual assumption of the leadership of the Indian nationalist movement, marked the onset of a long conflict. The British Empire began loosening its structure during the interwar years, in fact: by 1931 the Dominions were able to conduct their own foreign policy.

Just about every interwar democracy—even the most successful—contained elements that struck onlookers as problematic at best, undemocratic at worst. The Czechoslovak case is instructive. Czechoslovak democracy was tightly controlled by two extra-constitutional power centres: the Pětka and the Castle. The former term described the regular meetings of the leaders of the five largest Czech political parties: the Pětka began in 1920 at the suggestion of powerful Agrarian leader Antonín Švehla in response to early political upheavals and strikes, and continued in various forms through 1938. Its counterweight, the Castle, was Masaryk and Beneš's powerful, informal political organization: a nexus of information gathering, fund-raising, and direct political influence based in the presidential chancellery, several cabinet ministries and newspapers, and Masaryk's and Beneš's discretionary funds, personal wealth, and friendships with the country's elite. The Castle understood itself to be suprapartisan, as opposed to the Pětka; representative of a cosmopolitan 'Czechoslovak' nationalism; and representative of democracy itself. Both sides claimed to be truer to an ideal democratic practice. The Pětka could be seen as a dictatorship of the parties. Masaryk and Beneš were no more interested in anything resembling populism, believing democracy to follow from a set of philosophical principles and to be best enacted by efficient elites.[36] Belgian frustrations with democracy similarly stemmed from accusations of a 'regime of parties', given that the internal regional, linguistic, generational, and intellectual factions within parties made coalition-building near impossible. The parties' control over government meant that the formulation of policy devolved into turf warfare. Meanwhile financial scandals in the early 1930s led to the public revelation that parliamentarians—mainly from the Catholic Party—held some 411 positions in the country's banks and corporations.[37]

Democratic Survival in the Dangerous 1930s

The economic downturn of the 1930s seemed to prove the prevailing fear that democracy's day had passed. But the powerful example of Germany notwithstanding, interwar democracy withstood the Depression in many countries, among them France, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, and Great Britain.

Despite sinking deeply into the Great Depression by 1933, France retained a vibrantly democratic political system. Partisan divides worsened throughout the tumultuous 1930s, but the party system remained strong. The economic downturn, a rise in immigration (leading to xenophobic legislation and outbursts), and a left-leaning election result in 1932 led to a brief wave of popular violence in early 1934, when roughly 40,000 right-wing demonstrators protested supposed government corruption, leading to a violent clash with Paris police. The result was the spring 1936 Popular Front alliance between the Radical Party, the socialists, and the French Communist Party, led by socialist Léon Blum. During the Republic's last few years, the French radical Right regained popular support, specifically the Action Française movement, the Croix-de-Feu (later the Parti Social Francais), and the anti-communist, openly anti-Semitic Parti Populaire Français, founded by former Communist Jacques Doriot. While no radical-right movement ever seriously challenged French parliamentary democracy, the French radical Right and radical Left took one another for the real threat, rather than remaining focused on Nazi Germany. The Popular Front was later accused of weakening the country militarily, but in fact it began France's industrial rearmament in the face of German belligerence, and had increased defence spending—a trend continued by the Radical government of Édouard Daladier which succeeded it.[38]

Not even the august British Empire was immune to economic and political strain. Even before the Depression, as Britain's major colonies developed their own industrial economies, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia decreased their orders from Great Britain, despite the creation of events like 'Empire Shopping Weeks'. Relative latecomers to industrialization like Japan and Germany had developed using newer technology, and were more focused on products related to chemistry and engineering: weaponry, chemicals, dyes. The British economy retained its older emphasis on coal mining and shipbuilding, much of it in small-scale enterprises. The country electrified and modernized late, and resisted Ford- and Taylor-style factory processes. Britain did not mandate public education for all children until 1918, and did so over the objections of manufacturers. Miners and shipbuilders proved difficult to re-educate, and newer industries tended to locate themselves in southern England, thereby creating regional pockets of misery. These worsened during the Depression until the British pound was pulled off the gold standard and imperial tariffs were imposed to protect British manufacturing, ending Britain's long commitment to free trade policies. At no point during the interwar years did British unemployment dip below 10 per cent annually. But growth in consumer

industries and housing construction helped pull Britain out of the Depression relatively quickly, by the mid-1930s. Still, long-term unemployment persisted.[39]

Unemployment was an endemic Scandinavian problem as well, averaging 20 per cent between 1921 and 1939 in Denmark and Norway, only slightly lower in Sweden. Industrial growth remained steady throughout the period, but agriculture was deeply affected even before the Depression: in 1930, a full tenth of all Norwegian farmers faced bankruptcy. Agrarian and farmers' parties emerged in all three countries in an effort to re-establish farmers' late nineteenth-century social status and political power. In Norway and Denmark, these parties flirted with the radical Right. But in all three Scandinavian countries, 'red–green' coalitions emerged in the mid-1930s—alliances between social democratic and agrarian parties which stabilized the political system while introducing relatively radical economic solutions to the Depression. This development was analogous to Finland's 'red–earth' coalition in 1937. This historical moment is regarded as the birth of modern Nordic social democracy.[40]

During the 1930s, internal divisions within European communism and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War riveted the French population, especially on the left. Increasingly focused on internal political polarities and ideological extremes, France hunkered down behind what has been called a defensive 'Maginot mentality' as much as behind the Maginot Line. The many journalists ushered into the concrete-constructed splendour of the Maginot trenches tended not to mention the resources they had absorbed at the expense of investment in modern weaponry.[41] In both France and Great Britain, pacifism was very strong: in February 1933 the majority at a debate at the Oxford Union, that university's debating society, voted to refuse to fight for king and country, and in 1936 prominent intellectuals such as Vera Brittain and Bertrand Russell supported the formation of a Peace Pledge Union, the largest pacifist society in history by the late 1930s.[42]

The Depression strengthened the two traditional critiques of democracy from the Right and Centre: populism and technocracy. The technocratic complaint was a modernizing one: that until an electorate was fully educated, wise government depended on a certain distance from the voting public, considered overly responsive to demagoguery. Knowledge was more important than the majority will: policy should be administered by an efficient elite, insulated from the whims of the crowds. The populists and nationalists, meanwhile, argued that parliaments were mere talking-houses, and that democracy was incapable of truly reflecting the people's desires. Authoritarian monarchist Charles Maurras argued that democracy was 'feeble, ineffective, self-divided, anti-national'.[43] Former-Communist-turned-fascist Jacques Doriot and his Parti Populaire Français called for France to develop its own variant of National Socialism akin to Germany's Nazi Party—a complicated stance, given that he called for an invigorated French nationalism while emulating Hitler.[44] The Czechoslovak National Democrats moved steadily rightward over the interwar years, running in the 1935 elections with the fascist National League and attaining 7.6 per cent of the vote, significant given that the strongest party that year received 15 per cent.[45] The Nazis extended financial assistance and influence to similar movements and leaders, especially in neighbouring states: Konrad Henlein's

Sudetendeutsche Heimatsfront (later the Sudetendeutsche Partei) in Czechoslovakia, although historians debate the extent to which this movement was Nazified before 1938; the Rex and Vlaams Nationaal Verbond parties in Belgium's 1936 elections; and Vidkun Quisling's National Unity party in Norway.[46]

These conservative and fascist voices helped European democracy undo itself in 1938 and 1939, although the threat of Nazi occupation was crucial to legitimating their rule. In this sense interwar democracy came to an end in large part due to external forces, albeit sometimes aided from within. In Czechoslovakia after the Munich Crisis of September 1938, as the country reeled from the loss of its Sudeten borderlands, far-right Agrarian prime minister Rudolf Beran introduced repressive censorship and an Enabling Act, allowing him to rule without parliament. In France, Édouard Daladier's government relied on rule by decree after July 1939. It repressed communism and arrested communists long before war broke out.[47]

The League of Nations

The new European international system, restructured by the Paris Peace Conference and Woodrow Wilson's idealist liberalism, supposedly embodied democratic ideals and practices. At the same time it bore more than a glancing resemblance to the European system of the late nineteenth century. Among others, Isabel Hull and Carole Fink have detailed the creation of a regime of international law intended to protect the weak and stateless: national minorities, refugees, prisoners of war. Immediately after the Great War, the Paris system and League of Nations were intended to deepen those protections and to make another war unthinkable. The failures of the system have received historiographical emphasis; their successes deserve mention.

Wilson's call for an international organization based on diplomatic transparency, democratic multilateralism, peaceful conflict resolution, and minority protections was articulated in his Fourteen Points, publicly disseminated in January 1918, and defended in a pamphlet by Viscount Edward Grey. Publicity was one of the League's governing ideals: the notion that international affairs could be moulded, like democratic national politics, by public opinion was one of the many ways in which Wilson intended the League to rework the world in the American model.

Europe's older democracies, the League's guarantors, were also its traditional great powers and long-standing empires. Historians and contemporaries have long noted that the League was structured according to their interests. France's early efforts to shape the League as a tool of the Quai d'Orsay were so apparent that at least one historian notes British resistance to the League's efforts, or at least suspicion of them, as early as the mid-1920s. French prime minister Aristide Briand's passionate 1929 speech to the League Assembly calling for supranational European unity was related to France's ongoing fear of renascent German strength.[48] At the same time, it seems clear that participation in the League, and in the internal politics of the Geneva Secretariat, at least occasionally

shaped French politicians' understanding of their own national interests. And historians have argued that British civic awareness of the League of Nations, especially its League of Nations Union, 'inspired a rich and participatory culture of political protest, popular awareness, and civic ritual' between the two wars.[49]

Meanwhile, Europe's new democracies, created by the post-war treaties, tended to defend them—and the League—vociferously. Perhaps the most obvious exemplar here would be Czechoslovakia. Beneš's diplomatic efforts centred on concluding bilateral agreements with other European states as well as embedding Czechoslovakia firmly in European and global organizations such as the Little Entente, the diplomatic alliance Beneš crafted to unite Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania, and the League of Nations. Beneš was known as 'the man of the League of Nations', and thanks to his steady presence in Geneva was often able to minimize or quell petitions brought to the League's minority committees by Czechoslovakia's German speakers.[50]

For decades, the League was understood in light of its perceived failures—much like the interwar years more generally. It was condemned for failing to keep the peace, and for its inability to end traditional great-power politics within and outside Europe. The Secretariat tended to see the world in European terms; the League suffered frequently from the same bias. It lacked any ability to enforce its Covenant save sanctions. The League's supposedly foundational principles of sovereignty, equality, and independence were applied inconsistently across Europe and the Near East, let alone the rest of the world. Some states were viewed as able and willing to protect 'their' ethnic minorities, while others had to report to League supervision. Yet too often the goal of the League's minority section was political, deeply biased, and secretive, aimed at protecting the League's prestige and that of individual members. Europe's Jews, without a great-power defender, were left particularly exposed by the League's minority policies, but they were not alone. German minorities in Czechoslovakia and Poland tried without success to use the League's minority system to redress their complaints.[51]

And yet the League, the foremost representative of democratic internationalism between the wars, deserves more than a rise-and-fall narrative. Although the League shifted from its early Wilsonian ideals to a system reminding onlookers of the Concert of Vienna—that is, a gathering of the great powers, able to essentially force less powerful states to do their bidding—the real test of the League's abilities was its accomplishments, not its internal structure or ideals. The League effectively stabilized the economies of some post-Habsburg successor states, and worked persistently, with relatively few resources beyond persuasion, to protect refugees and minority populations, especially in Europe's new, nationalist East. Its welcoming of minorities as transnational actors, in an arena traditionally dominated by nation states, was unusual.[52] A more recent historiography has explored the League's actual activities, highlighting its innovative efforts to manage the relationship between state sovereignty and the developing international system.[53] The League's Secretariat, based in Geneva, was dominated by the best-populated legations: the British (153 staff members), the French (100), and the Swiss (126). Despite this, the officials in Geneva were genuinely devoted to transnational ideals and to the significance of their work.[54]

As Patricia Clavin has noted, its global hopes aside, the League was 'a very European institution located at the heart of Europe'. Many of the issues it took up were European problems: central and east European borders and minorities, refugees in Europe, disarmament, the extremities and adaptations of empire, and upholding the post-war treaties it had not created. Its assembly met once a year, its council four times a year. Both of these were dominated by the European powers. Of the League's fifty-five members, some twenty-six were European, paying for 65 per cent of its budget. But all member countries contributed to the work of the League's Secretariat, its permanent international bureaucratic arm that did the lion's share of its work. Women played an important role in the Secretariat, as did a vast array of international experts, who helped bring about international debate on issues like international law.[55]

An important set of responsibilities emerged from the transnational chaos in the aftermath of the Great War. Refugee flows in previously unforeseen numbers, economic disruption, and public health crises demanded a coordinated international response. The great powers, the overwhelmed new successor states, and swamped international organizations were happy to hand such responsibility to technocrats in Geneva, who in turn were eager to try to resolve these problems. Fridtjof Nansen, long given near-sole credit for establishing a structure effectively dealing with post-war refugees, is now known to have relied on the International Red Cross to repatriate 430,000 POWs from post-war Russia. His League-related aid projects in the early 1920s similarly depended on organizations like the Red Cross and Quaker Friends Committee. The League's work helped develop standards and practices for the treatment of refugees, as well as the 'Nansen passport', which helped some 90,000 refugees move across Europe, involving the League, member states, non-member states like the USSR, and organizations like the Red Cross. The ability to establish a system of cost-sharing and standards for granting asylum remains one of the League's most significant legacies.[56]

The League's other 'technical' concerns involved labour rights, international jurisprudence, communications, health, and peacekeeping. The last endeavour was perhaps the most challenging, involving guardianship over contested cities and territories, aiding diplomatic negotiations, and trying to persuade countries to avoid the arms race that had led to the First World War. The League could only suggest a course of action, as it had no enforcement arm, and it could only respond to crises rather than attempt to prevent them. Given these limitations, its successes in the 1920s—staving off war between Yugoslavia and Albania, Greece and Bulgaria, Sweden and Finland, Poland and Lithuania, Bolivia and Paraguay—were real. The 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria proved beyond the League's abilities to arbitrate, as did the European conflicts and arms race arising during the 1930s.[57]

Meanwhile, the League's other accomplishments were notable. The League's Economic and Financial Section was responsible for important studies and analyses on regional economies and trade patterns. Transnational flows of illegal goods and stateless human beings were substantially altered and much better understood thanks to the Secretariat's efforts. The Committee of Intellectual Co-operation tried to foster an internationalist culture among leading intellectuals and cultural industries, including film and academe. The League's Economic and Financial Organization worked to promote

economic and financial cooperation, and in the early post-war years directly helped stabilize and restructure the Austrian and Hungarian economies. This social, economic, and intellectual work was arguably more global in process and focus than much of the League's political intervention. Historians have argued that it helped to legitimize international organizations generally and the League in particular. These efforts brought in countries that had refused to join the League, notably the United States, particularly in the realm of public health. By involving both state interests and public opinion mobilized through the engagement of expert advisers, activists, wealthy philanthropies, international organizations, and even individual donors, it managed to negotiate the tension between state sovereignty and the international public.[58]

The League's Middle Eastern and African mandate system was tremendously varied but overall much less praiseworthy. Despite its initial promises to avoid an annexationist peace, little changed in the Middle East and Africa during the era of the League's supposed supervision, during which the former colonies were to transition to a greater degree of autonomy or home rule. For the most part, the fullest understanding of sovereignty was reserved for the colonial powers, not for their peripheries. Michael D. Callahan notes that the League's 'Permanent Mandates Commission was never a harsh critic of imperialism … rather, [it] was dedicated to a progressive agenda of gradual reform and to a pragmatic paternalism in Africa'.[59] Yet, he also notes, the mandates system contributed to the steady restriction of imperial power, brought colonial practices into a global, more transparent context, and offered possibilities for some African elites to challenge and constrain imperial rule. The League's ideals became more than lip service to pretty words: colonial officials were forced to bring their policies into greater engagement with these new international norms, at least during the more optimistic 1920s. Even as late as 1938, French and British pundits noted that exposure to world public opinion had changed colonialism for the better.[60]

The League's workings and successes were as messily imperfect as those of the states creating it. There is no question that the League never became the world government its creators and supporters hoped it might be. Nor was it able to stave off the Second World War. State sovereignty and security, and great-power guarantorship, proved difficult if not impossible to reconcile with humanitarian ideals. The pressure of public opinion did not force international diplomacy into the sunlight: in fact, often it seemed to lead politicians to hope to be seen as serving particular causes, rather than to actually work for change. However, especially with regard to international humanitarian work, economic and financial management, and intellectual cooperation, the League's creative processes and structure left a profound legacy, one which shaped and democratized the post-war international context.

Conclusion

Unsurprisingly, democracy in interwar Europe was a broad church: 'forms of democracy are dynamic, shifting, historically-rooted [*sic*] and contestable'.[61] It indicated of

course an ongoing process of governance, renegotiated repeatedly; a set of conversations among a group of political parties; a moral high ground, or realm of legitimate exercise of power; a synonym for the status quo. European democracies in the twentieth century, like democracies elsewhere in the world, have shown themselves to be populist, technocratic, oligarchic, liberal, direct, representative, and authoritarian—often the same democracies have demonstrated various of these tendencies in turn, usually while insisting that they in fact represented a normative, timeless embodiment of some supposedly pure democracy. Democracy itself is often used to invoke other accompanying phenomena, such as tolerance for difference and civil treatment of minorities; capitalism; and the restrained use of state power both at home and abroad.

Since the end of the Cold War, historians, sociologists, and political theorists have struggled to define democracy in all its forms, and to understand what factors help it to endure and which ones tear it apart. Among the centripetal forces helping attain democracy or holding it together, scholars have listed relative affluence, limited social inequality, prior experience with democracy, well-timed violence, the ability of social classes to work together for political change, and a benign international environment.[62] Centrifugal forces include anti-democratic politicians and parties within democratic structures, economic crises, deep social factions, and external threats. This list of the relatively obvious aside, no single causal factor seems decisive, and in successful democracies many of these different factors interacted with one another in distinctive ways.[63] Giovanni Capoccia emphasizes the significance of individual actors—heads of state and party leaders—in responding quickly and appropriately to extremist challenges from within the system. While difficult to employ in an essay of this length, Capoccia's approach seems the most useful in understanding the particular personalities and strategies that helped democracies avoid failure.

Their great diversity aside, interwar European democracies shared some common struggles, noted here. They argued over the nature of the executive power, which ranged from limited monarchies with a parliamentary system to an American-inflected presidency, as in Czechoslovakia. Party structure mattered, as did the flexibility of party leaders. More significant still was the ability of the electoral groupings represented by each party to compromise, and the ability of individual leaders to inititate negotiation. Doubt about the very nature of the democratic system, and the existence of internal anti-democratic forces, was endemic throughout interwar democracies, even the most successful ones. Although the national mythologies of Czechoslovakia and the Scandinavian countries claimed a supposedly timeless adherence to democracy, historians have emphasized the oligarchical tendencies of all these states; perhaps the most appropriate descriptive term would be Walter Lippmann's 'managed democracy'.[64] And yet, these problems aside, they survived.

The way most of Europe's interwar democracies ended—or did not—does not lend support to the thesis that Europeans rejected democracy wholesale between the two world wars. A great deal of scholarly attention has been devoted to the failed interwar democracies, above all those of Germany, Italy, and Spain. But just as much attention should be devoted to the survivors, those countries and peoples who also experienced

economic adversity and struggled with minority integration, yet retained the democratic process. Giovanni Capoccia estimates that some twenty-four European states could be considered democracies in 1920; slightly less than half of those remained democratic by the difficult year of 1939.[65] It seems clear that the greatest single threat to democracy in interwar Europe was Nazi Germany rather than European voters moving en bloc to the radical ends of the political spectrum.

Historians' discussions of democracy generally and interwar democracy specifically would be enriched by efforts to avoid moralizing. Complexity, impurity, internal doubt, and uneven implementation are the norm, not the exception, in democratic practice. Democracy's basic characteristics—universal suffrage, an independent legislature, the extension of civil rights—may not all arrive at the same time, and achieving one element of democracy may affect the rate at which a state arrives at the others.[66] Interwar European democracy's oligarchic elements may have secured democracy by ensuring the support of traditional elites, and by buffering the new democratic system. Undemocratic upper chambers of parliaments (or extra-constitutional alliances among party bosses), clientelism, national governments which elided any real parliamentary opposition—in the end, these anti-democratic devices helped stabilize democracies across Europe.[67] There was, and is, no single democratic norm.

Mark Mazower's influential critique of European democracy is an important one. Democracy is always inherently fragile, prone to attacks from within and requiring vigilant safeguarding on the part of its citizens and leaders. Yet the history of democracy and democratic internationalism in the interwar period is not entirely dark, as this chapter has demonstrated. Karl Mannheim's hopeful formulation might guide our approach to the topic: he argued in 1933 that the rise of the dictators only confirmed democracy's dominance, since the dictators claimed to bring their societies closer to fully expressing society's desires. For Mannheim, democracy had become 'a basic attitude which reaches beyond politics proper and shapes all cultural manifestations of societies of the democratic type'—which, potentially, characterized all of Europe.[68]

Notes

1. Jonathan Israel, *A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), vii–viii.
2. Giovanni Capoccia, *Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe* (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 3–7.
3. Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002); Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). Some intriguing insights on Wilsonian democratic internationalism are to be found in Federico Romero's and Massimo Salvadori's contributions to R. Laurence Moore and Maurizio Vaudagna (eds.), *The American Century in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).

4. David Runciman, *The Confidence Trap: A History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 35.
5. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage, 1998), 5.
6. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, 'Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research', *World Politics*, 49/3 (April 1997), 430–51.
7. Cited in Andrea Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914–1948* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 64.
8. John Davis, *A History of Britain, 1885–1939* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1999), 143.
9. Capoccia, *Defending Democracy*, 23–4.
10. Vaclav Beneš, 'Czechoslovak Democracy and Its Problems, 1918–1920', in Victor Mamatey and Radomir Luža (eds.), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973); Peter Bugge, 'Czech Democracy: Paragon or Parody?', *Bohemia: Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder*, 47/1 (2006–7); Jiří Kunc, *Stranické systémy v re/konstrukci* (Prague: Sociologické nakladatelství, 1999).
11. Anti-government unrest fomented by the anti-Communist group Lapua led to the break-up of the Agrarians into smaller parties in the early 1930s. Alan Siaroff, 'Democratic Breakdown and Democratic Stability: A Comparison of Interwar Estonia and Finland', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 32/1 (March 1999), 103–24; Osmo Jussila, Seppo Hentilä, and Jukka Nevakivi, *From Grand Duchy to Modern State: A Political History of Finland Since 1809* (London: Hurst & Company, 1999).
12. Ross McKibbin, *Classes and Cultures: England 1918–1951* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
13. The work of Helen McCarthy is central. See Helen McCarthy, 'Parties, Voluntary Societies and Democratic Politics in Interwar Britain', *Historical Journal*, 50 (2007), 891–912; Helen McCarthy, *The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism, c. 1918–1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011).
14. T. K. Derry, *A History of Scandinavia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Kazimierz Musial, *Roots of the Scandinavian Model: Images of Progress in the Era of Modernisation* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2000).
15. Sammy Smooha, 'Types of Democracy and Modes of Conflict Management in Ethnically Divided Societies', *Nations and Nationalism*, 8 (2002), 423–31.
16. Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, 'Beyond Dictatorship and Democracy: Rethinking National Minority Inclusion and Regime Type in Interwar Europe', *Comparative Political Studies*, 43/8–9 (2010), 1089–118.
17. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
18. Bugge, 'Czech Democracy', 7 n. 11, 8–9.
19. Nancy Wingfield, *Flag Wars and Stone Saints: How the Bohemian Lands Became Czech* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); on colonization, see the work of Daniel E. Miller, including 'Colonizing the Hungarian and German Border Areas during the Czechoslovak Land Reform, 1918–1938', *Austrian History Yearbook*, 24 (2003), 303–17.
20. Capoccia, *Defending Democracy*, 133–4; Martin Conway and Peter Romijn, 'Belgium and the Netherlands', in Robert Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted Paths: Europe 1914–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 93–4, 99–101; Maurice-Pierre Herremans,

The Language Problem in Belgium (Brussels: Belgian Information and Documentation Institute, 1967).

21. Rod Kedward, *France and the French: A Modern History* (Woodstock and New York: Overlook Press, 2007), 162–3; Michael Burns, *Dreyfus: A Family Affair, 1789–1945* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 431; Nadia Malinovich, *French and Jewish: Culture and the Politics of Identity in Early Twentieth-Century France* (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2008); Vicki Caron, 'The "Jewish Question" from Dreyfus to Vichy', in Martin S. Alexander (ed.), *French History Since Napoleon* (London: Arnold, 1999).
22. Melissa Feinberg, *Elusive Equality: Gender, Citizenship, and the Limits of Democracy in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1950* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006).
23. Davis, *A History of Britain, 1885–1939*, 143.
24. Kedward, *France and the French*, 99–100, 180–1; Paul Smith, *Feminism and the Third Republic: Women's Political and Civil Rights in France, 1918–1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Amanda Vickery (ed.), *Women, Privilege and Power: British Politics, 1750 to the Present* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Caitriona Beaumont, 'The Women's Movement, Politics and Citizenship, 1918s–1950s', in Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (ed.), *Women in Twentieth-Century Britain* (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 262–77.
25. Edward Arnold, *The Development of the Radical Right in France: From Boulanger to Le Pen* (London: Macmillan, 2000); Kedward, *France and the French*, 99–111, 167–83.
26. This party bore no relation to the National Socialist German Workers' Party, or NSDAP/Nazi Party, in neighbouring Germany. T. Mills Kelly, *Without Remorse: Czech Radical Nationalism in Late-Habsburg Austria* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2006); Miloš Trapl, *Political Catholicism and the Czechoslovak People's Party in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1938* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1995); Daniel A. Miller, *Forging Political Compromise: Antonín Švehla and the Czechoslovak Republican Party, 1918–1933* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999); Vladimír V. Dostal, *Agrární strana: Její rozmach a zánik* (Brno: Atlantis, 1998); Zdeněk Karník, *Socialisté na rozcestí: Habsburk, Masaryk či Šmeral* (Prague: Universita Karlová, 1996).
27. Jamie L. Bronstein and Andrew T. Harris, *Empire, State, and Society: Britain Since 1830* (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2012), 169, 174; Davis, *A History of Britain, 1885–1939*, 203–8.
28. Quoted in Martin Ceadel, 'Attitudes to War: Pacifism and Collective Security', in Paul Johnson (ed.), *Twentieth Century Britain: Economic, Social, and Cultural Change* (London and New York: Longman, 1994), 225. Jay Winter's work has been central to Great War memory culture. See *inter alia* J. M. Winter and Antoine Prost (eds.), *The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
29. On poilu culture, see Antoine Prost, *In the Wake of War: Les Anciennes Combattants and French Society* (Providence, RI: Berg, 1992).
30. Maurice Agulhon, *The French Republic 1879–1992* (London: Blackwell, 1993), 191–2.
31. Agulhon, *The French Republic 1879–1992*, 189.
32. Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle*, 84–7; Nancy Wingfield, 'The Battle of Zborov and the Politics of Commemoration in Czechoslovakia', *East European Politics and Societies*, 17/4 (2003), 654–81.
33. Margaret Cook Andersen, *Regeneration Through Empire: French Pronatalists and Colonial Settlement in the Third Republic* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2015); Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa,*

1895–1930 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); Benjamin Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844–1902* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

34. Ross McKibbin, 'Great Britain', in Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted Paths*, 35.
35. That said, one historian has called Eire the only successor state to retain full democracy as its political system by 1939: see Bill Kissane, 'Éamon de Valéra and the Survival of Democracy in Inter-War Ireland', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 42/2 (April 2007), 213–26.
36. Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle*, ch. 2 *passim*.
37. François Perin, *La Démocratie enrayée: Essai sur le régime parlementaire belge de 1918 à 1958* (Brussels: Institut belge de science politique, 1960); Capoccia, *Defending Democracy*, ch. 5 *passim*.
38. Kedward, *France and the French*, 158, 173; Joan Tumblety, 'France', in Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted Paths*, 117, 123–5, 129.
39. Concha Beltran, 'Natural Resources, Electrification and Economic Growth from the Nineteenth Century Through World War II', *Revista de Historia Económica*, 23/1 (2005), 46–79; Francesca Carnevali and Julie-Marie Strange (eds.), Twentieth-Century Britain: Economic, Cultural and Social Change (Harlow: Longman, 2007); W. R. Garside, 'Public Works and Mass Unemployment: Britain's Response in a European Perspective, 1919–1939', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 27 (1987); William Rubinstein, *Twentieth-Century Britain: A Political History* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 110.
40. Mary Hilson, 'Scandinavia', in Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted Paths*, 18–23; Malcolm Hamilton, *Democratic Socialism in Britain and Sweden* (New York: St Martins Press, 1989); Tim Tilton, *The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through the Welfare State to Socialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
41. Tumblety, 'France', 132; Kedward, *France and the French*, 227–8; Agulhon, *The French Republic 1879–1992*, 245.
42. Martin Ceadel, 'Attitudes to War: Pacifism and Collective Security', in Johnson (ed.), *Twentieth Century Britain*, 236.
43. Charles Maier, 'Democracy Since the French Revolution', in John Dunn (ed.), *Democracy: The Unfinished Journey 508 BC to AD 1993* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 137.
44. Arnold, *The Development of the Radical Right in France*.
45. Kopstein and Wittenberg, 'Beyond Dictatorship and Democracy', 21.
46. Mark Cornwall, *The Devil's Wall: The Nationalist Youth Mission of Heinz Rutha* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Capoccia, *Defending Democracy*, 77–107 on the Sudetens, 109ff. on Belgium; Hans Fredrik Dahl, *Quisling: A Study in Treachery* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
47. Kedward, *France and the French*, 230–1.
48. Marie-Renée Mouton, *La Société des Nations et les intérêts de la France (1920–1924)* (Bern and New York: Peter Lang, 1995).
49. McCarthy, *The British People and the League of Nations*.
50. Wingfield, *Flag Wars and Stone Saints*, 151–6; Nancy Meriwether Wingfield, 'Conflicting Constructions of Memory: Attacks on Statues of Joseph II in the Bohemian Lands after the Great War', *Austrian History Yearbook* (1997), 147–71.
51. Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,

2004); Christian Raitz von Frentz, *A Lesson Forgotten: Minority Protection under the League of Nations—The Case of the German Minority in Poland, 1920–1934* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999); Wingfield, *Flag Wars and Stone Saints*.

52. Zara Steiner, *The Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919–1933* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 359, 420–2.
53. Susan Pedersen's wonderful review essay on the League is of great use: see Pedersen, 'Back to the League of Nations', *American Historical Review*, 112/4 (October 2007), 1091–117; Steiner, *The Lights That Failed,* also her *The Triumph of the Dark: European International History, 1933–1939* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); David MacKenzie, *A World Beyond Borders: An Introduction to the History of International Organizations* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010); Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002); Madeleine Herren, *Internationale Organisationen seit 1865: Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliches Buchgesellschaft, 2009).
54. Christoph Kimmich, *Germany and the League of Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); George Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914–1919* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978); Richard Veatch, *Canada and the League of Nations* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975); S. Shepard Jones, *The Scandinavian States and the League of Nations* (1939; repr. New York: Greenwood Press, 1969); Michael Kennedy, *Ireland and the League of Nations, 1919–1946: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Politics* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996).
55. Patricia Clavin, 'Europe and the League of Nations', in Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted Paths*, 325–7, 330–1.
56. Clavin, 'Europe and the League of Nations', 329; Claudena M. Skran, *Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Peter Gattrell, *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia During World War I* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).
57. Clavin, 'Europe and the League of Nations', 333.
58. Clavin, 'Europe and the League of Nations', 340; Paul Weindling (ed.), *International Health Organizations and Movements, 1918–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); William B. McAllister, *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History* (London: Routledge, 2000); Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann (eds.), *Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, c.1880–1950* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Jean-Jacques Renohet, *L'UNESCO oubliée: La Société des Nations et la cooperation intellectuelle (1919–1946)* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999).
59. Quote from Michael D. Callahan, *A Sacred Trust: The League of Nations and Africa, 1929–1946* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), 5; also see Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914–1931* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999); Susan Pedersen, 'Settler Colonialism at the Bar of the League of Nations', in Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (eds.), *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Nadine Meouchy and Peter Sluglett, *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives/Les Mandats français et anglais dans une perspective comparative* (Leiden: Brill, 2004); Ibrahim Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers: Black Zion, Black Slavery, 1914–1940* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

60. Callahan, *A Sacred Trust*, 188–91.
61. Nick Hewlett, *Democracy in Modern France* (London: Continum, 2003), 59.
62. Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
63. Thomas Ertman, 'Democracy and Dictatorship in Interwar Western Europe Revisited', *World Politics*, 50 (April 1998), 475–505.
64. Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1925). Giovanni Capoccia has called it a 'difficult democracy': 'Legislative Responses against Extremism: The "Protection of Democracy" in the First Czechoslovak Republic (1920–1938)', *East European Politics and Societies*, 16 (2002), 691–738.
65. Capoccia, *Defending Democracy*, 7.
66. Daniel Ziblatt, 'How Did Europe Democratize?', *World Politics*, 58 (January 2006), 311–38, this insight at 333.
67. Ziblatt, 'How Did Europe Democratize?', 313.
68. Karl Mannheim, *Collected Works*, Vol. VII: *Essays on the Sociology of Culture* (1956; London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 176.

CHAPTER 14

THE POLITICAL 'LEFT' IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD, 1924–1939

PAMELA RADCLIFF*

In the turbulent interwar period, when duelling ideologies competed for the hearts and minds of Europeans, the political 'Left' was one of the most visible protagonists, with historians continuing to disagree about the role it played in shaping the outcome of the political struggles. Embedded in strong 'moral narratives' about the 'rise of fascism', the 'crisis of democracy', and the nature of the Bolshevik Revolution, the political Left has been vilified or lionized, often depending on how it has been defined.[1] For its harshest critics, the Left led inevitably to Stalinist totalitarianism while for its strongest supporters, it was the source of democratic renewal. Within these larger moral narratives about the battle for European civilization, there are smaller debates about the role of the Left in specific moments, from the revolutionary crisis after the First World War to the anti-fascist mobilization during the war. For the period from the mid-1920s until 1939, both supporters and detractors agree that the Left was on the defensive, internally divided and weakened by the Great Depression and subject to repression by the state, whether democratic, authoritarian, or Stalinist. Acknowledging this defensive position, most agree that the 'Left' was largely ineffective, whether in stabilizing democracies, spreading revolution, or preventing the rise of authoritarian regimes, although they disagree as to why. At the same time, this failure narrative should not subsume the vibrant experimentation and rich diversity of the Left experience, both across the Continent and at local level. From this perspective emerges a portrait of the interwar Left that cannot be contained in any single moral narrative and that previewed many possible futures.

Defining the 'Left'

Any history of the interwar Left must tackle the problem of defining its subject, as distinguished from the 'Centre' and 'Right' of the political spectrum. Even acknowledging

the grey areas of such a spectrum, there is little consensus about the exact demarcation lines. Historically, the modern Left originated in the French Revolution's platform of 'equality, fraternity and liberty', which inspired a variety of movements from liberalism to democracy, socialism, and anarchism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Whereas early nineteenth-century liberals had resided on the left, by the mid- to late nineteenth century they had shifted to the centre, challenged by aristocratic conservatives on the right and democrats, socialists, and anarchists on the left.

During the early twentieth century, the Left is most commonly equated with the 'socialist project', divided after the war between socialists and communists and, in Spain, anarchists. Arguably, the Left could also still include some non-socialist democrats or Left liberals, since democracy was, in most places, a progressive project after the First World War. In fact, the line between the self-defined democratic and socialist Left was porous, with both sides laying claim to the principles of popular inclusion and social justice that went beyond liberal individual civil and political rights, although they disagreed in their attitudes towards the capitalist economic system. Equally fuzzy in this period was the precise border between the extreme Left and Right, exemplified by an overlapping culture of 'social radicalism' in which communists and fascists contended for ownership over traditional left-wing concepts like 'revolution'.[2]

As a result, it is difficult to define a set of common goals and/or strategies that united the Left in opposition to the liberal Centre or the fascist and authoritarian Right. Even if we begin with the French Revolutionary trinity, these three principles existed in an uneasy tension that produced more paradoxes than harmonious unity. Thus, the ideal of 'fraternity' and its association with national sovereignty could not resolve conflicts over inclusion and exclusion based on gender, religious, class, and ethnic or racial identities, especially in their imperial dimension. And the classic trade-off between equality and liberty remains one of the great unresolvable paradoxes in modern democratic theory. How can a society protect the rights of individuals at the same time that it limits their freedoms in the pursuit of greater equality between them? Liberal and social democrats, anarchists, socialists, and communists all disagreed on the proper balance, especially in relation to the economic sphere. At its core, then, the European Enlightenment project left an inherently paradoxical and contradictory legacy which communists, anarchists, socialists, and democrats—and arguably, even fascists—wrestled to come to terms with, devising inevitably imperfect and varied solutions to the 'problem of community life' in twentieth-century mass society.[3]

In terms of operational strategy, the legal interwar Left continued, as before the war, to be divided into reformist and revolutionary wings, based on their willingness to work within the greatly expanded terrain of liberal democratic regimes, but even these were slippery categories.[4] Thus, at various points, communists, socialists, and anarchists moved between reformist and revolutionary strategies, sometimes in defence of their version of democracy and at other times towards a class-based transformation of the social and political order. At the same time, the boundary between reformist and revolutionary was not fixed. Except for the generally small self-defined democratic parties, the other groups on the Left were at best ambiguously or conditionally loyal to the parliamentary system. Thus, for most of them, multi-party democracy was either a temporary

stage en route to future transformation or a structure worth supporting only if they could implement deep social reforms. While critics have blamed the Left's conditional support of democratic legality for undermining regime stability, one could argue that this was more a general feature of interwar politics than a Left deviation. That is, the across-the-board commitment to the procedural 'rules of the game', including the rule of law, the principle of majority rule and loyal opposition, and the rights of the minority—not to mention the application of these to the colonial world—was weak among the biggest parties across the political spectrum. Most of these groups were more committed to a particular vision of the social order than to a system of procedures. Whether the major issue was a weak culture of trust, deep social and economic divisions, or the wide disparities in these visions, the interwar democratic regimes were vulnerable in the face of clashing views about the meaning of democracy.

This vulnerability was exacerbated by the economic crisis that hit Europe in the early 1930s, because it foregrounded the deep divisions, linked implicitly to class constituencies, regarding the relationship between democracy and capitalism. Whereas liberal democrats viewed the two as intimately connected through the principle of individual liberty, socialists, communists, and anarchists viewed them as contradictory through the principle of equality. In more concrete terms, left-wing parties' commitment to democratic legality was increasingly contingent on their ability to implement reforms that would either regulate capitalism in the short run or even dismantle pieces of it with partial nationalization. Disagreement over economic policy was one of the major sources of political polarization and parliamentary impasse in the democratic regimes of the 1930s, including within the broad Popular Front coalition governments in France and Spain. Only in Sweden were a majority of Socialists fully willing to accept a permanent truce between capitalism and democracy in return for redistributive policies, a bargain that would become the pillar of European welfare states after the Second World War and consolidate the long transition from what we might call socialist democracy to social democracy, which included the shift from explicitly class-based to cross-class politics.

Clashing views on the meaning of democracy make it difficult to identify clear heroes and villains for the moral narratives of the period. Since 1989, heroes tend to be associated with the defence and pursuit of democracy, but scholars share the same clashing views about democracy as did contemporaries. Thus, for François Furet, communism, socialism, and fascism were collectivist ideologies united against a democracy that he views as inherently liberal: that is, a society composed of autonomous and equal individuals.[5] On the other hand, for Geoff Eley, socialists were the pre-eminent democrats, with true democracy uncoupled from the exploitative capitalist system.[6] Critics of liberal democracy argue that the boundary between liberalism and fascism was unclear, as, in practice, both types of regimes pursued imperialism, excluded minorities, and repressed leftist dissidents with militarized police forces. Critics of socialist democracy argue that, in practice, the 'transformational politics' pursued by the Left inevitably led to the totalitarian terror epitomized by Stalinism or Nazism. For these critics, the potential totalitarian terror united revolutionary Left and Right, leaving liberals as the defenders of democracy. In fact, the ideological couplings were not so neat, neither socialist

democracy v. liberalism and fascism nor liberal democracy v. communism/socialism and fascism. In reality, the struggle was as much among and between democrats as it was against communism or fascism, and this lack of consensus made the fledgling democratic states more vulnerable to attack. At the same time, one could argue that it was precisely the constellation of all these movements together that created the conditions, not so much for the revival of democracy after the war in much of western Europe, as for its reinvention.

In the interwar period, there is no question that the divisions among would-be democrats, as well as the shifting boundary between the reformist and revolutionary Left, undermined the stability of democratic regimes. In the Spanish Republic of the 1930s, the disagreement over social reforms between the Socialist and Left democratic parties, on the one hand, and the liberal Radical Party on the other, helped prevent the formation of a stable democratic majority and fed the revolutionary extremes on both sides of the spectrum. Likewise, when Communists and Socialists came together in the French Popular Front, they could not hold the coalition together because of the economic differences with the liberal Radical Party. Underlying these divisions was the sociological reality of a class-segregated society which still powerfully shaped political constituencies, although not in a deterministic fashion. In general, the growing paralysis of democratic regimes, often generated by the divisions between liberal and socialist democrats, spurred defections from the reformist to the revolutionary Right and Left. On the Left, the claims of reformist socialists to pursue social, political, and economic inclusion of the masses through the existing democratic systems were weakened by such paralysis. The failure of majoritarian politics to achieve these egalitarian goals increased the attraction of anarchist and communist groups, as well as fascists, who spoke a language of working-class empowerment through insurrectionary and, if necessary, minoritarian direct action.

While such divisions and defections were damaging for democratic stability, it is unfair to place the weight of blame for the crisis of democracy on the 'Left'. For the socialist Left, the only democracy worth defending was one with a social content and it is frankly ahistorical to have expected them to defend a more limited procedural definition of democracy as defined by the liberals. Moreover, it was as much the struggle between the democratic Centre and Left to define the parameters of democracy as it was the defections of the revolutionary Left that made it difficult for democracy to consolidate. While it is true that in Austria and in Germany before the Nazi seizure of power, the divided Communist and Socialist Left could not band together against the Nazis, even when the Left was able to form broad coalitions of 'popular fronts', the unity was usually not enough to save democracy. Conservative defections from democratic legality, bolstered by military or paramilitary force, often proved decisive in overthrowing democratic regimes.

No discussion of the interwar Left would be complete without situating the huge anomalous case of the one European country in which the revolutionary Left had come to power with great fanfare in 1917. While the Bolshevik Revolution cast a long shadow over the history of the Left in the rest of Europe, especially through the arm of the

Comintern, the fate of the 'socialist project' itself ultimately lay in the Soviet Union and, in this period, with the Stalinist version of it. There is no question that the Soviet project belongs to the history of the interwar Left. Early Bolshevik leaders traced their heritage to the French revolutionary Left and promised, in the March 1919 programme, a 'higher type of democracy' that would be based in radically decentralized worker and peasant communes. The fact that these promises devolved into one of the most oppressive centralized states in the twentieth century, however, leaves the larger issue of the relationship between the USSR and the Left unresolved. Did Stalin 'betray' communism, as Leon Trotsky famously charged, or was Stalinism the logical fulfilment of a totalitarian collectivist ideology, as American Cold War pundits maintained?

More nuanced than these monolithic positions is the recognition that the 'socialist project' in the Soviet Union was as fragmented and contested as it was elsewhere, with conflicts over competing revolutionary agendas and contrasting visions of socialism as a defining characteristic of the first decade of the regime.[7] Furthermore, the implementation of any of these visions was deeply constrained by the cultural, economic, and social conditions of the country, the exigencies of civil war, and the resistance of various groups. At the same time, it is possible to view the contingent path of the Soviet 'socialist experiment' as one (particularly horrifying) articulation of the inherent contradictions in the French Revolutionary legacy, as played out in a specific historical context. From this perspective, the—in many ways unique—case of the Soviet Union can be integrated into a broader narrative of the interwar Left, defined not so much by 'failure' as by its diverse and contradictory responses to the major challenges of a European civilization in transition.

Mapping the Left: The Socialists

Within this broad picture of a fluid and divided Left, each of the main groups faced their own internal struggles and contradictions that varied depending on the specific context. The largest and most important group, especially in national politics across the Continent, were the socialists. In many of the new post-war democracies, socialist parties played key roles in securing broader democratic gains—including labour laws, welfare measures, women's suffrage, and union rights—and constituted the core of the democratic Left in many of them.[8] Socialist democratic reformism was strongest among what Geoff Eley calls the 'social democratic northern core', which included Germany, Austria, and the Scandinavian countries. In these countries, socialist parties were able to build on pre-war traditions and an entrenched culture of working within the parliamentary system. In other countries with strong parliamentary traditions, like France, Britain, Switzerland, and the Low Countries, the socialist Left emerged from the war as a newly legitimate player, able to 'renegotiate the social contract', even though conservative parties often took the lead. Socialists joined governments, if sometimes briefly, in Britain, Belgium, Germany, France, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Spain.

But the socialist democratic Left was also strong in new eastern European democracies in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and western Ukraine, and later in Spain.

However, many of these democracies fell victim to authoritarian coups, beginning with Poland in 1926 and culminating with Greece in 1936, followed by the collapse of Spanish and Czech democracies in 1939, leaving only Britain, France, the Low Countries, and Scandinavia with intact democracies at the outbreak of the Second World War. What role did the socialist parties play in these crises?

On a basic level, it was clear that the rising power of socialist parties, which had definitively broken through their pre-1914 marginalized status in European politics, threatened conservative political and economic interests and made the latter less likely to believe they could protect those interests in the political marketplace of multi-party democracy. Thus, socialists were pushing for a version of democracy that involved significant redistribution of wealth and power, and they openly claimed to be working towards dismantling the capitalist economy. Indeed, the majority socialist position outside Scandinavia, including in the British Labour Party, rejected the full version of John Maynard Keynes's blueprint for economic recovery from the depression because it was designed to save capitalism, not overthrow it. In addition to frightening conservatives, the goal of demolishing or even neutering capitalism was viewed by liberal democrats as a threat to liberty.

But it wasn't just the socialists' indirect impact on liberals and conservatives that affected democratic consolidation. Despite their willingness to work within the parliamentary system, most socialists were still ambivalently committed to a pluralist, non-class-based political framework and still looked forward to a future when the working class would be 'in the saddle', to borrow George Orwell's famous description of Barcelona at the outset of the Spanish Civil War.[9] Until that time, socialists were most committed to injecting as much social content into the existing democracies as they could. The problem was that they did not hold absolute majorities, at least in part because of their difficulty in attracting votes beyond their working-class core, which meant that they either had to compromise and build coalitions with other non-socialist parties or pursue a more confrontational strategy, which could push the boundaries of legality.[10]

The socialists' response to this conundrum varied depending on the context and their position in the political mix. During the relative economic prosperity and stability of the mid-1920s, socialists were often able to pass significant social legislation with the at least passive support of other parties, but when the economic crisis hit they were often left alone among democratic parties defending expensive welfare programmes, or 'economic democracy' as the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) called it. The budget-balancing orthodoxy of liberal economic policy, which was adopted by most democratic governments in the early 1930s, undermined many socialists' faith in the democratic system as a mechanism for implementing their short-term reforms and eroded their grass-roots support. Not surprisingly, one consequence of this erosion was the swelling ranks of communist parties, which had generally shrunk during the relatively stable 1920s. But the socialists were also left alone because, on the one hand, they often

resisted the compromises required to formally ally with what they called 'bourgeois' parties, and on the other hand, the communist parties treated them as enemies before the latter changed course with the popular front. In this sense, the problematic nature of coalition-building for socialists in the early 1930s contributed to the fragmentation of democratic politics even when they formally defended constitutional legality. An exception to this pattern was the Czech case, in which a five-party ruling coalition, led by the conservative Agrarians but including the two Czech Socialist parties, was able to hold together through the mid-1930s, cemented by the shared threat of Nazi-supported secessionism in the German Sudetenland.

The other option for the socialists would have been an insurrectionary path of taking control of the state and implementing their economic revolution. A long-standing leftist critique of the socialists has suggested that there was a missed opportunity to create a radical anti-capitalist democratic alternative that carved out a space between liberalism and Bolshevism. Whether or not there were missed opportunities, the socialists tended to send mixed messages but rarely ever took the step of planning and implementing a revolution, even during the peak of their mobilizing power after the First World War. In that period, the classic case of mixed messages came from the Italian Socialist Party, which maintained a confrontational mobilizing rhetoric that fired up local activists in Socialist strongholds to believe the revolution was imminent. Although national Socialist leaders concluded they didn't have the resources to mount a full insurrection, the picture looked different at local level in places like Ferrara where, as Paul Corner's classic study demonstrated, Socialists seemed to be 'in the saddle', dominating the local government, the public sphere, and the local labour market.[11] It was, of course, this kind of apparently revolutionary situation at local level that fed support for paramilitary Fascist squads, which made their reputation busting local Socialist unions' labour monopoly. While the Italian Socialists have been blamed by some for dithering in the face of revolutionary momentum and by others for not being fully committed to the democratic regime, another perspective would be to simply acknowledge their conundrum. That is, it was precisely the unresolved tension between these two poles that defined the Socialists' contradictory position in interwar democracy.

A decade later, the Spanish Socialist Party faced another version of the conundrum. It was the largest party in a democratic coalition government in 1931 that sought to implement an ambitious series of social reforms, including labour legislation and land redistribution. But three years later, frustrated by having been voted out of power in the 1933 election and facing the eradication or dilution of many of their reforms, the Socialists opted to stage an insurrection to regain control of the direction of the democratic regime. No one would dispute that the revolution was a strategic failure, taken up only in a few places, especially the deeply mobilized mining region of Asturias, where local militias held out for over a week before they were crushed by the army. But for defenders of the Socialists, the revolution was an understandable attack on a conservative government leaning towards fascism, while for critics, it was the ultimate proof of their lack of commitment to democratic legality and thus to the Republic itself. Once again, to critique the Socialists for not coming down on one side or the other of this

dilemma is to miss the central reality of what precisely was unresolvable in interwar socialist democracy.

At about the same time, the Belgian Socialist Party tried to chart a different course through the dilemma. In late 1933, the Belgian Socialists adopted the Plan de Man, a proposal for the radical restructuring of capitalism to be carried out by the democratic state. While a minority in the party supported an insurrectionary path to implementation, the majority narrowly defeated a proposed general strike and voted to pursue a constitutional path, building a governing majority that would fully implement the Plan. But with 37 per cent of the vote, the Socialists were faced with the choice of a coalition government with Christian Democrats who only promised to implement minor pieces of the Plan. The Socialists joined the coalition government in March 1935, and, as the dissident left wing had predicted, the Plan was effectively shelved.[12]

The socialist dilemma was not so starkly apparent in cases where conservative parties and employer groups were willing to be negotiating partners in social reform projects. In these cases, notably Britain, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries, the parameters of the welfare state settlement after the Second World War were already emerging through institutionalized negotiation between labour and management, brokered by the state. But it was in Sweden that the full social democratic model took shape in the interwar period, under the leadership of the Socialists but with the active cooperation of employers. In their 1932 Congress, the Swedish Socialists were the first to formally revoke the class struggle and the promise of future revolution and accept the permanent task of managing capitalism within a democratic system. With this 'people's party' platform, they won 41.7 per cent of the vote in the election that year, and built a majority coalition with the small Farmers' Party, offering them protectionist measures in return for support of a Keynesian plan to stimulate the economy and extensive welfare legislation.[13] Whether or not one views the full transition to social democracy as a positive step for European socialism, there is no question that it would have been unimaginable without conservative partners willing to accept deep social reforms. Likewise, it would have been unimaginable that conservative parties accept social reforms if these socialist parties had not agreed to end their principled opposition to private property and business. In other European democracies, including Spain in the 1930s, employers' groups resisted reforms tooth and nail, setting up an adversarial relationship that did not meet the minimum requirements for socialists to imagine a functional social democracy.

Beneath the level of national coalitions and grand strategies, the tensions and contradictions of interwar socialism seeped into the everyday lives of its members at local level, especially in socialist strongholds. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, but expanded and strengthened in the interwar period, was the phenomenon of municipal socialism, in which local communities, neighbourhoods, and even cities with socialist governments or councils sought to build the foundations of the future socialist order in the shadows of a capitalist economy and national governments in which workers were not 'in the saddle'. In the class-segregated urban geography of European cities and towns, socialists could set up almost enclosed political, social, and cultural worlds, a 'cradle to grave' experience that enveloped working-class members in a horizontal

community of equals set apart from the hierarchies of the larger society. In addition to the trade unions that advocated better wages and conditions in the workplace, there was a thick web of clubs and associations, from singing groups to sporting clubs to chess leagues, in which workers could spend their leisure time further cementing their communal bonds and the attendant values of mutuality and fraternity. Thus, these clubs were supposed to challenge the individualist competition of the mainstream culture and inculcate the alternative value system into workers' psyches. The political dimension of municipal socialism was anchored by socialist-dominated city councils, which used their resources to increase the delivery of public services to their working-class constituents, from public housing projects and transportation to public health and education.

The most impressive example of municipal socialism in the interwar period was Vienna.[14] With an absolute majority on the city council and twenty-one subdistricts, the Socialist Party embarked on an ambitious programme to transform the physical and cultural landscape of over 1 million inhabitants to express its own collectivist and egalitarian values. The core of the plan was a massive public housing project, financed by a luxury tax, which resulted in 64,000 new apartments subsidized at 5 per cent of a worker's wages. In addition to meeting material needs, the new apartment complexes were also supposed to 'anticipate' the collectivist values of the future socialist society. That is, they were constructed with significant common spaces, from laundry to public meeting rooms to childcare centres and cooperative stores, with parks, playgrounds, and schools in the vicinity. In addition, the Viennese Socialist Party organized the full gambit of public services and recreational clubs, communalizing everything from stamp collecting to rabbit breeding.

The 'anticipatory' nature of municipal socialism was reinforced by an ideological framework that reminded workers that they were not just improving their lives today but planning for the future. Thus, the Austrian Socialist Party's 1926 Linz Programme articulated the revolutionary intention to seize power for the working class. Towards this end, the party operated its own private militia, which was larger than the official army. In more visually accessible terms, the inauguration of a new stadium in Vienna in 1931 featured a mass spectacle showing workers toppling a huge head representing capitalism in a dramatic representation of the revolution.

There has been a long and vigorous debate in labour history about the efficacy of these local socialist cultures in creating what Antonio Gramsci called a 'counter-hegemonic' challenge capable of dislodging the dominant power structure. In other words, how much did they really unsettle the moorings of the existing hierarchical society as opposed to creating protected bubbles that were merely insulated—temporarily—from that society? The fact that many of the great municipal socialist projects, from Italy in 1919–21 to Vienna, Berlin, and other German cities in the 1920s and early 1930s, collapsed quickly in the face of authoritarian repression, seems to support the more pessimistic reading. That is, municipal socialism was unable to challenge the fundamental power relations of the larger society, and what must have appeared to workers on the ground level as being 'in the saddle' was more spectacle than substance.

Beyond this classic debate, the dilemmas of municipal socialism also illustrated the tensions in the relationship of the interwar socialist project with the existing democratic states. Thus, the mixed messages at the national level surfaced in everyday life in the very concept of an 'anticipatory' culture that was constructed within the institutional framework of parliamentary democracy but aimed towards a future post-revolutionary society. At the same time, however anticipatory it was intended to be, it continued to be rooted in many of the hierarchies of the current society. In particular, as feminist historians have pointed out, this socialist culture was infused with an unacknowledged masculinism that didn't begin to address the most fundamental gender hierarchies inside the working-class home. Thus, even though some women did find a place within the socialist movement, there remained a strong tension between the theoretical goals of gender equality and the traditional 'separate spheres' notion of gender roles.[15] In more general terms, socialists were not really more successful than other democrats at resolving what Eley calls the 'countervailing logics of unity and difference' based on race and ethnicity, as well as gender.[16] Without arguing that communitarian goals lead inevitably to totalitarianism, it is possible to acknowledge, once again, the unresolvable tension between the principles of equality and liberty, inclusion and exclusion, in the project of empowering the working class.

Even within those enclosed working-class communities, there were tensions over the unitary and collectivist goals. In some places, socialists had to battle with communists or anarchists, each of which claimed to represent the unitary interests of the working-class community. As Pamela Swett argues in a local study of Socialist and Communist jockeying for power in interwar Berlin, the intimacy of community life could foster intra-working-class violence as well as solidarity, especially in moments of crisis, exemplified by the Depression.[17] Often the violence emerged from the efforts of the minoritarian insurgent group, in this case, the Communists, to capture physical and cultural space from the dominant group. In the Spanish Republic of the 1930s, working-class communities were often divided into Socialist and anarchist strongholds, but uneasy coexistence could spark violence, often in neighbourhoods, bars, or cultural organizations associated with one or other group.[18]

But even these subgroups could not always keep their rank and file united around a common vision of the working-class community. The tension between individuals pursuing their selfish or familial interests and the socialists' collectivist visions could produce both passive rebellion from the rank and file as well as disciplinary measures from the leadership. Without adopting the liberal position that collectivism violated the 'natural' individualism of workers, it is possible to acknowledge the tensions between individual life projects and collective utopias. Thus, for example, in Vienna the Socialist leaders shut down an alternative worker-supported housing project based on single family homes in favour of their massive communitarian blocs. And, in Barcelona, where Orwell saw workers 'in the saddle', Michael Seidman's classic study argues that ordinary workers could be resistant to the personal sacrifices required to fulfil leaders' productivist goals.[19] In sum, the unresolved tensions in interwar socialism extended from the highest levels of national politics to rhythms of everyday life.

Mapping the Left: The Anarchists

Compared to the socialist parties, the anarchist movement played a much more circumscribed role in the interwar Left. While anarchism or revolutionary syndicalism had been found in a variety of countries in late nineteenth-century Europe, especially France, Russia, Italy, and Switzerland, after the crisis following the First World War it remained an explicit protagonist of the European Left only in Spain, although syndicalist currents remained in many trade union movements. Nevertheless, the crucial role that the movement played in the drama of the Spanish Republic and Civil War, as well as the way it exemplified some of the broader issues facing the interwar revolutionary Left, make anarchism more than a quaint anachronism in the period. Emphatically not a political party, the anarchist movement was distinguished from socialism and communism by its refusal to participate directly in parliamentary politics and its embrace of direct-action politics of the street and the workplace. In the early twentieth century, the anarchist movement incorporated syndicalist organization, in which trade unions were supposed to lead the revolution through a general strike and then form the nuclei of a new stateless society. In Spain, the anarcho-syndicalist federation, the CNT, was formed in 1910, but grew dramatically during the post-war period, withered during the dictatorship of the 1920s, and blossomed again in the early 1930s.

There has been much debate about why this anti-political movement continued to thrive in Spain through the democratic republic of the 1930s, but in basic terms it occupied the position of the modern revolutionary Left in Spain. A classic historiography influenced by Eric Hobsbawm's famous depiction of Spanish anarchists as 'primitive rebels' categorized them as products of Spain's economic backwardness.[20] Current historiography views them as a branch of modern politics, as much a child of the Enlightenment as was liberalism. Like the revolutionary Left across Europe, the CNT critiqued the parliamentary Socialists as wishy-washy and capitalized on the impasse in parliamentary politics with their calls for direct action and insurrection. If the Socialists walked the tightrope of getting enough reformist legislation passed to satisfy their constituency, the anarchists, like others on the revolutionary Left, fed on the disillusionment with piecemeal progress. Depending on one's perspective, the CNT, like other revolutionary groups, was either a barometer of the limits of democratic reform politics or an extremist spoiler that made it impossible for the democratic regime to consolidate.

Nevertheless, in practice, the anarchist position was more flexible and heterogeneous than either of these monolithic interpretations. In general, the movement maintained 'two faces': the face of mass mobilizing in the public sphere and the face of conspiratorial violence by underground cells. When civil liberties and a reasonably democratic state allowed it, the public face was foregrounded, but when the state relied on violence and repression to crush left-wing dissidents, the other face fed the cycle of violence. From the outset of the Spanish Republic, there was an ongoing debate within the CNT between a more reformist wing that wanted to work towards strengthening the organization and achieving short-term aims and a revolutionary wing which rejected all collaboration

with the democratic regime. Historians continue to argue about why the initially more reformist majority increasingly lost ground to the insurrectionist wing over the course of the Republic. On the one side are those who argue that the CNT's revolutionary ideology could never have peacefully coexisted with a democratic regime, while on the other side are those who place more blame on the Republic's pro-Socialist bias and militarized repression for drawing the CNT into a destructive insurrectionary cycle.[21]

Once again, the movement's heterogeneity defies definitive conclusions. In addition to the ideological divisions, anarchism was differentiated, much more than the other left-wing movements, as a result of its extreme localism and weak national sinews. As such, local anarchist movements often grew distinctively out of local contexts rather than predetermined moulds. Thus, in the city of Gijon, the CNT openly supported democratic republican parties in a collaborative relationship that lasted into the civil period, while in Catalonia, there was an unstable populist alliance between left-wing Catalanist republicans and the CNT.[22] At the local level, anarchists and democratic republicans could often more successfully share political space than could anarchists and Socialists, who were directly competing for worker membership and control of the labour market. At the same time, the anarchist and Socialist organizations were often functionally equivalent in their local strongholds, building community ties and struggling to improve the conditions of life in working-class neighbourhoods and towns. What made 'municipal anarchism' different from its socialist counterpart was that, during the peacetime Republic, anarchists did not directly control city or district councils.

The Civil War (1936–9), however, opened a new phase in municipal anarchism. The collapse of the republican state in July of 1936 temporarily devolved power to the local level, the fulcrum of anarchist power. As local studies have explored, anarchists, sometimes in collaboration with other groups, formed revolutionary governing councils that undertook the challenge of transforming hierarchical bourgeois cities into communal egalitarian spaces, collectivizing farms and businesses, and, at the same time, contributing to the military defence of the Republic with local militias. The balance between enthusiasm and coercion in these local social revolutions varied significantly, often depending on the pre-existing depth of anarchist support in the locale. At the level of national politics, the CNT's collaboration with the regime culminated when three anarchist ministers accepted posts in the republican government in 1937.

Nevertheless, the increased formal political participation of the CNT during the Civil War did not really fill the 'institutional vacuum' at the heart of the CNT project, whose power remained dispersed and uncoordinated.[23] The practical consequences for both the CNT and its revolutionary project were devastating. In the internecine struggle between Republicans, Socialists, anarchists, and a growing Communist party to take control of the Republican military and political apparatus, the CNT organization crumbled. Likewise, the social revolution unleashed in the first few months dissolved under pressure from a consolidating central government that wanted to rein in the CNT and focus all energies on the war effort. Whether the social revolution was undermining the war effort or not, the relative ease of its dismantling demonstrated the fragile foundations of a localized revolutionary process. In this sense, not unlike previous experiments

in municipal socialism, from Ferrara to Vienna, the view from the local level gave participants the false impression that workers were really 'in the saddle'.

Mapping the Left: The Communists

Outside Spain, the main force on the revolutionary Left in interwar Europe was the Communist Party, which had branches in virtually every European country as well as Asia, Africa, and North America. If the anarchists struggled to transform local power into a broader coherent political force, the communists outside the USSR suffered from a top-down structure in the form of the Communist International, or Comintern (1919–43), that limited the flexibility and responsiveness not only of local but of national communist parties. After a promising start in the immediate post-war mobilization, the interwar years marked perhaps the low point of communist influence in Europe. But even so, the communist movement was not a monolithic or static force in this period. Thus, there was some room for local and national variation, even within the confines of Comintern policy, as various local studies have demonstrated.[24] In addition to the national/international gap, the communist movement also shifted its stance along the revolutionary/reformist divide, illustrating once again that this line was permeable. From supporting insurrectionary opposition to democratic regimes in the 1920s and early 1930s, the communist parties moved towards what became formalized as the 'popular front' in June 1935, an interclass alliance that sought to unify the anti-fascist forces within democratic regimes.

The insurrectionary stance took shape during the revolutionary crisis of the post-war years. In the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, communism had emerged as a fresh new face on the Left, offering the promise of transformation, in the face of what many leftists, especially of the younger generation, felt were overly reformist socialist parties. In France, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Italy, significant chunks of the labour movement split off from the socialist parties to form new communist parties, while in Greece the recently formed Socialist Labour Party voted unanimously to transform itself into the Communist Party of Greece. In Norway and Bulgaria, Communists attracted relatively mass support, although the party remained marginal in Britain, Ireland, the Low Countries, Iberia, Denmark, most of eastern Europe, and Sweden.[25]

After the last post-war Communist revolts were crushed in Bulgaria and Germany in 1923 and Estonia in 1924, however, the movement entered a completely new era, weakened by illegalization in much of eastern Europe and the growing tension between a Bolshevik-controlled Comintern and party organizations trying to operate in specific local and national contexts. Historians are virtually unanimous in their judgement that the Comintern policies that prioritized Soviet goals, induced widespread purges, vilified other leftists, and imposed unwavering obedience had a negative impact on the interwar Left. In the 1928 Congress, the Comintern confirmed the goal of immediate revolution in the face of all enemies, including the socialists, who were labelled 'social fascists' for

their legalistic loyalty to 'bourgeois' democracies. The most direct negative impact of the intra-left schism was that it smoothed (although did not construct) the road to power for fascists in Germany and Austria, as it had in Italy in the early 1920s when the schism first opened. Moreover, the communist parties themselves suffered from the toxic atmosphere, which resulted in massive defections and electoral losses throughout the 1920s. Thus, even in cases like Greece where there was no rival socialist party, the combination of internal leadership crises and ideological rigidity kept the Communist Party on the margins of power. The depression signalled a resurgence of communist fortunes, as frustration with the reformist Left's economic impotence revived the revolutionary alternative, especially among younger and unemployed workers. At first, however, this revival only intensified the intra-leftist struggle for power, reflected on the community level in the kind of turf warfare described in Swett's analysis of Berlin in the years before the Nazi seizure of power.

It was not until the dramatic defeats of the 'Left' in Germany and Austria in 1933–4 that the Comintern abandoned its sectarian strategy and pursued a broad political alliance that sought to unite democrats, socialists, anarchists, and communists against the threat of fascism. Prefigured in the (successful) Communist and Socialist collaboration in the French general strike of 1934 and in the (unsuccessful) Asturian uprising in Spain in the same year, the Comintern officially embraced the popular front, although it was goaded as much by new Soviet security calculations as by the pressure from below. While the shift to the popular front was an important change of course, the new strategy only reached its full potential in wartime alliances. Thus, although the anti-fascist popular front increased support for the communist parties in the remaining democracies in the mid-1930s, and Popular Front governments even came to power briefly in France and Spain (February–July 1936) and (nearly) in Greece in 1936,[26] it was during the Spanish Civil War and especially the Second World War that Communists capitalized on the popular front strategy with their visible role in resistance movements. Thus, in Spain in 1936–9, and then in Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, and Czechoslovakia in 1943–5, the Communist parties became leading forces through their domination of the armed resistance, while in Italy and France, they supplanted the Socialists as the major working-class party.[27]

During the interwar period, however, the meaning of the popular front in the history of the 'Left' is ambiguous and contested. In terms of impact, the pre-war popular front had few successes in the war against fascist and authoritarian counter-revolution, which feeds the general 'failure' narrative about the Left, but also suggests that the previous division on the Left was not the crucial enabling condition for fascism. The division that remained front and centre in the popular front was that between liberal and socialist democrats, which undermined consolidation from the outset. This split was also implicit in the French Popular Front's refusal to supply its Spanish counterpart with military and other aid during the Civil War, which demonstrated a lack of functional international solidarity in the anti-fascist front of the 1930s.

More debated than the obvious inability of the popular front in the mid-1930s to 'save democracy' is its place in the history of communism. For its defenders, the popular front

opened the path of collaboration between communism and democracy that culminated with the USSR's entry into the Second World War and that was decisive in the defeat of fascism. For detractors, the communist embrace of the popular front was no more than a strategic move to dominate the Left while preparing the 'armed insurrection for the dictatorship of the proletariat', in the words of French Communist leader Maurice Thorez.[28] For the 1930s, this debate centres on Spain, and specifically on the role of the Communist Party (PCE), which only became an important player during the Civil War. Since George Orwell wrote his critical account of the Communists in *Homage to Catalonia*, debate has continued over whether they were the great defenders of Spanish democracy or its ruthless opponents. From one perspective, the Communist Party held together an interclass democratic alliance under challenging conditions, while from the other perspective, they employed terror and intimidation to crush their putative allies in the wartime Popular Front.[29] Hanging over this debate is the question of how much the PCE was responsible for its own actions or a pawn in Machiavellian Soviet scheming.[30] The Civil War ended before the Nazi–Soviet non-aggression pact in August 1939 would have put the PCE to the ultimate test of loyalty. In any case, the debate over the Spanish Communist Party's role in the wartime republic epitomizes the broader disagreement on the significance of the popular front in the history of interwar communism and the latter's place in the grand moral narratives about the period. At the least, the popular front was yet another product of the contradictory terrain on which the interwar Left operated.

Beneath these national contexts, it is at local level that, once again, we can see the impact of the contradictory impulses of interwar communism on the everyday life of militants. Local studies of 'municipal communism', or 'little Moscows' as they were known in Britain, illustrate the complex space in which party branches negotiated the gap between orders from above and local conditions.[31] Thus, in terms of everyday practice, communist-led local communities tended to function along the classic lines of municipal socialism. That is, they rooted themselves in dense neighbourhood networks and associations that offered workers an alternative culture of inclusion and used the resources of local governments to expand social services and urban infrastructure. In the French municipality of Ivry-sur-Seine, for example, by the mid-1930s, after a decade of Communist rule the party could claim credit for public housing projects for 5,000 residents, new medical clinics and bathhouses in each neighbourhood, a public garden and sports facilities, in addition to general urban improvements like roads and electrification.[32] Beyond the classic 'red belt' worker suburbs, Communists also built rural enclaves, attracting a heterogeneous mix of peasants, artisans, sharecroppers, and tenant farmers. Paradoxically, the indifference of national Communist leaders to the countryside created even greater autonomy for local leaders to tailor their message to local needs. Party cells also served as new sites of sociability in villages, organizing dances, festivals, and civil marriages to fill the gap left by the decline of traditional leisure activities.[33] Nevertheless, local Communist politics remained constrained within the straitjacket of Comintern policies and the unresolvable tensions they created on the ground. For those operating the Communist children's summer camps in Ivry-sur-Seine, the

tension between instilling a spirit of discipline and obedience on the one hand, and giving working-class children the opportunity for unstructured free play on the other, perfectly summed up the contradictions of municipal communism.

Nowhere were the contradictions—and diversity—of interwar communism more on display than in the self-proclaimed Communist state in the USSR. From the outset, competing visions of the promised 'higher form of democracy' sparked vigorous public debates that lasted into the late 1920s. Did socialism require centralized state control of industry and agriculture or decentralized peasant and worker management of production? Was liberation achieved through a productivist 'socialism of abundance' that transcended scarcity and poverty, or through grass-roots control of decision-making vis-à-vis the means of production? From the outset, the Bolshevik state quickly headed down the path of centralization and productivism as a result of a combination of factors, most prominently the civil war.[34] At the same time, groups of both peasants and workers defended, implicitly or explicitly, alternative revolutionary visions. Thus, numerous peasant uprisings, first in opposition to requisitioning and culminating in massive resistance to state collectivization in the early 1930s, promoted a revolutionary agenda rooted in local control of land, administration, and agriculture. Framed by the Bolsheviks as 'counter-revolutionary', peasants fought not for the return of aristocratic landlords, but at least in part in defence of the contingent gains of the 1917 Revolution, which devolved distribution and land use to local peasant communes. Likewise, worker strikes in the early 1920s advocated worker management in industry, while the famous Kronstadt rebellion, launched by sailors in March 1921, supported worker management and democratic soviets against the 'dictatorship of the Communist Party'. In repressing these alternative visions and defending its own evolving blueprint for socialism, the Bolshevik state's reliance on violent implementation increased exponentially and culminated under Stalin, although the regime earned many earnest followers through a combination of propaganda, privileges, and rewards.

Conclusion

So how does the trajectory of the Bolshevik Revolution complete the larger narrative of the interwar Left? The Stalinist state that emerged at the end of this process implemented some version of a communist revolutionary agenda, but the exact extent of overlap between Stalinism and communism, or between Stalinism and the revolutionary 'Left', brings us back to the grand moral narratives that situate the 'Left' on the side of either progress or barbarism in twentieth-century European history. What this chapter has tried to suggest, however, is that the heterogeneous and contradictory nature of the 'Left' defies such classification. Rooted in the unresolvable tensions of the Enlightenment project and the specific challenges of the interwar period, the 'Left' could not mount a coherent response to the 'challenge of community life' in a democratizing society. On one level, this conclusion does not disrupt the classic 'failure' narrative of an interwar

Left that could neither 'save' democracy nor unleash an authentic socialist revolution. But on another level, it pushes us to acknowledge that the lack of coherence was a structural feature that extended across a political spectrum characterized more by experimentation than by clear 'rules of the game'. Rather than a clear tripartite battle between the 'Left', democracy, and fascism, the political arena exhibited shifting boundaries as well as struggles over the ownership of the classic Enlightenment principles of 'modern' politics. The hegemonic vision of democracy that emerged out of this struggle would have been unimaginable without the searching and probing voice of the interwar 'Left', in all its messy inconsistency.

Notes

* I would like to thank Frank Biess, Tim Rees, Robert Edelman, and Nick Doumanis for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.

1. See Charles Maier's discussion of 'moral narratives' in 'Consigning the 20th Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era', *American Historical Review* (June 2000), 807–31.
2. The term is utilized by Timothy S. Brown, in *Weimar Radicals: Nazis and Communists Between Authenticity and Performance* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 4, borrowed from philosopher Helmuth Plessner.
3. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Knopf, 1998), xv, citing Raymond Aron.
4. Not addressed here is the ever-growing group of countries in which the 'Left' turned to clandestine operations following authoritarian or fascist coups.
5. François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
6. Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
7. This point is succinctly articulated in William Chase, 'The Socialist Experiment', in Gordon Martel (ed.), *A Companion to Europe, 1900–1945* (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 2006).
8. This is a core argument of Geoff Eley's monumental history of the Left, *Forging Democracy.*
9. This ambivalence is highlighted in Sheri Berman, *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's 20th Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), especially ch. 5.
10. The peak electoral support of some of the major socialist parties in western European democracies were: Germany 30 per cent (1928), Austria 41 per cent (1933), France 20.5 per cent (1932), Belgium 37 per cent (1932), Spain 24 per cent (1931): Gerd-Rainer Horn, *European Socialists Respond to Fascism: Ideology, Activism and Contingency in the 1930s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 11.
11. Paul Corner, *Fascism in Ferrara: 1915–1925* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
12. For a detailed analysis of the Plan, see Horn, *European Socialists*, ch. 5.
13. For an analysis of the 'Swedish Exception', see Berman, *The Primacy of Politics*, ch. 7.
14. See the classic study: Helmut Gruber, *Red Vienna: Experiment in Working-Class Culture, 1919–1934* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

15. For a comprehensive comparative analysis that confirms the widespread existence of these contradictions across Europe, see Helmut Gruber and Pamela Graves (eds.), *Women and Socialism—Socialism and Women: Europe between the Two World Wars* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998).
16. Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 61
17. Pamela E. Swett, *Neighbors and Enemies: The Culture of Radicalism in Berlin, 1929–1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
18. See Pamela Radcliff, *From Mobilization to Civil War: The Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijon, 1900–1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
19. Michael Seidman, *Workers Against Work: Labor in Paris and Barcelona during the Popular Fronts* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991).
20. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York: Norton, 1959).
21. The best general discussion in English is Julian Casanova, *Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War, 1931–1939* (London: Routledge, 2004).
22. Radcliff, 'The Culture of Empowerment in Gijón, 1936–1937' and Enric Ucelay da Cal, 'Catalan Populism in the Spanish Civil War', both in Chris Ealham and Michael Richards (eds.), *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
23. Chris Ealham, 'The Myth of the Maddened Crowd: Class, Culture and Space in the Revolutionary Urbanist Project in Barcelona, 1936–1937', in Ealham and Richards (eds.), *The Splintering of Spain.*
24. For a collection that emphasizes the complexity and diversity of the relationship between the Comintern and national parties, see Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe (eds.), *International Communism and the Communist International, 1919–1943* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).
25. The overall membership was modest: 473,000 non-Soviet members of the Comintern in 1927 and 785,000 in 1935, distributed globally among 76 parties, 50 of which were illegal. In 1927, only Germany and Czechoslovakia had over 100,000 members, France and China had 50,000 each, while more than half had less than 1,000: Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe, 'Introduction', in Rees and Thorpe (eds.), *International Communism*, 2.
26. For example, the Greek Communist Party increased 1.4 per cent in 1928 to 9.59 per cent of votes in 1935, and the French increased its parliamentary seats from 21 to 72, while party membership grew from 86,000 in 1935 to 328,000 in 1937. In Greece, after the January 1936 elections, various efforts to form a coalition government with the Communists ended with a coup and dictatorship in August.
27. Eley argues that 1943–7 was the 'anti-fascist moment' when Communists were finally pulled out of their isolation through integration in national liberation struggles: *Forging Democracy*, ch. 18.
28. Quoted in Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, *The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), 133. See ch. 4 for a discussion of these debates.
29. The classic anti-Communist text is Bernard Bolloten, *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1991), while the other position is laid out in Helen Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War, 1936–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

30. For the most nuanced position on this question, see Tim Rees, 'The Highpoint of Comintern Influence? The Communist Party and the Civil War in Spain', in Rees and Thorpe (eds.), *International Communism*.
31. See the classic study by Stuart Macintyre, *Little Moscows: Communism and Working-class Militancy in Inter-war Britain* (London: Croom Helm, 1980).
32. Laura Lee Downs, 'Municipal Communism and the Politics of Childhood: Ivry-Sur-Seine, 1925–1960', *Past and Present*, 166 (2000), 210.
33. Laird Boswell, *Rural Communism in France, 1920–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
34. For a balanced discussion of these factors, see Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR and the Successor States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chs. 3 and 5.

CHAPTER 15

FASCISM AND THE RIGHT IN INTERWAR EUROPE

Interaction, Entanglement, Hybridity

ARISTOTLE KALLIS

Introduction

The history of the concept of 'fascism' is marked by extremes of sweeping generalization and over-specification. For decades after 1945, 'fascism' was presented as a generic phenomenon in interwar European politics that was overwhelmingly defined through its antitheses: visceral opposition to liberalism and individualism, persecution of the Left, virulent anti-Semitism, destruction of democratic institutions, and so on. In historiographical terms, fascist movements and dictatorial regimes were often lumped together with limited attention to their significant differences or conversely with little interest in sophisticated comparative analysis. Viewed as a de facto phenomenon of the European Right,[1] 'fascism' found it initially difficult to occupy its distinct place on the spectrum of political ideologies. Beyond Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany—which were widely regarded as its paradigmatic core—survey works on interwar fascism that appeared from the 1950s to the 1970s included or omitted case studies without scrutinizing their distinct ideological character or exploring the sources of their inspiration. Liberal historiography tended to present fascism as a tragic exception to what was otherwise a path of 'progress' charted by the Enlightenment and advanced through a modern emancipatory drive in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[2] In fact, the idea that 'fascism' was the rogue product of specific national traditions and mindsets (most notably the German 'special path'[3]) made it possible for certain national historiographies to present 'fascism' as an alien import with no origins in national traditions.[4] Thus, severed from the intellectual and historical trajectory of modern Europe, and deprived of its autochthonous roots in many European societies, the concept of 'fascism' in the 1950s and 1960s ended up being not only under-defined and under-theorized but also misleadingly ahistorical.[5]

But the often indiscriminate over-extension of the under-theorized concept of 'fascism' produced its historiographical nemesis. If fascism was more than just Italian Fascism, if it had distinct ideological qualities and transnational momentum in the interwar years, then its unique attributes had to be first identified and then negotiated against the broader landscape of right-wing politics in 1920s and 1930s Europe. New approaches (from Ernst Nolte and George L. Mosse in the 1960s to Roger Griffin, Zeev Sternhell, and Stanley Payne more recently[6]) sought to establish fascism as a discrete ideological 'ism' of the twentieth century, its intellectual origins meticulously charted, its popularity during the interwar years scrutinized, and its national permutations fruitfully analysed in comparative terms. Increasingly viewed as a distinct 'third way' phenomenon—a unique ideological–political synthesis that traversed the conventional left–right boundary—fascism ceased to be seen as a mere facet, however more radical, of the interwar anti-democratic/anti-socialist Right.[7] In addition, the focus of definition gradually shifted from political praxis to ideas, from its outcomes to its declared intentions, from its truncated record or its failures to its expansive horizon of history-making ambition and endeavour.[8]

Nevertheless, defining 'fascism' and identifying its unique distinguishing attributes raised a host of new questions about how particular movements and regimes fitted the suggested definitions. Saving the concept of 'fascism' from overextension and trivialization produced a real danger of inflexible over-specification. Different taxonomies shifted the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of case studies, with some seemingly less radical right-wing dictatorships and hyper-nationalist movements now falling short of the new conceptual and taxonomical benchmarks. Previous dualistic classifications—democratic versus dictatorial, revolutionary versus reactionary, modern versus anti-modern, totalitarian versus either authoritarian or pluralistic, fascist/totalitarian versus authoritarian—started to crumble upon closer empirical scrutiny. A host of new, betwixt and between taxonomical categories had to be created for the 'not-quite-fascist' candidates—'semi-fascist', 'para-fascist', 'quasi-fascist', 'pseudo-fascist', 'would-be fascist', 'fascistoid'—all betraying a classificatory nightmare at the same time that they were celebrating the new-found conceptual sophistication of new paradigms of generic 'fascism'.[9]

This taxonomical conundrum is more acutely observed in the case of interwar dictatorial regimes. Even the most elaborate and carefully theorized model of generic fascism has worked far better in the laboratory conditions of ideological pronouncements made by fascist movements than in the domain of political regimes. In his sophisticated survey of interwar fascism, Stanley G. Payne nevertheless felt the need to produce a seventier taxonomy of 'national authoritarian' regimes in interwar Europe, with labels such as 'syncretic', 'semi-authoritarian', 'semi-pluralist', 'praetorian', 'bureaucratic', 'limited', and so on.[10] A similar tendency can be observed in Michael Mann's taxonomy of interwar authoritarian regimes, with the distinct category of 'fascist regimes' juxtaposed to others defined as 'corporatist', 'semi-reactionary', and 'semi-authoritarian'.[11] Cross-overs between fascism and a more conventional authoritarianism were the norm in interwar politics; what is more, they seemed to work in either direction.[12] Such slippages have

introduced historiographical distinctions and suggested gradations that sometimes point to variation of degree or level of success while on other occasions refer to fundamental qualitative differences.

And yet, once again, this taxonomical labyrinth may actually come with its own Ariadne's thread. Back in 1966, the pioneering volume edited by Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber on the history of the European Right had posed the question of the complex, very often untidy relation between 'fascists' and 'conservatives' in interwar Europe. While the two editors appeared to accept the Left–Right dualism, in the introduction to the volume Weber noted that such conventional dualistic labels 'are cracking':

> Does dictatorship automatically classify a man, a party, a regime, as being of the Right and, if so, what do we do about Stalin or Tito? Does radicalism or revolution provide an automatic definition of the Left or does it allow for Kemal Ataturk and Nasser? … We continue to use (the label 'right') but *no longer know, cannot possibly know for sure, quite what it covers, quite what we mean* … The more we have inspected the image of the (European interwar) right the less sure we have become of what it is.[13]

Throughout the volume, editors and authors talked of 'the love–hate relationship' between 'old' and 'new' interwar Right, the latter becoming largely identified with 'fascist' and some of its 'not-quite-fascist' variants and the former featuring a bewilderingly broad spectrum of conservative and authoritarian forces divided by at least as much as what united them. This observation was the starting point of a new wave of scholarship that sought to engage with—rather than exorcize through taxonomical boundary-drawing—the relation between 'fascists' and 'conservatives'. Martin Blinkhorn edited one volume and authored a monograph on this precise topic, combining the methodological sophistication of comparative analysis with a conceptually elastic approach that sought to map exchanges and mutual influences between the two broad families of the interwar Right. While his earlier edited volume resembled a survey study of such entanglements (and their unpredictability, varied in each case and time outcomes) in a broad sample of European countries, his 2000 monograph combined comparative analysis of domestic entanglements with a growing awareness of transnational influences, inspirations, and selective appropriations.[14] In particular, Blinkhorn underlined the significance of the *success* of Italian Fascism and later National Socialism (success measured in terms of conquest of power, resilience, radicalizing momentum, tangible radical outcomes, as well as the impression of power and momentum) in spreading fascism across Europe and facilitating complex ideological–political entanglements between the 'old' and the 'new' Right. And he concluded:

Perhaps then the *fascisant* imitators … intuitively grasped an underlying truth that analyses based on fascist theory and elite culture have tended to avoid. This was that more often than not 'fascism', as ideology and stylistic veneer or as political movement, was something the conservative–authoritarian right could use, and when appropriate discard … Fascist features grafted onto a conservative–authoritarian body may produce

a result little or no less authentically 'fascist' than a fascist movement that sells out to established interests.[15]

Here, then, rather unexpectedly, lay the promise of a way out from the taxonomical labyrinth: neither in further conceptual elaborations of the term 'fascism' nor in more complex, meticulously subdivided taxonomies, but in the recognition of entanglements, of the sheer complexity of transnational transfers, and of the exhilaratingly dynamic *hybridity* of the outcomes. Such hybridity that Blinkhorn's volume had explored in relation to the fascist–conservative nexus in a number of European countries was mirrored in the more recent labours of transnational approaches to the study of fascism on the pan-European and indeed global level.[16] Transnational history has embraced movement, encounter, dynamic interaction, and constant change. It has sought to contextualize national developments as facets of broader, more complex histories of dynamic exchanges, appropriations, and unique syntheses. The significance of this approach for the study of the interwar European Right lies in the recognition of the powerful transnational field of interactions in which its very different forces were shaped and kept operating in interaction with each other.

In this chapter, I suggest an approach to the analysis of the interwar European Right that aims to overcome rigid classificatory dichotomies between 'conservative' and 'radical' Right. While such distinctions remain valid and important on the conceptual level, they largely fail to navigate the granular empirical reality of interwar politics. I maintain that the paths of the 'old' and 'new' Right intersected and overlapped significantly in the 1920s and especially 1930s, allowing for a far wider range of ideological–political syntheses that shaped the entire history of the interwar Right. Just like the rise of the fascists to power involved a series of compromises and tactical revisions of fascism's earlier revolutionary outlook, the 'old' Right responded to the apparent success of 'fascism' by following a path of multiple radicalization—of ideas, of institutional experiments, and of political praxis. It is this radicalization of 'authoritarian' and 'conservative' politics that interests me here—a radicalization, I argue, that is impossible to comprehend without acknowledging both the critical influence of 'fascism' as un unfolding radical experiment in the 1920s and 1930s, and the reflexive feedback of constituencies of the 'old' Right as active, critical agents rather than passive imitators. The perceived success of 'fascism' in Italy, then in Germany, and later as the driving force of a wider 'authoritarian turn' across the continent exercised a profound transformative effect on the European 'old' Right. It functioned as both an energizing challenge and an empowering opportunity, providing (selective) inspiration and a tangible template for very different scenarios of radicalization. As a result, 'fascist' ideas and experiments travelled far across the continent, exercising a radicalizing influence on the politics of the 'old' Right that was disproportionately stronger than what observable political outcomes may suggest. They were adopted, reflexively and selectively, by an ever-expanding constituency of the 'old' Right—but only after refracting them through the lenses of national specificity and of their particular political expectations, producing in each case new, dynamic, and constantly mutating syntheses that spanned conventional dichotomies and point to a shared history of the interwar—'old' and 'new', 'authoritarian' and 'fascist'—Right.

The Significance of 1922 and the Momentum for an Authoritarian 'Departure'

There is no denying that the political experiment that was unfolding in Italy under Mussolini's regime from 1922 onwards exerted a strong intellectual and political fascination on many contemporaries across the Continent and beyond. The so-called crisis of liberal democracy witnessed in Italy in the immediate post-First World War period was by no means unique, in either kind or intensity.[17] That said, the dramatic sequence of events that led from Mussolini's appointment to the subsequent declaration of the Fascist dictatorship in January 1925 unfolded against the backdrop of a wave of democratic experiments in the wake of the First World War, in both new countries created by the collapse of the European empires and in established ones—like the defeated Germany.[18] Such experiments appeared for a short time to mark the victory of the liberal-democratic paradigm over authoritarian traditions and alternatives. Yet, democracy and liberalism were also resented by a broad spectrum of political forces that ranged from the revolutionary Left to sectors of the conservative Right and to radical nationalists. In a host of countries, especially in southern, central, and eastern Europe, liberal democracy was introduced or restored hastily, at times with external pressure, as an alien 'import' from the western democracies—'a standard-issue English suit foisted' on the vanquished and the weak, as Carl Schmitt noted.[19] As such, the liberal-democratic paradigm was plagued from the outset by minimal or half-hearted elite support and popular legitimacy, as well as by the lack of a strong political and institutional foundation. Democracy appeared to become mainstream in the early 1920s, if by mainstream one means the number of countries formally adopting it and the predominant official discourse of political elites at the helm of these experiments. But this popularity was superficial, disguising mounting undercurrents of animus and suppressed desires to reverse it.[20] In this respect, the agitation of radicals of either the Right or the Left against liberal/parliamentary democracy was neither surprising nor the most troubling challenge to the legitimacy of liberal-democratic rule in the immediate post-First World War years. The grudging, lukewarm, and increasingly faltering commitment of sectors of the 'old' Right to parliamentary democracy, on the other hand, was far more alarming, especially since these were supposed to be the pillars of the new institutional arrangements that were expected to defend it against its authoritarian and revolutionary enemies.[21]

To be sure, conservative elites did not have to wait for the 'fascist' alternative to show how grudging and reversible their commitment to democracy was. The short-lived revolutionary regime of Béla Kun in Hungary (March to August 1919) was suppressed by a coalition of conservative and authoritarian military forces under Admiral Miklós Horthy, who became Regent in 1920 and remained in that position until he was removed

by Nazi Germany in 1944.[22] Upon assuming power in 1920, Horthy insisted on expanded powers and repressive measure against the revolutionary Left; but he also resisted calls for establishing an outright dictatorship. Instead, interwar Hungary mutated into a rather unique political hybrid—'semi-pluralist' and 'semi-authoritarian' at the same time, as Blinkhorn noted—with regular elections but also systematic crackdown on radical political forces of the Right and the Left. Political repression was accompanied by an increasingly authoritarian concentration of power at the hands of the Regent and a weakened parliament dominated by a broad agrarian–conservative–clerical coalition of forces loyal to him.[23]

Still, the dramatic events of late October 1922 in Italy and the capitulation of Liberal Italy to Mussolini's agitation tactics marked a decisive turning point and in hindsight set in motion a powerful transformative momentum with an international horizon. Unlike the traditional conservative coalition that had propelled and sustained Horthy's authoritarian project throughout the interwar period, Italian Fascists were the perennial radical outsiders who had followed an unorthodox path to power and had been vindicated by the events that followed the 'March on Rome'. Born in March 1919, in the uncertain but effervescent atmosphere of the Italian *dopoguerra*, the movement had already become notorious for its scathing critique of the old political class, its unique brand of paramilitarism, street activism, and violent attacks on the Left, as well as its revolutionary proclamations that evangelized a new heroic era in Italian history.[24] Mussolini's appointment in October 1922 was a decisive victory against many odds for the relatively small constituency of Italian Fascists. This victory was not fully apparent in October 1922: the head of a radical movement that had just staged a daring take-over assault on the liberal system in Italy had been placed as head of a coalition government, in a formally constitutional arrangement sanctioned—and in theory supervised—by incumbent mainstream elite actors. But it was the consolidation of the Fascist regime, first within the limits of the 1922 coalition and, after January 1925, as a single-party radical, indeed totalitarian, dictatorship that confirmed the viability of the political experiment and charted an alternative path beyond the liberalism of 'the West' and the revolutionary socialism of the Soviet Union. The ensuing political, institutional, and stylistic innovations that were pioneered by Mussolini's regime throughout the 1920s cast a very different light on the significance of the events of October 1922. In charting a novel path for 'successful' radical political change in-the-making, the experiment appeared to confirm the viability of a post-liberal 'departure' and supplied a new radical template for pursuing it in a radical, taboo-shattering direction. What had started as an Italian experiment with uncertain chances of 'success' could now be seen as a seismic political paradigm shift whose resonance extended beyond Italy and whose ingredients of both diagnosis and remedy were apposite to other national contexts.[25] As the Fascist regime continued to take shape throughout the 1920s and to show an increasingly self-confident radical knack, its 'magnetic field' grew stronger and wider,[26] long before Mussolini himself spoke of Fascism as an 'export product' with an ambitious international horizon.[27]

The chain of events that led from the March on Rome to the Fascist dictatorship and the construction of the *stato totalitario* opened up a new field of possibilities for radical

political change and established a powerful precedent that others beyond Italy were too keen to dissect for their own reasons. Yet different political constituencies of sympathetic observers translated the same set of unfolding developments into significantly divergent political 'lessons'. On one level, the Fascist experiment was perceived as a long-awaited, viable trajectory and 'destination' for nascent radical, ultra-nationalist anti-system forces in many other countries. It offered a sort of tried-and-tested blueprint for the radical political action and vision needed to push through a revolutionary nationalist, post-liberal, and anti-socialist transformation. Radicals admired the scope of the Fascist regime's radical and fanatically pursued regenerative horizon. Genuinely fascinated with Mussolini and the raw dynamism of the Fascist movement, many became convinced (and this conviction only gathered momentum in subsequent years) that Italian Fascism had triggered an international 'domino effect' that would soon sweep away liberals, socialists, and conservatives, ushering in a new sense of 'heroic' time in world history.[28]

On another level, however, what happened in Italy in the 1920s tapped into, and in turn fostered, a broader political demand for a post-liberal alternative to democracy—not revolutionary in its horizon but more radical than what more conventional authoritarian precedents had to offer. Sympathetic conservatives and authoritarians were interested in the actual compromise solution that brought about the successful post-liberal authoritarian 'departure' in Italy and unlocked a host of new possibilities for political *synthesis* between mainstream and ('successful') radical elements. They saw in the consolidation of Mussolini's power the irreversible passing of the era of parliamentary democracy, the dawn of a new kind of populist dictatorship with a more radical edge derived from a unifying platform of organic nationalism, and a hugely effective strategy for obliterating the Left. Could it be then that the events of 1922 in Italy had rehearsed the viability of a new kind of authoritarian dictatorship—more populist, more attuned to the needs of modern mass mobilization and plebiscitary support, more radical in its institutional make-up and political praxis but still driven by established social and political power bases and successfully fending off the threat of a genuine social revolution by outsiders of the Left or the Right?[29]

Within barely a year after the March on Rome, these two wildly different scenarios had already been attempted elsewhere. In Germany, the young leader of a new political movement with the incongruous title National Socialist German Workers Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, NSDAP), a certain Adolf Hitler, interpreted Mussolini's strategy of conquering power in literal terms. In November 1923, Hitler organized and headed a woefully misconceived coup in Munich—starting with a march on the streets of the Bavarian capital and aspiring to bring down the Weimar government. The November putsch ended in farcical failure. Yet, in 1941 Hitler confided that the charismatic personality of the Duce, the success of the March on Rome, and the practice of Fascist *squadrismo* exerted a powerful psychological influence on him:

> Don't suppose that the events in Italy had no influence on us. The brown shirt would probably not have existed without the black shirt. The march on Rome, in October

> 1922, was one of the turning points of history. *The mere fact that anything of the sort could be attempted, and could succeed, gave us an impetus.*[30]

At the time of the March on Rome, Hitler was just one of many aspiring radical nationalist leaders, leading a fringe political start-up with uncertain prospects. Within a few years, the Italian Fascist regime had established clandestine links with a constantly growing number of national radical subversive organizations across Europe. Macedonian and Croat separatists fighting against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Hungarian revisionists, and Romanian radical nationalists joined the NSDAP in the list of financial beneficiaries of the Fascist regime—a list that would grow much longer and reach much further in subsequent years.[31] The choice of beneficiaries was driven primarily by geopolitical considerations, with ideology playing a secondary role in securing Fascist financial favours. However, as more and more radical nationalist movements with 'fascist' trappings appeared in many European countries in the 1920s and early 1930s (only a few, such as the British Union of Fascists, proudly proclaiming themselves 'fascist'; the majority acknowledging their ideological debts to Mussolini's regime but consciously shying away from adopting the label), Mussolini and his Fascism were recognized as the pioneers and leading forces of a transnational history-making project. The French author Robert Brasillach—like his mentor, Georges Valois, the founder of the *Action Francaise*—saw in the Fascist 'totalitarian' state a fascinating experiment with 'Latin' roots that combined the political with the dramatic and the aesthetic.[32] The American poet Ezra Pound presented Mussolini as the modern embodiment of the 'enlightened soul' and artifex with a passion for construction, who would spearhead with his personality and determination the revival of a historic(al) epic.[33] The leader of the radical Romanian movement Iron Guard, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, acknowledged the degree to which the March on Rome and the successful consolidation of the Fascist regime convinced him that the events of 1922 marked the beginning of a new era of transnational seismic transformation:

> I heard the news of the huge Fascist eruption: the March on Rome and Mussolini's victory. I rejoiced as much as if it were my own country's victory … Mussolini, the brave man who trampled the dragon underfoot, was one of us, that is why all dragon heads hurled themselves upon him, swearing death to him. For us, the others, he will be a bright North Star giving us hope; … proof of the possibilities of victory.[34]

But the transnational field of Fascist sympathizers also featured other, far less likely members. In March 1923, the Spanish military headed by Miguel Primo de Rivera overthrew the liberal parliamentary system and established what at first sight resembled a traditional authoritarian dictatorship at the service of the monarchy, the armed forces, and the Church. Yet, Primo de Rivera was a strong admirer of Mussolini, describing him later as his teacher and primary source of political inspiration.[35] In spite of his unlikely conservative provenance and his strong allegiances to eminently non-revolutionary

institutions of the Spanish state, de Rivera 'imported' Fascist experiments such as the state regulation of labour relations on the basis of corporatism, the model of a single mass party organization (*Union Patriotica*), and the institution of a legitimizing parliament, again along the lines of the Fascist precedent.[36] He was also known to have been planning the introduction of a new constitution inspired by Fascist corporatist ideas and a reorganization of Spanish youth organizations, again along the lines pioneered by Mussolini's regime. Although he went to great lengths to present these experiments as organically linked to Spanish traditions and his own political thought, it proved hard for him to shake off the impression that he was simply drawing inspiration from his Italian political idol.

In many ways, Codreanu's or Hitler's fascination with Mussolini's regime made sense in a way that Primo de Rivera's did not. The revolutionary, action-oriented dynamic of Italian Fascism, its anti-systemic origins, and its strong sense of 'rupture' with the immediate past matched the National Socialists' radical formation, world view, and intentions.[37] Primo de Rivera, on the other hand, was a far more conventional conservative figure of the 'old' European Right seeking something akin to a counter-restoration of traditional monarchical power and the influence of Catholicism after decades of liberal experimentation in Spain. This, however, did not stop him from extracting political lessons and inspirations from the Italian case that served, shaped, and legitimized his very different political project. In so doing, he set a different kind of precedent for a fluent synthesis between facets of the 'old' and 'new' Right that was to be repeated, in the more familiar form of dictatorial rule, in other parts of Europe in the following decade. By the time that Primo de Rivera's regime collapsed in 1930, dictatorships had been established in Portugal (1926), Poland, Lithuania (both 1926), Albania (1928), and Yugoslavia (1929)—in all cases by conservative figures of the 'old' Right and with the support of powerful traditional institutions. A second phase of authoritarian 'departures' coincided with the appointment of Hitler as German chancellor and the consolidation of the Nazi dictatorship in 1933–4: in addition to Germany, Austria (March 1933), Estonia (March 1934), Latvia, and Bulgaria (May 1934) joined what Michael Mann has described as the 'authoritarian half of (interwar) Europe'.[38] Finally, a third phase swept away most of the remaining democracies in central, southern, and eastern Europe from 1936 until the outbreak of the war: again Greece (1936) and Spain (1939), but also Romania (1938, 1941). Only the more established northern democracies more or less successfully resisted the authoritarian onslaught. Even there, prominent figures of the conservative Right lavished praise and qualified admiration on Mussolini, albeit with the caveat that his ideas and style of politics were perfectly suited for Italy but unfit for their countries. Winston Churchill and Austen Chamberlain, as well as prominent businessmen from both sides of the Atlantic, expressed positive views in relation to the Duce's crackdown on the organized Left and his success in restoring order in the previously deeply fractious and polarized political system of post-war Italy.[39] Some went even further, praising corporatist economics, lauding Mussolini with coming to an accommodation with the Catholic Church in 1929, and even justifying violently repressive measures against the organized Left.[40]

Entanglements, Hybrids, and the Path of Radicalization

If in the 1920s Italian Fascism and Mussolini's regime had been the only major source of influence for new radical movements and adventurous authoritarian proponents of the 'old' Right, the 1930s added National Socialist Germany, as well as a series of other regional experiments, to the inspiration pool. Hitler's appointment as chancellor in January 1933 was hailed by Fascist Italy as a victory for 'German fascism', portrayed by the Italian press as a triumph of 'Fascist civilisation, reincarnation splendidly young and vital of the civilisation of ancient Rome … advancing with its proud banners to conquer the hearts and minds' of others across the Continent.[41] And yet the two regimes remained viscerally divided on fundamental ideological and political issues. Contemporary sympathetic observers were fully aware of what divided the two paradigmatic fascist regimes of the interwar period, as well as of their bizarre competition for 'primacy'. Many radical ultra-nationalist parties switched their loyalties in the process, in the overwhelming majority of cases from Italian Fascism to German National Socialism. By contrast, the new breed of dictatorships that appeared in Europe during the 1930s showed astuteness in borrowing liberally and selectively from each of the two regimes while avoiding a complete ideological alignment with either of them. Even then, however, they were eager to perceive in their collective agency of Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany a cumulative drive for a unique history-making project that seemed to be on the cusp of reshaping European politics and emerging triumphant.

The case of Gyula Gömbös, the Hungarian arch-conservative who served as prime minister from 1932–6, illustrates eloquently this new political trend. Having spent the 1920s as a vocal critic of Horthy's semi-pluralist regime, he emerged in 1932 as the prime candidate of the resurgent Right's bid for power. Ideologically situated between Horthy's conservatism and the far more extreme rightist alternative of the fascist Arrow Cross, Gömbös was nevertheless strongly attracted to the new political vision and style of, first, Fascist Italy and, later, Nazi Germany. Already in 1929, as under-secretary to the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, he had visited Rome to meet Mussolini and express his admiration for his regime.[42] He repeated this kind of political pilgrimage twice as prime minister—in November 1932 and again shortly before his death in 1936.[43] But he was also impressively quick to congratulate Hitler on his appointment as chancellor in 1933 and earned the distinction of being the first prime minister to visit Berlin in June 1933 (a gesture that he repeated in 1935). Gömbös cultivated very close ties with both dictators and regimes, at a time when the two were seriously divided on key ideological and geopolitical issues. His profound anti-Semitism coexisted with his enthusiastic endorsement of the Fascist corporatism model and the 'Fascist International' project. This pick-and-choose attitude was motivated by his belief that the two regimes in Italy and Germany represented facets of the same wave of radical-authoritarian, one-party, anti-communist transformation in the politics of the European interwar Right. He

spoke on numerous occasions of his hope that a 'Rome–Berlin axis' would emerge, leading the rest of the Continent in a new, post-liberal and post-Versailles realignment. He promised Goering in 1935 that, under his leadership, Hungary would become a one-party 'totalitarian' state fashioned after the Nazi model within a very short period of time.[44] Just before his death, he was also planning on introducing a corporatism system in Hungary, devised under the influence of ideas already rehearsed in Italy.[45] Still, Gömbös was a supremely pragmatic admirer of what he perceived as the new 'fascist' paradigm. He may have been determined to transform the regime that he headed into a fascist-like system but he chose to do so 'from above', and in opposition to the country's primary 'fascist' movement (the Arrow Cross), borrowing ideas and practices from both Italy and Germany without aligning himself exclusively with either regime in order to construct a hybrid political formula that suited best Hungary's particular political and social circumstances.[46]

Gömbös's experiment turned out to be short-lived and reversible. The dictatorship headed by António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal from 1932, on the other hand, proved impressively resilient. Salazar, a conservative professor of economics, had been appointed prime minister six years after democracy had been replaced by a national authoritarian regime through a military coup. In the remaining years of the 1930s, he oversaw a major political and institutional transformation of the Portuguese state that was strongly influenced by Fascist corporatist ideas that had also underpinned a similar experiment in Austria under Engelbert Dollfuss. A new constitution introduced in 1933 codified an idiosyncratic mix of traditional social Catholicism with distinct 'fascist trappings' inspired by Mussolini's regime, under the banner of the 'New State' (*Estado Novo*).[47] Nevertheless, Salazar borrowed highly selectively and reflexively from both Italy and Germany, adapting institutional and stylistic influences in ways that suited the domestic conditions and his more conservative political horizon. If the dictatorship's burgeoning corporatist vision, as well as its experiments with new youth and propaganda organizations, drew inspiration from Fascist prototypes, his new secret police and propaganda control institutions borrowed more closely from the Nazi model of the Gestapo and the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda respectively. As the Salazar dictatorship continued to take its distinct shape in the rest of the 1930s, it emerged as a paradigm for other aspiring authoritarians elsewhere in Europe—essentially as a tempered alternative to the two major fascist regimes in Italy and Germany, engineered 'from above' rather than spearheaded by a radical fascist movement, less radical and unpredictably dynamic and more order-affirming.[48]

Salazar also embarked on a policy of ruthless repression of Portugal's own fascist movement—the National Syndicalists or 'Blueshirts'. Under the leadership of Rolão Preto, the movement emerged as a significant political force in the early 1930s, advocating an amalgam of native organic nationalism imbued with loyalty to the Church and the monarchy (the so-called *Integralismo Lusitano*) and adapting 'fascist' ideas largely inspired by Mussolini's movement in Italy.[49] Preto had both praised Italian Fascism in the early 1920s and been a fervent supporter of the 1926 coup. For him the coup had produced both the political space and the ideological horizon for an open-ended

revolutionary transformation in Portugal. Salazar initially co-opted the movement, using it as a vehicle of social mass mobilization and benefiting from its radical mystique;[50] but the Blueshirts' increasing radicalism and unruly activism convinced him that an outright ban was the best response. Thus in 1934 he ordered the violent dissolution of the National Syndicalists, with Preto, forced to go into exile, becoming a vehement critic of Salazar's regime.[51]

Salazar's volatile and contradictory stance towards the self-proclaimed fascists was symptomatic of the often difficult relations between the 'old' and 'new' interwar Right even when they shared common enemies and visions for the future. The pattern of initial co-opting followed by repression witnessed in Portugal was also followed in Romania under General Ion Antonescu, who briefly courted the support of the Legionaries of the Iron Guard before turning ruthlessly against them in January 1941. Other dictatorships ruled out any form of cooperation with the 'new' Right. The royal dictatorship of King Carol in Romania had outlawed the Iron Guard and executed its leadership, including Codreanu himself. In Hungary, Horthy's regime outlawed and suppressed both the earlier Scythe Cross and the Arrow Cross fascist movements. Some dictators (e.g. in Austria, with the alliance between Chancellor Dollfuss's authoritarian *Ständestaat* and the Heimwehr against the rising threat of the Austrian NSDAP) elected to embrace a less radical component of native 'fascism' under the supervision of traditional pillars of power and in defence of the existing political order, thus also manipulating antagonisms inside the radical constituency of the 'new' Right. Only in Franco's Spain did a successfully symbiotic arrangement prove resilient, with the radical Falange Española transformed into one of the fundamental institutional pillars of the dictatorship.[52]

On the eve of the German attack on Poland, an arc of post-liberal, nationalist, and fervently anti-communist dictatorships sliced the map of Europe from Lithuania to the Balkans and all the way to the edge of the Iberian peninsula. While some were more radical in their discourse and praxis than others, they all featured elements that suggested a dual 'departure'—*from* liberalism and *towards* a new paradigm of radical institutional and political transformation predicated on the perceived 'success' and dynamism of Fascist Italy and/or National Socialist Germany. Rather than viewing these two attributes of the interwar 'authoritarian turn' (departure from liberalism and departure towards a new, more radical authoritarian alternative) as a classificatory vexation or as justification for reinforcing the original conceptual dichotomies (i.e. the traditional distinction between 'fascism' and 'authoritarianism', 'new' and 'old' Right), we should recognize that they operated in, and emerged from, a shared transnational space of open-ended political hybridization. This approach does not question the validity of historiographical distinctions made between, say, Hitler's regime and Salazar's dictatorship. Indeed, when scrutinized more closely, each of these dictatorships proffered very different responses—partly inspired from developments elsewhere but also crucially informed by distinct domestic circumstances and traditions—to the broader perceived crisis of liberal democracy and the ostensible threat of international socialism. But the fetish of methodological individualism should not be allowed to obscure the critical influence that feedback from developments in one country had on other

contemporary sympathetic observers elsewhere. What was happening in Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany mattered in a particular crucial way—as a taboo-breaking precedent and pool of radical inspiration that in the eyes of a growing number of contemporary observers of the Right constituted an unfolding 'successful' and viable political paradigm. But new hybrids, such as Salazar's or Dollfuss's dictatorships in Portugal and Austria respectively, which were seemingly situated in a grey zone between conventional authoritarian dictatorship and the novel Nazi–Fascist template of radical rule, also proved very influential beyond their original contexts, providing inspiration for other authoritarian dictators and guiding them further and further down the path of radicalization.

Inspiration by, and empowerment from, broader international radical precedents unfolded in a context of transnational political learning that was highly reflexive, versatile, and responsive to both domestic circumstances and external changes. Different—and shifting over time—understandings by a range of political constituencies of what was happening in Germany, Italy, or elsewhere combined with highly diverse initial conditions and feedbacks in each country to produce a kaleidoscope of hybrid political outcomes. Not only do these outcomes remain supremely resistant to classification but they require a different heuristic apparatus that gives equal weight to transnational influences and national responses. Even the most fervent transnational disciples of fascism—those genuinely fascinated by its ideological premise of profound civilizational regeneration, usually found among the founders and members of 'fascist' movements—were essentially marrying 'fascist' inspiration with traditions and circumstances particular to their national settings. So long as this 'fascism', in its particular Italian and/or German guise or as a combined force through the Axis alliance, was seen as 'successful' and victorious, others observed it as a critically empowering precedent that had opened up the field of opportunity in an increasingly radical and uncompromising direction. The kaleidoscope of ensuing hybrid ideological–political outcomes were not just different from their sources of inspiration or from one another but also occasionally even more radical in some respects than their prototypes, infused with communicative ingredients that only made sense in their originating particular national-cultural setting.

Reflexivity and 'Recontextualization': Making 'Fascism' Work for the Authoritarian Right

It was this kind of reflexive recontextualization, rather than slavish imitation, that produced what the historiography of fascism has often described as 'fascist trappings' in a wide range of countries during the 1930s and the wartime years. In 1935, Ferruccio Guido Cabalzar, a journalist and trusted political associate of Mussolini, visited Latvia

on behalf of the Action Committees for the Universality of Rome (*Comitati d'Azione per l'Universalità di Roma*, CAUR)—an organization that the Fascist regime had set up in 1933 precisely to cultivate the 'export' of fascism into other parts of Europe. A dictatorship since 1934, the Latvian regime was headed by the conservative nationalist figure Karlis Ulmanis. An admirer of Mussolini, Ulmanis nevertheless approached 'fascism' as a spiritual matrix for idealist national action—not tied to predefined ideological doctrines but developed organically in each national context on the basis of reflection and acute awareness of domestic conditions. Cabalzar reinforced this message, stating that 'fascism', albeit based on putatively universal values, would crystallize in different forms in other countries.[53] In Lithuania, the Smetona dictatorship (established in 1926) embarked on a major 'fascistization' drive, recontextualizing institutions from Fascist Italy in key areas such as youth, personal cult, and corporatist syndicalism. Neither of these dictatorial figures departed from the conservative-authoritarian mould and world view; in fact, by far the most widespread and successful model of 'authoritarian departure' in interwar Europe featured such unlikely—in ideological and political terms—figures of the 'old' Right. Still, there was ample evidence of growing political convergence, admiration for 'fascist' experiments as new radical technologies of rule in response to seemingly comparable 'problems', and a striking, yet highly reflexive process of political learning that produced a kaleidoscope of hybrid political solutions.

Convergence, this time with National Socialist Germany, marked the radicalization of other dictatorial regimes just before and during the Second World War, especially on the matter of racial/anti-Jewish policy. In Slovakia, a wartime state that was the product of the Nazi violent territorial reorganization of Europe, the clerical government introduced fully formed racial legislation in September 1941 in order to address the country's so-called 'Jewish Question'. The legislation, known as the Jewish Codex, was based on a very restrictive legal definition of Slovak citizenship and contained more than 300 specifically anti-Jewish regulations. The initiative was driven by a radical faction within the government that supported a closer ideological and political alignment with Nazi Germany, emboldened by the perceived 'success', dynamism, and impending victory of the Axis forces. Inspired by the 1935 Nazi Nuremberg 'racial' model, it also introduced religious principles that were more in line with the clerical roots of the governing Slovak People's Party. In so doing, however, the Slovak definition of 1941 outdid the Nuremberg one, including not only more 'half-Jews' but also those with only one Jewish grandparent, so long as they had continued to practise the Jewish religion until April 1939.[54] The year 1941 was also marked by the introduction of a racially based anti-Jewish law in Hungary by the Horthy regime. Hungary had already proved that it did not need any external inducement to identify a domestic 'Jewish Question' and seek to 'solve' it. Back in 1920, the country had introduced restrictive 'quota' legislation (*numerus clausus*) with a view to limiting Jewish participation in Hungary's professional, economic, and cultural life. The legislation may have lapsed in subsequent years but the emergence of Gömbös in 1932 brought the 'Jewish Question' back onto the regime's increasingly more radical political agenda. What Gömbös did not succeed in doing before his death in 1936, subsequent Hungarian governments achieved

with striking alacrity in 1938–41. The 1941 anti-Jewish law mentioned earlier was in fact the third revised version of legislation that was first introduced in 1938 and then revised in a more restrictive direction in 1939 before reaching its predominantly racial, Nuremberg-inspired 1941 iteration. Recontextualization ensured that the first two laws introduced distinctions meaningful to their Hungarian context (allowances for those who had converted or moved to Hungary before a specific point). By contrast, the 1941 law divulged the empowering and radicalizing effect of Nazi taboo-shattering precedent in this domain; but it also continued to underline the significance of reflexive adaptation, with some regulations exceeding in harshness the Nuremberg mould or following a different restrictive recipe (e.g. the revival of the 1920 principle of *numerus clausus*) while other stipulations accounted for mitigating factors (religion, residence) that made sense in the Hungarian context alone.[55]

It is the example of the wartime Ustaša regime in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), however, that has been described as the most peculiar (and uniquely brutal) product of hybridization—both critically influenced by the precedent of Fascist and National Socialist radical praxis and unintelligible outside the particular ideological, political, and cultural context of the fledgling Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The dramatic events that followed the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 thrust the Ustaša into the forefront of Croat political life. The leader of the movement, Ante Pavelic, still in Italy at the start of the Nazi campaign in the Balkans and until only recently under surveillance by the Fascist authorities, watched the Axis invading forces occupy and dismember the state of Yugoslavia. On 10 April he heard on the radio the declaration of the Independent State of Croatia, made by the leading Ustaša figure Slavko Kvaternik. Three days later, after more than a decade of exile and clandestinity, Pavelic set foot on Croat territory as the unlikely leader of a new, in theory sovereign, state. In his meeting with Hitler in early June 1941, he was permitted to follow 'a nationally intolerant policy [towards "alien" minorities … that] must be pursued for fifty years, because too much tolerance on such issues can only do harm'.[56] 'Cleansing' operations, particularly in areas with sizeable Serb communities, had been reported only days after Kvaternik's founding proclamation of the NDH. These were followed by a series of legislative arrangements that set the tone for the regime's aggressively ethno-exclusive future policies, particularly with regard to Serbs and Jews (e.g. introduction of a blue band with the letter P to be worn by all Serbs inside the NDH, similar to the yellow equivalent for the Jews).[57] While initially operating under the auspices of Fascist Italy and then growing increasingly closer to the National Socialist regime, the Ustaša movement was nevertheless consumed by its very particular goal of independent, homogeneous statehood and its uniquely retributive, fiercely eliminationist anti-Serb vision. Far from being a passive imitator, its leadership 'decontextualized' numerous 'fascist' ideas and practices in order to 'recontextualize' them, in an adapted form, to advance the Ustaša movement and regime's particular priorities in direct relevance to its national setting and circumstances. As Jonathan Steinberg noted, 'in the months of May and June 1941, it [the Ustaša regime] passed the laws that the Nazis had taken years to work out'.[58] Still, both the brutal, ritualistic nature of the eliminationist violence unleashed by the NDH and its

particular targets reflected unique accommodations between external ('fascist') influences and specific domestic attributes.[59]

Even in a country like Greece, which is perhaps unique in another way—lacking a distinct 'fascist' social or political constituency during the 1930s—the authoritarian turn of the 1930s did produce a hybrid dictatorship that borrowed reflexively from foreign 'fascist' models of rule while remaining rooted in, and responsive to, national traditions.[60] The former general Ioannis Metaxas was perhaps the most unlikely figure to lead a radical transformation of the Greek state and society. A deeply conservative and staunchly pro-royalist figure with a distinguished military career but very limited political success in the 1930s, he seized power through a coup on 4 August 1936 with the blessing of the recently restored to his throne King George. Although Metaxas was a long-time admirer of German power and, once in power, cultivated closer economic and military powers with the Third Reich, he did not seriously challenge the traditional pro-British orientation of Greek foreign policy. His political motto of 'transformation' (*metavoli*) was a distinct hybrid, featuring a myth of national revival based on national millennial history (his so-called Third Hellenic Civilization), a rejection of liberalism and materialism in favour of traditional social and religious values, and a brand of political paternalism built around his modest and serious personality.[61] Uncomfortable with modern techniques of populist politics and lacking a sizeable pool of social support, Metaxas was co-opted by the monarchy (and against the wishes of mainstream conservative and liberal parties) as a safe pair of hands, untainted by the bitter political polarization of the previous decades, seemingly predictable and pliable.

Nevertheless, this deeply conservative figure oversaw the introduction of a number of novel technologies of social and political radical transformation in Greece that would have been unintelligible without the radical precedents already rehearsed—seemingly successfully—elsewhere. His *metavoli* referenced, etymologically as well as politically, a 'departure' from the fractious Greek politics of the 1920s and 1930s, as well as from the canons of liberalism and parliamentary democracy. In addition, however, it charted a novel path of engineering a new kind of individual and society that illustrated both political learning from other prototypes and reflexive, highly pragmatic recontextualization. Metaxas personally handled the creation of a new type of holistic youth organization (*Ethniki Organosis Neoleas*, EON) that not only adapted similar experiments in Italy and Germany but was also intended to function as a vehicle for the consolidation and future radicalization of his regime.[62] Similarly, during his short-lived dictatorship (until early 1941, when Metaxas himself died and soon afterwards Greece was occupied by the Axis military forces) he showed a clear appreciation of the Portuguese Estado Novo, with its mixture of social conservatism, corporatist organization of the economic and social spheres, and experiments with controlled mobilization. Predictably, the Greek dictator considered the case of Portugal as 'in most respects resembling that of Greece', in terms of both domestic conditions and governance.[63] The regime's ideologues were tasked to study the Portuguese experiment with a view to producing a new constitution for the Greek state. Weeks before his death, Metaxas appeared ready to introduce a draft for a new constitution, borrowing selectively from other countries but at the same

time subsuming these influences into the core values of his dictatorship—in particular, supreme loyalty to the monarchy and the centrality of Christian Orthodox religion in the social sphere. His admiration for the 'fascist' models of rule, and his frustration with the Italian attack on Greece in the autumn of 1940, precisely because it brought the Axis bloc into a collision course with his own, otherwise sympathetic regime,[64] coexisted with a reflexive appreciation of traditional aspects of the Greek state and society that dictated a distinct, different approach to the country's post-liberal, authoritarian transformation.[65]

Conclusions: A Shared History for the Interwar Right?

It would indeed be hard to find an 'authoritarian' dictatorship in 1930s Europe, from Portugal to Romania and from Greece to Latvia, that had not developed a more radical ideological-political edge and displayed a series of what historians often describe, rather dismissively, as 'fascist trappings'. These 'trappings' attested to the growing political influence of the 'fascist' regimes on the 'old' Right—as a pool of radical inspiration and a repertoire of experiments that could be reflexively recontextualized in other national contexts. And yet, the same 'fascist trappings' have also been used to drive a wedge between 'fascist' and 'authoritarian' types of rule, as well as to restate the differences between the ideologies of the 'new' and 'old' interwar Right that underpinned them, respectively. Classificatory distinction between 'fascism' and 'authoritarianism' or 'conservatism' remains paramount to historiographical attempts to understand the radical dynamic, alluring novelty, and conquering momentum of interwar fascism in its diverse iterations. However, a similar distinction in the political and institutional spheres falls apart upon closer scrutiny. 'Fascist trappings' tell us two very different stories—one about the perceived comparative shortcomings of the outcomes; and another about the channels of transnational diffusion and recontextualization that propelled even unlikely conservative figures such as Salazar, Ulmanis, and Metaxas into radicalization—and one with an increasingly 'fascist' complexion.

There is little doubt that 1922 was a critical turning point for the entire history of the interwar European Right—in all its shades from 'old' to 'new'. No matter how different the political lessons that fascists, authoritarians, conservatives, and others extrapolated from the Italian case, Mussolini's rise to power and the establishment of a new, more radical kind of dictatorship exercised a profound transformative influence well beyond the circle of 'fascist' sympathizers across Europe. The result was a broader and more radical 'authoritarian turn' in large parts of Europe, starting in the 1920s and gaining stronger momentum in the 1930s with the arrival of Hitler on the political scene. The perceived success and dynamism of Fascist Italy and then National Socialist Germany mattered as a legitimizing precedent and (partially at least) as a seemingly successful

template for radicalization. It mattered enormously to the circle of radical 'fascist' start-ups that sprang up in most European countries during the interwar period. But it also mattered—far more than previously assumed—to a growing constituency of authoritarian leaders who saw in 'fascist' praxis a precedent for radical political change without necessarily leading to the same political outcomes that were unfolding in Italy and Germany. For them, the two regimes provided the historic momentum for change and a set of new radical ideas that, selectively and reflexively recontextualized, could be useful in other domestic contexts and political purposes. In short, the unfolding 'fascist' experiment mattered as an emphatic negation of the past and as a highly promising direction of travel, if not necessarily as a precise route or, even more so, fixed destination.

The question that Paul Mazgaj and other historians of interwar France posed in relation to the country's new radical/fascist Right of the 1930s can be extended across Mann's 'authoritarian half of Europe': 'were the differences between the "new" and the "traditional" right, however real, less significant than what they shared as allies' in the pursuit of a radically new, post-liberal and post-socialist order?[66] If the study of these 'not-quite-fascist' dictatorships focused less on where they fell short in relation to the 'successes' of Fascist Italy or National Socialist Germany and more on why and how they chose to borrow reflexively from contemporary 'fascist' experiments, then assumed dichotomies between the 'old Right' and 'fascism' become far less empirically clear-cut or heuristically useful. Instead of approaching them as 'species apart' in self-imposed isolation and within classificatory silos, Michel Dobry has asked us to treat the 'old Right' and 'fascism' in far more intimate 'relational terms', as dynamic and multifaceted phenomena that should be compared for their intrinsic similarities and fascinating intersections *in spite of their often different outcomes*.[67] Understanding the volatile and tangled history of the interwar Right demands a stronger, more constructive focus on these intersections and hybrid outcomes while never losing sight of the shared drive towards radicalization and the critical influence of 'fascism' at all stages of this process.

Notes

1. H. Rogger and E. Weber (eds.), *European Right: A Historical Profile* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).
2. F. F. Rizi, *Benedetto Croce and Italian Fascism* (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2003).
3. R. Stackelberg, *Hitler's Germany: Origins, Interpretations, Legacies* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2014).
4. For example, M. Dobry, 'Février 1934 et la découverte de l'allergie de la société française à la "Révolution fasciste"', *Revue Française de Sociologie*, 30/3–4 (1989), 511–33.
5. A. Kallis, 'Introduction', in A. Kallis (ed.), *The Fascism Reader* (London: Routledge, 2003), 21–9.
6. E. Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York and Toronto: Mentor Books, 1969); G. L. Mosse, 'Towards a General Theory of Fascism', in G. L. Mosse (ed.), *International Fascism: New Thoughts and New Approaches* (London and Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications,

1979), 1–41; R. Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); Z. Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Religion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); S. G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (London: UCL Press, 1997).

7. Z. Sternhell, *Neither Right Nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 141ff; R. Eatwell, *Fascism: A History* (London: Pimlico, 2003), 14.
8. D. Roberts, *The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth-Century Europe: Understanding the Poverty of Great Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 269.
9. R. Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London and New York: Palgrave, 1993), 121.
10. M. Knox, *To the Threshold of Power, 1922/33,* Vol. I: *Origins and Dynamics of the Fascist and National Socialist Dictatorships* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8.
11. M. Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 44–6.
12. A. Costa Pinto and A. Kallis, 'Introduction', in A. Costa Pinto and A. Kallis (eds.), *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 16.
13. Rogger and Weber, *European Right*, 2, 5, emphasis added.
14. M. Blinkhorn, ed., *Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990); M. Blinkhorn, *Fascism and the Right in Europe, 1919–1945* (London: Longman, 2000).
15. Blinkhorn, *Fascism and the Right*, 110.
16. For example, A. Bauerkaemper, 'Transnational Fascism: Cross-Border Relations between Regimes and Movements in Europe, 1922–1939', *East Central Europe*, 37/2–3 (2010), 214–46; C. Goeschel, 'Italia docet? The Relationship between Italian Fascism and Nazism Revisited', *European History Quarterly*, 42/3 (2012), 480–92.
17. J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); 'Fascism and non-democratic regimes', in H. Maier (ed.), *Totalitarianism and Political Religions*, Vol. III: *Concepts for the Comparison of Dictatorships—theory and history of interpretation* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 225–91. See also G. Cappoccia, *Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
18. S. P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
19. S. Holmes, *The Anatomy of Anti-Liberalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 37–8.
20. P. C. Caldwell and W. E. Scheuerman (eds.) *From Liberal Democracy to Fascism: Legal and Political Thought in the Weimar Republic* (Boston, MA: Humanities Press, 2000); N. Ezrow and E. Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and their Leaders* (London: Continuum, 2011).
21. Linz, 'Fascism and non-democratic regimes', 248.
22. R. Griffiths, *Fascism* (London: Continuum, 2005, 2nd edn), 107; B. Vago, 'Fascism in eastern Europe', in W. Laqueur (ed.), *Fascism: A Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 231.
23. Blinkhorn, *Fascism and the Right*, 46. On Horthy's regime in interwar Hungary, see Mann, *Fascists*, 237–60.
24. Roberts, *Totalitarian Experiment,* 271–335.
25. A. Kallis, 'The "fascist effect": on the dynamics of political hybridisation in interwar Europe', in A. Costa Pinto and A. Kallis (eds.), *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 13–41.

26. P. Burrin, 'La France dans le champ magnétique des fascismes', *Le Débat* 32 (1984), 52–72.
27. B. Scholz, 'Italienischer Faschismus als "Export"-Artikel (1927–1935)', Dissertation: Universität Trier, 2001; available at <http://ubt.opus.hbz-nrw.de/volltexte/2004/219/ pdf/ 19970213.pdf>; A. Kallis, *The Third Rome, 1922–1943: The Making of the Fascist Capital* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 226–8.
28. R. Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning Under Mussolini and Hitler* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), 209; R. Griffin, '"I am no longer human. I am a Titan. A God!" The Fascist Quest to Regenerate Time', in M. Feldman (ed.), *A Fascist Century. Essays by Roger Griffin* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), 3–23.
29. G. L. Mosse, *Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1980), 183.
30. H. Trevor-Roper, *Hitler's Table Talk, 1941–1945* (New York: Enigma, 1996), 10, emphasis added.
31. A. Cassels, *Mussolini's Early Diplomacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 294–5.
32. M. A. F. Witt, *The Search for Modern Tragedy: Aesthetic Fascism in Italy and France* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 149.
33. T. Redman, *Ezra Pound and Italian Fascism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 102.
34. C. Z. Codreanu, *Pentru Legionari* (Sibiu: Tipografia Vestemean, 1936); English online translation by G. van der Heide available at <https://ia700501.us.archive.org/10/ items/ ForMyLegionariesTheIronGuard/ForMyLegionaries.pdf>.
35. S. G. Payne, *The Franco Regime, 1936–1975* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 23.
36. S. Ben-Ami, *Fascism from Above: Dictatorship of Primo De Rivera in Spain, 1923–1930* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Antonio Costa Pinto, *The Nature of Fascism Revisited* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2012), 124–5.
37. Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism*, Introduction.
38. Mann, *Fascists*, 24.
39. P. Neville, *Hitler and Appeasement: The British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War* (London: Continuum, 2006), 50; R. A. Rosenbaum, *Waking to Danger: Americans and Nazi Germany, 1933–1941* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2010), 50–8.
40. T. Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism: Religious Identity and Political Extremism Between the Wars* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 141–6.
41. "Il Reich fascista", *Il Messaggero, 7.3.1933*, 1
42. Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Rome, Presidenza Consiglio Ministri (PCM), 1928–30, 4.2.15/8155 (Gömbös visit to Italy, 1929).
43. ACS, Segretaria Particolare del Duce (SPD), Carteggio Ordinario (CO), 137.389, 379 (file for Gyula Gömbös).
44. S. G. Payne, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), 112.
45. M. M. Kovacs, *Liberal Professions and Illiberal Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 90–5; Costa Pinto, *Nature of Fascism Revisited*, 138–9.
46. On the idea of a 'fascism from above', see S. Ben-Ami, *Fascism from Above: The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923–1930* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983); cf. A. Kallis, '"Fascism", "Para-fascism" and "Fascistization": on the Similarities of Three Conceptual Categories', *European History Quarterly*, 33/2 (2003), 219–50.

47. G. Adinolfi and A. Costa Pinto, 'Salazar's New State: the Paradoxes of Hybridization in the Fascist Era', in A. Costa Pinto and A. Kallis (eds.), *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 154–75; A. Costa Pinto, *Salazar's Dictatorship and European Fascism: Problems of Interpretation* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1995); F. Ribeiro de Menezes, *Salazar: A Political Biography* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009), 106ff.
48. A. Kallis, '"Ideas in flux … ": the "4th of August" dictatorship in Greece as a political "departure" in search of "destination"', in G. Botz and A. Costa Pinto (eds.), *Corporatism in Interwar Europe* (forthcoming*).
49. A. Costa Pinto, '"Chaos" and "order"; Preto, Salazar and Charismatic Appeal in Inter-War Portugal', in A. Costa Pinto, R. Eatwell, and S. Ugelvik Larsen (eds.), *Charisma and Fascism* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2007), 69.
50. A. Costa Pinto, *The Blue Shirts. Portuguese Fascists and the New State* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs) 181–4.
51. P. H. Lewis, *Latin Fascist Elites: The Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar Regimes* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 142.
52. Kallis, '"Para-fascism"', 233–4; M. Jerez Mir and J. Luque, 'State and Regime in Early Francoism, 1936–45: Power Structures, Main Actors and Repression Policy', in Costa Pinto and Kallis (eds.), *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship,* 176–97.
53. J. Kuck, 'Renewed Latvia. A Case Study of the Transnational Fascism Model', *Fascism*, 2/2 (2013), 183–204.
54. E. Nižnanský, 'Expropriation and Deportation of Jews in Slovakia', in B. Kosmala and F. Tych (eds.), *Facing the NS Genocide: Non-Jews and Jews in Europe* (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), 205–30; A. Kallis, *Genocide and Fascism. The Eliminationist Drive in Interwar Europe* (New York and London, 2009), 244–50.
55. M. M. Kovács, 'The problem of continuity between the 1920 numerus clausus and post-1938 anti-Jewish legislation in Hungary', *East European Jewish Affairs,* 35/1 (2005), 23–32; J. Wittenberg, 'External Influences on the Evolution of Hungarian Authoritarianism', in A. Costa Pinto and A. Kallis (eds.), *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 226–7.
56. M. Levene, *Annihilation*, Vol. II: *The European Rimlands, 1939–1953* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 271.
57. M. A. Rivelli, *La Génocide Occulté* (Paris: L'Age d'Homme, 1998), 38.
58. J. Steinberg, 'Types of Genocide? Croatians, Serbs and Jews, 1941–5', in D. Cesarani (ed.), *The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 179; J. Steinberg, *All or Nothing: The Axis and the Holocaust, 1941–1943* (London: Routledge, 2002), 29.
59. R. Yeomans, *Visions of Annihilation: the Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism, 1941–1945* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013), 345–64.
60. C. Iordachi, 'Fascism in Southeastern Europe: a comparison between Romania's Legion of the Archangel Michael and Croatia's Ustasha', in R. Daskalov and D. Rushkova (eds.), *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*, Vol. II: *Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions* (Amsterdam: Brill, 2013), 392–4; Payne, *History of Fascism*, 317.
61. A. Kallis, 'Fascism and religion: the Metaxas regime in Greece and the "Third Hellenic Civilisation"', in M. Feldman, M. Turda, T. Georgescu (eds.), *Clerical Fascism in Interwar Europe* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2008), 23–4.

62. E. Machaira, *The Youth Organisation of the 4th of August Regime* (Athens: Historic Archive of Greek Youth, 1987); A. Rigos, *The Critical Years, 1935–1941* (Athens: Papazisis Publications, 1997; 2 vols) [both in Greek].
63. Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry, 5548 A/13/2/3, 22: K. Kollas, Ambassador in Portugal, 7.1.1941.
64. V. Bogiatzis, Μετέωρος μοντερνισμός. Τεχνολογία, ιδεολογία της επιστήμης και πολιτική στην Ελλάδα του μεσοπολέμου (1922–1940) (Athens: Eurasia, 2012), 267–9.
65. A. Kallis, 'Neither Fascist nor Authoritarian: The 4th of August Regime in Greece (1936–1941) and the Dynamics of Fascistisation in 1930s Europe', *East Central Europe*, 37/2–3 (2010), 303–30.
66. P. Mazgaj, *Imagining Fascism: The Cultural Politics of the French Young Right, 1930–1945* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2010), 33.
67. M. Dobry, 'Desperately Seeking "Generic Fascism": Some Discordant Thoughts on the Academic Recycling of Indigenous Categories', in A. Costa Pinto (ed.), *Rethinking the Nature of Fascism. Comparative Perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), 53–83.

CHAPTER 16

SOCIAL POLICY, WELFARE, AND SOCIAL IDENTITIES, 1900–1950

JULIA MOSES

The first half of the twentieth century witnessed the dramatic emergence of modern welfare states across Europe. National governments forged social policies that aimed to care for individuals from 'cradle to grave', in the words of William Beveridge, architect of Britain's leading post-war legislation in the field. Why did this transformation take form? Was this process uniform across Europe? And what did it mean for the relations between individuals and states? By 1949, British sociologist T. H. Marshall could reflect back on recent decades and declare that citizenship was no longer defined simply by political rights such as the franchise or civil rights like freedom of religion. Citizenship was now a matter of social rights: the rights to be free from hunger, disease, and perhaps even unemployment. If the nineteenth century had seen the apotheosis of negative understandings of liberty, marked by laissez-faire economic policy and moralizing rhetoric about idleness as the cause of poverty, the early twentieth century witnessed its twin: the positive view of liberty about which Isaiah Berlin wrote in 1958. This concept of liberty encouraged utopian aspirations that drew admirers across Europe and from across the political spectrum.[1] Between 1900 and 1950, liberal, conservative, and social democratic governments shared with their communist, fascist, and National Socialist counterparts a commitment to social improvement. The implications of this philosophy were enormous. On the one hand, demands for social welfare grew over the first half of the century, as did expectations for the state's beneficence. This could be seen, for example, in the writings on 'social law' in the early 1900s that would continue into the late 1940s: law was no longer seen simply as a means to ensure stability, set rules for government and politics, and stamp out crime. It was now viewed by reformers like Georges Gurvitch as a way to enable people to reach their full potential—to secure them against daily injustices at work and home alike.[2] Growing demand for change could also be seen on the street, beyond the vast tomes on social law, in workers' and women's

strikes against food prices or low wages, or for shorter workdays. On the other hand, however, individuals were met with growing claims on each other. These expectations were embodied in new legislation, for example, to produce new generations of children and to contribute to what were increasingly seen as *national* economies.

Many observers throughout this period were, of course, ambivalent about social policy. Welfare legislation stood at the core of a broader debate about what liberalism should resemble in a period that many people thought of as 'modern'. Should 'modern' states be technocratic and interventionist, using new technologies and new forms of knowledge to 'improve' society? Should they act as 'gardeners', fertilizing, weeding, and harvesting their populations?[3] Or, following a negative understanding of liberty, should states remain 'small', allowing civil society to flourish on its own? The former view had the potential to level out inequalities; the latter could ensure that merit, rather than privilege, determined the course of one's life.[4] This debate was complicated by the tumultuous political events that ensconced the Continent during the interwar years. One of the key discussions of this period focused on the welfare state as a positive counterpart to the 'warfare states' of the time. However, some associated social policy with excessive state power and even 'authoritarianism'. The left-wing revolutions across central and eastern Europe after the First World War and the rise of the Soviet Union, and the growth of political fascism in Italy, Germany, and elsewhere certainly contributed to this view. In the Weimar Republic, for example, the term 'welfare state' was used pejoratively in order to criticize policy ideas.[5]

Despite conflicting points of view about the scope and implementation of social policy, a common pattern came to characterize the development of welfare legislation in Europe over the first half of the twentieth century, and it can be detected across ideological divides and over political turning points such as 1914 and 1945. It was marked by this struggle over the boundaries of liberalism and the role of the state when imagining the future. To be sure, welfare remained (by and large) a local, communal, and commercial matter across Europe during the first half of the twentieth century. Friendly societies, trade unions, and workers' mutual aid societies continued to predominate, and the central state played a peripheral role throughout much of this period.[6] By 1950, however, as Mark Mazower has argued powerfully, planning for a better future became the key motivation behind social welfare, and it ran from the British Isles across Europe, from Spain north to Norway and east to the USSR.[7]

This perspective challenges several predominant stories about social policy and the rise of the welfare state in twentieth-century Europe. Many scholars have argued that social policy in the early twentieth century stemmed from industrial and political modernization. Industrial modernity, characterized by factory work, male breadwinners, and urban living, created new social problems that required novel solutions, such as laws on public health, free and compulsory schooling to train up new generations of workers, and policies that encouraged people to continue having families. At the same time, political modernization, marked by the rise of mass democracy and professional governmental bureaucracies, facilitated the adoption and implementation of new social policies. Certainly, statistics point to the parallel rise of industrialization and 'welfare

states' across Europe, which have been characterized by legislation targeting work, health, and the family, with the central state playing a greater role in funding or directly providing social services.[8] According to this view, groups within civil society—such as philanthropic organizations, trade unions, and the Church—gradually withdrew from the social arena as the state took on these new tasks.[9] Recent research has added to this account of modernization by emphasizing the growth of transnational and international communication about social problems and policy. As Daniel Rodgers and others have shown, modern technologies not only bred new kinds of social ills. Steamships, telegraphs ,and other innovations also enabled social reformers and politicians to share ideas about solving those problems. By the mid-twentieth century, transnational and international communication about social policy transcended mere dialogue: new international bodies such as the World Health Organization, the United Nations, and the International Labour Organization created binding conventions that determined how states could act. Modernization not only contributed to welfare states; it contributed to a new international welfare order.[10]

An alternative story has emphasized the role of interest groups in pushing for specific policies. For many scholars, it was the success of the political left, social democracy, and the demands of workers (and, occasionally, of Christian Democrats) that determined whether a country adopted welfare legislation as a corrective to the shadow-side of modern capitalism. For others, it was the middle classes or business owners who played the major role in staking out claims to social policy that would serve their own interests. European social legislation has often been broken down into particular constellations or typologies that connect specific interest groups with welfare regimes. In Gøsta Esping-Andersen's influential formulation, for example, economics, religion, and voting patterns contributed to the rise of conservative, social democratic, and liberal welfare states across Europe.[11] A much older account of the rise of European welfare states emphasizes social integration as an outcome of the battle between these competing interests. According to this argument, welfare was seen by contemporaries as a means to integrate potentially discordant groups, and especially the working classes, in light of the onslaught of modern capitalism. This view of welfare states was echoed, for example, as early as the 1890s in the sociologist Émile Durkheim's analysis of the effects of modern capitalism on social structures.[12] This classic story about welfare as a tool for social integration often points to the role of Otto von Bismarck, the first chancellor of unified Germany, who introduced social insurance in part as a means to stave off working-class unrest and the popularity of the growing Social Democratic Party. From this integrationist perspective, the rise of welfare policy has often been seen as a success story. Numerous accounts detail the rise of progressive, beneficial, and inclusive 'welfare states' in the first half of the twentieth century. Although it can be applied to imperial Germany, this version of the past is most often associated with the British welfare state and the 'universalist' system that is often associated with post-war Scandinavian countries.

This chapter suggests that an emphasis on integration and community did, indeed, characterize European social policies in the early twentieth century, and it chimed

with demands for positive liberties and utopian aspirations for social improvement. Nonetheless, the relative emphasis on individual and community varied across Europe over the first half of the century, following developments in the economy, the experiences of war, and political change. Moreover, this focus on integration and community, and the quest for an ideal future, held the potential to be both oppressive and exclusionary. To be sure, social policy was employed during this period to stave off the worst effects of economic crisis in the early 1930s, yet it also served as a tool to cast out those seen as 'undesirable' in society—whether the 'mentally deficient' in Britain; 'gypsies' across Europe; or homosexuals, the disabled, and Jews in Nazi Germany. This chapter highlights two related themes that reveal these complexities: work and population politics.

Social policy in early twentieth-century Europe connected work and family in new ways. Amidst growing international rivalries and nationalist sentiment, populations were increasingly seen as sources of labour and military power that could be harnessed by Europe's nation states and empires alike. Sexologists and other new social scientists of this era, social workers and education specialists, reformers associated with the Church, and local governmental and new national welfare schemes came together in this common goal. Whether supported by members of the political Right or Left, social policy across Europe in the first half of the twentieth century sought to encourage economic growth and the health and productivity of population groups that were seen as especially worthy. In many ways, this was the age when biology became political, carving out the new form of biopolitics about which Michel Foucault has written. There were certainly individuals who reacted against these trends, and local and regional variations in how these attitudes and practices took form.[13] Nonetheless, the repercussions for the relationship between individuals and the communities in which they lived were tremendous—and held the potential to be fatal.

Organizing Capitalism

Social policy was hardly an innovation of the years after 1900 in Europe. Legislation related to social problems can be traced at least to the early modern period in Britain, the German states, and elsewhere, where poor laws endowed paupers with aid, usually on the condition that they were members of the local community where they sought benefits. Church-based philanthropy, as well as social provisions provided through guilds and other workers' organizations, was also widespread prior to the twentieth century. By the 1880s, the seeds of early welfare states had been sown. These were characterized by the redistribution of cash, usually through social insurance that assisted workers in times of unemployment, illness, or old age; provision in kind, such as education; and indirect benefits, such as tax credits and deductions for health- and childcare. What was novel about the policies that began in the 1880s was their focus on workers. While earlier

social policy dealt with broad problems associated with poverty and focused on a small population of paupers, welfare at the dawn of the twentieth century was clearly anchored in labour. As Robert Castel has noted, wage relations set the tone for the expansion of social policy during this period.[14] Welfare legislation was preventive in nature, seeking to master the ebbs and flows of markets under modern capitalism. As the product of wage labour, modern welfare relied on workers to contribute to social insurance funds that could assist them if they fell on hard times. In principle, the policy was universal, applying to the whole community of wage labourers rather than merely the poor. In practice, it focused on male breadwinners, relegating women and children to the category of dependants. Moreover, the social insurance of the late nineteenth century targeted industrial trades, neglecting the vast agricultural landscape that still characterized much of Europe into the early twentieth century. For example, the majority of the former Austrian Empire remained rural after its collapse in 1918, which had profound implications for the creation of new welfare states in Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

Social insurance was an attractive policy during this period because it sidestepped the more contentious, and potentially more costly, issue of *preventing* sickness, accidents, and unemployment. Controlling workplaces and markets was more difficult, for governments and employers alike, than addressing the aftermath of poorly ventilated factories and accidents. Social insurance also seemed preferable, at least to employers, to costly lawsuits for workmen's compensation. Insurance solutions, both state and private, were able to solve these thorny issues without greatly challenging the principles of economic liberalism that proved triumphant in the nineteenth century. Germany's social insurance from the 1880s is often seen as the forerunner of modern European welfare states. The programme included sickness insurance (1883), accident insurance (1884), and disability and old-age pensions (1889) that supplemented Germany's minimal labour legislation from 1878, which set safety regulations and provided for factory inspections. The policies provided a model with international appeal. Austria followed suit soon afterwards with an analogous social insurance scheme, and even rural Finland and Russia created accident insurance policies in 1895 and 1912. By 1916, twelve countries across Europe had introduced accident insurance. Sickness, old-age, and unemployment insurance was, by contrast, more scattered and usually introduced after some delay. Nonetheless, by 1946, most European states had introduced pension schemes for accidents, sickness, and old age, even if only a minority offered unemployment coverage. Maintaining the delicate balance between economic liberalism and social peace perhaps accounted for the centrality of accident compensation before 1914. However, social protection was gradually expanded to non-wage situations, especially when it could still be considered economically beneficial. For example, sickness benefit was seen as a means to assist workers in recovering their strength so they could return to work, and old-age pensions were a means to replace older workers with their younger, and potentially more productive, counterparts. As John Pickstone has noted, social insurance conformed to a general 'productionist' trend in medicine that characterized the twentieth century.[15]

The productionist spirit behind social insurance was, of course, not the only reason for its popularity during this period. The policy found so many advocates across Europe because it was propagated widely through the many international conferences and journals devoted to the 'social question' from the 1890s. Recent scientific disciplines—such as statistics and industrial medicine—and new professions—such as factory inspectors and engineers—played key roles in circulating information about these early measures of European welfare states. They met, for example, through the International Statistical Institute, which had been established in 1885 in order to create a new measure for labour statistics that would later result in one of the first indices for unemployment. They also united at the International Association for the Legal Protection of Workers, which was founded at the 1900 Exposition Universelle in Paris and maintained an International Labour Office in Basel, Switzerland. The Expo itself featured lavish displays on the 'social question', including an impressive pyramid sponsored by the German government that outlined the country's successes with social insurance. These new international organizations served as clearing houses for information on social policy, publishing regular reports and, in the case of the International Association for the Legal Protection of Workers, even advocating international law to protect workers. For example, the association proposed two of the earliest international conventions on social policy in 1905, which aimed to ban working at night for women and children and the use of toxic white phosphorus in matchmaking. Mirroring these exchanges amongst the growing fleets of social policy experts were the meetings of the Socialist Second International. Founded in 1889, the Second International immediately set itself the task of shortening working hours and improving labour conditions. Beyond these international meetings and exchanges of ideas through journals, social reformers, trade unionists, and politicians alike participated in study visits to investigate social policy abroad. For example, the influential British social reformers Beatrice and Sidney Webb not only toured imperial Germany in the early 1900s, they also explored Australia when considering how to solve the problem of old-age poverty back home. For Britain, in particular, these international exchanges often extended to the empire. While social policies in the former white settler colonies of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada provided an inspiration for British reformers, colonies such as Tanganyika offered a destination for British social political exports, especially in health care.

What these early international exchanges about social policy revealed was a profound lack of agreement about what constituted the 'social question' at the turn of the twentieth century: was labour the main issue, and could social insurance solve it? This question came to a head during the First World War. As Rudolf Hilferding, the Austrian-born economist and later finance minister in the Weimar Republic, argued in 1915, by the outbreak of war, the typical small-scale industries of the nineteenth century had withered away. They had been replaced by a new system of 'organized capitalism' which was characterized by the centralization and professionalization of production, a more prominent role for the state in economic affairs, and the organization of workers and employers in powerful lobbies. The war exacerbated this trend, as employers, trade unions, and government ministries worked together in new corporatist arrangements

in order to ensure the steady production of munitions, food, and other goods necessary for the conflict. Early experiments in 'industrial efficiency'—including Taylorism and Fordism imported from the United States—denoted this transformation, which was connected to a broader agenda to modernize employer-sponsored welfare schemes in order to encourage productivity.[16] As Charles Maier has shown, these practices would continue to gain sway into the 1920s, especially in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in France and Italy, where they worked in conjunction with corporatism in order to preserve economic stability by staving off shortages and overproduction that characterized the war and early post-war era. For example, in Germany and France, industrial output had plummeted to one-third its pre-war level by 1920, and it was halved in Hungary, Poland, and Austria.[17] Maintaining the war economy and ensuring post-war stabilization therefore required a radical intervention into the labour market, marking a caesura in thinking about political economy and the scope of social policy.

Expecting More

In the context of the First World War, social policy ceased to be constrained by earlier ambivalence about departing from laissez-faire economics and negative understandings of liberalism. In order to facilitate wartime production, social policy necessarily became expansive and enabling. It shifted from focusing on *individual* breadwinners towards contemplating *national communities* forged by the experience of 'total war'. These communities were embodied, for example, in the *Union sacrée* in France and the *Burgfrieden* in Germany. The war mobilized vast new populations of workers. Women, the young, and the elderly took up employment across Europe in factories and fields, impelling governments to enact new rules on safety at work and policies on social insurance on the one hand, and contributing to growing fears about the impact of women's work on birth rates and infant mortality on the other. The dramatic death toll during the war, encompassing civilian and military populations, also sparked anxieties about a 'lost generation' that would need to be revived. At least 9 million servicemen were killed across Europe, with Serbia alone losing 40 per cent of its military and one-quarter of its total population. Many soldiers fell to disease rather than combat, and the outbreak of Spanish flu in 1918 spiked death tolls across military and civilian lines. By 1920, when the epidemic subsided, over 20 million people across the globe, and perhaps as many as 100 million, succumbed to the illness.[18]

The war also ignited an economic crisis across Europe that would last into the mid-1920s, sparking a wave of protest and experiments in social and monetary policy. The crisis was initially characterized by food shortages on the home front that, in the case of Germany and Austria, were aggravated by Britain's naval blockade in the North Sea. Daily calorie intakes plummeted during the 'hunger winter' of 1916/17 in Germany, bringing charities and public authorities in Berlin to establish mobile soup kitchens—the innovative *Gulaschkanonen* (stew cannons) that had been tested earlier in Hamburg.[19]

Consumer prices rose dramatically during the war, and would continue to do so until late 1923. Inflation—and in the case of Germany, Austria, Poland, Russia, and Hungary, hyperinflation—wiped out middle-class savings. In Germany, for example, wholesale prices rose at a rate of 335 per cent per month between August 1922 and November 1923. In other states, such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway, bank failures typified this early post-war period.[20] Wages crumbled as an outcome of inflation, hitting workers particularly hard. In Germany, average real wages dropped 55 per cent during the war, and they remained 10 per cent below pre-war levels by 1921.

Labour strikes became common across Europe from the middle of the war and extended to non-belligerents that were also suffering from the economic downturn and tense working conditions during and after the conflict. The massive influx of young, often unskilled workers to support the war effort also fuelled tensions. In some countries, including Britain, workers were emboldened to strike during the war due to their increased bargaining power and full employment, alongside anxieties about rising prices. As early as 1915, 200,000 miners in South Wales went on strike, and by 1917, France experienced its own wave of industrial action. Spain abstained from the military conflict but experienced an economic boom during the war due to its role as a supplier of provisions. In 1917, it saw 306 strikes, and the number consistently rose in subsequent years, reaching as many as 1,060 in 1920. Although major social reforms such as the eight-hour workday were introduced in response, they were unable to quell industrial unrest, especially in radical Catalonia. Even in neutral Switzerland, popular unrest increased throughout the war and peaked in November 1918 with the first and only general strike in the history of the country. In Austria, Russia, and Germany, strikes became widespread by 1916 and were characterized by demands for improved working conditions and wages. By 1918, and as early as 1917 in Russia, workers began calling for not only an end to the war but also dramatic political change.[21]

This new emphasis proved important for social policy. On the one hand, the post-war peace settlement cast a spotlight on social welfare as a means to secure political and economic stability. The outcome was the creation in 1919 of the League of Nations, which focused on the treatment of refugees, health and economic questions, and the International Labour Organization (ILO)—itself largely an outgrowth of the pre-war International Labour Office. The League of Nations and the ILO advocated new international norms on labour law and social legislation that catered not only to European states but also to their current and former colonies. For example, as early as 1921, the ILO issued an international convention to standardize compensation for workplace accidents in agriculture. In subsequent years, it targeted forced labour, the rights of migrant workers, health insurance, and unemployment. On the other hand, the war resulted in a democratic movement that transformed the nature of social policy. Across much of central, southern, and eastern Europe, the conflict resulted in revolution and the creation of new democratic republics. Moreover, the introduction of mass suffrage, including women and working-class men, ushered in a new political era in which popular demands were increasingly heard at the ballot box.

The constitutions drafted during this period reflected post-war aspirations for social improvement. As Detlev Peukert has noted, 'the principle of a welfare state and its most important concrete institutional manifestations were enshrined in the Weimar constitution'. For example, the preamble to the 1919 constitution cited 'social progress' as its primary motivation, and the document included provisions for social insurance and education. However, in keeping with the language of community that had become prevalent during the war, the constitution also demanded that individuals give back to the welfare of society by working when possible. Article 163 declared: 'Every German has the moral obligation, his personal freedom notwithstanding, to exercise his mental and physical powers in a manner required by the welfare of all.'[22] As in the Weimar Republic, in the USSR many of the demands for welfare legislation were met. Lenin had been lobbying for social insurance in Russia since the early 1900s, and a version of his vision was put into practice following the revolution in 1917. Just five days after the seizure of power, the Bolshevik government announced a groundbreaking new social insurance programme. Although the scheme was realized only in a piecemeal fashion over subsequent decades, workers were nonetheless expected to give back to society in return for what they had earned. As Article 12 of the Soviet constitution of 1936 put it, 'Work in the USSR is a matter of duty and honor for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."'[23]

These requirements to work were unrealistic for the millions of veterans who returned from the war physically and psychologically broken. In fact, social policy across Europe in the 1920s focused largely on relief for war veterans as well as for widows, orphans, and displaced persons. In Czechoslovakia, for example, over 700,000 'war victims'—mostly widows and orphans—received state allowances during this period. New international organizations such as the International Save the Children Union, which had been set up in Geneva in 1919, also catered to these groups. In both Britain and Germany, as Deborah Cohen has shown, voluntary organizations and government agencies offered relief for war veterans, assisting with genuine need and, especially in Weimar Germany, feeding into calls for further social rights.[24] These demands resulted in Britain in an extensive programme of public housing—'homes fit for heroes'—in 1919. However, conflicts surrounding wages and working conditions, which culminated in the General Strike of 1926, and the many gaps in health care that persisted since Britain introduced a system of National Insurance in 1911 seemed to require further social legislation. Following lobbying by the Labour Party and the Socialist Medical Association, as well as the investigation by a Royal Commission between 1924 and 1926, health insurance was gradually extended, though it remained far from comprehensive. Similarly, France's mixed welfare system, which continued to rely largely on mutual funds, finally saw an overhaul after the war, with the introduction of a comprehensive social insurance system, covering old age, maternity, illness, and disability, in 1928. The new law was, to a certain extent, an outcome of the war itself. Alsace-Lorraine, which had been acquired from Germany in the peace settlement, offered a comprehensive package of social legislation that was coveted across France.[25]

The many new states founded during this period also sought to address the growing demands of demobilized soldiers, workers, and others through new social legislation. It was in 1927, in the Weimar Republic, for example, that Germany saw the adoption of its first policy on unemployment insurance and the vast expansion of public housing. While Liberal Italy had inaugurated several social insurance policies prior to the war, it was the new Fascist government that spearheaded the comprehensive Charter of Labour in 1927 and health insurance in 1929. By 1938, 73 per cent of the workforce in social democratic Czechoslovakia had health insurance. The immediate post-war years saw perhaps the most radical change. For example, the provisional government in Poland ushered in health insurance, following the old Bismarckian model, as early as 1919. In the same year, the Hungarian Soviet Republic placed social insurance at the forefront of its agenda. Although the Hungarian political experiment soon collapsed, Hungary nonetheless expanded social policy in subsequent years. Between 1920 and 1930, there was an 83 per cent increase in the number of people eligible for pensions. Similarly, Poland continued to consolidate its welfare state throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s, culminating in unification laws under the *Sanacja*, the centrist quasi-dictatorship, between 1933 and 1935. The percentage of the population covered by pensions quadrupled between 1925 and 1938.[26] By contrast, Spain saw a more modest development of social policy during this period. Under García Prieto's Liberal government of 1922, new legislation focused primarily on labour arbitration, a policy that was carried forward following Primo de Rivera's coup in 1924.

Much of the social legislation introduced during the interwar years reflected the changing nature of the economy, with the rapid shift from rural landscapes to industrial, urban work. By 1930, for example, less than half of the Spanish workforce was agricultural, and the agrarian reforms of the Second Republic brought about new sources of conflict, bringing workers to demand higher salaries and more employment rights.[27] Similarly, the New Economic Policy begun after the civil war in Russia resulted in the overhaul of farming, which later peaked under the Soviet Union's five-year plans. Eight and a half million peasants flooded urban labour markets during the first five-year plan alone, and the insured population jumped accordingly, from 10.9 million in 1929 to 25.6 million in 1936.[28] While some of the land reforms during this period, such as those in Greece, resulted from fears about rural radicalism, changes to the agricultural economy also reflected a global crisis in productivity in the mid-1920s. The global surplus of food, and especially wheat, resulted in deteriorating conditions for farmers across Europe. However, many rural workers remained insulated from these European and global trends. In Serbia, great estates were broken up and redistributed to peasant farmers. While social insurance reached a third of workers by the end of the 1920s, the vast majority of the population still worked the land and escaped the reach of this policy.[29]

When the global economic depression began to unfold in earnest around 1931, in the wake of the October 1929 Wall Street Crash, many expectations of the early post-war years remained unmet. States across Europe had unrolled new social legislation throughout the 1920s, assuaging demands for better housing, working hours, and pensions. However, many of these policies proved too ambitious, and cost-cutting during

the slump required curtailing promising new programmes. For example, in the Weimar Republic, the Imperial Youth Welfare Law of 1922 created reform schools and other special educational provisions. Due to financial cuts, the policy was amended in 1932 so that children in reform schools were released before they even reached the age of majority.[30] Although it had resulted in cuts to some areas of social legislation, like Weimar's youth welfare programmes, the financial crisis nonetheless confirmed policymakers' decision to abandon a laissez-faire approach to society and economy. 'Planning' became the key term from the 1930s. It had already emerged in Russia's five-year plans and could be traced in Weimar's ample social legislation. However, the fact that unemployment rates skyrocketed in the late 1920s and 1930s brought many states to follow radical new economic ideas. These were espoused, for example, in John Maynard Keynes's 1936 *General Theory of Money, Interest and Employment*. Between 1930 and 1938, unemployment averaged 26.6 per cent in Norway, 21.8 per cent in Germany, and 14 per cent in Belgium, with unskilled men hit hardest in each country. In some regions, such as Wales, unemployment reached a staggering 36.5 per cent in 1932.[31] Public works programmes like the German Workers' Front sought to stimulate national economies and create new jobs for these workers, who contributed to vast infrastructural projects, building dams and motorways. Elsewhere, insurance was adopted as a means to address unemployment, as was the case in Norway in 1938.

By catering to the unemployed and investing in public works, the social legislation of the Depression built on the long-standing trope of community that had become prevalent during the First World War and that was echoed in the Weimar and Soviet constitutions. For example, the Norwegian law on old-age pensions from 1937 was universal in principle, in that it did not require means-testing. However, it was exclusionary in nature, casting out citizens who had lived abroad and people deemed drunkards, vagrants, or beggars. Norway's social insurance schemes of this era targeted only the *skötsemma arbetare* (respectable workers), revealing the limits of 'community' amidst financial crisis.[32]

Engineering Populations

The social policies of the 1920s and 1930s revealed new boundaries of the 'sayable' and the 'doable' in politics.[33] When it came to addressing the family, biological thinking took centre stage during these years. Social legislation had targeted the family prior to the First World War, and it already featured a social Darwinian edge. Maternalism, 'the exaltation of motherhood as the woman citizen's most important right and duty', brought together socialists, sex reformers, and Christian voluntary organizations as early as the 1890s to call for new policies that would encourage healthy children and mothers alike. The French League for the Rights of Women (1892), the Belgian League for the Rights of Women (1893), the moderate German League of German Women's Associations (1896), and the more radical German League for the Protection of Mothers (1904) were but

a few of the many women's groups that began advocating the reform of laws on marriage and the family during this period. These groups formed part of a larger international movement that was mobilized by figures such as Ellen Key, the popular Swedish author who lobbied for equality in marriage and the rights of single mothers and illegitimate children.[34] They also contributed to a broader discourse including advocates of the Briton Francis Galton's Eugenics Education Society (1907), the American Charles B. Davenport's Eugenics Record Office (1910) at Cold Spring Harbor, and later the Russian Eugenics Office (1921). These diverse groups signalled a growing consensus across Europe that populations needed to be managed with effective policy. 'Eugenics' fitted neatly into this belief. The movement proved enormously appealing, incorporating statisticians, physicians, and the growing group of researchers into human sexuality. It also drew from women's groups, conservatives, and socialists alike.[35]

Calls for the rights of mothers and children were able to gain traction during this period due to widespread anxieties about birth rates and infant mortality, on the one hand, and the 'quality' of the population, on the other. Amidst growing international rivalries and nationalism in the years leading up to the First World War, population decline was able to evoke a moral panic. For example, in Denmark in 1901, as many as one in five babies born to unmarried mothers died in their first year. In Italy, an astonishing 37.5 per cent of children placed in orphanages—who were mostly illegitimate—died by age 1. In France, pro-natalism became a national ethos after the defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. In the forty years from 1871 to 1911, the French population rose by 8.6 per cent—a sharp contrast to the 60 per cent increase in neighbouring Germany. In Britain, the disastrous performance in the Boer War (1899–1902) also fuelled debate about 'improving' the population. The Report of the Inter-departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration (1904) found that poor nutrition in childhood had created a generation of weak recruits. Several legislative reforms resulted from these early initiatives. In Britain, free school meals were introduced in 1906, and, in Norway, which granted women the vote in 1913, a new policy on the status of illegitimate children was adopted just two years later. Alarm about *dénatalité* in France resounded across the political spectrum, resulting in extra-parliamentary commissions on depopulation in 1901 and 1912 and the introduction of modest allowances in 1913 for needy families with four or more children.[36]

After the First World War, population policy became more prevalent across Europe. Fears about population health were exacerbated during the conflict. Growing numbers of working women sparked new anxieties about the effects of work—especially when it involved exposure to toxic chemicals like TNT—on reproduction. The end of the conflict also brought new concerns about a generation of widows who would never remarry and about the liberated single women who preferred work and the lifestyle of the 'new woman' of the 1920s to the maternal icon of the nineteenth century. For example, as early as 1915 in Britain, the Queen's Work for Women Fund, a philanthropic organization, aimed to retrain female workers so that they could become good mothers by learning how to make cots for babies and baby clothes as well as meals. In 1917, the Ministry of Labour followed suit, running a scheme in which female factory workers learned how

to manage a household.[37] Despite widespread worries that women had unlearned how to be mothers and wives during the war, marriage numbers increased across Europe in the 1920s and continued to rise in subsequent decades. In many ways, post-war societies turned to the family as a bastion of security after years of unrest. The growing emphasis on the family could be seen, for example, in the constitution of the Weimar Republic, which identified marriage as the 'foundation both of family life and of the nation's preservation and growth'.[38] The new independent Republic of Ireland followed suit in its constitution of 1937, declaring that 'the state shall … endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obligated by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home'. Eight years earlier, Ireland emulated many of its European counterparts in adopting a 'marriage bar'—a ban on work for married women in certain sectors like the civil service and the post office—as a means to ensure that, for women, family came first.[39]

The 'population question' brought states across Europe together in promoting innovative new social legislation after the war. This could be seen in Britain's maternity and child welfare legislation from 1918 and the subsequent fall in infant mortality. It was also evident in Weimar's Imperial Youth Welfare Act of 1924, which attempted to address fears about growing hooliganism and lawlessness amongst young people. The 'population question' came most clearly to the forefront in Benito Mussolini's 'Battle for Births' in Italy in 1927, which had been inaugurated shortly after the establishment of ONMI, the Opera Nazionale per la protezione della maternità ed infanzia (National Organization for the Protection of Motherhood and Infancy). ONMI sought to establish state-financed soup kitchens, nurseries, and milk dispensaries that would be teamed with health care and educational advice. Even if it only extended to Italy's urban residents and was limited by constrained budgets, the scheme denoted a sea change in the state's involvement in the everyday lives of its citizens. Just one year later, Mussolini attempted to stamp out 'voluntary infecundity' with a celibacy tax. This shift in emphasis was less bombastic but more effective in Sweden.[40] In 1935, the Swedish social democrats Alva and Gunnar Myrdal released their own take on the *Crisis of the Population Question*, suggesting that educational institutions could be used to encourage marriage and childbearing. At the same time, however, they recommended a form of 'rational reproduction' that would allow for birth control and abortion while also granting welfare to poor mothers and creating public housing for poor families. Many of these policies were introduced by the Swedish parliament in 1937 and 1938.

The Myrdals' emphasis on planning resonated with a broader movement that connected anxieties about the family with questions of political economy. Already in the late 1920s, amidst the economic crisis of the Depression, Weimar social reformers noted that the vast expenses of welfare institutions such as mental hospitals and prisons could be curbed by sterilizing patients. While unproductive 'degenerates' should be deterred from breeding, argued geneticists like Richard Goldschmidt in 1927, groups like the Imperial League for Child Rich Families declared that the 'fit and healthy' should be encouraged with policies like parental insurance. In Britain, the Eugenics Society began advocating voluntary sterilization during this period, and sterilization laws were passed

in Denmark (1929), Norway (1934), and Sweden (1935). Several years earlier, in 1913, Britain's Mental Deficiency Act took another tack to solve the problem of passing on 'undesirable' characteristics: it allowed for the easy confinement of the 'feeble-minded', usually working-class women, in mental institutions. The National Socialist Law to Prevent Hereditarily Sick Offspring (1933) was part and parcel of this trend. The policy had, in fact, first been proposed—albeit as a voluntary measure—in 1932 by physicians in the Weimar Republic. The sterilization law targeted nine 'diseases' that had long been perceived as responsible for birth defects, including blindness, deafness, epilepsy, alcoholism, and feeble-mindedness.

National Socialist 'racial hygiene', with its ban on mixed marriage with Jews in 1935 and obsession with *Sippenhaft* (kin liability), in many ways proved exceptional. The easy slip from voluntary sterilization to compulsion and, ultimately, to outright 'euthanasia' for 'degenerate' populations, including disabled children and inmates of concentration camps, was a uniquely National Socialist approach to social policy (even if illegal euthanasia had begun in secret in Germany already in the late 1920s).[41] Nonetheless, the emphasis on radical biological interventions as part of social policy was hardly unique to Nazi Germany. In 1908, for example, the Norwegian Women's National Council petitioned parliament to take the revolutionary step of requiring premarital health certificates, and French feminists followed suit twenty years later with a similar lobby. For these women's groups, the introduction of health screening before marriage was seen as a means to ensure that prospective spouses were not only free from illnesses that were perceived to be hereditary, but also from venereal diseases such as syphilis, which had been the subject of a moral panic at the turn of the century. For those on the political left, therefore, eugenics posed a tool to create new utopias where social problems could be snuffed out with the aid of science, helping individuals and freeing up overburdened welfare schemes.[42] Moreover, the National Socialist emphasis on the importance of family in contributing to the *Volksgemeinschaft* (people's community) reflected a broader consensus across Europe during the interwar years that communal obligations transcended individual rights and needs.[43] This sentiment was embodied, for example, in the *Folkhemmet* (people's home) ideology that underpinned Sweden's Social Democratic welfare reforms from the mid-1930s. In many ways, this understanding of community survived the Second World War, laying the foundation for the 'welfare states' that are often associated with the years after 1945.

Building Utopias

In 1941, the chief of the ILO's Social Insurance Department, Oswald Stein, claimed that 'a few years ago social security was little more than a slogan, a bare outline of an idea; today the slogan stands for a wide-visioned, constructive programme; and tomorrow the programme will have become an accomplished fact if humanity remains free and follows the road of progress'.[44] By the early 1940s, social policy across Europe had come

to touch upon the workplace and the home. It had moved from the domains of the indigent, who had been covered by outdated poor laws, and of the breadwinners, who had contributed to exclusive social insurance funds, to the centre of public policymaking. Stein's emphasis on social security rather than social insurance was indicative of this transformation. The neologism, which gained prominence following the US Social Security Act of 1935, went hand in hand with the other positive buzzword of this period: the welfare state.[45] The focus had shifted from individuals in the nineteenth century to communities in the interwar years. Following the radical social political schemes of the Depression and the shocking results of National Socialist innovations in social policy, the language of welfare shifted again. The interwar trope of community had been inherently exclusionary: a community is bounded, casting aside everyone beyond its walls. The terminology favoured during the 1940s was universalism. The ILO's Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention of 1952 reflected this transition: it was the first international law on social policy that was universal in scope, extending beyond individual industries and sectors of the workforce.

It is easy to overemphasize the novelty of the 'welfare states' after 1945. The war itself, as the sociologist Richard Titmuss argued in his 1950 *Problems of Social Policy*, seemed to create a new social order that fostered the creation and funding of universal welfare programmes. As Titmuss noted, 'damage to homes and injuries to persons were not less likely among the rich than the poor and so … the assistance provided by the Government to counter the hazards of war carried little social discrimination, and was offered to all groups in the community'.[46] Numerous scholars have pointed to William Beveridge's *Report* from 1942 as laying the map for the post-war construction of comprehensive social services. It sought to link economic policy by providing full employment, which Beveridge saw as a form of 'welfare' policy that could combat family poverty, alongside universal measures for basic subsistence, health care, and family endowments. In many ways, it embodied the Keynesian economic philosophy and the emphasis on planning that had become so influential during the interwar years. Beveridge's 1942 *Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services*, as well as his *Full Employment in a Free Society* from 1944, found admirers across Europe, inspiring social reformers in Scandinavia and Italy alike. Moreover, the 1941 Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill during the height of the war, seemed to inaugurate a sea change in thinking about social policy as a means to ensure social harmony. It sought to create 'common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world'. Amongst these aims was 'securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security'. With its Philadelphia Declaration of 1944, the ILO followed suit in espousing this goal. As Alain Supiot has observed, the document synthesized the 'spirit of the age', which was characterized by the conviction that social improvement could be carried out through measures to promote equality and security for all.[47]

It was, however, continuity that characterized the period immediately after the war. To be sure, Britain vastly expanded its school system in 1944 and overhauled National Insurance and created a National Health Service in 1946. It also inaugurated

a new system of National Assistance in 1948 that marked the end to the country's ancient poor law. The new policies were universal in scope, based on general taxes, which had risen considerably during the war, as well as workers' and employers' contributions from salaries. In France, like Britain, social provision was also expanded after the war. In 1942, French social reformers, including Pierre Laroque, met regularly in London to begin planning post-war welfare reforms that were influenced by both the Beveridge Plan and the New Deal's Tennessee Valley Authority. In 1945, Laroque became the new head of the Direction Génerale de la Sécurité Sociale and declared three aims for France's welfare system: 'democratization, national solidarity and rationalization'. However, Laroque's goal to create a unified system of social insurance fell flat in the face of middle-class resistance and a profound institutional legacy left by 'employers, mutual society leaders, pro-natalists and others between the wars'.[48] Similarly, Britain's new system of social welfare was universal in coverage and comprehensive in scope, though it offered minimal benefits and stingy pensions. In many ways, Beveridge's aims echoed the liberal emphasis on 'self-help' that had characterized British social policy in the nineteenth century. As Pat Thane has noted, 'the [post-war] Labour legislation together came closer to the introduction of a national minimum than any previous government action, but it remained a minimal, residual flat-rate payment which failed to eliminate means-tested supplements from the lives of the poorest'.[49]

Elsewhere, too, social policy continued almost seamlessly after 1945. In post-Fascist Italy and Germany, the transition to Christian democracy seemed to usher in a new era in social welfare.[50] West Germany and post-war Italy continued to offer workers social insurance based on individual contributions, but they also emphasized inclusiveness, as was the case with West Germany's 1957 pension law and Italy's pension reform of 1952. In both countries, however, social policy was still characterized by a commitment to family that seemed to echo much earlier legislation, which was particularly evident in West Germany's new constitution from 1949. Similarly, the transition across Eastern Europe to communism might have inaugurated a new understanding of social welfare. However, as Tomasz Inglot has shown, the post-war welfare states of East-Central Europe also resembled their pre-1945 counterparts. On the one hand, the institutional legacy of the Austrian Empire, and the interwar Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Hungarian experiments in social policy, proved too comprehensive to overhaul radically. On the other, the Soviet Union was unable to provide a compelling new model. In fact, Czechoslovakia looked west, to Britain, where its key social reformer was based in exile during the war. However, the war itself had provoked a number of major changes in the Czechoslovakian welfare system: the mass extermination of the country's Jews and the post-war expulsion of its German population meant that their social insurance contributions and property were redistributed to the rest of the population. The Second World War also resulted in several major reforms to social insurance, including the introduction of mandatory unemployment insurance and a 75 per cent increase in disability and widows' pensions—innovations that were introduced by Reinhard Heydrich under Nazi Occupation.[51]

While many of the welfare systems after the Second World War paid tribute to universalism, they nonetheless continued to rely on commercial insurance, employers' welfare schemes, and voluntary organizations—as well as the family—to assist with social concerns. This was particularly evident in Switzerland, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, which adopted pension schemes incorporating state pensions, employers' pension plans, and commercial insurance.[52] Even in post-war Sweden, where the *Folkhemmet* vision of welfare continued to flourish, social legislation remained far from universal. In 1946, a national, flat-rate and universal pension was adopted. Nonetheless, contributions to the fund were based on income, and the pension was still supported by a means-tested supplement. While family allowances and new pensions were introduced in 1946, followed by a universal child allowance in 1947, health insurance was only made comprehensive in the late 1950s. Moreover, by the late 1960s, half the workforce still remained without unemployment insurance.[53]

The years immediately after the Second World War had marked a shift in scale and language for social policy. However, utopian visions for social improvement remained limited by political and economic constraints. Full employment and economic growth allowed many European states, like Sweden, to stretch their social nets after the war, yet their extension rested upon political consensus. Moreover, recasting the social net proved especially difficult in countries like West Germany, which saw its population transform overnight after the war as millions of expellees returned home. Not least, after the revelations of National Socialism's population policies, planning for the future had to conform to new limits of the 'sayable and doable' in social politics. In this light, the needs of the community could no longer be held *visibly* above the rights of the individual. In many states across Europe, and especially in Britain, post-war benefits were more comprehensive than ever before, and languages of solidarism and universalism had come to predominate. Nonetheless, as Mark Mazower has astutely noted, 'each epoch reacted against its predecessor: post-1918 against the individualism of mid-nineteenth-century liberalism, post-1945 against inter-war collectivism'. This observation is nowhere more pertinent than in the domain of social policy.[54]

Conclusions

The half-century between 1900 and 1950 saw the rise and fall of utopian aspirations to solve the 'social question'. What that question was, however, was open to dispute. For many, work proved central, while others pointed to birth rates and the 'quality' of the population. In any case, across Europe, social policy in the first half of the twentieth century reflected anxieties about productivity, about vibrant economies and populations that were cast in explicitly *national* terms, to be nurtured by new national legislation. To be sure, transnational movements lobbied for social reform as early as the 1900s, and international organizations gained prominence from the interwar era in pushing for universal standards in social legislation. After 1945, moreover, the creeping movement

towards European integration seemed to shift social policy either upwards, towards the realm of international regulation, or downwards, into the domain of regional economies. Nonetheless, throughout this period, the 'social' was viewed, above all, as a problem for nation states.[55] This nexus between the social and the national was unique to the early twentieth century, and it reflected a new paradigm in which people made sense of the relationship between individuals and the state. Laissez-faire understandings of self-help and individualism that characterized discussions about poverty, ill health, and inequalities in the nineteenth century were no longer tenable. New forms of knowledge about society and the economy, alongside nationalist sentiment about national economic and military strength, contributed to a sea change in the making of social policy. Across Europe, social legislation shifted from focusing on individual breadwinners to managing entire populations who were now seen as 'communities'. The language of social reform mirrored this transformation, as 'welfare states' took on a positive connotation. Even after the collapse of fascism with the end of the Second World War and the introduction of a new swathe of 'universal' social legislation, Europe's welfare states were unable to shake off their communal heritage. From east to west, and north to south, European states continued to cultivate their 'gardens' with carefully planned social policy.

* This chapter began as a joint project with Professor Matthieu Leimgruber (University of Zurich), who has been a source of inspiration and constructive criticism throughout the writing process. I am enormously grateful to Matthieu for inviting me to join the project in the first place and for his generosity, astute insights, and immense knowledge of the historiography. I am also grateful to Pat Thane for her judicious reading of this chapter.

Notes

1. Jose Harris, 'Political Thought and the Welfare State, 1870–1930: An Intellectual Framework for British Social Policy', *Past and Present*, 135 (1992), 116–41.
2. Georges Gurvitch, *Le Temps présent et l'idée du droit social* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1931).
3. Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 13, 18.
4. Harold Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), 6–7.
5. Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, 'The Historical Core and Changing Boundaries of the Welfare State', in Flora and Heidenheimer (eds.), *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (1981; New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2003), 17–36, at 19.
6. Marcel van der Linden (ed.), *Social Security Mutualism: The Comparative History of Mutual Benefits Societies* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1996).
7. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 203–6, 267–8.
8. Peter Flora and Jens Alber, 'Modernization, Democratization and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe', in Flora and Heidenheimer (eds.), *The Development of Welfare States*, 37–80.
9. Abram de Swaan, *In Care of the State: Health Care, Education, and Welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988).

10. Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1998); Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux (eds.), *Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
11. Claus Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, ed. John Keane (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); Peter Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State, 1875–1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Isabela Mares, *The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
12. Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society* (1893), ed. Steven Lukes (2nd edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013).
13. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1–2, 60–76. Critiques and adumbrations of 'biopolitics': 'Forum on Soviet Modernity and Steven Kotkin's Magnetic Mountain', *Contemporary European History*, 23/2 (2014), 167–236.
14. Robert Castel, *Les Métamorphoses de la question sociale: Une chronique du salariat* (1995; Paris: Flammarion, 1999).
15. John Pickstone, 'Production, Community and Consumption: The Political Economy of Twentieth-Century Medicine', in Roger Cooter and John Pickstone (eds.), *Companion to Medicine in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 2000), 1–21.
16. Jennifer Klein, *For All These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America's Public–Private Welfare State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
17. Charles S. Maier, 'Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European Ideologies and the Vision of Industrial Productivity in the 1920s', *Journal of Contemporary History* 5/2 (1970), 27–61; Charles H. Feinstein, Peter Temin, and Gianni Toniolo, *The European Economy between the Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 61.
18. Hew Strachan, *The First World War: A New History* (2003; London: Simon and Schuster, 2014), xvii–xviii, 154, 160; John M. Barry, *The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History* (2004; London: Penguin, 2009), 4; Leslie Benson, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 21.
19. Belinda J. Davis, *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 137–45.
20. Feinstein et al., *The European Economy*, 40–4.
21. Dick Geary, *European Labour Protest, 1848–1939* (1981; London: Methuen, 1984), 137–8; Julián Casanova and Carlos Gil Andrés, *Twentieth-Century Spain: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 67.
22. Detlev Peukert, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity* (1987; New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 130–2.
23. Quoted in Gaston V. Rimlinger, *Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America and Russia* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), 255.
24. Tomasz Inglot, *Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919–2004* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 64–5; Deborah Cohen, *The War Come Home: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914–1939* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001).
25. Paul V. Dutton, *Origins of the French Welfare State: The Struggle for Social Reform in France, 1914–1947* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 90–5.
26. Inglot, *Welfare States*, 66, 84, 89, 99–100.

27. Casanova and Andrés, *Twentieth-Century Spain*, 79, 91, 119.
28. Rimlinger, *Welfare Policy*, 280.
29. Benson, *Yugoslavia*, 51.
30. Peukert, *The Weimar Republic*, 146.
31. Feinstein et al., *The European Economy*, 132–4.
32. Mary Hilson, *The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945* (London: Reaktion, 2008), 94–5.
33. Willibald Steinmetz, *Das Sagbare und das Machbare: Zum Wandel politischer Handlungsspielräume: England 1780–1867* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1993).
34. Ann Taylor Allen, *Feminism and Motherhood in Western Europe, 1890–1970: The Maternal Dilemma* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 8, 45.
35. Daniel J. Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (1985; 2nd edn, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
36. Allen, *Feminism*, 51, 59; Susan Pedersen, *Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France, 1914–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 59–77.
37. Deborah Thom, *Nice Girls and Rude Girls: Women Workers in World War I* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 122–43, 171.
38. Quoted in Peukert, *The Weimar Republic*, 131.
39. Quoted in Allen, *Feminism*, 158.
40. Maria Sophia Quine, *Italy's Social Revolution: Charity and Welfare from Liberalism to Fascism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 129–72.
41. Paul Weindling, *Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 441–3, 504–5, 522–5.
42. Allen, *Feminism*, 105–6.
43. On National Socialist understandings of the concept, see Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto (eds.), *Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering & Private Lives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
44. Quoted in Gerry Rodgers, Lee Swepston, Eddy Lee, and Jasmien Van Daele, *The International Labour Organization and the Quest for Social Justice, 1919–2009* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 150.
45. Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds.), *Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Transnational and Comparative Perspectives* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014).
46. Richard M. Titmuss, *Problems of Social Policy* (London: HMSO, 1950), 506–7.
47. Alain Supiot, *The Spirit of Philadelphia: Social Justice vs. The Total Market* (London: Verso, 2012).
48. Dutton, *Origins of the French Welfare State*, 202, 208–10, 218–19; Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity*, 185–6.
49. Pat Thane, *The Foundations of the Welfare State* (1982; 2nd edn, Harlow: Longman, 1996), 238.
50. Kees van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State* (London: Routledge, 1995).
51. Inglot, *Welfare States*, 72, 75–8.
52. Matthieu Leimgruber, *Solidarity without the State? Business and the Shaping of the Swiss Welfare State, 1890–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 21–8.
53. Hilson, *The Nordic Model*, 95.
54. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 299.
55. Maurizio Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

CHAPTER 17

DISCIPLINE, TERROR, AND THE STATE

PAUL M. HAGENLOH

Introduction

It seems difficult not to equate European state systems in the interwar period with violence, particularly the three major dictatorships of the era: Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and Fascist Italy. The entire Continent was so awash with violence in the early twentieth century—world war, civil wars, labour camps, and mass repressions—that it seems reasonable to conclude that violence in all registers was the natural mode of state administration at the time, and that the particularly repressive practices carried out by these dictatorships were only the most virulent expressions of a broader mode of European statecraft that had at its core a violent programme of social transformation and control.

Interwar dictatorships were indeed violent, in ways that ranged from the mere potential to be oppressive, like the requirement to register one's place of residence with local police, to the literally mortal. But in order to assess the role of violence in European political systems, and in particular to assess the ways in which it was used by these dictatorships to control their populations, we must contextualize these practices along two important axes. Firstly, it is crucial to understand the nature of compulsion and violence in modern state systems in general, and to underscore the propensity of modern states, especially European states, to employ numerous levers of coercion and violence in order to effect fundamental changes in the social nature of the populations under their control. At the same time, we must take seriously the close relationship between civilian and military practices in the period, and we must understand the influence that three decades of nearly uninterrupted conflict (or at the very least mobilization for conflict) had on the ways that European states went about the business of administering civilian populations. 'Total war' shaped 'total war societies', which in turn supported

'totalitarian' dictatorships. Military violence, authoritarianism, and repression were all directly related in the interwar European experience.

This chapter will focus specifically on how interwar dictatorships employed violence in controlling their internal populations, concentrating particularly on authoritarian regimes but arguing that these regimes employed numerous modes of violent statecraft—surveillance, preventative detention, limitations on geographic mobility—that were prevalent across the Continent in this period, in addition to some that were unique to dictatorships. Of course authoritarian states were indeed different from democratic ones, and they varied among themselves as well, but all European states operated in a common context of war, colonialism, and social transformation, and they all participated in a related and vast expansion of their ability to respond to such disruptions by identifying, categorizing, encouraging, or suppressing individuals (and groups) within the populations under their control. Although this chapter focuses on dictatorships, it is impossible to understand those regimes without reference to the broader context.

This discussion of necessity has limitations, many of which are admittedly artificial. To begin with, I limit my discussion to the three dictatorships mentioned above, which are certainly the most important in terms of sheer destructive power but also represent the most studied among many other dictatorships on the Continent at this time, some quite repressive in their own right. I omit discussion of these societies during the two world wars, notwithstanding my claim for the importance of military practices in civilian violence, because those two periods are well treated elsewhere in this collection. To be clear, leaving out the 'war years' does not entail leaving out war entirely: military conflict raged on across the Continent even in years of 'peace', particularly in the eastern European zones contested by the new Soviet, Polish, and Ukrainian states in the early 1920s. Perhaps just as importantly, several key European states did not undergo any fundamental transition towards a peacetime footing even well into the 1920s; all three authoritarian dictatorships mentioned above took mobilization for war as one of their key policy goals as well as a unifying political message that could overcome the trying economic circumstances of the era.

At the other limit, the horrors of the Second World War, including the Holocaust, are of course related to the use of violence in the interwar period, but most historians agree that the nature and magnitude of these events demarcate them from the violence of the interwar period—though, as we will see below, this division is not so clear in the case of the USSR, where the fantastic waves of state violence that accompanied the collectivization of agriculture in the early 1930s and the 'Great Terror' later in the decade were every bit as substantial as those that took place after 1941.[1]

Such limitations notwithstanding, I argue that the outlines of a coherent set of violent state practices in Europe are visible in the years roughly bounded by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the German invasion of Poland in 1939: surveillance, denunciation, preventative detention, population registration and mobility restrictions, forced labour, extra-legal repression of political suspects, and indeed mass repression of entire swathes of domestic populations who were defined as internal 'aliens' on ethno-religious or sociopolitical grounds and targeted for expulsion or total annihilation. These related

state practices make it possible to speak profitably of a category of 'interwar European dictatorships' that is distinct from other historical forms of authoritarianism.

Surveillance and Statecraft in the Early Twentieth Century

One of the most powerful images of life under dictatorship in interwar Europe is that of the 'surveillance state', in which an all-powerful and omniscient political police, be it the Gestapo, Stalin's NKVD, or the Fascist OVRA, carefully monitors every move of atomized individuals who have absolutely no room for free expression or resistance, and not much more for free thought or even passive withdrawal. George Orwell's dystopian vision of a global totalitarian future in *1984* remains the quintessential literary depiction of this idea, with hidden cameras and two-way video screens controlled by the 'Thought Police' ferreting out every instance of even potential free thinking ('thoughtcrime'). This understanding of European dictatorships became remarkably widespread in the decades after 1945, and its Orwellian version is not terribly different in essence from the more sophisticated version proposed by Hannah Arendt and then adopted by a generation of theorists of totalitarianism, according to which these dictatorial states atomize and 'stabilize' their populations through widespread and random application of terror so that the forces of nature or history can 'race freely through mankind, uninhibited by any spontaneous human action'.[2] The problem with this approach is not that it misconstrues the importance of surveillance and control to interwar dictatorships—indeed surveillance was a crucial part of the state system in all the cases we are examining—but that it misses the complexity of surveillance practices across the Continent, the relative importance not only of surveillance but also of denunciations often freely provided, and in some cases the failures of the surveillance systems to provide accurate data to these regimes at all. Just as important, positing surveillance as a unique aspect of authoritarian dictatorships ignores the importance of the practice in modern European states in general, both in terms of gathering information and understanding diverse civilian populations and in terms of military intelligence and mobilization for 'total war' (the latter techniques often honed in colonial contexts and then transposed to the metropole).

The literature on surveillance and the modern European state is vast, and we will not be able to cover it in depth here. Two main interpretative frameworks are most important to our analysis. Firstly, there is a tradition of understanding surveillance as not merely defensive, not designed simply to protect the state from political threats, but as a key part of a constructive mode of modern statehood that seeks to identify, define, shape, and hence constrain the lived social realities of the disparate populations that reside in complex modern nation states. This tradition stretches as far back as the French Revolution but took its current theoretical shape in the work of the Frankfurt School, expanding through the works of Michel Foucault on 'governmentality' and 'biopolitics'

and culminating in the work of Zygmunt Bauman and James Scott.[3] These theorists view surveillance as part of a broader state project that seeks not only to identify and understand populations—itself a major new part of modern statecraft—but also to shape them constructively, to provide them with knowledge about themselves in order to 'discipline' them into becoming constituent parts of modern mass (in some formulations capitalist) societies. Modern states seek not only to 'see' populations, in Scott's terms, but also to enmesh individuals in the constructive process of creating modern identities that are legible and hence controllable; this self-generated knowledge, for Bauman, is one key source of the panoply of modern administrative tools that allow states to refashion or 'garden' these populations, from pro-natal policies to death camps. For Foucault, surveillance is inherently repressive; for others, such as Scott and Bauman, it is potentially repressive but actually so only in particular contexts. But for all the theorists in this tradition the drive to survey, create, and punish is inherently modern and operates well beyond the context of the authoritarian systems in which it developed to such a high degree.

Secondly, historians have recently begun to come to terms with the close connection between civilian state forms and military practices, especially in terms of the way the two came together during the cataclysmic events of the First World War. Wartime surveillance built on earlier traditions of policing and social control—the 'Black Offices' of post-Revolutionary France and the Bertillon photographic system of cataloguing political subversives—had analogues across the Continent. But during the First World War nearly all major combatants moved much further to collect massive amounts of data, particularly via perlustration, about 'public opinion' and 'mood' not only within the army but at the home front as well (itself a newly important concept in the context of total war). European states sought not only to manage the war effort but also to control the entirety of a new category of knowledge called 'public opinion'; measuring public opinion was but one step towards managing the public, a task taken up by all belligerents by the end of the war and extended without hesitation to the demobilization and, in many cases, the remobilization efforts that followed.[4] European military administrations honed these tools to understand and shape popular opinion in the midst of open conflict as well, both in the European theatre and in the colonies during and after the war. For example, British agents plumbed the depths of Turkish national movements in Anatolia through a mixture of informants, intercepts, and simple reading of the local oppositionist press, while French and British 'soldier-researchers' employed explicitly sociological and anthropological research frameworks in order to penetrate and understand Bedouin tribes in the 1920s, in the French case with the explicit goal of transforming nomads into sedentary pastoralists who would hardly look out of place just outside Paris.[5] By the end of the Great War, then, these twin strands of European statecraft had become intertwined, and indeed the distinction between 'total war' and 'mass society' had become substantially blurred: European states directed a tremendous amount of effort towards understanding, mobilizing, and homogenizing their populations in peacetime as well as war, leading one historian of Germany to speak of the creation of 'totalitarian' society well in advance of the emergence of the Nazi dictatorship.[6]

Surveillance and Repression in the USSR

In recent years, historians of the Soviet Union have taken up these theoretical traditions most enthusiastically. Although many of the above theorists were focused on the repressive tendencies inherent in modern industrial capitalism, the early Soviet command system nonetheless fits the model quite well. The Communist state, especially in its early revolutionary incarnations, was explicitly focused on the transformation not only of economic and political structures but also of the individual mentalities of each and every citizen in the political community as part of the broader refashioning of Soviet society. Hence surveillance, including both information gathering and widespread propagandizing of the acceptable social norms and the proper characteristics of the 'New Soviet Man', became a major goal of the state from its very inception. For example, the Bolsheviks focused on surveillance almost immediately upon taking power and employed by the end of the civil war some 10,000 trained officials to carry out perlustration of *all* postal correspondence, not merely to gather actionable intelligence regarding opposition but also to gauge the 'mood' of the general population and compile running reports that could serve as the basis for rational policymaking in a host of important areas.[7] This reciprocal form of intelligence gathering and active construction of social norms was most visible at the social 'peripheries' of the new Soviet Empire. In the countryside, urban officials in the 1920s struggled to understand alien rural economies and social networks, while at the same time they categorized rural residents according to their modern, class-based social schemas and forced local communities to reorganize themselves in ways legible to the state (voluntary communes, social classes overlaid on the more corporatist traditional arrangements in the countryside)—all this well before the turn to massive amounts of deadly violence in the early 1930s that forced peasants to accept, however begrudgingly, the state-owned collective farm system.[8] Much the same was true, in a different register, on the ethnic peripheries of the empire, where Russocentric Communists recast all manner of traditional social organizations—tribe, gender, religion—into a language, and a social structure, of modern social class that was visible to the central administration.[9] In the comparatively calm 1920s as well as the exceedingly violent 1930s, the Communist regime employed violence at virtually all levels of state administration, by means of excision as well as inclusion—from labour camps and political prisons to surveillance in queues and public parks, in civil as well as political police systems, educational bureaucracies, sports organizations, even urban custodial services—as part of an explicit attempt to 'sculpt an idealized image of the politicosocial body' as well as to control the vast geographic and cultural spaces it inherited from the Tsarist Empire.[10]

How extensive was this system of surveillance in the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s, and how much room did individuals have for freedom of thought and expression? The sheer scope of the Soviet surveillance system, which the new regime put into

place immediately upon taking power in 1917 and which grew rapidly thereafter, was indeed vast. The head of the political police, Nikolai Ezhov, estimated in 1936 that his State Security officers, who themselves numbered just over 25,000, maintained a complicated network of both paid and unpaid informants: each of the roughly four dozen regional police administrations employed several hundred paid full-time informants (not including the officers themselves) and several thousand particularly valuable but unpaid 'special' informants, who focused on political crime in important cities and border regions. In addition, the political police counted some 27,650 'residents' across the USSR who were responsible for coordinating informants, both political and civil, plus a network of over 270,000 'general' informants, who were unpaid and did not have direct contact with the political police but formed the front-line 'eyes and ears' of the regime.[11] The internal passport system, set up hastily in 1932 in response to the massive demographic and social dislocations caused by collectivization and famine, functioned as an additional lever of direct state power over individual behaviour. By 1935 some 27 million Soviet citizens, mostly in urban or border areas, were required to carry passport books that included information on not only identity, social class, residency, and later ethnicity, but also past criminal infractions, legal status as non-citizens (the 'disenfranchised'), and restrictions on geographic mobility for individuals deemed members of 'threatening' or 'dangerous' social strata. The Soviet civil police system was substantial as well, by mid-decade numbering roughly 150,000 officers, including 30,000–40,000 assigned to protect industrial and retail organizations.[12] In addition, virtually every Soviet bureaucratic agency that dealt with the public—retail trade organizations, the press, academic societies—maintained robust surveillance systems to gather information about their publics and to transmit this information to police and Communist Party officials. The dedication of the Soviet regime to the total transparency of its populations and to the reciprocal exchange of information between rulers and the ruled was no mere window dressing: in this respect, at least, Orwell's vision of surveillance and control is not far off the mark.

Yet historians disagree about how effective this system of surveillance really was, and about how accurate was the information flowing in both directions. These massive systems of surveillance were in many cases merely artefacts of the hyper-bureaucratization of the Soviet system—huge 'paper' organizations that in reality provided little concrete information to Soviet authorities, often ignored except when it became necessary to prove to one's superiors that the 'business of the state' was being looked after. Hence an internal political police report in 1935, for example, maintained that police in Moscow carried out little daily work with their admittedly extensive networks of informants, and that a paltry 7 per cent of cases investigated by the elite Moscow Criminal Investigations Department (itself a step above the less qualified precinct police) involved surveillance or informants in any way. The same political police chief cited above also complained in 1936 that both the civil and political police made little systematic use of surveillance in their daily work regarding civil and even political crime, leaving matters to the ad hoc preferences of individual local officers.[13] Many recent works agree that, when it was time to actually 'sculpt' the Soviet body politic through violence, the regime relied on far

more blunt instruments of social control, including mass arrests of whole categories of suspect individuals, sweeps of the homeless and juvenile delinquents from urban public spaces, and deportations of individuals falling foul of complex residence and registration laws, all often resulting in misery and death in overfilled and undersupplied labour camps but not in any positive 'reshaping' of the body politic.[14] Total surveillance may have been the aspiration of the Soviet state, but in most cases the realities of violent state administration were far more mundane, brutal, and indiscriminate.

Yet an equally vigorous strand of argument claims that the interrelated practices of information gathering and information production in the USSR did create a particularly Soviet ecosystem of possible and precluded 'mentalities', and that many (if not all) Soviet citizens did take on the identities and categories both offered and required by the state. Soviet citizens learned to 'speak Bolshevik', to take up not only the vocabularies of the new Soviet regime but also the assumptions behind them about the proper role of the individual in the great state projects being undertaken in the name of socialism. They learned to 'speak out' in not only oppositional but also 'mobilizing, self-activating' ways, which underscored the power of the Soviet state to engage even the most cynical residents of the USSR in a process of self-definition that bound them to the terms, if not ultimately the goals, of the Bolshevik project.[15]

Hence we arrive at a perhaps puzzling conclusion: the Stalinist state, long understood as the epitome of a dictatorial system based on surveillance, social atomization, and violence, was both far more extensive and far more ineffective than historians imagined before the collapse of the regime in 1991. Given that the goals of the regime, however, were not merely repression and control—given that all modern states are constructive, and that the Soviet state was involved in a wide-ranging programme to create modern identities where they only recently had come to the historical stage—perhaps we should not understand these two historical realities in opposition. The Stalinist state did indeed, following Foucault, 'discipline and punish' its populations. That the punishments were often capricious, even strategically pointless, does not detract from the constructive project of Soviet surveillance itself.

Denunciation and Control in Nazi Germany

How similar was the system of surveillance and social control in Nazi Germany? The answer that has emerged from the past three decades of robust research on life under National Socialism is, perhaps surprisingly, that the two systems are different in virtually every way: mechanisms, goals, even the levels of daily control exercised by the state. This answer is surprising, in part, because the two systems shared much of the same theoretical framing and context. Historians of late imperial and Weimar Germany have been highly influenced by Foucault and quite concerned with the propensity of the

modern German state to categorize and 'operate' on their populations; and indeed the most influential account of the collapse of the Weimar project in past decades places that era's mode of 'governmentality' squarely in a trajectory of modern surveillance, social engineering, and state control that sets the stage for Nazi dictatorship.[16] The Great War influenced German society fundamentally as well, with the German military and civilian administrations working together not only to manage the industrial war effort but also to promote 'enlightenment activity' (*Aufkärungtatigskeit*) among the population in order to transform individuals from passive subjects into active agents of a modern national state.[17]

Yet the National Socialist dictatorship emerged after an extended period of experimentation with democracy, and within a legal tradition that stressed predictability and made radical administrative change both unlikely and unnecessary in 1933. The National Socialist state, particularly in its early years, relied far less on surveillance and terror than was once assumed. In fact, German citizens by and large knew about and supported the goals and actions of the new Nazi regime, which is now often described as a majoritarian or 'plebiscitarian' dictatorship, one in which the regime shrewdly cultivated public opinion and offered ethnic Germans many reasons to support the regime's increasingly harsh policies against 'outsiders'—first socialists, then foreigners, the handicapped, and German Jews—all in the name first of restoring public order and, more insistently as the decade progressed, of creating a racially defined 'community of the people'.[18]

The lack of overt terror against most of the German population under National Socialism so contradicts popular and even early post-war scholarly accounts of the dictatorship, exemplified by the image of 'the Gestapo' exercising untrammelled authority of life and death at every moment, that it bears further discussion. It is not that the Nazi state shied away from terror against political opponents and 'social outsiders'. Immediately in 1933, and increasingly thereafter, the regime moved swiftly to suppress numerous categories of 'social aliens', including socialists, 'habitual criminals', beggars, chronic 'welfare cases', and Jews. The National Socialist Party propagandized these goals clearly and loudly both before and after 1933, and broad swathes of the population, including professional strata like civil servants and medical and justice professionals, eagerly agreed with many, if not all, of these initiatives. Cooperation between these independent actors in German society and the new Nazi authorities in defining and repressing the 'outsiders' was in fact a crucial method of cementing the support of the German population at large for the increasingly radical National Socialist state.[19] The comparison with Stalin's USSR is stark. The Stalinist state worked tirelessly to eliminate any independent social or professional organizations and laid claim to the entire right to define social reality itself; the National Socialist regime, by comparison, was more than willing to construct alliances with independent social actors, shifting and sometimes implicit though they were, in order to unify its 'plebiscitarian' dictatorial system behind its social policy goals.

Most German citizens, writes the leading expert on the topic, in fact 'had no direct confrontation with the Gestapo, Kripo [criminal police], or the concentration camps' at all; coercion was 'selective and focused' and designed not to terrorize the whole society

but to gain their tacit acceptance and even active support by repressing internal 'enemies' already on the margins of German society in some way.[20] The National Socialist state was highly developed in terms of its capacity for information gathering of other sorts, from population statistics to the medical profession to highly developed systems to register and track 'aliens' among citizens, yet in the key area of police surveillance the state was rather weak. In fact, there were comparably few officers in the infamous Gestapo in the first place: some 32,000 total employees in the organization even as of the end of 1944, of whom only 15,500 or so were 'executive officials' as opposed to office workers, labourers, and so on.[21]

How, then, did the National Socialist regime gather information and target individuals for arrest and excision from the body politic? Most current accounts point to a combination of professional practices that defined, identified, and tracked 'undesirable' populations which were then targeted by the regime, some of which predated the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, and denunciations from the population at large—freely given, spontaneous reports to authorities by individuals that might have expressed some initial distaste for the radical style of the Nazi regime but who shared the conviction that German society would never be 'regenerated' without a thorough purge of socially and ethnically 'alien' elements. For example, legal traditions in late imperial and Weimar approaches to 'habitual criminals', including increasingly popular calls for provisions for 'security confinement' for 'professionals', set the stage for the imposition without much opposition—indeed, with enthusiastic support from the legal and penal communities—of a November 1933 law that provided for *indefinite* confinement, even retrospectively, of individuals deemed 'incorrigible' (most for repeated property offences and most having spent a considerable portion of their lives in prison already). By the end of 1938 roughly 13,000 people were held in 'security confinement' in concentration camps, more than three times the 4,264 people held in camps at that time under 'state security' confinement.[22]

Much the same could be said for the National Socialist treatment of prostitutes, the disabled, and German Jews, all of whom found themselves subject to gradually more strident restrictions and registration requirements after 1933. This relentless progression was particularly evident in the legal and social position of Jewish Germans under the regime. The 'Jewish Question' was of course central to Nazi self-definition well before 1933, but the regime at first acted cautiously due to an initial lack of support (though not outright opposition) to its goals. Each step built on the previous ones: the April 1933 prohibition on Jews in all areas of civil service and the family background questionnaires that followed, the state-organized boycotts of Jewish businesses after 1933 that were vigorously supported by local populations and initiated by middle-class businessmen who wanted to take advantage of the sudden shift in their comparative advantage, even going so far as creating anti-Jewish trade organizations at mid-decade, the Nuremberg Laws that restricted marriage and citizenship rights, and the pogroms of 1938 and the rapid 'Aryanization' of the entire business community thereafter, which ended any illusions that German Jews would escape the National Socialist obsession with racial purity.[23] These and similar virulent policies were pressed by the Nazi regime in all areas of social

life, but only gradually, and only insofar as they received popular support from interest groups within German society and from the population at large. Yet measures that were too radical and provoked opposition were often back-pedalled, at least temporarily, as with the infamous mass murders of the disabled that commenced in complete secrecy in 1939, only after the beginning of war, and that were halted, at least in an organized fashion, once they became known to the public in 1941.[24]

The important role of denunciations in the National Socialist system is one of the most surprising revelations of recent historical work, and one that shows a stark contrast between the Stalinist and National Socialist systems of state control. If the Nazi administrative system, especially its feared Gestapo, was numerically smaller than that of the USSR, it was nonetheless effective, perhaps even more so, because of its ability to gain a wide range of positive responses—tacit cooperation, active participation in actions defined by the state, and spontaneous, voluntary denunciations of all kinds—from the populations it controlled. Such responses varied based on many factors, including location in the country (the Catholic south being less likely to evince active support for the regime) or the nature of the specific policies in question. But if the Gestapo was able to respond to resistance and non-compliance with overt brutality, it was able to do so because, in most instances, such action was not required; most German citizens, writes one commentator, 'convinced themselves of Hitler's advantages and the "positive" sides of the new dictatorship' and were 'pleased to see such persons [those branded as political criminals] sent off to the newly established concentration camps'.[25] In the Stalinist case, although confessions played a major part in the hermeneutics of repression and control, denunciations, at least in the period before the Second World War, played a relatively minor role in the broader system of terror, despite their overtly propagandistic value in the showy events surrounding the Party purges in the 1930s. The Soviet state intended to allow no social autonomy among non-Party groups, and hence had little need for the kind of active social participation in policing or repression that defined the Nazi system. This particular combination of state and individual coercion need not be seen as a relative weakness of the Nazi dictatorship; indeed, insofar as this sort of participation helped bind individual Germans to the larger projects proffered by the Nazi state (even if some were rejected), it certainly forms part of the broader project of creating active, modern citizens whose very identities are intertwined with the operations of the state itself.

Violence and the State in Fascist Italy

Many of these same relationships between state and society are evident in Fascist Italy, a regime that until recently has occupied something of an odd niche in the historiography of interwar Europe: that of a relatively 'benign' dictatorship that, despite its authoritarian nature and clearly anti-Semitic policies during the Second World War, helped modernize the country and promote general welfare and therefore could be seen by some as

a progressive historical force. This generally positive view of Italian Fascism overlaps with an older account that emerged even before 1945 and stresses the resistance of the Italian population to a Fascist dictatorship that, although it was unpopular, never made real inroads to the fabric of Italian society. Both interpretations, which left most Italians 'off the hook' for the horrors carried out by the dictatorship, have been shattered in the past two decades by historians that take seriously both the repressive and deadly nature of the regime and the extent to which the Fascist system, especially its repressive political police, relied extensively on active support from within the population in order to identify and subdue political enemies, social outsiders, and all manner of individuals deemed incompatible with the new Fascist order.[26]

How did the Fascist regime exercise control in Italian society, and how did that control compare to that in Nazi Germany and the USSR? Violence was of course key to the Fascist project even before the March on Rome in 1922—stylized public violence that was intended to terrorize political opponents, purify Italian society of decadent and weak liberal tendencies, aid in the spiritual mobilization of the Italian people, and help create a new *uomo fascista* for the modern era.[27] Mussolini scaled back the freedom of the infamous *squadristi* upon taking control of the state, but the newest research on the era still stresses that the entire Fascist system—the political police, the civil police, the social spaces inhabited by individuals now ranked in a hierarchy of racial and political value—was shot through with violence. Fascist institutions, including the political and civil police, not only made use of violent techniques in suppressing political opponents and other social 'outsiders' but also welcomed the general population into the same repressive processes, both expanding the reach of the state and investing ordinary Italians in the workings of the repressive system itself.

Mussolini moved after 1922 to centralize police powers and to blur the lines between 'legal' and 'squad' violence, in order to provide his regime with both a powerful system for controlling dissent and a broader landscape of violence and fear against which to effect the social transformation at the core of the Fascist movement. This trend culminated in 1926 with emergency decrees that created the Division of Political Police (Polpol) and the Division of General and Confidential Affairs, the latter of which controlled all internal political policing, including political confinement and the notorious OVRA (Opera Vigilanza e Repressione Antifascista). Together the Polpol and OVRA served as wide-ranging intelligence agencies, working like their analogues in Nazi Germany and the USSR not only to gather information on anti-fascist movements at home and abroad but also to understand and control the entirety of domestic Italian society. Fascist police gathered information not only on socialists or Communists, but also on habitual criminals, prostitutes, alcoholics, and the mentally ill (the latter categories often targeted with the help of professionals who were legally obligated to report). Recent work makes clear that this vast intelligence system was concerned with both controlling individual behaviour and gathering abstract information: Mussolini's regime was no less concerned with 'public mood' than any other modern European state.[28]

Yet the most important function of these wide-reaching police structures was to enlarge the sphere of state violence within Italian society and to make violence

a constituent part of the Fascist administrative system. The Fascist regime, notes one recent commentator, sentenced some 15,000 individuals to 'political' confinement and between 25,000 and 50,000 to 'common' confinement between 1926 and 1943, their lives broken and scattered across a 'Fascist archipelago' of labour camps, prisons, and confinement colonies throughout the Italian peninsula. Yet these sentences were only the tip of the iceberg: the state and popular violence employed to target these individuals seeped into every social nook and cranny, subjecting ordinary Italians of every background and political persuasion to a constant state of fear and intimidation. Both public and private spaces were targets of this 'ordinary violence', which was aimed not only at political opponents but increasingly across the 1930s at a whole range of individuals who stood in the way of the 'regeneration' of the national community: vagabonds, 'habitual criminals', homosexuals, suspected 'abortionists', and a host of others.[29]

Popular participation was central, furthermore, to the exercise of this 'ordinary' violence in Fascist Italy—not merely acquiescence, but active participation, including denunciations to police as well as physical confrontations in public spaces. Italian citizens were pressured to denounce members of vulnerable groups, a practice that often functioned as a lever of social power wielded by 'respectable' citizens over 'social outsiders': the stable, 'patriotic', or 'hard-working' turning against those deemed promiscuous, immoral, or lazy. Hence the structure and vocabulary of the Fascist repressive system could overlap with traditional social fissures—indeed, this overlap was one of the strengths of the system.[30] Such practices also posed dangers for the denouncers, not only in terms of simple exposure to the repressive system but also because failure to denounce could in turn be a cause for targeting by local authorities (or other denouncers). Yet the experience of Italian Jews both before and after Italy's entry into the war in June 1940 underscores how context and individual agency intertwine within a dictatorial system. Italian Jews suffered persecution at the hands of zealous 'Aryan' Italians well before 1940, who relied on discriminatory laws that restricted Jewish property and professional rights; but it was the altered context of war and German occupation that transformed such racist and often venal personal tendencies into death sentences for the Italian Jews denounced by vindictive anti-Semites.[31]

Did this level of participation translate into a particularly Fascist 'mentality', as some historians argue it did in the USSR? Research on this topic is in its infancy, perhaps still stunted by the decades-old assumption that 'average Italians' rejected the regime entirely and were coerced into submission only by force. But at least one recent commentator argues that, although most Italians found numerous aspects of the regime with which to disagree—anger at the greed of provincial bosses, distrust of Mussolini's alliance with Germany—they nonetheless found numerous emotional resonances with the Fascist project that may have been strong enough to transcend the centrifugal cultural forces mitigating against the creation of a single 'Fascist civilization'. The cult of the Duce, the widespread pride at the brutal conquest of Ethiopia in 1935–6, the resonance of the Fascist calls for moral and spiritual regeneration with the undeniably important cultural influence of the Catholic Church in Italian society—all of these arguably non-political moments of cultural integration may very well have been 'internalized to the point of

generating a desire to transcend old bourgeois and liberal habits and become attuned to the revolutionary mindset of fascism'.[32] Violent state and social practices, then, became one part of the broader cultural context in which Italian Fascism maintained both its claim to leadership and the concrete power to coerce citizens into accepting and participating in its revolutionary project.

Violence, Terror, and War

If violence was no less a constituent part of the Fascist system of administration than that of the Soviet Union, and perhaps even more so than that of National Socialism, then a very reasonable question emerges: why did Italian Fascism entail so much less overt repression of its citizens compared to the other two dictatorships? What factors mitigated against Fascist violence metastasizing into the kind of mass repression that defines Stalinism or Nazism—the Holocaust, the Gulag, the 'mass operations' of 1937–8 that resulted in roughly three-quarters of a million executions in the USSR in under two years? The most important answer is that this question gets the relevant categories wrong: Italian Fascism did indeed result in the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of individuals, but those murders occurred in colonial and military contexts rather than on the Italian peninsula. And it is here that we must return to the question of war, and to the role of military practice in helping these regimes define 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. In all three cases there is a direct relationship between, on the one hand, the kind of routine (though quite repressive) violence used by the regime on a daily basis to enforce compliance and bolster social cohesion, and on the other, the excisionary, repressive violence that emerges from the propensity of modern states to 'operate' on their populations but is often extended to non-domestic contexts. Understanding this connection, however, requires a broader analytic framework, including an appreciation of the close connections between military and civilian administration in the interwar European era.

Fascist Italy lacked an explicit drive to externalize the violence that was so crucial to its internal self-definition. Fascist violence was turned inward, to help 'purify' the national community; it had to be externalized in order to protect the Fascist experiment then this was an acceptable, though not necessarily desirable, outcome. At the same time, Italian Fascism did not, on balance, involve the same vision of hierarchical racialized utopia across Europe that drove National Socialism. Although Mussolini's regime enthusiastically aided Nazi authorities in anti-Jewish campaigns both before and after June 1940, when Italy joined the war, the reaction of both civilian and military authorities at all levels to pressure to move from ostracizing to murdering Italian Jews was uneven: in some areas such as the Italian occupation zone in the south of France Fascism could even be seen as something of a haven for Jews fleeing the National Socialists in the north and Vichy in the south.[33]

Yet Fascist practices in African colonies show just how deeply violence had become entrenched in both the practices and the culture of the dictatorship, and how far the

regime was prepared to take violent methods of rule when transposed to a context completely outside the boundaries set by domestic political traditions. Long-standing tensions in Italy's Libyan colonies prompted Mussolini to launch 'pacification' campaigns as early as 1923, which spiralled by the end of the decade into purely genocidal military actions intended to stamp out local Sanusi bands for good. The Italians not only employed overwhelming military force but also spoiled resources, slaughtered cattle, and poisoned water supplies in order to cause misery and starvation; in addition they carried out public hangings of rebel leaders in order to demoralize the opposition. Such tactics should be understood as the culmination of the violent techniques used within the Fascist system at home, both police repression and the stylized, often symbolic, street violence that pitted 'good' Italians against degenerate social aliens.

Italian actions in Ethiopia in 1935 and 1936 were even worse: Italian troops bombed hospitals, razed entire villages to the ground, and publicly executed rebels and civilians alike before taking Addis Ababa in 1936.[34] In the Italian colonial context, Fascistic notions of purifying violence came full circle: as one commentator notes, colonial conflict, rather than the domestic political sphere, was 'fascism's first true mass mobilization', an 'experimental field of violence' in which the regime terrorized non-combatant populations with all the instruments available to a modern state, from aerial bombings to chemical weapons, all used as 'instruments of governance as well as conquest'. Italian troops did much the same in occupied territories during the Second World War (e.g. Greece and Yugoslavia), replicating the kind of street violence that had emerged two decades before—arson, public beatings, and ritualized shamings involving the forced ingestion of castor oil—and combining them with the violent techniques of the modern military state, including internment, deportation, and mass execution.[35]

The relationship between domestic violence and war was no less clear in the National Socialist case, even if the basic position of internalized violence in the ideology of the regimes' elites was quite different. The National Socialists did indeed envision internalized violence to be the key to 'purification' of the national community, but they were constrained by the conservative nature of German administrative culture and the need to maintain consensus within society. War was an explicit means of national regeneration—in this National Socialists and Fascists agreed—but for National Socialists it was also an expedient means to overcome domestic scruples and to begin to implement the more radical elements of their revolutionary programme. This conceptual shift is clear in the regime's treatment of 'habitual criminals', discussed above, who after 1939 were generally sentenced not to 'security confinement' but to death; in 1942 the regime ordered penal authorities to hand over the roughly 13,400 individuals serving such sentences to the police for transportation to the camp system and 'annihilation through labor'.[36] Much the same was true of the Nazi campaign against the disabled: although some 300,000 people were forcibly sterilized before the war with the active and often enthusiastic support of health, education, and welfare professionals, it was with the start of the war in 1939 that Hitler launched a massive, well-planned 'euthanasia' operation—mass murder of the disabled, infants and children first and foremost—that resulted in

some 80,000 victims being gassed before the operation was called off, at a centralized level at least, in 1941.[37]

Such actions can be understood as transposing the idea of 'military necessity', itself often used in the twentieth century to justify terroristic military operations against civilian populations, to the field of domestic politics. Once the war began and the German Army began to suffer casualties at the hands of racial 'inferiors', Nazi racial-biological theory inevitably required the elimination of 'inferior' categories within the domestic population.[38] In the opposite direction, a tremendous amount of research in the past two decades has underscored the extent to which the Nazi war of extermination in the East, carried out by the *Wehrmacht* as well as by the Waffen-SS and the notorious *Einsatzgruppen* (Special Commando Groups), was accepted by the vast majority of these soldiers and security officers as a legitimate war against *civilian* populations, in which the racially inferior—Russians, Poles, and above all Jews—were legitimate targets of genocidal violence that would not have been acceptable either during peacetime or within the boundaries of 'Old Germany'. Hence the outbreak of 'total war'—the second in as many decades—allowed for the transposition of ideologically driven norms of violence from the Nazi political realm into the military realm, and for the acceptance by most commanders in the *Wehrmacht* that war would entail mass murder of civilians.[39] Nazism, as an ideology and a set of state practices, is simply unthinkable without war; daily levels of coercion among German populations may have been surprisingly low, as noted above, but they were so only as a complement to a grandiose, genocidal project that intended to export fantastic levels of genocidal violence beyond the (racial and geographical) boundaries of the 'national community'.

The Soviet Union is, quite plainly, an outlier in this regard, as the Bolsheviks applied massive amounts of coercion and force, much of it overtly military in nature, to their own populations throughout the process of gaining control and forcing social transformation throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Massive violence applied to explicitly civilian populations was of course a fundamental part of the Russian Civil War, on both sides, but the premier example of early Soviet state violence in service of social transformation is the 'de-Cossackization' effort that began in 1919. The Don Cossacks, a military estate of the former Tsarist Empire with a specific cultural (but not ethnic) identity, were identified by the fledgling Soviet state, itself still in the midst of a taxing civil war, as a 'harmful' and 'unhealthy' segment of the population that had to be 'exterminated' in order to 'make the Don [Territory] healthy', in the words of one senior Party official. The ensuing military conflict and 'mass terror', which lasted several months, resulted in some 10,000 executions. Yet central policies regarding ethnic and cultural minorities changed abruptly at the end of the civil war, and the Don Cossacks quickly became a normalized part of the multi-ethnic Soviet empire.[40] Similar coordinated bursts of overt violence against specific 'strata' among the population continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s, from Red Army operations against 'basmachi' (Central Asian partisans, centred in the Fergana Valley), to oppositionists in Transcaucasia, to peasant rebels opposed to the encroachment of the urban Bolshevik state on the freedoms gained in the countryside in 1917.

Repression in the countryside against 'kulak [wealthy peasant] elements' in the late 1920s and early 1930s in particular moved easily from repressive methods honed in civilian contexts—interrogations, arrests, confiscation of property—to full-blown military manoeuvres. The Soviet state repressed thousands of individual revolts in these years, with the Red Army moving in if necessary to suppress uprisings that often involved thousands of participants. Such repressions did not stop with the state simply regaining control: political police troops responded afterwards with what are often termed 'mopping up operations'—essentially reprisals in an internal civil war that entailed mass arrests, deportations, and several tens of thousands of executions. By the end of 1931 some 1.8 million people had been deported as 'kulaks' across the USSR, a fantastic number that shows just how easily the Stalinist regime could move from mechanisms of internal political control, like surveillance and police arrests, to massive forced deportations and summary executions of 'anti-Soviet' peasants that resemble the National Socialist project in the East far more than anything carried out by either the Nazis or the Fascists within their own boundaries.[41] Mass repressions throughout the rest of the 1930s—mass deportations of 'socially harmful elements' from major cities in 1935, ethnic cleansings of 'suspect' populations from border regions, and especially the 'mass operations' against 'national contingents', 'kulak elements', and 'other anti-Soviet elements' in 1937 and 1938, all fulfilled this same dual function. Not only did the Stalinist state instil fear into the population in order ensure compliance and control; it also carried out massive social-engineering projects intended to reshape the demographic, economic, and ethnic foundations of the whole empire, and it made very little conceptual or practical distinction between the two.[42]

Conclusion

What, then, can we say about the mechanisms of terror and social control on which these three authoritarian regimes were based? Fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism occupy a special place in the historiography of interwar Europe because they were central to initial post-war accounts of 'totalitarianism'. This loose set of theoretical approaches to dictatorship, quite different depending on which theorist one prefers, has indeed helped shape a robust understanding of the relationship between authoritarianism and the modern state in interwar Europe. All three of these regimes make a claim to 'total' access to social and cultural spaces within their nations, and all three rely, to varying extents, on violence to access and regulate those spaces. Yet, as we have seen, the level of 'success' that can be claimed by each varies substantially. The Stalinist Soviet Union was certainly the most violent of the three at home, in terms of the ability of the state to reach into individual lives and coerce them via the concrete exercise of state power. And yet the USSR was also the least able of the three to promote any real consensus or to move past a mode of state administration based on repeated bouts of harrowing, destructive violence applied sometimes indiscriminately to a battered population. The

National Socialist and Fascist regimes could lay far more claim to the creation of a single cultural paradigm that supported and promoted the specific goals of the regime, at least within their borders. Yet these examples of 'consensus dictatorship' (National Socialism most fully, Fascism perhaps less so) relied as much on the symbolic and cultural effects of state violence as on its purely administrative or punitive functions, and both had to rely on and allow for a substantial amount of social autonomy within the population in order to support their goals.

These regimes do share one important trait: a fundamental mixing of civilian and military administrative practices. Perhaps paradoxically, the most overtly genocidal of the three, Nazi Germany, was the one in which traditions of legality and statecraft (the *Rechtsstaat*) most mitigated against the application of widespread state violence within the boundaries of the nation state; yet those same traditions failed to impinge on the ideological radicalization of the military campaigns in the East, where the regime's utopian vision for domestic transformation was put into effect most fully. In Stalin's USSR, by comparison, administrative traditions based on corporate notions of governance gave way easily not only to expediency but also to notions of martial law and military necessity; it is possible even to speak of a 'militarization' of domestic Soviet society under Stalin. This interplay between civilian and military violence played out in Fascist Italy primarily in the cultural sphere, with traditions of *squadrismo* and the cult of the Duce allowing for easy transposition of violence between public spaces, police stations, and the battlefields of North Africa. The fact that this nexus was located in the realm of public and political culture in Italy made it not only subtle but also durable and relatively less amenable to critique, which is still in its infancy in comparison to the historiographies of Nazism and the USSR. Ultimately, interwar European dictatorships were authoritarian regimes that were formed by, and understandable only in the context of, total global war.

Notes

1. For a concise statement of the differences between the Nazi dictatorship before and after 1939, see Robert Gellately, 'The Third Reich, the Holocaust, and Visions of Serial Genocide', in Gellately and Ben Kiernan (eds.), *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 241–63.
2. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951; New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973), 465; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956).
3. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002); Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality', in *The Foucault Effect*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1989; Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
4. David Englander, 'Military Intelligence and the Defense of the Realm: The Surveillance of Soldiers and Civilians in Britain During the First World War', *Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labor History*, 52/1 (1987), 24–32; Peter Holquist, '"Information Is the Alpha

and Omega of Our Work": Bolshevik Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context', *Journal of Modern History*, 69/3 (September 1997), 438–43.

5. A. L. MacFie, 'British Intelligence and the Turkish National Movement, 1919–1922', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 37/1 (January 2001), 1–16; Martin Thomas, 'Bedouin Tribes and the Imperial Intelligence Services in Syria, Iraq and Transjordan in the 1920s', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 38/4 (October 2003), 539–61.
6. Elisabeth Domansky, 'The Transformation of State and Society in World War I Germany', in Amir Weiner (ed.), *Landscaping the Human Garden: Twentieth-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 46–66.
7. Holquist, 'Information Is the Alpha and Omega', 422–32.
8. Tracy McDonald, *Face to the Village: The Riazan Countryside under Soviet Rule, 1921–1930* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011).
9. Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Kate Brown, *A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
10. Peter Holquist, 'State Violence as Technique: The Logic of Violence in Soviet Totalitarianism', in Weiner (ed.), *Landscaping the Human Garden*, 19–45, quote at 44.
11. Paul M. Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926–1941* (Washington DC, and Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 230–1, 399 n. 6.
12. Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police*, 38–9, 119–32.
13. Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police*, 230.
14. Nicolas Werth, *Cannibal Island: Death in a Siberian Gulag* (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007); David R. Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924–1953* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).
15. Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995); Jochen Hellbeck, 'Languages of Affirmation and Dissent in Stalinist Russia', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 1/1 (Winter 2000), 71–96; Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary Under Stalin* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
16. Detlev J. K. Peukert, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992).
17. Michael Geyer, 'The Militarization of Europe, 1914–1945', in John Gillis (ed.), *The Militarization of the Western World* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989).
18. Martin Broszat, *Hitler and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic*, trans. V. R. Berghahn (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987).
19. Robert Gellately and Nathan Stoltzfus (eds.), *Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
20. Robert Gellately, *Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 256–9.
21. Robert Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 44–5.
22. Nikolaus Wachsmann, 'From Confinement to Extermination: "Habitual Criminals" in the Third Reich', in Gellately and Stoltzfus (eds.), *Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany*, 165–91.

23. Frank Bajohr, 'No "Volksgenossen": Jewish Entrepreneurs in the Third Reich', in Gellately and Stoltzfus (eds.), *Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany*, 45–65.
24. Henry Friedlander, 'The Exclusion and Murder of the Disabled', in Gellately and Stoltzfus (eds.), *Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany*, 145–64.
25. Gellately, *Backing Hitler,* 257.
26. Patrick Bernhard, 'Renarrating Italian Fascism: New Directions in the Historiography of a European Dictatorship', *Contemporary European History*, 23/1 (2014), 151–63.
27. Aristotle Kallis, *Genocide and Fascism: The Eliminationist Drive in Fascist Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 106–12.
28. Michael Ebner, 'The Political Police and Denunciation during Fascism: A Review of Recent Historical Literature', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 11/2 (2006), 212–16.
29. Michael R. Ebner, *Ordinary Violence in Mussolini's Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 5–11, 15.
30. Ebner, *Ordinary Violence*, 239–47.
31. Ebner, 'Political Police', 218–20.
32. Christopher Duggan, *Fascist Voices: An Intimate History of Mussolini's Italy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xx–xxi.
33. Aristotle A. Kallis, 'Fascism, Violence and Terror', in Brett Bowden and Michael T. Davis (eds.), *Terror: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism* (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 2008), 198–201.
34. Kallis, *Genocide and Fascism,* 222–4.
35. Ruth Ben-Ghiat, 'Response to Matteo Millan: Mapping Squadrist Violence', *Contemporary European History*, 22/4 (2013), 582–3, citing Aram Mattioli, *Experimentierfeld der Gewalt: Der Abessinienkrieg und seine internationale Bedeutung 1935–1941* (Zurich: Orell Füssli, 2005).
36. Wachsmann, 'From Confinement to Extermination', 177–81.
37. Friedlander, 'The Exclusion of the Disabled', 151–6.
38. Gellately, 'The Third Reich', 246.
39. Jörg Baberowski and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, 'The Quest for Order and the Pursuit of Terror: National Socialist Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union as Multiethnic Empires', in Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (eds.), *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 188–91.
40. Holquist, 'Violence in Soviet Totalitarianism', 25–6; see also Peter Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
41. Nicolas Werth, 'A State Against Its People: Violence, Repression, and Terror in the Soviet Union', in Stéphane Courtois et al. (eds.), *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 33–268, esp. 146–58.
42. Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police*, esp. 227–87.

PART V

THEMES

CHAPTER 18

THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE MASSES

ROGER D. MARKWICK AND NICHOLAS DOUMANIS

It could be said of Europeans at the beginning of the twentieth century that most identified primarily with their faith and locality. National or state-based patriotisms were more common among the urban middle classes, particularly in the western and northern extremities of Europe, in Scandinavia, the British Isles, France, and the Low Countries, although even in these parts it is questionable whether rural folk, to borrow a phrase from Miroslav Hroch, set 'special store by their nationality'.[1] Within fifty years, however, nationality had become a dominant and inescapable fact of life for the great majority. Indifference to national ideas and symbols persisted in some rural corners, but overall the nation had come to effectively determine the primary identities and basic civic rights of Europeans generally. By 1950 Europeans had responded to state strategies to transform territories into ethnic spaces, either because they were receptive to socialization measures (primary schooling, state and press propaganda, etc.), or because they succumbed to forms of coercion that effectively forced people to choose a national identity. The First World War was the watershed in this regard. Total war, state mobilization of the maximum material and human resources at its disposal, necessarily entailed the state mobilizing and reinforcing the nationalist sentiments that had been gathering popular momentum since the late nineteenth century. In arguing thus, we are guided by Eric Hobsbawm's proposition that 'states and nationalisms' make nations, not 'the other way round'.[2] The 'Great War' unleashed forces that would culminate in the mass deaths, killings, and expulsions that devastated the eastern half of Europe in the 1930s and 1940s; these were simultaneously nation-building and people-destroying exercises, depending on the nature of the regimes that prosecuted them. The mass deaths and expulsions in 1930s Soviet Ukraine and Russia were primarily the product of breakneck industrialization. But Hitler's wars, following on from his attempt to consolidate a Greater German Reich on the grounds of German 'self-determination', were aimed at destruction of a multinational state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—and the annihilation of 'subhuman' ethnicities, that is, Jews and Slavs. Eventually, Hitler's aspiration for a

bio-ethnically pure German empire was destroyed by the Soviet multinational military that upheld the concept of the nation state. By the end of the Second World War the nation state as the primary social unit had become entrenched in Europe.

This chapter considers the complex reasons why and how Europeans and Europe were 'nationalized' in the first half of the twentieth century. Historians no longer assume this transition was an inevitable corollary of modernity, but there have been very few attempts thus far to explain the specific circumstances and stages in which Europeans were 'nationalized' by the mid-twentieth century.[3] Nationalism broadly conceived (as identity, ideology, state form, political culture) certainly 'triumphed', but it was a qualified triumph and it was not inevitable. The nation state did increasingly become the standard form for a legitimate state from 1918, but nationalism's limitations as an ideology or vision for society were brought into sharp relief when fascism used it as its central organizing principle for society. Indeed, from 1918 an appeal to national identity proved to be an essential component for any right-wing movement or ideology seeking to secure a popular base. At least up until Hitler's accession to power in 1933, the communist parties, if not their social democrat rivals, fought Mussolini and Hitler by counterposing class to nation. But in the wake of Stalin's retreat in the 1920s from internationalism in favour of his autarkic conception of 'socialism in one country' and Hitler's triumph, the communist parties followed suit in the guise of 'popular fronts' appealing to so-called 'progressive' patriotic sentiment, especially in France and Spain. Ultimately, Mussolini's and Hitler's brands of truculent, racist chauvinism were defeated by Stalin's patriotically motivated Red Army. The result was not only the defeat of fascism in 1945 but also the securing of nation state and patriotism as the organizing principles of the post-war Left, just as they had been for social democratic parties in 1914. At least up until the 1993 Maastricht Treaty established the European Union, nationalism and nationhood were facts of European life.

Masses and Nation Before 1914

Shortly after Italian unification in 1860, the Italian statesman Massimo D'Azeglio is alleged to have said: 'We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians' (*Fatta l'Italia, bisogna fare gli Italiani*).[4] Since then, this apocryphal saying has been frequently used to convey the view that the nation has often preceded nationalism, or the view that a real nation had to consist of bona fide nationals. Thus, Italy lacked substance as a nation because it lacked self-conscious Italians and Italian speakers. In fact, every European nation or would-be nation had to *make* its nationals. In the first instance, 'the people' mattered because they were deemed to be the source of sovereignty. Ever since the term 'nation' was first invoked as a political category during the French Revolution, states have sought legitimacy by claiming a 'national' mandate (i.e. popular mandate), even when neglecting to seek one: dictators from the Revolution onwards have insisted that they rule *for* the nation rather than in their own right. Secondly, there were the

practical imperatives and political implications of the breakdown of pre-modern societies, and the perpetual growth of modern varieties from the mid-eighteenth century. As Ernest Gellner and many others since have pointed out, the growth of nationalism was a function of the greatest transition in human history since the Neolithic era (urbanization, migration, the commercialization of production, new middle-class formations, mass politics, etc.), which eroded or eliminated old hierarchies, and at the very least called for systems of governance that allowed for greater social participation.[5] From a government perspective, a body of committed subjects or citizens operating with a common language, and bound by other shared attributes (particularly religion), also made for efficient governance. In the decades leading to the First World War, northern and western European states with long traditions of statehood led the way in socializing their populations through means both direct (primary schooling, flags, commemorative practices, national historiographies) and indirect (railways, post offices, mass communications). Eugen Weber showed that by 1914 France had made its patois-speaking and parochially minded citizens more tangibly French. In the multi-ethnic empires of central and eastern Europe, cultural elites saw nationalism as a means of promoting group interests within empires, as the Hungarians did within the Habsburg Empire. Some groups under foreign domination began to dream of national self-determination, as was the case with some Christian movements in the Ottoman Balkans and eastern Anatolia.

The urgency with which states and nationalists sought to nationalize the masses, however, had a lot to do with international factors, not least capitalist globalization. In his *Imperialism and World Economy* (1918), Nikolai Bukharin argued that the 'internationalization' of capitalism was accompanied and contradicted by capitalist 'nationalization': the forging of nation states by powerful financial–industrial classes to promote their international interests against rival counterparts, resulting in wars: 'The fighting force in the world market thus depends on the power and the consolidation of "the nation", upon its financial and military resources.'[6] With some exceptions like Spain, where elites feared that mobilizing the masses with nationalist ideas might court domestic upheaval, governments regarded the political mobilization of society as essential for state security.[7] There was the paradigm presented by Europe's dominant states whose power was such that they could influence deep-seated structural changes within other societies. Britain, France, and, from 1871, Germany were able to bully the old Continental empires (Habsburg Austria, the Ottoman Empire) while building global colonial empires 'with almost contemptuous ease',[8] and this would inevitably foster emulation—Meiji Japan offers the classic case. With their efficient fiscal, administrative, and legal systems, and, critically, their relatively homogeneous and 'nationalized' cultures, the established powers served as exemplar *nation* states that others had to emulate or else risk subjugation or extinction. French victories during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars had demonstrated the potency of a highly motivated 'nation at arms'. By the same token, the multi-ethnicity of the Continental empires was seen as a liability, since diverse populations could never be governed as efficiently, and minorities never fully trusted.

All states were motivated by what Charles Maier has described as 'territoriality', or 'the properties, including power, provided by the control of bordered political space, which until recently at least created the framework for national and ethnic identity'.[9] Thus, Germany claimed Alsace and much of Lorraine in 1871 for reasons not based on dynastic right but on the grounds that these were German-speaking regions. Throughout the eastern half of Europe, irredentism was justified on 'ethnographic' rights as much as on historical rights. Hence the most contested regions were also subjected to ethnographic manipulation, as nationalist operatives, mainly primary school teachers, set out to 'awaken' ignorant peasants to their 'true' identities, or convince bilingual or 'hermaphrodite' Czech and German speakers of the need to choose an exclusive identity. In Ottoman Macedonia just prior to the Young Turk Revolution (1908), Orthodox Christian paramilitary groups were essentially terrorizing villagers into declaring for Greece, Bulgaria, or an independent Macedonia, while the First Balkan War (1912) was used by the victors to nationalize the conquered lands by ethnically cleansing Muslims.

Between 1870 and 1914, an increasing proportion of Europeans began to 'set special store' by their nationality, although we cannot be sure about the extent and numbers. It was certainly a mainly middle-class and urban phenomenon. In western and central Europe, state-focused patriotisms—such as British, French, Danish, and Swedish—had been in the making since the eighteenth century, but it was during the last decades of the nineteenth century that nationalism developed into something like a mass phenomenon, as commodity relations broke down pre-capitalist parochialisms. By 1914, the efforts of states and private agencies to instruct patois speakers in the national language, and to promote national consciousness, had clearly borne fruit. Eric Hobsbawm relates a number of telling developments, such as the fact that political parties seeking to extend their social base saw advantage in supporting national causes and appealing to the national sentiments of their members. As the nation was regarded increasingly as a moral community, right-wing political movements increasingly appealed to and actively promoted national sentiments while labour and social democratic movements increasingly succumbed to nationalist pressures.

There was also the fact that massive numbers of men enlisted to fight in 1914, and the further fact that very few soldiers deserted during the war as compared to previous wars.[10] Even those who had little interest in or liking for nationalism, such as loyal Habsburg and Ottoman subjects, sensed they had little choice but to adjust to what Timothy Snyder has described as 'nationalism as the future': as something fated and for which preparations should be made. Snyder notes that upper-class families in eastern Europe were hedging their bets by having each of their progeny declare for a different national cause, as it was not clear on which side of a national border they might end up.[11]

Nationalism and Total War

Nationalists with a capital 'N'—namely the right-wing activists who lobbied loudly for more adventurous imperial or irredentist policies, and who believed in the cathartic

effects of war (e.g., the Pan-German League, the Union of the Russian People)—were a tiny, albeit vociferous, minority; but they contributed to the growing chorus of pre-First World War jingoism fuelled by press proprietors and some intellectuals.[12] Coupling militarism with 'social Darwinism', philosophers such as the German Oswald Spengler and the English Herbert Spencer saw struggles between nations as a law of nature: 'survival of the fittest'.[13] But militarist nationalism was an uneven phenomenon—more pronounced in the metropolises of the major industrial powers than in the underdeveloped, peasant periphery. The long-standing claim that the 'peoples of Europe leapt eagerly into war' (A. J. P. Taylor), meaning that the 'acceptance of war when it came was the result of decades in which patriotism had been inculcated at many levels of national life all over Europe' (James Joll), has been largely discredited.[14] Recent research on the public mood in Britain and across the Continent shows that the prospect of war was greeted with considerable disquiet and sadness, and that most Europeans sought reassurance that it would be a defensive war.[15] Europeans resigned themselves to what they accepted as an 'existential' war of 'self-defence' in which 'the nation was commonly articulated in communitarian terms and framed in the language of local, class or religious solidarities. The war was construed as a personal battle for the safety of one's family and home.'[16] The less than enthusiastic patriotism was not for want of trying, particularly in Britain, France, and Germany, where, Margaret MacMillan argues, press proprietors and nationalist writers worked overtime 'to stir up public emotions and elevate patriotism into jingoistic nationalism … All across Europe relations between Germany and Russia, Hungary and Rumania, Austria and Serbia, or Britain and France, were coloured and often poisoned by national and racial fears of the other.' And with jingoism spread imperial 'militarism'.[17]

Nationalism was much weaker in the agrarian, multi-ethnic empires. The rulers of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires feared nationalism's centrifugal force, which the Romanov autocracy sought to counter by propagating pan-Slavism.[18] The teeming masses of peasants and urban plebeians, including the great majority of Russian, Ottoman, and Italian subjects, whose opinions were not sought (and which certainly did not count as 'public opinion'), were 'subalterns', outside (or beneath) the power structure. These indifferent Europeans probably constituted a majority, and they undoubtedly regarded the war as yet another onerous burden imposed from above. During the years approaching 1914, committed nationalists were still complaining about national indifference in ethnically mixed regions of eastern and central Europe. Historians of national movements in the linguistically mixed regions of pre-war Bohemia and Silesia have noted the 'problem' of local reluctance to embrace fully an exclusive national identity.[19] Nationalism made little sense to agrarian peoples whose everyday lives and communal engagements involved regular 'boundary crossings': movements between languages, cultures, and sometimes religions. In the Ottoman Empire, nationalism was limited to Christian elites who used it to strengthen corporate identities within the imperial system, whereas the lower orders feared that any ideology that promoted cultural exclusivity might jeopardize their intercommunal relations.[20]

Militarist jingoists did not have it all their own way. Widespread anti-war, pacifist, and disarmament sentiment was reflected in two international peace conferences in The Hague (1899 and 1907), ironically initiated by Tsar Nicholas II; twenty universal peace congresses between 1899 and 1914; and three congresses of the Second Socialist International: Stuttgart (1907), Copenhagen (1910), and Basel (1912), which essentially declared 'war against war'.[21] There were many anti-war demonstrations in the July Days: those in Berlin may have been larger than those organized by its supporters.[22] Nevertheless, all the anti-war sentiment foundered on the rock of nationalism—not least the Second International, which proved incapable of deciding how it would oppose a European war: parliamentary resolutions, demonstrations, strikes, or even insurrection.[23] In the end, the International's constituent socialist parties opted for a *union sacrée* with their own national governments, the price of which for the French Socialist Party was the assassination by a nationalist of their leader Jean Jaurès four days before the outbreak of war.

Despite all the pre-war peace sentiment and stirring anti-war resolutions, popular reaction during the high summer of 1914 was a revelation of sorts. Vast crowds did gather before the Winter Palace in St Petersburg, in front of the Schloss in Berlin, in London's Trafalgar Square, and in other public spaces in European cities during the July Crisis and early August. Some were baying for blood, but most were energized by a sense of common concern and purpose. For a short time, all classes seemed to rally as one. Russians, Germans, the British, and Habsburg subjects could suddenly *observe* their unity and revel in it. It appeared that Europeans were more commonly looking to their nation to provide a moral frame for modern society, one that exercised ethical leverage and promoted fraternity and social harmony. After all, Europe's belle époque, the tranquil age that preceded the war, certainly did not seem that way to contemporaries. As Peter Gay puts it, 'Europe before 1914 was a threatened and nervous world';[24] but many understood Thomas Mann's pre-war exclamation of war as 'purification, liberation, and an enormous hope'.[25] At the very least it reflected a common aspiration among the political classes that the war might heal social tensions and promote social harmony: a combination of suffragette militancy and a crisis around Irish Home Rule saw Britain 'trembling on the edge of civil war'; Kaiser Wilhem II's Germany was faced with a 3 million-strong trade union movement and a Social Democratic Party (SPD) with the largest Reichstag representation; while in July 1914 in Russia the autocracy was wracked by widespread strikes.[26] The rallies that greeted the outbreak of war therefore seemed to prove the idea of nation as moral unit writ large, or 'imagined community'; it was extremely attractive to the public mainstream but shattered the European Left in 1914. The Second International was famously abandoned when war was declared, not because socialists were infected by nationalist fervour but because they opted for defence of the nation as *la patrie, Heimat*, fatherland, at the expense of international class struggle against imperialism. As Geoff Eley argues, 'Purely nationalist motives were inseparable' from the International's reformist agenda: 'The summons to national unity was a chance to come in from the cold.'[27]

Patriotic Consensus 1914–1916

The role of the war in spreading national consciousness and deepening emotional attachments to nationalism has yet to receive proper historical treatment, but it is patently clear that the war's role was catalytic. For the first two years of the war, 'national mobilization', drawing on and cultivating 'pre-existing sentiments of national community and political affiliation' rather than coercion, was key to the warring state mobilizing 'civil society';[28] only with the unravelling of patriotic compacts from 1916 did states unleash their immense coercive capacities domestically. Geoff Eley reminds us that with the possible exception of the 1860s, the First World War was to be 'the single most concentrated pan-European transformation since the French Revolution', and that it triggered a 'huge change of consciousness'.[29] This 'consciousness change', in which nationality was the key component, resulted from a radical shift in the perceived role of the state. Hitherto the state had been primarily an instrument for imposing order, dispensing justice, and procuring taxes; now it was expected to engage with civil society in order to secure public support for the waging of total war. In Germany, Britain, and France, and to some degree in the Hungarian-dominated parts of the Habsburg Empire, the mobilization of society in order to wage industrial warfare was secured through a social contract, whereby subjects or citizens would be rewarded for their sacrifices with political and social reform. Of course, the state could never meet such high expectations, especially with the inexorable deterioration of material conditions. However, the mere fact that home fronts did not collapse, at least until 1917 and then most spectacularly in Russia and to a lesser extent Germany and Austria-Hungary, had much to do with the fact that the social compact was framed through a patriotic consensus. Thus in Germany, where SPD leader Friedrich Ebert voted for war credits, a civil truce (*Burgfrieden)* was facilitated in the main by the support of leading social democrats. In Britain, Labour Party leader Arthur Henderson joined the War Cabinet, while in France socialist Jules Guesde became a *ministre d'état*, as did the president of the Socialist International, Émile Vandervelde, for Belgium. The nation, after all, had been cast as the object of wartime sacrifice. State *and* society allegedly found common cause *in* the nation: *l'union sacrée*. As Peter Fritzsche says of Germany during the latter years of the war, and which could also be said of France and Britain, the rise of social dissent ought to be read as a function of increased public engagement in national life and with the public interest. Specifically of Germany in 1918, Fritzsche claims that 'The German people had gotten a glimpse of themselves as a national compact that existed independently of the monarchy and rested on the achievements of the ordinary citizens and soldiers'.[30] The war had crystallized the notion of an imagined community, albeit one increasingly divided about the national interest. The war certainly politicized populations to an unprecedented degree; nationalism played a critical role in framing this politicization.

The growth of nationalism during the First World War certainly exhibited regional and class variations. Much depended on the state's management of the war effort,

especially its capacity to direct the economy, boost morale through propaganda, and portray the burdens of war as being borne equitably; in short, the capacity of the state to mobilize civil society.[31] Where the state created a true 'home front', as happened in Britain, France, and Germany, the process of 'nationalization' penetrated all social classes. More than ever before, at least in the first year of the war, the national interest assumed a primacy in people's minds. Total war placed state and society in an unusually intimate relationship, and had ordinary people, often for the first time, reading the world and their place within it through a national frame. Labour organizations in Paris, for example, perceived their efforts as an expression of solidarity with soldiers at the front, especially soldiers from workers' families. As French workers their labours were now read as being patriotic in nature.[32] A more obvious sign of nationalization was the rise of voluntary organizations committed to patriotic duties. The middle classes were particularly active in sustaining the patriotic consensus by taking a lead in organizing patriotic rallies, rituals, and memorialization. In each of the belligerent countries, including Italy, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, teachers, public employees, civic notables, and town mayors were instrumental in the staging of patriotic public rituals and celebrations.[33] These ardent foot soldiers of nationalism were essential in predominantly peasant societies like Italy and Russia, where popular indifference to the national cause remained extensive, but they also became increasingly important in Germany, Britain, and France as the war dragged on longer than expected and morale waned. In Freiburg, for example, patriotic celebrations had to be bureaucratized by local authorities as early as 1915 in order to place some controls on popular behaviour and to check the decline in popular enthusiasm.[34] The popular entertainment industry supported patriotic 'morality' by voluntarily holding the line on censorship, while overt propaganda was presented largely through the press, in public exhibitions, and through education.[35]

The German patriotic consensus was based on the understanding that the entire nation ought to behave as a moral community: as a *Volksgemeinschaft* (people's community) rather than as a mere *Gesellschaft* (society).[36] Throughout the war, Germans were urged to remember 'the August Days' of class unity and selfless regard as the true Germany. In Britain, the same idea of Britain as a moral community was reflected in what Adrian Gregory describes as an economy of sacrifice: moral worth was now measured by sacrifice. As such the war created a new moral hierarchy, with front-line soldiers elevated to the top while those accused of shirking and profiteering were relegated to the bottom.[37] To be sure, behaviour during the war was also predicated on other critical moral imperatives, such as religious faith and basic notions of military honour.[38] It is difficult to know the extent to which patriotism weighed on the minds of soldiers; most studies point to the much greater importance of front-line camaraderie and loyalty to the 'primary unit'. Soldiers generally kept fighting because of their devotion to their front-line comrades and their acceptance of harsh military discipline and hierarchies. Military discipline ensured that hardly any British, French, or German soldiers defected to the enemy—notwithstanding the famous 1914 German–British 'Christmas truce', the first sign of war-weariness. But the marked decline in morale and discipline in the major militaries from 1917 onwards saw the introduction of 'ideological mobilization'.

The German military led the way with 'patriotic instruction' but to no avail; military failure was followed by the 'political collapse' of the *Kaiserreich* on 9 November 1918.[39] Although the subject peoples that fought for the Habsburg Empire initially remained loyal as a matter of obligation and military pride, they generally did not have much emotional investment in the cause and deserted en masse beginning in the latter months of 1917.[40]

Subaltern Nationalisms

Within the multi-ethnic empires the 'fomenting of nationalism as a form of political warfare' proved suicidal; the strains of sustained warfare caused subject peoples to focus more sharply on their national distinctions and eventually to call for political independence, with deliberate encouragement by the belligerent powers.[41] The Habsburg monarchy could inspire loyalty but not passion; it failed to instil a national imperial idea that could motivate collective mobilization. Indeed, with a weaker state and less industrialized economy than its German ally, little effort was made to forge a home front, with repression preferred to mobilization. Even in Vienna itself, the onus for managing survival was left to each family unit; as society disintegrated due to the stress of severe food shortages, ethnic tensions mounted.[42] As the empire and the war effort lost credibility, despite the efforts of the military leadership if not the Habsburg monarchy, in the absence of any political alternative, subject peoples asserted themselves as national forces. The Czechs, for example, believed that their struggle was against Bohemia's Germans who were deemed to have exercised power, and demanded national independence.[43] In the Ottoman Empire, nationalism made its inroads somewhat earlier during the First Balkan War (1912). Hitherto the average Ottoman subject identified with their faith and placed little if any value in national or ethnic categories. From the Balkan Wars to 1922 the Ottoman Empire and its regional enemies engaged in a spate of ethnic cleansings and mass killings that in some cases were genocidal: notably the Armenians.[44] One effect of the turmoil was the creation of 'flag-waving' nationals. Muslim refugees from Crete and Macedonia became the most ardent Turkish nationalists, while Greek Christians persecuted by Turkish militias and bandits during the First World War became ardent Greeks. After the war, refugees deemed to have been insufficiently nationalized by wartime experiences, and who continued to speak in their mother tongues, were pressured to become better Turks or Greeks.

However, as the war dragged on, class tensions challenged national unity, most dramatically in the Russian Empire where an initial patriotic upsurge in the cities subsided following major defeats on the battlefield, notably Tannenberg in August 1914. The growing gulf between state and society was reflected in plummeting morale on the military front and increasing turbulence on the home front. Russian soldiers were increasingly unmoved by patriotic appeals to 'Faith, Tsar and Fatherland'.[45] As one officer recalled,

'The drafts arriving from the interior of Russia had not the slightest notion of what the war had to do with them':

> Time after time I asked my men in the trenches why we were at war; the inevitable senseless answer was that a certain Archduke and his wife were murdered and that consequently the Austrians had tried to humiliate the Serbians…Why Germany should want to make war on us because of the Serbians, no one could say …[46]

In Italy, which belatedly entered the fray in May 1915, war was not making Italians out of peasants.[47] Catastrophic defeat at Caporetto in October 1917 did trigger cries that the nascent Italian nation was under threat, but just at a time when social division was beginning to erupt. As anxiety rose about military morale and domestic stability, in 1917–18 all the belligerent states, with varying degrees of success, resorted to national 'remobilization' in order to sustain the prolonged war effort.[48]

Nation Against Class, 1917–1924

Mobilization for the 'Great War' had seen unprecedented patriotic propaganda, delivered in parliaments, pulpits, and increasingly through print media, to arouse popular passions and identification with the warring states. But as the war bogged down in the trenches, war-weariness increasingly manifested itself as class conflict, necessitating the imposition of draconian military discipline both on the front line and the home front, coupled with reinvigorated propaganda campaigns to reinforce rapidly fraying patriotic sentiment. The unravelling of nationalist sentiment was welcomed and actively promoted by those on the Left such as Lenin, who from the outset had denounced the war as 'bourgeois, imperialist and dynastic'.[49] A tiny, besieged minority in September 1915, when the anti-war Left issued their 'Zimmerwald Manifesto' demanding 'peace and national self-determination without annexations',[50] by 1917 they were beginning to win a larger audience, principally among the urban industrial working classes—not only in autocratic Russia but also within the Entente and Triple Alliance, notably Germany. In Russia, Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries agitated to transform a military conflagration into class war and socialist revolution. Likewise, in Germany, Italy, France, and Britain, pacifism and anti-militarist sentiment grew among industrial workers, many of them women. In Germany, military and civilian discipline eventually broke down;, culminating in the short-lived 1918 'November Revolution' and the declaration of the Weimar Republic intended to forestall socialist revolution. The fracturing of nations along class lines on the European continent spread also to those states on the periphery of the military struggle:, from Spain to the Balkans. Outside Europe, however, nationalism surged, driven by anti-colonial sentiment, from Turkey to China.[51]

But as class fissures grew in Europe during the latter years of the war, actively promoted by various stripes of pacifists, socialist, and internationalists on the Left, so too

did aggressive patriotic movements in support of the war effort or for self-determination within subaltern and peripheral nationalities and ethnicities, especially as multinational empires in or on the periphery of central and eastern Europe faltered: principally, the Austro-Hungarian, the Ottoman, and the Russian empires. In all three cases minority ethnicities increasingly aspired to 'state building nationalism': the establishment of nation states that were ethnically and territorially distinct.[52] Such aspirations were especially politically explosive in east-central Europe, where some 25 million minority peoples lived, not least Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs.[53]

As the First World War took its toll on the multinational empires, virulent ethnocentric nationalism deliberately set itself against class. In the 'borderlands' between the Baltic and Black seas, where four different multinational empires—the Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian, and German—confronted each other, as often as not at the behest of the British, French, and Italians, the latter years of the war and its aftermath (1917–23) saw violent political and class conflict 'nationalized': 'Armenian and Greek merchants, Polish landowners, Jewish traders—all became targets' of ethnic cleansing, pogroms, and genocide, 'especially if they were more prosperous than their neighbors'.[54]

The war tore asunder the multi-ethnic Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires. These ageing agrarian dynasties had foundered in the face of sustained total war waged by industrial juggernauts, particularly imperial Germany and Britain; military defeat gave impetus to aspirant nationalism that had been percolating away in east-central Europe since the beginning of the twentieth century. But a just peace, codified in 1918 in US president Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' on the basis of the principle of 'self-determination', legitimated national aspirations, at least in some cases. Point 24 called for 'guaranties for political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike'.[55] Delivered to the US Congress on 8 January 1918, Wilson's Fourteen Points was a riposte to Lenin's 'Decree on Peace' issued two months earlier which accorded 'any nation … the right to decide the forms of its state'.[56]

Wilson took his principle of 'self-determination' to the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference. 'The War undoubtedly had had the effect of over-exciting the feeling of nationality,' declared Italian foreign minister Sidney Sonnino; 'perhaps America fostered it by putting the principles so clearly.' Not everybody was certain what Wilson meant by 'self-determination', including US secretary of state Robert Lansing who asked, 'Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community?'[57] Self-determination did not apply to the Irish, the Germans, the Arabs, or the Chinese, but for those European ethnicities whose claims to nationhood coincided with the interests of the victorious powers, it was clear enough.

At Versailles much time and energy was expended in selectively redrawing national borders (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Belgium, France) or, where they did not yet exist, in creating them (Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Yugoslavia).[58] The 'self-determination' pronounced at Versailles, the response of the victorious imperial powers to Bolshevik internationalism, legitimized ethnically pure nation statehood—albeit qualified by treaties overseen by the League of Nations requiring the preservation of minority rights. Poland provided 'the model' in this regard.[59] Almost all of the subaltern nation states that emerged with the disintegration of the

multi-ethnic Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires combined militant nationalism with varying degrees of anti-Bolshevism, often under the aegis of a military strongman if not a plebeian fascist movement: inter alia, Admiral Horthy in Hungary (1920–44), General Mannerheim in Finland (1918–19), the Tsankov regime in Bulgaria (1923–6), and Marshal Piłsudski in Poland (1926–39).[60] The post-war Yugoslav 'Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes' was dominated by the Serb nationalist Karadjordjević dynasty, which in 1929 became what has been called a 'monarcho-fascist' dictatorship.[61] Notwithstanding the liberal conviction that assimilation was the *sine qua non* of democracy, in every case violent chauvinist authoritarianism in the name of the nation was directed against ethnic and political minorities, as often as not Jews and Bolsheviks.

Fascism, Nazism, Nationalism

Benito Mussolini set the pace for aggressive nationalism during the First World War. The former militant socialist editor of *Avanti* repudiated Italian neutrality and advocated joining the war on the side of the Entente in October 1915, surfacing a month later as editor of a new newspaper: *Il popolo d'Italia* (The People of Italy). Resonant of Giuseppe Manzini (1805–72), one of the fathers of the Risorgimento, *Il popolo d'Italia* would become the official paper of Mussolini's Fascist regime in 1922. The day that Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary, 24 May 1915, Mussolini wrote: 'Italy has a historic personality, is alive, possessed of its own body and immortal.'[62] For Mussolini, Fascism was consummating the Risorgimento, as he put it on the eve of his theatrical 1922 March on Rome. The shock troops of Fascism, the *squadristi*, were not merely violently anti-Bolshevik; they also saw themselves as revolutionary nationalists, intent on replacing a listless Italian parliamentarism with a dynamic, authoritarian, 'new Italy'.[63]

Mussolini's militant Fascism provided the model for one of the principal 'heirs' of 'Wilsonian' self-determination: Adolf Hitler, the Austrian who had despised the 'racial cosmopolitanism' of Habsburg Vienna.[64] Arch-advocate of German self-determination, the other side of Hitler's war on Judaeo-Bolshevism was the struggle to fold the *Volksdeutsche* into a greater German nation, a 'people's community' (*Volksgemeinschaft*), in defiance of the Versailles Treaty which was denounced as the cause of German national humiliation.[65] Hitler was determined to secure German 'self-determination' where Weimar Republic diplomacy had failed.[66] Once Nazism was in power, '*völkisch*-nationalist and racist population policies' coupled with 'revisionist ideas about territorial and social reordering (*Neuordinungsideen*)'[67] provided the pretext for a succession of 'coups' that culminated in the Second World War: reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936; the *Anschluss* with Austria in March 1938; occupation of the Czechoslovak Sudetenland in March 1938 and the remainder of the country with the declaration of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939; and annexation of Memel in Lithuania in March 1939 and Danzig in Poland in September 1939.[68]

Notwithstanding Nazism's political indebtedness to Italian Fascism, Nazi nationalism was distinguished from its Fascist counterpart by its biopolitical twist. It has been argued that,

> In the wake of the cataclysmic mass slaughter, hunger and epidemic typhus and influenza of the First World War, there was an increasing sense that the German race was under severe threat. In response, German racial anthropology had a dual role: first to regenerate the nation saving German populations from an imagined extermination imposed by Germany's enemies; second, to sustain German ethnic communities outside Germany's borders … The hidden agenda was to reinforce these communities as outposts for an eventual restoration of a Greater German Reich, recovering *Lebensraum* and uniting the ethnic Germans.[69]

Lebensraum for a racially pure Greater German Reich in eastern Europe was a key objective for Hitler from the mid-1920s onwards;, evident from his unpublished 'Second Book' (1928). A social Darwinist conception of racial war, pitting the so-called Aryan race against Latins, Slavs, and especially Jews in a struggle for survival, was the driving force of history in the Nazi *Weltanschauung*. Borrowing from eugenicist medical science, Nazism advocated 'racial hygiene'—the cleansing of the German race of its impurities.[70] Such racial, primarily anti-Semitic, nationalism preceded Nazism but was raised to white heat by almost two decades of continuous crisis before Hitler came to power in 1933: catastrophic war, defeat, revolution and counter-revolution (1918 to 1923), savage inflation (1923), and the Great Depression (1929). Laced with a lethal dose of anti-Bolshevism, injected particularly by the Baltic German Alfred Rosenberg, mobilization of the racial, predatory state for wars of conquest was at the heart of Nazi nationalism, which would culminate in total warfare and mass genocide on an unprecedented scale.

Apocalyptic as it eventually became, Nazism's biopolitical nationalism was not unique. The authoritarian Baltic States promoted a 'strong ethno-nationalism that defined the nation as a biological group' and utilized 'national eugenics projects' to 'establish a nation in biological terms: not only to homogenize the nation ethnically but also genetically and racially to form a racial state'.[71] Indeed, it has been argued that eugenics provided the Baltics with a 'historical bridge between … the great European multi-ethnic dynastic and imperial states … to the post-1918 birth of democracies based on the principle of self-determination'.[72] Nazi genocide was the ultimate expression of biopolitical imperialism.

Internationalism to Multinationalism

At first sight, accusations that Hitler and Stalin mirrored each other as they 'conducted wars of annihilation against internal and external enemies … of class, race, and nation',[73] seem plausible. But such a perspective, in reality a recapitulation of the long-discredited

totalitarian perspective equating Stalin's Soviet Union with Hitler's National Socialist Germany, is not tenable. It betrays a profound misunderstanding of the distinct natures of the Stalinist and Nazi regimes, which made them mortal enemies. Stalin's primary objective was to forge an autarkic, industrialized, multinational state, under the rubric of 'socialism in one country'. Nationalism and nation–building were on Stalin's agenda, not genocide; nor was it inherent in the construction of a non-capitalist, non-expansionary state—however draconian.

In stark contrast, the European fascist regimes, primarily Italy and Germany, were would-be expanding colonial powers. Accordingly, they drew their models for ethnic cleansing, national homogeneity, and genocide not from Stalin but from European and American colonialist and racial wars. Hitler drew his conception for the colonization of eastern Europe from the brutal way in which European settlers had dealt with North American Indians: 'a "superior" settler population would displace an "inferior" native population'.[74] In this regard, Nazism's genocide against the Slav 'subhumans' and the 'final solution' for Jews drew on European genocidal precedents, particularly in the Americas and Africa.[75]

The October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution threw down a class gauntlet against European great-power chauvinism. From the outset, theirs was an international, socialist revolution against colonial exploitation and national oppression, which they considered intrinsic to capitalist imperialism. Accordingly, the Bolsheviks repudiated the nationalism, racism, and ethnocentrism of the European great powers as reactionary while lauding national self-determination for marginalized, minority, and oppressed peoples as progressive. Having famously condemned the Tsarist Empire as a 'prison house of nations', Lenin and the Bolsheviks saw themselves as liberating the minority nations from the homogenizing dominance of 'Great Russian chauvinism' and its attendant racist, national, and linguistic denial.[76] Stalin, however, would retreat from this course.

Until late 1922, Stalin, author of the canonical Bolshevik text *Marxism and the Nationalities Question* (first published in 1913), and commissar of nationalities from 1917 to 1924, largely sided with Lenin. However, in the course of the 1922 'Georgian affair', Lenin, convinced that the Russian Communist Party was succumbing to Russian nationalist tendencies, denounced 'Great Russian chauvinism' and Stalin as a 'Great Russian bully'.[77] Lenin's approach became enshrined as the 'Greater Danger Principle', that is, that Russian great-power chauvinism was more dangerous than local nationalism.

Throughout the 1920s the Bolsheviks promoted nationhood among minority nations; 'national-territorial' principles aimed to promote national languages and leaders. Designated 'indigenization' (*korenizatsiia*), it came to define Soviet nationalities policy, deliberately promoting the national identities and cultures of non-Russian nationalities: what has been called 'affirmative action' nationalism.[78] However, in the late 1920s Stalin retreated from Bolshevik aspirations to internationalize the October 1917 Revolution in favour of his semi-autarkic concept of 'socialism in one country'. At home and abroad, nation increasingly trumped class. The inevitable corollary of Stalin's 'nationalist turn' was an increasingly 'patriotic',[79] nation-state-based internationalism—abandoning

class-based internationalism, in which workers had no homeland, in favour of defending the 'independence' of the 'socialist fatherland'.

Nationalization and Indigenization

Not withstanding Stalin's increasingly Russian patriotic discourse in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Soviet state and party continued its 'nationalizing policy' of *korenizatsiia*, fostering territorial and ethnic identities among non-Russian peoples, promoting indigenous political leaders, languages, education, and culture, at the expense of the Russians. Non-Russian Communist Party members and leaders soared. The territorialization of ethnicity in the 1930s saw the creation of homelands for the 'small peoples' of the far north; hitherto 'tribes' of reindeer herders became 'nations'. Likewise, in 1934 a Jewish 'homeland', Birobidzhan, was established close to the Chinese border.[80]

Already, however, a fundamental shift in Soviet nationalities policy, and partial retreat from *korenizatsiia*, had come in December 1932 at the height of the forced grain collection crisis, which saw violent resistance. The Politburo blamed the crisis on Ukrainian and local non-Russian nationalisms. In its wake, local and district national structures were abolished in favour of the further territorialization of national republics and at the expense of minority ethnicities within them: unifying and homogenizing the minorities.[81] Notwithstanding declarations of Soviet internationalism, Russian nationalism, language, and culture were rehabilitated and the 'Greater Danger Principle' abandoned. Increasingly, Russia became the pivotal nationality in the Union—but not the only nation.[82]

Even when Stalinism was at its most brutally repressive, it was neither deliberately genocidal nor as lethal as its fascist opponents, particularly Nazism. The driving force of Stalin's policies in the 1930s was forced-march industrialization, not national conquest, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. Notwithstanding the estimated 5.7 million excess deaths in 1932–3—overwhelmingly in Soviet Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine—in the course of Stalin's forced collectivization of agriculture,[83] it was not genocide.[84] Nor was it a prototype for Nazi death camps and genocide against the Jews; conflation of the Gulag with Auschwitz, let alone a causal relationship between them, is untenable.[85] Despite terrible human suffering and mass deaths, the 1931–2 *Holmodor* (murder by hunger) as Ukrainian nationalists have labelled it, was not a genocidal project directed specifically at ethnic Ukrainians; Caucasians, Central Asians, Kazakhs, and Russians also starved in their millions.[86]

Stalin's Soviet Union pursued a contradictory nationalist policy. On the one hand, from the mid-1930s the Russianization of Soviet patriotism and culture gathered pace. Loyalty to and love of the Russian 'Motherland' (*rodina*) and Soviet 'Fatherland' (*otechestvo*) became principles of state. In March 1938 Russian was made compulsory in all Soviet schools. On the other hand, 'friendship of the peoples' within the Soviet Union was promoted, as was 'ethnicization' of nationalities that in some cases had

not previously existed, for example, Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, and Tajiks.[87] Nevertheless, unfettered nationalism was viewed as chauvinist, as opposed to patriotism which was seen as love of country. While certain patriotisms were extolled, Russian in particular, chauvinism was harshly repressed. Stalin's nationalizing policies simultaneously Russified Soviet identity and the Russian republic while forging new nations and shoring up others. The result on the eve of the Second World War was that Stalin's Union of Soviet Socialist Republics became what Ronald Suny has called an 'empire of republics'.[88]

Patriotism at War

With the rapidly growing threat of war, Stalin's increasing populist embrace of Russian patriotism was accompanied by menacing declarations against potential traitor nationalities, real or imagined, within or without the Soviet Union. 'National operations' in the Ukrainian Donbass region in 1937–8 saw mass arrests, deportations, and executions of Germans, Poles, and Latvians. Koreans in the Far East, and Germans and Poles in the West, were pre-emptively deported from their homelands deep into Soviet territory: what would nowadays be deemed 'ethnic cleansing'.[89]

The signing of the September 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, with its secret protocols allowing German–Soviet occupation of Poland and the Baltic States, saw ruthless Soviet repression and deportation of thousands of Poles, Lithuanians, Estonians, and Latvians to Soviet Central Asia. Most infamously, in April 1940 21,857 (overwhelmingly Polish) officers, landlords, and officials were secretly executed by the NKVD (secret police) at Katyn Forest.[90]

From the moment Stalin's 'empire of republics' took up arms against Hitler's invading Axis forces in June 1941, it did so under the banner of a 'sacred' 'Great Patriotic War' in defence of the 'Motherland'. Stalin said not a word about world socialism, class struggle, or Marxism. Stalin's highly gendered, populist, patriotic, religious discourse was intended to appeal to the overwhelming majority of a largely peasant, multi-ethnic populace and military.[91] Although defence of socialism was frequently invoked in Soviet propaganda, it was principally under the banner of a Russified patriotism that millions of Soviet citizens were successfully mobilized for apocalyptic war. 'I insist on being signed up for active service with the Worker–Peasant Red Army', wrote a young woman in June 1941. 'I will fight the enemy to the last drop of blood, and if need be, I will give my life for the Motherland and for Stalin.'[92] Such patriotic sentiments were legion among the Soviet citizenry, and point to the success with which in the 1930s national identification with the 'Motherland' (*rodina*) had been instilled in and embraced by a multinational, multi-ethnic populace. Victory in the Great Patriotic War, waged over four traumatic years, would only cement that popular patriotic consciousness and the Soviet multinational state as its natural crucible. International socialism that transcended the nation state, the promise of 1917, was a distant memory.

The obverse of the Stalinist state waging a 'sacred' Great Patriotic War was ruthlessness towards non-Russian minorities accused of collaborating with the Axis powers. Between October 1943 and June 1944, 1.5 million people from accused minority nations were deported to Siberia or Central Asia; up to one-third died in transit. Entire nationalities were subjected to such collective punishment—which became a war crime under the 1949 Geneva Conventions.[93] Victory over Nazism brought little relief from exile as collective punishment. The onset of the Cold War and the ensuing forced collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet-occupied Baltic States in 1949 saw another wave of deportations of alleged kulaks (rich farmers) and collaborators.[94]

Notwithstanding Stalin's May 1945 exultation of the Russians as the 'leading people', the 'most outstanding nation of all the nations forming the Soviet Union', and 'the decisive force which ensured the historic victory over the enemy of humanity—over fascism',[95] Soviet deportations and ethnic cleansing on such a scale were not driven by a desire to ethnically or biologically homogenize the Soviet Union or to erase entire peoples from the earth. These were key objectives of fascism—particularly its Nazi variant.

Aftermath: Triumph of the Nation State

Soviet defeat of Nazism in the 'Great Patriotic War' destroyed Nazism's aspirations for a biopolitically pure, Aryan empire in east and central Europe. But at the same time, it consolidated nationalism and the nation state as the natural political unit in Europe, on both sides of the Cold War 'iron curtain'. Ever since the 'patriotic turn' of the Communist International and its constituent parties in 1935, anti-fascist 'popular front' movements and governments such as those in France and Spain had fought to claim the nationalist space occupied by the extreme Right.[96] As a result, the subsequent anti-fascist war and resistance in occupied Europe, as often as not led by national communist parties, were primarily fought as wars for national liberation and the restoration of democracy—not for international socialism. Consequently the defeat of fascism and authoritarianism in their various guises (with the notable exceptions of Spain and Portugal), and the onset of the Cold War, saw the consolidation of nation states: capitalist or state-socialist 'people's democracies'. In Italy, the Communist Party under its 'hard-line Stalinist' secretary Palmiro Togliatti participated until 1947 in governments of 'national unity' and advocated a '*via nazionale* for Communism'.[97] In France, the dominant role of the Communist Party (PCF) in the Resistance enabled them to tap into the patriotic 'humanist traditions' of the 1789 revolution, fostering a 'sense of identity or co-identity between the PCF and France', bolstered by PCF secretary Maurice Thorez's 1946 commitment to a French 'road to socialism'.[98] With socialism deferred, Italian and French nationhood, patriotism, and capitalism were thereby consolidated.

Consolidation could be cruel. German speakers in central and southern Europe were victims of vengeful 'ethnic cleansing'. 'We must expel all the Germans', Polish communist Władysław Gomułka declared, 'because countries are built on national lines and not on multinational ones.'[99] In scenes reminiscent of the 1922 Turkish–Greek mass expulsions, between 1944 and 1950 some 12 to 14 million German civilians fled or were forced to relocate—at the cost of at least half a million lives—from Poland, Yugoslavia, and particularly Czech Sudetenland to Germany; the expulsions were authorized by the victorious Allies at their July–August 1945 Potsdam Conference.[100] It was 'the largest single refugee movement in European history', but the Germans were not alone. Another 7 million refugees were forcibly resettled; 'the result was the virtual elimination of many minorities in eastern Europe'. In these circumstances, the European nation-state system that came into being in the wake of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements between Stalin and his allies in the 'Grand Alliance' effectively realized 'Versailles's dreams of national homogeneity'.[101] The nation state as the norm in Europe, east and west, was the product of Europe's traumatic 'second thirty years war', 1914–1945,[102] which witnessed the triumph of nationalism over internationalism and nationhood over class.

Notes

1. Mirsoslav Hroch, 'From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe', repr. in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 63.
2. Hobsbawm's approach follows 'Hroch's pathbreaking comparative studies of small European national movements', specifically 'his useful division of the history of national movements into three phases', notably 'phase C when—and not before—nationalist programmes acquire mass support': Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 10.
3. Exceptions are Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism* and Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions for National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
4. Stephanie Malia Hom, 'On the Origins of Making Italy: Massimo D'Azeglio and "Fatta l'Italia, bisogna fare gli Italiani"', *Italian Culture*, 31/1 (2013), 1–16.
5. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), ch. 3; Christopher A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).
6. Cited in Hugo Radice, *Global Capitalism* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 23.
7. José Alvarez Junco, 'The Nation-Building Process in Nineteenth Century Spain', in Clare Mar-Molinero and Angel Smith (eds.), *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities* (Oxford and Washington: Berg, 1996), 99.
8. E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 9. Although Britain, France, and Germany were hardly homogeneous in cultural or even linguistic terms, each had a sufficiently broad middle-class social base to cultivate a national culture.

9. Charles S. Maier, 'Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era', *American Historical Review*, 105/3 (2000), 808.
10. Hobsbawm, *Age of Empire*, 161.
11. Timothy Snyder, 'The Origins of Nations: The Brotherlands Hypothesis', 15 October 2013, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/events/events/2013/131015_The-Brotherlands.aspx>, accessed 11 November 2013.
12. Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 228–9.
13. Margaret MacMillan, *The War That Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War* (London: Profile, 2013), 246–7.
14. A. J. P. Taylor, *The First World War: An Illustrated History* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1966), 22; James Joll, *The Origins of the First World War* (London and New York: Longman, 1984), 184.
15. Michael S. Neiberg, *Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 234.
16. Peter Purseigle, 'The First World War and the Transformations of the State', *International Affairs*, 90/2 (2014), 255–6.
17. MacMillan, *The War That Ended Peace*, 103, 251, 253, 256.
18. MacMillan, *The War That Ended Peace*, 248–9.
19. Tahra Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1948* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Pieter Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
20. Nicholas Doumanis, *Before the Nation: Muslim–Christian Coexistence and Its Destruction in Late-Ottoman Anatolia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 5.
21. MacMillan, *The War That Ended Peace*, 274–84; Manifesto of the International Socialist Congress at Basel, <http://www.workers.org/marcy/cd/sambol/bolwar/bolwar08.htm>, last accessed 29 March 2015.
22. Peter Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 19.
23. MacMillan, *The War That Ended Peace*, 291–3.
24. Peter Gay, *The Cultivation of Hatred: The Bourgeois Experience; Victoria to Freud*, Vol. III (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 518.
25. Quoted in Peter Gay, *The Cultivation of Hatred*, 516.
26. In 1904 Tsarist minister of the interior Vyacheslav Plehve reputedly declared that Russia needed a 'small victorious war' to take people's minds off 'political questions'; Russia lost its war against Japan and a revolutionary situation erupted: MacMillan, *The War That Ended Peace*, 68, 166, 492.
27. Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 126.
28. John Horne, 'Introduction', in Horne (ed.), *State, Society and Mobilization in Europe During the First World War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 2–3.
29. Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 124.
30. Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis*, 80–1.
31. Purseigle, 'The First World War and the Transformations of the State', 249–64.
32. Jean-Louis Robert, 'Mobilizing Labour and Socialist Militants in Paris', in Horne (ed.), *State, Society and Mobilization*, 75.

33. Roger Chickering, *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 48.
34. Roger Chickering, *The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 433.
35. Jan Ruger, 'Entertainment', in Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert (eds.), *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914–1919*, Vol. II: A Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 116; see also chapters by Stefan Goebel and Jan Lawrence in the same volume.
36. Chickering, *Imperial Germany*, 15; Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis*, 36.
37. Adrian Gregory, *The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 121, 136.
38. Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (London: Allen Lane, 1998), 354–6.
39. See Wilhelm Deist, 'The German Army, the Authoritarian Nation-State and Total War', in Horne (ed), *State, Society and Mobilization*, 164, 168–71, and David Englander, 'Discipline and Morale in the British Army, 1917–1918', in Horne (ed.), *State, Society and Mobilization*, 140.
40. Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 77–8; Mark Cornwall, 'Morale and Patriotism in the Austro-Hungarian Army, 1914–1918', in Horne (ed.), *State, Society and Mobilization*, 178.
41. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Allen Lane, 1998), 45–6.
42. Maureen Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
43. Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism*, 83. Doubts about the loyalty of 'nationally contaminated' Czech troops, as the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff put it, were subsequently extended to Ruthene, Serb, Romanian, and Italian forces: Cornwall, 'Morale and Patriotism', 176–7.
44. The 'particularly brutal character' of the 1912–13 Balkan Wars was manifested in mass atrocities inflicted on civilians. 'Since nation building was the goal, civilians who were not of the same nation had to be removed and violence was the best method to accomplish this end': Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (eds.), *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013), 6.
45. Nikolai N. Golovin, *Voennye usiliia Rossii v Mirovoi voine* (1939; Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2013), 343.
46. Quoted in Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891–1924* (London: Pimlico, 1996), 258.
47. Paul Corner and Giovanna Procacci, 'The Italian Experience of "Total" Mobilization, 1915–1920', in Horne (ed.), *State, Society and Mobilization*, 232.
48. Horne, 'Introduction', 8, 12–17.
49. V. I. Lenin, 'The Tasks of Revolutionary Social-Democracy in the European War [6 September 1914]', in Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress, 1974), xxi. 15–19, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/aug/x01.htm>, accessed 24 March 2015.
50. 'Manifesto of the International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald', International Socialist Commission at Berne, Bulletin No. 1, p. 2, 21 September 1915, <http://www.workers.org/marcy/cd/sambol/bolwar/bolwar10.htm>, accessed 24 March 2015.

51. Erik J. Zurcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014); Xu Guoqi, 'The Great War and China's Military Expedition Plan', *Journal of Military History*, 72 (2008), 106–12.
52. Rogers Brubaker, cited in Oliver Zimmer, *Nationalism in Europe, 1890–1940* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), 51–2. Zimmer distinguishes between 'ethnic' and 'national' minorities: the former 'did not possess a homeland'; the latter, 'theoretically, could migrate to, and expect protection from, their 'home' state. The Jews were a 'classic example of an ethnic minority'; while Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland were an example of 'large national minorities'.
53. Zimmer, *Nationalism*, 60.
54. Bartov and Weitz (eds.), *Shatterzone*, 6.
55. 'Address of President Wilson to the Congress of the United States' (Washington, 1918).
56. Vladimir Lenin, 'Report on Peace', Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/oct/25-26/26b.htm>, accessed 21 April 2015.
57. Margaret MacMillan, *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War* (London: John Murray, 2003), 19, 21.
58. R. J. B. Bosworth, *Nationalism* (London: Longman, 2013), 108–9.
59. Mazower, *Dark Europe*, 53–4.
60. Roger D. Markwick, 'Communism: Fascism's Other', in R. J. B. Bosworth (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 344. Atatürk tried to steer a mid-course between capitalism and Bolshevism, for which there would be 'no place' in post-Ottoman Turkey: George W. Gawrych, *Young Atatürk: From Ottoman Soldier to Statesman of Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 86.
61. Marko Attila Hoare, 'Yugoslavia and its Successor States', in Bosworth (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism*, 415–16.
62. R. J. B. Bosworth, *Mussolini* (2nd edn, London: Arnold, 2010), 88–9, 94.
63. Cited in Roger Griffin (ed.), *Fascism* (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 1995), 39–41.
64. Richard J. Evans, 'The Emergence of Nazi Ideology', in Jane Caplan (ed.), *Nazi Germany: The Short Oxford History of Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 35–6.
65. Evans, 'The Emergence of Nazi Ideology', 31.
66. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 55.
67. Ingo Haar, '"Sudetendeutsche" Bevolkerungsfragen zwischen Minderheitenkampf und Münchener Abkommen: Zur Nationalisierung und Radikalisierung deutscher Wissenschaftsmilieus in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1919–1938', *Historical Social Research*, 31/4 (2006), abstract, 236.
68. Bosworth, *Nationalism*, 110–11, 113.
69. Paul J. Weindling, 'Race, Eugenics and National Identity in the Eastern Baltic: From Racial Surveys to Racial States', in Björn M. Felder and Paul J. Weindling (eds.), *Baltic Eugenics: Bio-Politics, Race and Nation in Interwar Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania* (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2013), 40.
70. Evans, 'The Emergence of Nazi Ideology', 38–9, 43–6.
71. Björn M. Felder, 'Eugenics Sterilisation and the Racial State: The Baltic States, Russia and the Global Eugenics Movement', in Felder and Weindling (eds.), *Baltic Eugenics*, 5.
72. Weindling, 'Race, Eugenics', 33.
73. Jorg Baberowski and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, 'The Quest for Order', in Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (eds.), *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 219.

74. H. Glenn Penny, *Kindred by Choice: Germans and American Indians Since 1800* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 155.
75. Ernest Mandel, *The Meaning of the Second World War* (London: Verso, 1986), 90–2. Cf. Sven Lindqvist, *The Dead Do Not Die: 'Exterminate All the Brutes' and Terra Nullius* (New York: New Press, 2014), 162–7.
76. For a contrary view, see Baberowski and Doering-Manteuffel, 'The Quest for Order', 180–227.
77. Moshe Lewin, *Lenin's Last Struggle*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith with a new introduction (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 86, 88.
78. Martin, 'An Affirmative Action Empire', 71–6.
79. José Neves, 'The Foreign Road to the Homeland: Paris and the National Turn of a Portuguese Communist', *Twentieth Century Communism*, 7 (2014), 66.
80. Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR and the Successor States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 284–90.
81. Suny, *The Soviet Experiment*, 286–7.
82. Martin, 'An Affirmative Action Empire', 80–1.
83. R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, *The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931–1933* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), ch. 13, esp. 415.
84. Davies and Wheatcroft, *The Years of Hunger,* 441.
85. A causal connection between Stalinist and Nazi repression has characterized much of the neo-totalitarian argumentation in recent decades, a precedent set most strikingly by Ernst Nolte in the 1980s *Historikstreit*. It has been rekindled in Timothy Snyder's *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Bodley Head, 2010).
86. Davies and Wheatcroft, *The Years of Hunger*, 408–17. Norman M. Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), esp. 3, 79 argues that Stalin's 'Ukrainian killer famine' constituted an 'episode of genocide' in a succession of mass killings, confirming 'the genocidal character of the Soviet regime in the 1930s, which killed systematically rather than episodically'.
87. Baberowski and Doering-Manteuffel, 'The Quest for Order', 206–7.
88. Suny, *The Soviet Experiment*, 287–90.
89. Baberowski and Doering-Manteuffel, 'The Quest for Order', 215–16. Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*, 111, stops just short of deeming what he calls Stalin's 'Great Terror' 'genocide'.
90. 'Memorandum from Lavrenti Beria to Stalin', 5 March 1940, in Ronald Grigor Suny (ed.), *The Structure of Soviet History*, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 304–6.
91. Roger D. Markwick, 'The Great Patriotic War in Soviet and Post-Soviet Collective Memory', in Dan Stone (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 692–4.
92. Cited in Roger D. Markwick and Euridice Charon Cardona, *Soviet Women on the Frontline in the Second World War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 32.
93. Chris Ward, *Stalin's Russia* (2nd edn, London: Arnold, 1995), 196; 'Report from Beria to Stalin', 4 July 1944, in Suny (ed.), *The Structure of Soviet History*, 313–15.
94. Ward, *Stalin's Russia*, 196.
95. J. V. Stalin, 'Toast to the Russian People at a Reception in Honour of Red Army Commanders Given by the Soviet Government in the Kremlin on Thursday, May 24, 1945', <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1945/05/24.htm>, accessed 19 October 2014.

96. Jessica Wardhaugh, 'Fighting for the Unknown Soldier: The Contested Territory of the French Nation in 1934–1938', *Modern & Contemporary France*, 15/2 (2007), 185–201; Xosé Manoel Núñez and José M. Faraldo, 'The First Great Patriotic War: Spanish Communists and Nationalism, 1936–1939', *Nationalities Papers*, 37/4 (July 2009), 401–24.
97. Jan-Werner Müller, 'The Paradoxes of Post-War Italian Political Thought', *History of European Ideas*, 39/1 (2013), 89.
98. Gino G. Raymond, *The French Communist Party During the Fifth Republic: A Crisis of Leadership and Ideology* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), 19, 23.
99. Cited in Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 221.
100. R. M. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012).
101. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 220–2.
102. A concept used by Domenico Losurdo, among others. See Helmut Dunkhase, 'Domenico Losurdo: Stalin. Geschichte einer schwarzer Legende. Rezension', October 2012, 2, <http://www.helmutdunkhase.de/>, accessed 17 May 2015.

CHAPTER 19

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND MASS SOCIETY

A European Civil War?

MARY VINCENT

Some months after the bombing of Guernica in April 1937, the journalist George Steer, who had witnessed the event, wrote that 'the condition into which the world is now drifting is one of 'chronic local wars'. For Steer the anti-fascist, this was a consequence of aggression; war fought without quarter meant these 'local wars never end'.[1] We know, of course, that this was not the case. The 'local wars' of the 1930s flowed into the Second World War, which was to be both their culmination—particularly after 1943—and their end. By the conclusion of the Greek Civil War in 1949, this particular period of intra-societal violence was over, though there would be echoes during the disintegration of post-communist Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Generally, though, the Second World War proved to be a terminus; the post-war period would be shaped by the geopolitical realities of the Cold War rather than the internal and uncertain political dynamic that had characterized the interwar years.

It is this 'rich and chaotic fluidity' that forms the subject of this chapter.[2] An 'earth-shattering explosion of immense state-sponsored violence' reconfigured European society after 1914, resulting in a period of deep political and cultural uncertainty.[3] This was not simply a question of a new political imaginary, though there is no doubt that 1917 unleashed both a renewed sense of possibilities and a keener, though often ill-defined, sense of threat. The Russian Revolution changed both the terms of politics and the sense of what violence could achieve just as Mussolini's seizure of power in Italy introduced a new model for the Right. The surveillance and mobilizing impulses of the Bolshevik and Fascist states as well as the ubiquitous forms of cultural and discursive violence changed political behaviour in Europe. This was in part about political opponents. A fear of Bolshevism after 1917, of Fascism after 1922, and of Nazism after 1933 created an emotional urgency around politics, which was defined as much by fear of what might happen as by what actually did. For the sharpest exchanges were not with those on the other

side, but with the forces of the state. In the early twentieth century, the modern state's capacity to accrue power to itself was both potent and visible. The mass warfare and revolution of 1914–18 unleashed a three-way dynamic, strengthening the violent capacity of the state even as, in central Europe at least, it seemed to be at its weakest.

After the armistice, a wave of paramilitarism both bridged and changed the difference between war and peace in east-central Europe. As self-styled counter-revolutionaries took action against the Red menace, a new climate of political violence appeared in Europe, pitting a revolutionary Left against a resistant and counter-revolutionary Right. This ideological division is used historiographically as a framework for the interwar period, notably in the temporal structure that depicts the years between 1917 and 1945 as a 'European civil war', when opposed ideological forces struggled for the future shape of the Continent. Ernst Nolte saw this 'European civil war' as propelled by the competing totalitarian blocks of Soviet communism and Nazism and the same sense of ideological cleavage—functioning essentially as a structure—informs other interpretations, for example, Eric Hobsbawm's 'age of extremes'.[4] The popularity of the 'European civil war' as a heuristic device allowing the period to be defined by the antithetical claims of the radical Right and the far Left is unsurprising. But this does not make it convincing, particularly not in Nolte's highly schematic and polarized interpretation.

One response is to dismiss the notion of a European civil war altogether.[5] Another is to critique it.[6] Despite the reductionism of a historiography closely wedded to a right–left binary divide, a plurality of political values, norms, and beliefs coexisted in interwar Europe. This is not to deny the existence of ideological cleavage. It is clear that, while varied and competing ideas around political, religious, and social values persisted in interwar Europe, there was no corresponding commitment to political pluralism. Nor was there any real consensus as to how a mass political system should be organized, despite the importation of Wilsonian democracy in the form of constitutional republics in 1918. The political instability of these 'provisional' regimes of east-central Europe did little to reassure those with limited faith in democracy, whether they preferred the alternatives offered by Bolshevism or Fascism, or the oligarchic certainties of an older world, whether monarchist or liberal.

The erosion of representative democratic systems throughout east-central and southern Europe in the 1920s and 1930s serves as an example of the process of polarization—or radicalization—that divided Europe along left–right lines in the interwar period. But this was not a simple, or even a clear, process. In the Weimar Republic, for example, the impossibility of achieving even a 'minimum consensus' is explained by the notion of 'fragmentation'. Such fragmentation was, though, around political beliefs and ideas; significantly, in terms of style, tactics, and 'political self-representation', there was far more agreement.[7] On the one hand, this cohesion led to a 'flattening' of diverse positions and groups through a superficial resemblance; on the other, it redefined political allegiance and identity in terms of actions rather than opinion and beliefs. We do not—and almost certainly cannot—know which of these was the prime mover in terms of interwar politics. But the distinction helps to explain how interwar Europe experienced a fluid, dynamic, and, often, dangerous militarization while retaining a varied and plural

politics that schemas such as Nolte's simply caricature. Complexity remained, albeit within and underneath the new political style.

This emphasis on action was only possible in an age of mass politics, and it helps to explain why the fear of civil war was so present during the interwar period.[8] Following Enzo Traverso, this idea of civil war is related to the change in 'war cultures' after 1914, as the distinction between military and political violence became increasingly blurred. 'Total' war—either as an idea or as lived experience—drew civilians into battle, brought colonial methods of warfare to Europe, and polarized collective identities, pitting a 'positive communal identity' against a 'demonized enemy' in a highly simplified way.[9] As conceived by Horne and Kramer, 'war cultures' recreated national identities. As the interwar period demonstrated, though, polarized collective identities could and did operate within and across national boundaries. The First World War had established an idea of unnaturally cruel enemies, who existed externally, sustained by 'enemy' states, but whose spies and acolytes were found everywhere. Outside the parameters of a war between states, these continuing 'war cultures' sustained an idea of civil war, often against unidentified or 'invisible' enemies, reworking the nineteenth century's 'culture wars'.[10] A catharsis would be achieved through deliberate acts of cultural violence. A demonized enemy would only be vanquished if utterly extirpated. In the early twentieth century, war was fought without quarter.

This reworked idea of a 'European civil war' understood in cultural terms is both richer and more convincing than its highly schematized ideological counterpart. The question remains, though, what such a conception means in terms of actual civil war. The notion of a transnational, pan-European civil war is only convincingly applied to particular sub-periods, specifically 1917–23 and the collaboration and resistance of 1943–5, both wars 'of intimate enemies and local massacre', the latter of which gave rise to an out-and-out civil war in Greece. As Stanley Payne has pointed out, in the intervening period civil war was rare; though the Russian Civil War continued until 1921, Ireland and Spain were the only European countries to fight civil wars that began and ended between 1919 and 1939. Europe's early twentieth century was bookended by civil war, but only because the period also began and ended with world war. Understood in the classical sense as armed conflict within a sovereign state between groups subject to the authority of that state (at least initially), the term does, however, have a certain ambiguity.[11] Uprisings, insurrections, insurgencies, and revolutionary attempts would all fit within this definition of 'civil war', a lumping together that does little to help us understand the dynamics of intra-societal violence in the interwar period.

This ambiguity of language was only too apparent at the time. Fear of civil war was reflected in a deep reluctance to use the term even when its reality was quite apparent. The Finnish Civil War of 1918, for example, was known variously as a 'revolution', 'revolt', or 'mutiny' before being officially baptized the Liberation War.[12] The same terminology was used in Civil War Spain with Francoist depictions of a 'crusade' or war of 'liberation' fought against the 'anti-Spain' and both sides talking of resistance to foreign invasion, a discourse shaped by the 'red' and 'white' of the Russian Civil War. 'Civil war' was not a neutral term; the abandonment of any attempt to conduct politics through normal

means had to be disguised, at least rhetorically. Paradoxically, however, the term was used, and with some alacrity, to describe other kinds of conflicts, notably the armed risings in Vienna and the region of Asturias in northern Spain that took place in 1934. The English journalist and war correspondent Philip Gibbs spoke of 'civil war' in Vienna, quoting a 'friendly waiter' in Innsbruck: 'Outwardly … Austria is peaceful: Underneath it is a powder keg.'[13]

The term 'Austrian Civil War' is commonly used. In contrast, in the case of Asturias, both protagonists and historians have overwhelmingly preferred the—equally problematic—term 'revolution'. Both were, however, socialist-led insurrections that pitted mobilized, unionized labour against the forces of the state, though the Austrian case was complicated by the Heimwehr offensive and paramilitary organization across the political spectrum.[14] These 1934 uprisings thus fulfilled the classic conditions of civil war without much—or in the case of Asturias, any—likelihood of actually giving rise to one, a pattern first set by the Paris Commune. In Adrian Shubert's words: 'The defeat is neither surprising nor difficult to explain. The insurrection was not preceded by a crisis of the state … The army and police were both reliable … The outcome was a foregone conclusion.'[15] Red Vienna was less isolated but its destruction equally dramatic. Outnumbered and less well armed, the socialist Schutzbund was forced into a military defence of the municipal housing projects, which succumbed to relentless artillery fire.[16]

Civil war is an exceptional circumstance, and it builds its own logic of violence as soon as hostilities are engaged. For civil wars are more than simply a recourse to violence; rather they reveal an inability to resolve political conflict by normal means. They are thus different from urban or regional insurrections, no matter how bloody or politically significant these are. The conditions in which civil war breaks out are actually quite rare: they have to involve two opposing sides that map onto a territorial division that extends and prolongs the conflict. Ideological cleavage was clearly a component of this, as demonstrated in, for example, the left-wing insurrections of 1934. But the logic of civil war was a function of engagement, not of origins, and certainly not of outcomes. Even in Spain, civil war was the unintended outcome of a failed military coup; no one on either side had been working towards a protracted civil conflict. Positions and identities hardened once the killing started, flattening multiple, varied allegiances into apparently monolithically antithetical sides. This single fault line, a lived sense of 'us and them', developed from the experience of fighting, obscuring the fact that everyday political affiliations and identities rarely divided so neatly. Indeed, this was demonstrated again and again at local level even during wars, like Spain's, that reflected a very high degree of ideological engagement. The fluidity and uncertainty of allegiances at local level should not be forgotten, even when obscured by the master narrative—the 'us' and 'them'—that was used to frame local complexities.[17]

The determining factor in the outbreak of engaged, extended civil war was the power and cohesion of the state. No matter how divided a society, if the state retains control, civil war is impossible. The example of Vienna clearly shows this. Similarly, the differing histories of interwar Germany, Italy, Austria, and Hungary demonstrate that high levels of political violence will not inevitably lead to civil war. It is neither coincidence nor

happenstance that only Ireland and Spain fought civil wars in Europe between 1919 and 1939. The Irish Civil War (1921–2) erupted in the messy circumstances of independence as the new Free State finally emerged from the repressive violence of British colonial rule. In many ways, the conflict was part of a wider anti-colonial struggle, its parameters delineated as much by the struggle for the new state as by the legacy of the War of Independence. In Spain, the civil war of 1936–9 broke out under democracy, but where the democratic experiment announced by the 1931 constitution had been constrained by the chronic weakness of the state. Without fiscal measures and with no real economic policy, the fledging Republic became a prize to be won by competing—and rapidly mobilizing—political forces. When the garrisons rose in a military coup on 18 July 1936, the government issued a series of contradictory notices asserting 'complete tranquillity' even as the sound of firing came from the capital's Montana barracks. The prime minister resigned by nightfall; thirty-six hours later, Republican Spain had had no fewer than three separate governments.

State capacity—and the ability of those in power to command it—is an essential causal explanation for civil war and helps to explain its rarity. There are variations and striking contrasts between even the Spanish and Irish examples. Though the exact number of casualties will never be known (in either case), the figure of *c.*2,000 deaths is often given for the Irish Civil War, slightly less than the number killed in Spain under the Second Republic *before* the outbreak of civil war. This figure, though, includes those killed during the repression that followed the Asturian uprising, ferociously conducted by colonial troops. General Franco's Army of Africa was brought to the peninsula to pacify a rebellious population with tactics practised in the Moroccan Rif and at a human cost of 144 policemen, 88 soldiers, and nearly 2,000 civilians.[18] The dead of Asturias account for the great majority of those killed in the political violence of the Republic, and they died at the hands of the state.

The case of Spain makes the point of access to the resources of the state quite explicitly. In October 1934, under an uneasy right-wing coalition government, the Spanish state could suppress a rebellion because it commanded the loyalty of the army. In July 1936, in part as a result of the political polarization of the previous two years, and under an even uneasier left-wing coalition government, around half the armed forces rebelled. Had they not fractured in this way, there would not have been a civil war. Had they all rebelled, there would have been a military coup, an authoritarian solution similar to the one that played out in Austria, where Chancellor Dollfuss's assumption of dictatorial powers was confirmed by the constitution that came into effect on 1 May 1934, or Portugal's Estado Novo. These examples show the 'segmented' position of the army within the modern state: if the army and police are loyal to the regime, then the government's authority is probably secure; if they are disloyal, it will be fatally weakened.[19]

Any analysis of the new 'war culture' of early twentieth-century Europe thus has to address the question of state power, which had, in part, created it. For the lived experience of the world's first 'total' war had depended on the modern state's ability to conscript generations of young men, and to deploy troops from far-flung parts of the globe.[20] 'Colonial' military practices went alongside a demonization of the enemy to change

contemporary notions of policing and 'order'. One example was Britain's deployment of the Black and Tans in Ireland in 1920–1, though it is fair to say that Ireland was no stranger to brutal colonial practices, which had long been used there, in contrast to the rest of Britain.[21] The deployment and spread of paramilitaries and militias challenged the Weberian axiom that a state must hold a monopoly of legitimate armed force while the experience of soldiering among ordinary men—now, after 1918, usually enfranchised—also extended the idea of active citizens, providing a ready audience for the rhetoric of 'politics as action', which was widespread in the 1930s.

Irregular tactics and guerrilla warfare were widely used by soldier-citizens during the Irish Civil War—unsurprisingly given the recent history of success of the IRA (Irish Republican Army) against the British—whereas in Spain warfare was a matter of trenches and fixed positions. In both countries, though, more people died away from the battlefield than in the front line. This was not unusual. In Spain an estimated 50,000 died behind the Republican lines, over three times that number at the hands of the victors; during the much shorter Finnish Civil War, a third of the victims were killed extralegally and by paramilitaries.[22] Rather than uprooting male citizens and taking them to the violence of the battlefield, civil war brought violence into everyday life. The disintegration of the old land empires in eastern Europe during the First World War combined with spiralling post-revolutionary conflict in what was to become the Soviet Union to lead to civil war in Finland (1918), Hungary (1919–20), and—briefly—Germany (1919) as well as in the Russian lands themselves (1917–21). This period of extended civil conflict that finally concluded the First World War in east-central Europe and the Baltic, expanded and transformed political violence, primarily through paramilitary activity.

This was also the context for the Russian Civil War, but that conflict was more protracted, more murderous, and much more significant. The Russian Civil War was the historic moment when the violent military practices of the First World War turned inwards and were redirected towards revolutionary ends. Exterminatory violence, harnessed to the power of the modern state, was the means to transform Bolshevik society.[23] The fluid, intercommunal violence of the Russian Civil War was far more than a simple spilling-over of military violence and had profound effects in the ensuing decades. Civil war was, as this chapter has argued, a discrete and unusual circumstance. But it was clearly and intimately related to other less choate expressions of intra-societal violence, which was such a marked feature of the extraordinary mass politics of Europe during the interwar years.

There were significant political and institutional differences between western and eastern Europe, not least in the strength and capacity of the successor states to contain intra-societal violence. The scale of the upheaval in east-central Europe—where people went to bed in 1918 as imperial subjects and woke up as democratic citizens in small new constitutional republics with borders they did not recognize—led to 'a maelstrom of different armed conflicts' as 'political entities and affiliations were dissolved by force and recomposed like the gems of a kaleidoscope'.[24] The extent and fluidity of paramilitary violence in these European 'borderlands' had profound effects. It helped to create new nation states and was then demobilized by them, at least temporarily.

For these civil, representative governments had only a conditional legitimacy, serving essentially as 'provisional' regimes.[25] As they gave way to—or reinvented themselves as—authoritarian, militarized regimes, the now domesticated violence that had given birth to them was re-emphasized. It is surely no coincidence that rulers such as Marshal Piłsudski and General Horthy adopted quasi-monarchical presidential trappings, as did their Spanish counterparts, Generals Franco and Primo de Rivera. This was not simply nostalgia for earlier forms of politics, though that played a part; rather, the resurrection of notables and the old order brought with them their own legitimacy, in which ideas of social peace and hierarchical order were key.

These older political ideas and identities were as much a part of the interwar political landscape as were the new dynamics of Bolshevism and fascism. In Hungary, Poland, and Spain, religion became a powerful component of reinvented forms of nationalism, while confessional identities proved surprisingly durable.[26] Alliances between old and new were common; not even in Germany and Italy did fascists come to power on their own. For at least two decades, scholars have stressed the fractured and fissiparous nature of political and social divisions during the interwar period. Indeed, the fluidity and uncertainty of the interwar period related to the fact that there were three major and competing political options: the radical Right, the radical Left, and liberal democracy. All, of course, were claimed as the expression of popular sovereignty, whether that was acclaimed or elected, just as each side in a civil war purported to be the very representation of the nation. But intra-societal violence derives from a fragmented polity with myriad divisions and differences and this is a far more accurate representation of the interwar period, even for 'civil war states' such as Spain, Ireland, and Hungary. Yet, greater awareness of the fluidity of the various political positions and boundaries as well as of the often highly contingent nature of personal choice, is not always reflected in the historiography. Devices such as 'the third Spain' in the case of the civil war of 1936–9 are used to show that not everyone can be accommodated within an ideologically driven left–right divide while simultaneously retaining exactly that division.

It is also the case that, despite the developing strength of the Communist Party, notably in Germany, and the rise of fascism, the major political cleavages of the period were themselves fractured. Representative parliamentarism also proved resistant to fascism, whether social democratic or conservative in tone, and whatever its ceremonial form. Constitutional monarchies proved just as resilient as historic republics and, as in the case of Britain, a strong moderate conservative movement may have proved the most effective bulwark against fascism. Among various attempts to keep political behaviour within 'civil' boundaries, legislation to ban political uniforms and insignia loomed large, encompassing Scandinavia and the Netherlands in 1933, Finland and Lithuania in 1934, and finally Britain and Czechoslovakia in 1936. Even though similar legislation foundered in Ireland and Switzerland, there was a clear correlation between functioning democracies and accepted modes of political expression.

It is tempting to see these western European democratic countries as somehow resilient against the currents of violence unleashed elsewhere on the Continent. There was a greater political decorum in Scandinavia, Great Britain, and France and a stronger

sense of the individual, closely related to longer and more embedded traditions of representative government. However, the fact that legislation to ban uniformed demonstrations was needed in the first place strongly suggests that democratic countries were not immune to the violent imaginary of the interwar years. Gerwarth and Horne observe that, after 1923, 'the wider culture of violent rhetoric, uniformed politics and street fighting … struck root beneath the apparent quiescence and return to the norms of peaceful politics'.[27] This played out differently in east and west, north and south, varying according to political culture and state capacity. But the battle for the streets was very real. In an age of genuine mass politics, street violence became the leitmotiv of interwar Europe. Images of paramilitaries in coloured shirts, castor oil, running street battles, and armed confrontations—not least with the forces of the state—colour our view of the period, reinforcing the sense of political flux.

As these mental pictures also show, there was a clear aestheticization of violence in interwar Europe, which was reinforced after 1922 by the powerful emphasis on spectacle in both the Italian and the Soviet states. Collective display—the national body at work—demonstrated popular consent for the new politics as both fascism and communism filled public space with disciplined, uniformed bodies. Attempts to emulate this in other countries exaggerated the strength of the radical parties and may at times have verged on the absurd, as with Oswald Moseley's posturing British Union of Fascists (BUF), but they could still result in real violence, as at Cable Street in 1936. Moseley's Blackshirts are unusual for a fascist group in that they never killed anyone, but they still brought violence—and a new aesthetic of violence—to the streets of Britain. Recent works on the 'non-fascist' mobilizing Right in the interwar democracies of France and Spain reinforce this sense of the erosion of peaceful politics, with rhetorical and physical violence incorporated into the armoury of ostensibly law-abiding political parties. In Kevin Passmore's words, violence became 'central' to their 'self-definition and political practice',[28] a process that was undoubtedly mirrored among similar groups on the left. Street violence is a crude form of politics that lends itself to oversimplification, particularly in a period of sharp rhetorical polarization. It thus contributed to the momentum and the dynamic of intra-societal violence, particularly in the 1930s, as well as being an expression of it.

In countries that experienced a seizure of the state—which was by no means uncommon—levels of political violence were undoubtedly higher. *Squadristi* violence was essential to both Mussolini's rise to power and his new state. Political confrontations cost 986 lives in Italy between November 1918 and June 1921 as fear became part of the political lexicon; indeed the period has, once again, been seen by historians as a civil war in all but name. There were defined protagonists. Targeting individuals was part of the practice of eliminating the institutions of socialism, which was Fascism's original target and goal.[29] Similarly, violent clashes between Right and Left rose in Weimar Germany between 1930 and 1933, with 155 deaths recorded in 1929–30, 108 of whom were communists. Social democrats were far less involved, accounting for only eight of the fatalities.[30] The Nazis' rise to power was thus less overtly violent than the Fascists' but, as in Italy, they would incorporate violence into the very fabric of the regime, and with far

more murderous consequences. Here, political violence served its own purpose; it was a means to 'generate and regenerate power'.[31] The radical Right continued to intimidate all 'adversaries, neutrals and even partisans' after they had achieved power. Violence was ingrained in the fabric of the regime.

Combined with the experience of soldiering in the First World War, the regime changes in the USSR, Italy, and Germany gave violence a new imaginary power, as well as plenty of examples as to its actual use. Political violence was now catharsis, lauded as an agent of purification, used to cleanse the national and the social body. Importantly, this did not have to involve killing; post-*squadristi* Italy, for example, saw murderous violence decline sharply as the Fascist regime both took control of its own shock troops and introduced new methods of confinement, intimidation, and social exclusion.[32] Even countries with high levels of social peace, such as France, saw violence become part of the political language, used as a means of coercive negotiation, particularly within public space; at least fifty were killed here between 1934 and 1938.[33] Just as civil war was a struggle for national space that would determine the future shape of society, so intra-social violence in this period looked to establish and negotiate claims over the nature and ownership of public space. The pattern had originated with the paramilitarism of the post-1918 period and was apparent within both dictatorships and democracies, though there was significant variation, and not only in the numbers of deaths. Crucially dictatorial regimes, as well as those tending towards authoritarianism, subsumed violence to themselves not simply in terms of the coercive apparatus of the state but also in the everyday mechanisms of policing and control that individual citizens had to negotiate, eventually as a matter of routine. Incarceration, restrictions on movement, denunciations, and other forms of 'ordinary' violence not only made it an everyday reality but also reinforced—and defined—a sense of political and social cleavage. This could, if necessary, be demonstrated in ruthless displays of military and state power.

In the suppression of Red Vienna, for example, the reconquest of physical space from armed workers was a crucial element of the struggle. In February 1934, the Karl Marx Hof on the Ringroad of the Proletariat was a symbolic as well as a military target. The most ambitious of the Red Vienna town planning projects, it housed over 1,000 flats and overlooked a main railway station, as did the barracks. Rumours had abounded of conspiracy and interconnections between the proletarian housing developments that now lined the Viennese boulevards. Once taken, this physical space was to be brutally subdued, a course of action justified in part by the shadowy imagined conspiracies taking place deep underground. The flattening of Red Vienna was an extreme battle, determined by military force and a clear example of 'war cultures' and the demonization of an at least partly imagined enemy. But there were many running battles around public space, and in these the state was usually involved only as an arbitrating policeman. Across Europe, most intra-social violence coalesced around the control of public space as it had done since the 'culture wars' of the late nineteenth century.

Such struggles were in part about controlling those who inhabited this space. The 'punitive expeditions' of early *squadristi* violence saw Blackshirts arriving by the hundreds in small towns or villages to enact revenge on local socialists after an attack on one

of their own.[34] These 'punitive expeditions' relied on local cooperation; victims had to be identified and possibly disarmed, quite often by police officers. It is this community involvement that demonstrates how political violence is, in fact, communal and social even if the motivations and targets—in this case socialists and their institutions—were more narrowly defined. In Germany, the *Landpropaganda* of the SA (*Sturmabteilung*) were similar displays of force in small, confined communities, which invariably ended violently. In Berlin, the SA's marching columns moved through working-class districts, in a systematic 'invasion' directed by Goebbels, who had a weather eye on the publicity generated by the violence that inevitably ensued and that he was intending to provoke. The men themselves were the advertisement, their discipline, strength, and willingness to fight standing for the potency of the wider Nazi movement.

The battle for the streets was presented in stark terms as a right–left struggle. As in 1917–23, the Red menace had a powerful legitimizing effect.[35] The streets had to be won back from socialists and communists, often broadly identified with the working class. In terms of access to the organs of the state, this would prove to be a one-sided fight. But there was plenty of resistance among the workers and socialists themselves, even if the KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands) ultimately proved unable to halt the Nazi seizure of power. The struggle was also more evenly balanced outside the fascist dictatorships. Strikes, boycotts, and, in Italy, factory occupations were the Left's weapons, centred on the workplace and the economic means of production. Socialist tactics thus retained a sense of socio-economic purpose, even if the violence they engendered increasingly spilled over onto the street. This was both a consequence and a constituent of the politics of confrontation. Young left-wing militants fought to take possession of public space, in part through demonstrations, protests, and other symbolic acts that, like strikes, were designed to show the sheer numerical power of the working class and so give the lie to the noisy claims of the radical Right. It was, after all, axiomatic that the proletariat was not only the most productive but also the most numerous social class. Against such demonstrations of power, who could doubt its ultimate victory?[36]

Their opponents remained unpersuaded; the Right was less well versed in Marxian theory and in any case spoke the integrating language of the nation rather than that of class. It was also unclear just what level of commitment was entailed by, for example, downing tools or taking part in a rally, a point that was not lost on contemporaries. Nor did socialists have a monopoly of anti-fascist feeling. There were constitutionalists, often republicans, while anarchism was a complicating factor, particularly in Spain, which by the 1930s had the largest anarchist movement the world had ever seen. In its own terms, anarchism is 'unpolitical' in that it has no truck with parties, parliaments, or the apparatus of the state. But anarchists were also uncompromisingly dedicated to the emancipation of the working class and the movement's adherents vied with socialists and communists for the loyalty of the people. For all its idiosyncrasy, anarchism was clearly a phenomenon of the Left just as fascism's rhetorical claim to offer a 'third', corporatist way between socialism and capitalism never disguised its position on the far Right. The rise of fascism sharpened the left–right cleavage and, by making it seem all-embracing, threatened to turn it into a chasm. But shades of opinion continued, as did

the division between moderate, representative options and their radical counterparts on both left and right.

The rise of fascism brought a new understanding of political violence as a weapon in and of itself, unrelated to economic purpose or the workplace. This led to a new sense of urgency. Young militants harried their opponents in seemingly endless successions of skirmishes and confrontations. The official response of organized socialist and communist parties varied over time, but paramilitarism remained an option. After the armed resistance to Mussolini offered by the Arditi del Popolo—non-aligned groups that, particularly in the initial stages of resistance, built on a communal experience of resistance in urban working-class neighbourhoods, a non-sectarian tradition influenced at least as much by anarchism as by socialism—'Red Front' militias were established by the KPD in 1924 and later, as the GDA (Groupes de défense antifascistes) in France. The Italian Communist Party was always uncomfortable with the Arditi, reflecting the profound sectarian divisions that persisted across both left and right but with particular virulence on the left. This concern with ideological purity persisted at the highest level, and influenced the direction laid out by the Communist International as it sought to provide a definitive anti-fascist lead. This led to a change of tack in 1928, abandoning militias and looking to provoke a mass revolutionary response to fascism rather than an armed one. In 1935, the tactics changed again with the adoption of the inter-party, interclass Popular Front strategy. But, a year earlier, the Milicias Antifascistas Obreras y Campesinas (MAOC) were founded in Spain, and continued through the formation of the very moderate Spanish Popular Front; indeed the MAOC grew in number and potency once the socialist and communist youth movements merged in April 1936, two months after the election of a Popular Front coalition government.[37]

These politicized, quasi-militarized young men became part of the 'shirted' movements of interwar Europe. Outside the fascist dictatorships, they were relatively few in number but they profoundly changed the language, rhetoric, and practice of politics. This was, in part, a question of the visual lexicon of gesture and uniform, a political 'self-fashioning' that clearly bridged party divides. Badges and insignia—whether worn, like armbands, or uttered, like songs or slogans—not only proclaimed a communal identity but were also deployed combatively, for example during election campaigns.[38] The paraphernalia of fascism was widely adopted among non-fascist groups, whether monarchist or confessional, in a way that was partly about style but also about how 'politics' was defined and conducted. To stay with the example of Spain, young left-wing militants—whether or not they were organized in the MAOC—policed meetings and rallies, providing 'security' for their comrades, exactly the same functions as had been core to the Red Front paramilitaries in the 1920s. But in Spain, as in France and many other countries, their opponents were not necessarily fascists. Like its counterparts all over Europe, the Falange Española, founded in 1933, struggled to become more than a marginal presence. Far more significant was the JAP (Juventudes de Acción Popular), the youth wing of Spain's mainstream Catholic party, the CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas), which vastly outnumbered the Falange until 1936 and, though it had fewer killers, was involved in similar patterns of violent skirmishes,

particularly around propaganda, whether publicizing and patrolling meetings, putting up posters, or selling newspapers.[39]

The picture was the same in France with socialist youths pitted against, for example, monarchists with each group locked into a spiral of retaliatory violence. These public altercations ranged from fisticuffs to armed encounters but invariably involved some aspect of what, in relation to the KPD under Weimar, Rosenhaft has termed 'policing', that is, a territorial claim on the street.[40] In Berlin, young communists would 'patrol' their own neighbourhoods, preventing or removing Nazi propaganda and, indeed, Nazis themselves, often after a body search for identifying insignia. Forms of 'possessing' public space included pamphleteering, bill-sticking, or selling newspapers and the low-level skirmishes that invariably followed were a much more widespread and characteristic form of violence than armed uprisings or spectacular displays of occupying force by fascist foot soldiers. They took place on urban streets all over Europe, though with varying frequency depending on how carefully—or how brutally—they were themselves 'policed' by the authorities. The outcome was often little more than bruises but fatal encounters were not uncommon—the JAP claimed twenty-six 'martyrs' by 1936—and always led to political funerals, demonstrations, and deliberately provocative cults of commemoration.[41]

In the democracies, one effect of these assaults on and in public space was to challenge legitimate notions of where politics was located. Representative electoral systems took politics off the streets. Political debate took place in clubs and the editorial columns of newspapers but political action was largely confined to parliaments, both the legislative chambers and the lobbies. Street politics challenged this; it was crude and clamorous but so, it could be argued, was the voice of the people. Trade union organization as well as the agitation of the Left had politicized the workplace while informal politics had long taken place in taverns, pubs, and bars, all of them, of course, characteristically male spaces. But the rise of fascism brought with it a new understanding of violence as a form of political action. Shirted movements proclaimed the efficacy of actions—usually blows—over words. Street protests throughout Europe challenged the legitimacy of parliamentary politics even as paramilitary militias challenged the state's monopoly of armed force. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, election campaigns became increasingly inflected by violence, as confrontation at the ballot box was amplified into the combative politics of public space. Activists, quite literally, wore their political identity on their sleeves, while campaigning and publicity inevitably led to brawling.

These new understandings of political action exaggerated the clarity of the left–right divide but nevertheless represented a profound shift in mass politics. Young men were now highly visible political actors, primarily because violence had become a constituent part of political life. Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of street fighters, and radical activists more generally, were young men.[42] Political violence was, however, not simply a question of praxis; it was, after all, still largely confined to small numbers of highly committed militants. A much wider and more insidious change lay in the adoption of violent language and symbolism, as in the French example of the Croix-de-Feu.[43] Physical combat or assault is an extreme form of violence; it is hardly its only expression.

Many groups saw themselves as 'fighters' at least in a symbolic sense and this rhetoric of paramilitarism combined with a demonization of opponents that directly reflected the 'war cultures' of the post-First World War era to create a violent politics that both changed and undermined the old norms of representative government. The existence of an opponent who doubled as an enemy was crucial to this process, which was always symbiotic, to the extent, indeed, that an apparently clear fascist/anti-fascist cleavage was superimposed on a much less clear-cut political reality.

This willingness to espouse violence as a political solution, at least rhetorically, was also a means of self-identification that separated these new, contemporary political forms from the outmoded 'talking shops' of nineteenth-century liberalism. This was not restricted to fascists, although they, like the communists, made much of both their modernity and their radicalism. Claims to 'boldness' and action were common to youth and militia movements of all stamps, leading to, in Reichardt's words, a 'death-dealing vitalism in the name of youth' that reveals much that is paradoxical about European politics and culture in the interwar years.[44] But, despite some of the mystical—and mystifying—rhetoric that groups like the Falange or Romania's Legion of the Archangel Michael employed to reinforce this conundrum, there were more prosaic explanations. These young men were now newly enfranchised citizens, freed by the suffrage extensions of the immediate post-war from the oligarchic shackles of limited franchises and impatient with the 'talking shops' of bourgeois politics favoured by their elders. Students were always over-represented in shirted movements, which were, in turn, over-represented in brawling and political skirmishes. To those involved in it, street violence expressed politics as action and it clearly had a symbolic function as well as a practical effect.

It is no coincidence that defining street politics in this way meant that its protagonists were invariably male. The end of the First World War had led to a powerful cultural concern with gender-role boundaries, as the blurring roles and looser social mores of the war years were replaced by a rigorously policed 'normality'.[45] In political terms, the street was no place for women. They could take a lead in demonstrations—particularly when, like food or consumer riots, they concerned providing for families—but they played only a secondary role in street violence. This could be important. As resisters found throughout Nazi-occupied Europe, women were useful in clandestine operations as they tended to attract less attention and so could move more freely. During the 1930s women members or sympathizers would provide vital cover or transport arms but their work was neither visible nor recognized.[46] Fascist movements all over Europe excluded women specifically because, unlike men, they were not born to fight. A hyper-masculine identity as 'natural' warriors both drew from and parodied the real experience of soldiering that so many European men had shared between 1914 and 1918. This made for a powerful aestheticization of violence, demonstrated most clearly in ideas of the New Man, whether Fascist or Soviet.

As the poster art of the interwar period vividly illustrated, the male musculature represented strength and resistance—particularly, but by no means exclusively, anti-fascist resistance.[47] With the exception of Soviet aircrew in the Second World War, no military

involved women in a front-line capacity, though there were women resistance fighters in the Greek and, briefly, the Spanish civil wars. But it was not simply the deeply embedded association of military action and masculinity that excluded women from the street violence of the 1930s; it was also the nature of the politics it represented.[48] In particular, its policing function made the brawling and patrolling so resolutely male. Increasingly common, and often more violent, the tussles around newspaper sellers, street space, and the occupation of the public realm were in many ways a continuation of earlier practices. They offered a way in which politics continued to be a male preserve, excluding newly enfranchised women from both political life and the public sphere.[49]

This was no patriarchal plot, but rather a continuation of long-established cultural norms in uncertain and even chaotic times. Many men and women valued stability and predictability, as did governments and 'bourgeois' politicians. But culture was not simply a source of reassurance. Cultural violence was also catharsis. The commitment to cultural and political pluralism—which may well have been shallow outside the established democracies—was sharply eroded by 'war cultures', which had been shaped as much by deliberate cultural destruction as by mass killing.[50] This was symbolized during the interwar period by the Nazi book burning of 10 May 1933, which was orchestrated by the party and its marching, uniformed student supporters, but was watched in Berlin by a crowd of 40,000, with academic speeches and university dignitaries.

Acts of cultural violence resist single readings even more than political ones do. Burning books was a powerful symbolic act, with clearly cathartic intent, not least in the use of fire. Yet, the actual object of attack was hard to discern: was it the books themselves, their authors, or the ideas they contained? The role of the audience was also ambivalent: presumably, the event was intended to impress, with an admiring but also fearful audience. But in common with much cultural violence, the book burnings were also transgressive, as was underlined by the academic presence at an act of cultural vandalism. There were, of course, many and various reasons why individuals should have taken part, including vanity and fear. But, setting aside the destructive form of the event, support for censoring books was very common. Justifying the removal of certain works, on the grounds of morality, political expedience, or public safety, was hardly uncommon. The boundaries were drawn differently—one Catholic group in Republican Spain categorized Laurel and Hardy films as pornographic—but the principle of censorship was widely supported. When university and public libraries were purged in Francoist Spain, the committees were administered by academics.

The Berlin book burnings took place just off the Unter Den Linden, in central, ceremonial, public space. Like its political counterpart, cultural violence often involved a struggle for public space taking fluid and improvised forms, in contrast to Nazi Germany's highly choreographed public spectacle. It was always transgressive, deriving some of its potency from the thrill of the forbidden, which melded impromptu groups and forged a reciprocal sense of comradeship.[51] Anti-Semitic attacks, for example, were not confined to radical militants, used to operating at the margins of the law, nor did they only involve street violence. Cultural violence against Jews was widely practised all over Europe—though with particular virulence in Germany, Hungary, and Romania—and took

numerous forms, including shunning and exclusion, desecration, particularly of cemeteries, and arson. Fire, that age-old agent of purification, was familiar from pogroms and featured regularly in anti-Semitic attacks, for example, the 1931 violence against the Jews of Salonika, which fell a long way outside the Pale of Settlement.[52]

The anti-Jewish riots in Salonika were not a prelude to worsening, systematic anti-Semitic violence, in marked contrast to their east-central European counterparts. But they did represent, albeit briefly, an attempt to control and cleanse public space, carried out by a temporary and improvised alliance of people, only some of whom were radical political militants. Latent prejudices and rising communal tension had combined in an explosion of societal violence. But, without any state programme of anti-Semitism or the legislative will to exclude and discriminate against Jews, the violence played itself out. As on so many occasions in interwar Europe, a key difference lies in the role of the state, whose power could be used to persecute or to protect ethnic groups. And without governmental support, and the access to state resources this allowed, these transient, purificatory ad hoc alliances tended to dissipate, however violent their actions.

This same pattern is seen in other incidents of cultural violence, the highly gendered communal rituals of shaming and head-shaving seen during the liberations of 1944–5, for example, or the waves of anticlerical violence that occurred during both the Russian and Spanish civil wars.[53] Like anti-Semitic violence, these transgressive acts often took older forms, such as disinterring corpses or 'executing' statues. Though less well known than other forms of violence, these anticlerical conflicts cost the lives of thousands of ecclesiastical personnel, with levels of iconoclasm and church-burning not seen in Europe since the French Revolution. The new Soviet Union mounted a dechristianization campaign that cost *c.*8,000 lives in 1922 alone. In Civil War Spain, where the violence was not state-sponsored, the intention was to excise Catholicism from the Republic, removing its cultural weight and physical presence in a revolutionary new dawn. Republican militiamen played a key role in this process, which erupted spontaneously on the immediate outbreak of war, to the deep disquiet of the Republican authorities.[54] Appalled by the violence but unable to deny it, officials downplayed the anticlericalism, falling back on clichéd images of priests firing from bell towers. This was a fiction, but served as a means of both denying and justifying the anticlerical onslaught.

This uncomfortable position did not just reflect the weakness of the Republican government or the difficulty in speaking out against 'the people' during a people's war. Anticlericalism represented a continuation of the 'culture wars' of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; Republican ministers and civil governors may have deplored the methods—and vulgarity—of the anticlerical mob but they were not unsympathetic to its aims. For decades, liberals, socialists, and anarchists had fought together for the secularization of public space, mounting legal challenges and demonstrating against confessional cemeteries, processions, and official ritual. Indeed, in many ways, anticlericalism was the only common cause the 'Left' had. Republicans could not simply turn their back on this legacy. Catholic religious practice was effectively driven underground in the Republican zone, though the anticlerical violence ceased as the government regained full control of its territory.

The anticlerical violence in both Spain and the Soviet Union was, in part, about changing people's beliefs and challenging a dominant culture. But it was also about public space, just as the 'culture wars' had been. This battle to own—or at least dominate—the streets and squares of interwar Europe lay at the heart of both the cultural and the political violence of the period. It was a battle without victors, at least outside the dictatorships that could impose, and then police, a monopoly on public space. But as resisters showed everywhere, even this was not without challenge. It is striking that, throughout the period, there was so little acceptance of attempts to co-own the street. Very few Europeans seemed to aspire to create a genuinely neutral space, at least outside Britain and Scandinavia, and even here it came under challenge. This failure to accept the cultural pluralism on which democracy is based had its roots not only in the militarization of the post-1918 period and the vertiginous dynamic of fascism and anti-fascism but also in the coercive nature of nineteenth-century liberalism, which had also looked to 'own' the street. In a world of limited franchises and oligarchic politics, these battles were largely fought constitutionally, within legislatures. This changed in an age of mass politics, when the battle for the future nature of Europe spilled over onto the streets.

Notes

1. Quoted in Tom Buchanan, *The Impact of the Spanish Civil War on Britain: War, Loss and Memory* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2007), 42.
2. Martin Conway and Peter Romijm (eds.), *The War for Legitimacy in Politics and Culture 1936–1946* (Oxford: Berg, 2008), 1.
3. Ian Kershaw, 'War and Political Violence in Europe', *Contemporary European History*, 14/1 (2005), 107–23.
4. Ernst Nolte, *La Guerre civile européenne 1917–1945: National-socialisme et bolchevisme* (Paris: Éditions des Syrtes, 2000) (first published in German, 1987).
5. Stanley Payne, *Civil War in Europe, 1905–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
6. Enzo Traverso, *A Sangre y fuego: De la guerra civil europea, 1914–1945* (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2009) (first published in French, 2007); James McMillan, 'War', in Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth (eds.), *Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 40–86 esp. 42.
7. Dirk Schumann, *Political Violence in the Weimar Republic, 1918–1933* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 186.
8. Namely the subtitle of Schumann's book, *Fight for the Streets and Fear of Civil War*.
9. John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial* (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 291.
10. Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser (eds.), *Culture Wars: Secular–Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
11. Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 16–19, 365–7.

12. Pertti Haapala and Marko Tikka, 'Revolution, Civil War and Terror in Finland, 1918', in Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (eds.), *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe After the Great War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 72–84.
13. Philip Gibbs, *European Journey* (London: Doubleday, 1934), 255, 288.
14. Anson Rabinbach, *The Crisis of Austrian Socialism: From Red Vienna to Civil War, 1927–1934* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 184–9.
15. Adrian Shubert, *The Road to Revolution in Spain: The Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860–1934* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 163.
16. Rabinbach, *Crisis of Austrian Socialism*, 202–10.
17. Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence*, 364–87.
18. Paul Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain* (London: HarperCollins, 2012), 85. An earlier analysis, which gave the then accepted figure of 1,500 for the Asturian death toll, calculates a further 619 deaths in political violence under the Republic: Stanley Payne, 'Political Violence in the Second Spanish Republic', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 25/2–3 (1990), 269–88 esp. 284.
19. This analysis follows Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol. II (2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 402–43.
20. Alan Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
21. Adrian Gregory, 'Peculiarities of the English? War, Violence and Politics, 1900–1939', *Journal of Modern European History*, 1/1 (2003), 44–59.
22. Preston, *Spanish Holocaust*; Haapala and Tikka, 'Revolution, Civil War and Terror'.
23. Peter Holquist, 'Violent Russia, Deadly Marxism? Russia in the Epoch of Violence, 1905–1921', *Kritika* 4/3 (2003), 627–52.
24. Jochen Böhler, 'Enduring Violence: The Postwar Struggles in East Central Europe, 1917–1921', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 50 (2015), 58–77 at 59.
25. Peter Romijn and Ben Frommer, 'Legitimacy in Interwar Europe', in Conway and Romijn (eds.), *The War for Legitimacy*, 29–65.
26. Paul A. Hanebrink, *In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 1890–1944* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Brian Porter-Szucs, *Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Mary Vincent, 'The Spanish Civil War as a War of Religion', in Martin Baumeister and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (eds.), *'If You Tolerate This …': The Spanish Civil War in an Age of Total War* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008), 74–89.
27. Gerwarth and Horne (eds.), *War in Peace*, 16.
28. Cited in Kevin Passmore, 'Boy Scouting for Grown-ups? Paramilitarism in the Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Francais', *French Historical Studies*, 19/2 (1995), 527–57; see also Passmore, *From Liberalism to Fascism: The Right in a French Province, 1928–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
29. 'Paramilitary Violence in Italian Fascism: A Discussion', *Contemporary European History*, 22/4 (2013), 551–84, esp. Matteo Millan, 'The Institutionalisation of *Squadrismo*: Disciplining Paramilitary Violence in the Italian Fascist Dictatorship', 551–74.
30. Ten of the dead were police officers: Schumann, *Political Violence*, 251–2.
31. Conway and Romijm (eds.), *The War for Legitimacy*, 57.
32. Michael R. Ebner, *Ordinary Violence in Mussolini's Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

33. Chris Millington, 'Street-Fighting Men: Political Violence in Inter-war France', *English Historical Review*, 129 (2014), 606–7.
34. Sven Reichardt, 'Fascist Marches in Italy and Germany: Squadre and SA before the Seizure of Power', in Matthias Reiss (ed.), *The Street as Stage: Protest Marches and Public Rallies since the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 169–89.
35. Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, 'Bolshevism as Fantasy: Fear of Revolution and Counter-Revolutionary Violence, 1917–1923', in Gerwarth and Horne (eds.), *War in Peace*, 40–51.
36. See the study by Eve Rosenhaft, *Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence, 1929–1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
37. See Rosenhaft, *Beating the Fascists*; Millington, 'Street-Fighting Men'; Antonio Sonnessa, 'Working-Class Defence Organization, Anti-Fascist Resistance and the Arditi Del Popolo in Turin, 1919–1922', *European History Quarterly*, 33/2 (2003), 183–218; Eduardo Gonzalez Calleja, 'La dialéctica de las pistolas: La violencia y la fragmentación del poder político durante la Segunda República', in Javier Muñoz Soto, José Luis Ledesma, and Javier Rodrigo (eds.), *Culturas y políticas de la violencia* (Madrid: Complutense University of Madrid, 2005), 101–46.
38. See e.g. Roland Clark, 'Collective Singing in Romanian Fascism', *Cultural and Social History*, 10/2 (2013), 251–71.
39. Sid Lowe, *Catholicism, War and the Foundation of Francoism: The Juventud de Acción Popular in Spain, 1931–1939* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2010).
40. Rosenhaft, *Beating the Fascists*, 143–6.
41. Lowe, *Catholicism, War and the Foundation of Francoism*, 41; Rafael Cruz, 'El sabor fúnebre de la política española entre 1876 y 1940', in Jesús Casquete and Rafael Cruz (eds.), *Políticas de la muerte: Usos y abusos del ritual fúnebre en la Europa del siglo XX* (Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata, 2009), 91–101.
42. Nearly 85 per cent of Berlin's KPD street fighters were under 30, over a third of them under 21: Rosenhaft, *Beating the Fascists*, 45, 193–6. For their opponents, see Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust, *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980).
43. Passmore, *From Liberalism to Fascism* and 'Boy Scouting for Grown-ups'.
44. Reichardt, 'Fascist Marches', 187.
45. Mary Louise Roberts, *Civilization without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917–1927* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Susan Kingsley Kent, *Making Peace: the Reconstruction of Gender in Interwar Britain* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
46. For overviews, see Helmut Gruber and Pamela M. Graves (eds.), *Women and Socialism, Socialism and Women: Europe Between the Two World Wars* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998) and Kevin Passmore, *Women, Gender, and Fascism in Europe, 1919–1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).
47. Schumann, *Political Violence*, 196–202; there are online collections of Soviet and Spanish posters at <http://www.iisg.nl/exhibitions/chairman/sovintro.php and http://libraries.ucsd.edu/speccoll/visfront/>.
48. Millington, 'Street-Fighting Men', 627–33; Schumann, *Political Violence*, 186–211.
49. In western Europe all but French, Swiss, and Italian women had the vote by the 1930s; in the east, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Albania enfranchised women.

50. Crucially, the burning of Louvain: Kramer, *Dynamics of Destruction*, esp. 6–19. See also Matthew Fishburn, *Burning Books* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 20–3.
51. See Richard Maddox, 'Revolutionary Anticlericalism and Hegemonic Processes in an Andalusian Town, August 1936', *American Ethnologist*, 22/1 (1995), 125–43.
52. Aristotle Kallis, 'The Jewish Community of Salonica under Siege: The Anti-Semitic Violence of the Summer of 1931', *Holocaust & Genocide Studies*, 20/1 (2006), 34–56.
53. Fabrice Virgili, *Shorn Women: Gender and Punishment in Liberation France* (Oxford: Berg, 2002); Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924* (London: Pimlico, 1996), 745–51; Maria Thomas, *The Faith and the Fury: Popular Anticlerical Violence and Iconoclasm in Spain 1931–1936* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2013).
54. Mary Vincent, '"The Keys of the Kingdom": Religious Violence in the Spanish Civil War, July–August 1936', in Chris Ealham and Michael Richards (eds.), *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 68–89.

CHAPTER 20

EUROPEAN SEXUALITIES IN THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR*

DAGMAR HERZOG

The impact of the First World War on sexual politics and sexual mores and practices was to be tremendous, as the war dramatically quickened changes in the organization of—and indeed the very understanding of—sexuality that had been under way since the turn of the century. In many nations, the interwar period would then be a time of considerably greater loosening of sexual customs—especially with regard to sexual mores for females, but also with respect to greater visibility for homosexuals. This interwar period would also, however, be marked by unprecedented efforts on the part of national and local governments to intervene in their citizens' private lives. This phenomenon of increased state intervention in the intimate sphere—that of relationships, bedrooms, and bodies—would be true both for those nations that turned to fascism and those that remained democratic. But no changes would be as convulsive and consequential as those wrought by the slaughter unleashed across the European continent in the Second World War. By 1945, it was obvious that sexuality had exploded out of the familial framework—a fact that explains a great deal about the renewed turns to conservatism and domesticity which would follow in that war's wake.

The First World War accelerated longer-term trends towards greater equality between the sexes, as well as towards heightened mobility of individuals—not just from countryside to towns, but also across many national borders within Europe. The war witnessed extensive traffic across Europe's external boundaries, too, as colonial troops from India, for instance, were drafted to fight on the side of Britain, and troops from Senegal, Tunisia, and Indochina were mobilized on behalf of France.

War's impact on sexuality soon showed its Janus face. The war brought both trauma and thrill. Theretofore unimaginable violence gripped the Continent; war, as Sigmund Freud pointed out, altered human nature and brought out the sadistic and regressive elements that were kept more effectively under wraps in peacetime. Quite apart from the libidinal elements evident in violence more generally, the war also brought with it

a terrifying array of specifically sexual violence, including rape, gang rape, and genital mutilation—phenomena reaching their most heinous manifestation in the mass incidence of sexual torture as well as sexual enslavement by Turkish troops of Armenian women in the course of the Armenian genocide of 1915–18.

Yet we will never understand the complex interconnections between war and sex if we focus only on the negative manifestations. For the war also offered numerous opportunities for new sexual pleasures, experiences, and relationships—often including the transgression of boundaries of nation, colour, sexual orientation, and class. It was precisely the anonymity and mass mobility facilitated by war, and the disruption of traditional constraints and communal and familial monitoring mechanisms, that offered countless chances for consensual delights. The consequences were not just temporary but potentially momentous, as military mobilization, for instance, highlighted the need for far more effective venereal disease control and public health programming, or as the remarkable (and to government observers shocking) prevalence of romantic relationships between white women in European metropoles and the colonial men of colour conscripted into European armies threatened to capsize the entire colonial order—along with the presumptive privilege of *European men* to partner with *colonized women*—and the pretence of white female purity on which that order rested.

It is important, however, both in the case of sexual violence and in the case of consensual pleasure, not to assume some sort of transhistorical sex drive erupting (either dangerously or happily) at those moments when constraints are removed—even as we take seriously the often heightened intensity of sexual encounters in times of war, either due to the impending separation of lovers or to the imminent threat of death. Instead, sex in wartime brings into view even more clearly than in peacetime just how extraordinarily variable a phenomenon sexuality can be. Thus, for instance, military brothels encouraged a more depersonalized, conveyor-belt quality of sex than had been typical in the prostitution pervasive in the pre-war period.

Meanwhile, the outbreak of revolution in Russia in 1917 altered the course of the war, even as it altered the course of the history of sexuality. The idea that the Russian Revolution had, seemingly overnight, swept away a repressive culture and then subsequently instituted the decriminalization of both abortion and homosexuality was in some ways a convenient fiction, covering over as it did the trend towards liberal reforms of sex-related law in Russia in the pre-revolutionary years. But the symbolic significance of those decriminalizations made them a focus for the most elated inspiration and horrified alarm, respectively, for sexual liberalization enthusiasts and anti-Bolshevik conservatives elsewhere in Europe.

The Russian Revolution in all its dimensions proved especially disturbing to church authorities and—taken together with the inescapable evidence of rising distrust of church teachings on sexual morality and family planning throughout Europe—it provoked the churches into developing a panoply of counter-strategies. The churches' evolving efforts to present Christian marriage as no longer a patriarchal or prudish but rather a companionate and joyfully sensual project was clearly intended to take the sting out of sex liberals' critiques and to adapt the growing popular interest in

eroticizing marriage to an ongoing defence of the institution of marriage. And church hostility to contraception and abortion and to the more general pursuit of pleasure for its own sake did indeed create deep anxieties and conflicts for many believers. But many other Europeans in the post-First World War era began to articulate—or at the very least to practise—alternative visions of sexuality unhinged from any concern with church teachings or with (what was increasingly referred to disdainfully as) 'bourgeois' respectability. The collapse of certainties of all kinds created a novel post-war climate of openness to experimentation—a climate which, while deeply threatening to some, was bracingly exciting to others.

The interwar era would thus see a rich burgeoning of bohemian and other ventures in non-traditional sexual arrangements among heterosexuals and homosexuals alike. These ventures ranged from openly acknowledged love triangles in artistic and intellectual milieux, to classy urban clubs catering to lesbians and homosexual men, to outdoors-oriented organizations dedicated to health reform and naturism. These more daring and ostentatiously visible (and to their critics distressing) manifestations of experimentalism were matched by a more quiet evolution in mores at the grass roots—not only because contraceptive products and information were more readily available, but also because in the course of the war years time-honoured authorities had been shaken and habits loosened.

There were, however, plenty of ongoing defenders of the traditional sexual double standard. In the British debates of the interwar years, for example, while there were certainly those who loudly celebrated free love as well as those who, with just as much fervour, offered more moderate paeans to greater affection and equality within marriage, there were also numerous commentators who contended that misty visions of mutuality, whether inside or outside marriage, were idealistic nonsense. Men and women really were by nature profoundly different; a marriage based on aspirations for loving closeness and regular exchange of ideas was an absurdity. British anti-feminist Boswell King, in his *Sex and Human Nature* (1933), opined that real men were emphatically not domestically inclined. Men had roving eyes, enjoyed non-emotional sex with a variety of women in addition to their wives, and otherwise infinitely preferred the company of other males.

It would be against not just punitive and restrictive laws but also against this kind of unapologetic misogyny that sex reform as a transnational movement rebelled in the interwar years. The 1920s and early 1930s were to mark the heyday of sex reform organizations—from Britain and Scandinavia to the Netherlands, Austria, and Spain, as well as across the newly created nations of eastern Europe. The aim was to rethink the entire complex of issues relating to marriage, reproduction, gender relations, and the very idea of what sex was and could be. It is indicative that the now-famous words of the Norwegian-born, later Swedish feminist and sex reformer Elise Ottesen-Jensen, co-founder in 1933 of the Swedish Association for Sexuality Education (Riksförbundet för Sexuell Upplysning, RFSU)—'I dream of the day when every newborn child is welcome, when men and women are equal, and when sexuality is an expression of intimacy, joy and tenderness'—could seem in their day both sentimentally utopian and strikingly

controversial.[1] And while local initiatives ran the gamut from contraceptive-dispensing clinics (among the earliest of these was one opened in Vienna in 1922 by Johann Ferch and one launched in Oslo in 1924 by Katti Anker Møller) to a petition drive lobbying for legal changes in the status of homosexuality to proposals for sex education in schools, there was a growing effort to coordinate across national boundaries and develop a coherent vision for transforming sexual politics and cultures alike.

In the midst of constant cross-referencing across the boundaries between western and eastern Europe, the tensions and overlaps between sex reform and eugenics became difficult to disentangle. Polish eugenicists, for instance, led by the physician Leon Wernic (who was also strongly involved in feminist causes and efforts to abolish prostitution), was most deeply influenced by Swiss and Scandinavian models, while Czechs, who described their efforts as 'democratic' and motivated by 'humanitarianism', expressly opposed themselves to the most overtly racialist German eugenicists. In Hungary, in the rightward shift that followed the Communist experiment of 1919, self-appointed expert activists and public health officials alike would only entertain the topic of birth control in the context of eugenic measures and efforts to prevent the hereditarily ill or mentally deficient from propagating, and had absolutely no interest in contraception as a means towards female sexual self-determination.

Meanwhile, nearly all European state governments were prompted by the experience of the First World War to expand welfare and health care and administrative systems which intervened—in both restrictive and supportive ways—in the private lives and even directly in the bodies of citizens. The results ranged from the state financing of academic research institutes in demography and eugenics, to the passage (or at least debating) of laws concerning either compulsory or voluntary sterilization of criminals, the mentally ill, and those suffering from hereditary disease (one of the first such laws was passed in Switzerland in 1928, in the canton of Vaud—it was understood as 'progressive' and 'reformist'), to the setting-up of clinics at which couples wishing to marry were encouraged to get certificates attesting that they did not suffer from mental illness or deficiency, tuberculosis, or venereal disease, or clinics which provided prenatal care for women and classes in infant care. In some nations, sex reform activists and eugenicists were recruited to the newly formed ministries of health and public hygiene. Yet at the same time, sex reform remained contested.

In trying, then, to discern whether the interwar era should be understood as a time of sexual revolution—as some contemporaries thought it was and as many scholars have argued—it is important to identify what exactly was changing. Certainly there was the new level of visibility to homosexuality, especially among men but increasingly also women—a growing refusal to hide one's predilections, a greater comfort with defining oneself as inclined to same-sex attractions (even when heterosexual marriages were officially maintained). The interwar era saw the flourishing of open homosexual subcultures in most major European cities. In addition to practical experimentation, the interwar years saw an extraordinary surge in literary publications dedicated to exploring both self-laceratingly surreptitious and defiantly ecstatic homosexuality, and a

growing publicity around the topic in general—in Britain, France, and Germany especially, though also, albeit to a lesser extent, in Switzerland, Sweden, and Spain.

Yet also for heterosexuals popular mores and practices were loosening—but what primarily made that dramatic was that they were loosening *for women*. Men had already had considerable freedoms before. What was being challenged was the inequality of heterosexual relations. Finally, then, what was distinctive about the post-First World War years and what made it appear to be an era of revolution was the *openness* of public discussions about sex, the willingness of progressive activists and literati to challenge restrictive laws and social codes, and the growing popular flaunting of those codes. And ultimately, it was precisely this openness and publicity around sex that would provide fodder for the terrorizing backlash against the whole notion of individuals as having sexual rights that would become such a major feature of the sexual politics of German Nazism, Vichy France, and the Fascist regimes of Italy and Spain (as well as, strikingly, of Stalin's reign in the Soviet Union). Hostility to contraception and abortion and to homosexuality (although in each case with distinctive national variations in the timing and force—and even the meanings—of the crackdowns) would become *the* distinctive markers of fascist sexual politics—and not least a particularly easy way for fascists to garner support from religious conservatives.

Male ambivalence about female sexual emancipation turned out to be a surprisingly significant key to the rise of European fascist movements. In Italy, where fascism was born (in 1919) and where a fascist movement first acquired the reins of government, under the leadership of Benito Mussolini (in 1922), connections between the ascendancy of the political Right and attempts to restore masculine sexual predominance were especially clear. Central were efforts to restore a masculinity believed to have been undermined by the triple trauma of widespread bloodshed in the First World War, the displacements and injustices of capitalist economies (a concern that would become especially acute after the Great Depression of 1929), and the transformation of gender roles and growing sexual, emotional, and economic independence of women. Italian men were taught to worry that they had been emasculated and Italian fascism claimed explicitly that it could provide therapies for male insecurity and restore masculine privilege. In the words of a contemporary, writing in the journal *Il Selvaggio* in 1924: 'It is a question … of giving back to all classes of Italian society a sense of force, virility and wilfulness. It is a question of defending the warrior tradition of our race: to make Italian males, considered by foreigners as pasta eaters, mandolin players, etc. into men.' This made the onset of a new war an exciting prospect. As another writer of the era effused, 'war is something sublime … the brutal discriminator that distinguishes man from man': on the one side, 'the effeminate, the cry-babies, the mommy's boys; on the other … the hot-blooded heroes'. The idea was to remake (male) human nature, to create a new type of man. For women, moreover, submissiveness alone was not enough. High fertility was also essential. Repeated impregnation of the wife was understood—with astonishing explicitness—as a man's best revenge against modernity. Men had been demoralized by the loss of authority when a wife worked outside the home (working the fields was considered

an acceptable exception; working in a store or office was a problem). 'Women's work', Mussolini announced, 'distracts from procreation' and 'foments independence'. It would be better for a family to lose the additional income.[2]

As Mussolini continued to consolidate power, the sale of contraceptive devices was criminalized in 1926, and subsequently the Rocco Code of 1930–1 prescribed heavy jail penalties for abetting, procuring, and performing abortions. But fascism could also be perceived as modernizing; it had a double edge. Mussolini's government thus strove to upgrade professionally the skills and services provided by midwives—even as it attempted to draw midwives into the work of reporting 'miscarriages'—while at the same time giving free rein to the police to monitor midwives closely (since many also provided abortions). Under Mussolini, male homosexuality also began to be aggressively prosecuted and punished. While homosexuality was not included in the Rocco Code, the Italian police had broad jurisdiction in surveillance and incarceration of men deemed gender deviants or caught engaging in homosexual activity. Between 1926, when new police prerogatives were introduced, and 1943, when Italian fascism was defeated, several thousand men (the exact numbers will never be known) were incarcerated for homosexuality in penal colonies—both in those designed for common criminals (*confino commune*) and in those designated for political opponents of the regime (*confino politico*)—as well as in local jails.

It is specifically this context of widespread anxiety about the decline of heterosexual male predominance that helps to explain why the fascism of the 1920s–1940s characteristically, and indicatively, tended to criminalize contraception and to intensify the suppression of women's access to abortion as well as male homosexuality. Women's inability to control their own reproductive life-choices made them dependent and vulnerable by definition; declining birth rates had been interpreted, in every nation, as a weakening of the nation's strength. And homosexuality among men was perceived as a dangerous degeneracy. Yet the backlash against individual sexual rights that would come to define Fascist sexual politics did not emerge overnight, but rather had older origins, and also had a far broader political base than fascism per se.

In France, for instance, the law of 1920, which was passed almost unanimously, had already criminalized the sale of contraceptives as well as 'propaganda' on behalf of contraception, and had also made abortion an imprisonable offence with a minimum sentence of six months. The innovation brought by Marshal Philippe Pétain's Vichy government in 1942 was a far harsher new law allowing abortionists to be tried before the Tribunal d'État. Abortion became a crime against the state, and could incur the death penalty. In addition, also in 1942 and despite the fact that consensual homosexual acts had been decriminalized in France since the French Revolution, Pétain's government reintroduced the long-disappeared category of 'unnatural acts' and acted on long-standing requests of the Parisian police and the French naval authorities in moving to criminalize sexual acts between an adult over 21 and an individual of the same sex under the age of 21.

In Spain, by contrast, the liberal moment arrived only in the early 1930s—just as right-wing counter-movements were already taking shape in France and Germany. Anarchists were part of the government of the Second Spanish Republic formed in 1931 and they sought to put their views on female sexual self-determination, but also on the need for improved prenatal, maternal, and infant care, into policy and practice. The Republican government formed in 1936—with anarchist feminist Federica Montseny as the new minister of health—liberalized abortion access, while also inaugurating new hospitals and services for maternity and paediatrics. Most of this would come to an abrupt end with the crushing of the Republic and the triumph of Francisco Franco in 1939.

Franco's government—alarmed at the decline of the birth rate (from 33.8 per thousand in 1900 to 28.2 per thousand in 1930) and convinced that abortion and the 'leprosy' of contraception were the cause, eager especially to garner the support of the Catholic Church and generally hostile to all the increasing freedoms acquired by women in the years of the Republic (including the right to divorce and the greater tendency to work outside the home)—in 1941 not only made all sale or advertisement of contraception illegal but also declared abortion a crime against the state. The government actively mobilized doctors to turn in all cases of suspected abortion that came to their attention, and set high prison terms (in some cases over ten years) for those who performed or abetted abortions. Homosexuality was, at least initially, handled with less harshness. While already at the onset of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, the leading general and close friend of Franco's Gonzalo Queipo de Llano let it be known in a radio address that 'every fairy or pervert that brings any kind of shame to this movement should, I say to you, be killed like a dog', it would in fact not be until the 1970s that the Franco regime explicitly criminalized male homosexuality and sent men accused of same-sex acts to re-education camps.[3]

The repressive reorganization of sexual politics in Fascist Italy, or in Pétain's France or Franco's Spain, however, ultimately in no way compared with the grotesque extremism of Nazi Germany. No regime before or since has done so much to intervene violently in the bodies and intimate relationships of its citizens—and of citizens of all the conquered and occupied and collaborating nations—while at the same time promising rapturous enjoyment and the right to break taboos to its own followers. The crucial point to grasp about Nazi sexual politics is the way that it combined subjugation with disinhibition.

Far from being a trivial side matter, the reorganization of sexuality was at the heart of the Nazi project. Already during the late years of Weimar, malicious sexual innuendo was a vital element of Nazi anti-Semitism and the mobilization of popular animus against Jews—as well as a key factor in the early support of the Christian churches for the Nazi regime. And as the years of the Third Reich unfolded, there were countless sexually repressive and cruel phenomena, some directed by the regime, others spontaneously invented by its supporters and beneficiaries: from the forced sterilization of proletarian women whose purported promiscuity was taken as a sign of mental deficiency to the hounding, torture, and murder of homosexual men (numbers of whom came to the attention of the law because they were denounced by neighbours or co-workers), from the aggressive prosecution of Jewish–gentile sex in the so-called 'race defilement' trials

to the monstrous reproductive experiments and sexual sadism practised on Jewish and other prisoners in the concentration camps and death factories.

Yet in the end, none of these horrific facts justifies the conclusion that the Third Reich was repressive for everyone. For avowedly heterosexual, non-disabled non-Jews—that is, the majority of the population—Nazi policy and practice turned out to be anything but sexually repressive. Certainly, there was under Nazism a cacophony of conflicting injunctions, and throughout the Third Reich, a wealth of regime-endorsed writings advanced the arguments that racial purity and national recovery depended on premarital chastity, monogamous and prolifically procreative marriage, and wholesome family life. Traditionalist constituencies could always find texts that reflected their concerns and described Weimar as a 'Jews' republic' and a hothouse of decadence and promiscuity, a time of the most 'vulgar stimulation of steamy, debauched eroticism'.[4] But the overall goal of Nazi sexual politics was not so much to suppress sexuality. Rather, the aim was to reinvent it as an 'Aryan' privilege—all the while claiming to be 'cleaning up' sexual morality in Germany and overcoming the 'Jewish' legacy of Weimar.

While racism of any kind has necessarily always been also about sex, this was especially true for National Socialism. The Third Reich was an immense venture in reproductive engineering. This was powerfully apparent in the vigour with which Nazis pursued the project not only of encouraging and enforcing the reproduction of those prized as 'healthy' (through financial incentives, propagandistic enticements, and restrictions on contraception and abortion) but also, and crucially, of prohibiting (through sterilization, involuntary abortion, and eventually mass murder) the reproduction of those deemed 'undesirable'. The Reich Office for Combatting Abortion and Homosexuality was created in 1936, the sale of all contraceptives aside from condoms was outlawed in 1941, and the penalties on abortion providers were expanded in 1943 to include the death penalty. Yet the other side of the coin was the coercive abortions violently imposed on women deemed likely to have 'hereditarily diseased offspring': Jewish and Sinti and Roma women as well as forced labourers brought into the Reich. In addition, there was throughout Nazism a strong impulse to penetrate the mysteries of the human organism, a ferocious 'will to know' about the functioning of psyches and bodies that also, over and over again, crossed the border into violence. Some of the patients in their regular practices and the inmates of prisons and camps provided medical doctors with human 'material' for an array of invasive investigations into sexual variability, desire and response, drive and dysfunction.

The Nazi regime also displayed a manifest effort to manipulate—in quite sophisticated ways—the range of (so often profoundly conflicting) psychological and physiological reactions that sexuality can evoke: arousal and anxiety, attachment and repulsion, ennui or envy as well as ecstasy. The stimulation of contradictory affects and sensations was used both to bind people to the regime and to mobilize anti-Semitic and other forms of racist and eugenic sentiment, including discomfort and revulsion at the disabled. For instance, when the Nazis launched their campaign to sterilize the disabled (ultimately between 300,000 and 400,000 individuals were sterilized against their will),

they accompanied this campaign with strategic arguments that included flattery of the sensual sex appeal of women who produced 'healthy' children.

The encouragement of cheerful heterosexual activity—both within and outside marriage—for those racially approved by the regime was also the other face of vicious, eventually lethal, homophobia. In 1935, the Nazis sharpened the existing law, Paragraph 175, which criminalized male (but not female) homosexuality, not only expanding it to include 175a, with its special provisions against seduction of minors and abuse of relations of dependency (like teacher–student, boss–employee, officer–soldier), but also widening the law's application. By 1937, prosecutions for homosexuality escalated considerably.

By the end of the war approximately 100,000 men had been prosecuted for same-sex activities. Close to half (between 46,000 and 50,000) had been convicted and usually sent to prisons or penitentiaries, or to concentration camps where they were made to do impossibly hard labour in rock quarries and often tortured, treated as among the most despicable of the prisoners, and at Buchenwald subjected to medical experiments and at other camps forced intercourse with female prostitutes. Several hundred were castrated. And although the majority—perhaps 70 per cent—survived these torments, only often to be drafted into the *Wehrmacht*, it is estimated that somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 died. The killing fields included not only concentration camps and prisons but also mental institutions and *Wehrmacht* cannon fodder units in suicide missions. Intensified prosecution of men caught in same-sex acts was also extended to lands occupied by the *Wehrmacht* in the course of the Second World War.

In short, the distinctive innovation of Nazi sexual politics was the attempt to harness the popular groundswell of growing preoccupation with sex and liberalization of heterosexual mores to a racist and homophobic agenda. Thus, while Nazism was the ultimate example of fascist sexual politics in its aggressive suppression of both abortion and homosexuality, it differed from all other fascism in its overtly expressed hostility to traditional Christian sexual mores. No other fascism would contain the ribald, decisively pro-sex and distinctively anti-Church impulses that Nazism so clearly did. (In the meantime, Joseph Stalin's sexual politics turned out to be more conservative than Adolf Hitler's. The Soviet Union's own particular variant of intensified homophobic persecution was justified not as an emulation of the murderous homophobia implemented by Nazism but rather as a contrast to the homoeroticism insinuated to be at the heart of Nazism; Communist propaganda referred to homosexuality as 'fascist perversion'.) The other three—largely Catholic—western European fascist regimes of Italy, Vichy France, and Spain, like the right-wing dictatorship that António de Oliveira Salazar created after his *coup d'ĕtat* in Portugal, were far more concerned than the Nazis ever were to reinforce rather than to challenge Catholic Church teachings on sex and reproduction (in Salazar's Portugal abortion and homosexuality would also be suppressed). The uniqueness of the German situation, and especially the fierce contest that raged during the Third Reich between the Christian churches and the Nazis over sexual values and practices, would eventually emerge as an especially important determining factor in the evolution of sexual politics in Europe after the Nazis were defeated in 1945—and

the churches gained renewed prestige under the auspices of the American occupiers in particular.

While nations with right-wing regimes escalated the prosecution of both homosexuality and abortion, and as Stalin's Soviet Union, too, recriminalized homosexuality in 1933 and then, expressly in hopes of increasing the birth rate, recriminalized abortion in 1936, democratic nations showed more contradictory pictures. Great Britain maintained its criminalization of male homosexuality (in fact, the interwar era saw heightened prosecution) and—while lifting restrictions on the distribution of contraceptive information in 1930—only ever so slightly loosened restrictions on access to abortion in 1929, with an additional modification in 1939. Democratic Switzerland offered the opposite trajectories: criminalizing abortion while decriminalizing consensual adult homosexuality. But the democratic nations of Denmark and Sweden moved their sexual politics towards greater liberality.

In 1930, Denmark—which had a large illegal abortion industry, with medical doctors providing the service off the books—officially reduced the prison sentences for providing illegal abortions from eight years to two, while police also seldom prosecuted the women seeking the abortions. Based on the recommendations of a government commission launched in 1932, the Danes in 1939 passed a law permitting abortions under three possible 'indications': medical (danger to the woman's life or health); ethical (rape or incest); eugenic (the possibility of foetal anomalies). And in 1938 Sweden had already become the first Western nation (and the second nation in the world after the Soviet Union in 1920) significantly to liberalize its abortion law (recognizing the first three indications, as well as a fourth category, referred to as 'worn-out mothers'). Denmark moved to decriminalize homosexuality in 1933 and Sweden would eventually follow suit in 1944. Strikingly, in a gendered time-lag pattern that resembled the developments in other nations, while the first Danish novel alluding to (chaste and tragic) male homosexual love, Christian Houmark's *For Guds Aasyn* (In the Eye of God), appeared in 1910, it would not be until 1941 that the first lesbian novel, *Et Vildskud* (Strange Friends), was published (under the pseudonym Agnete Holk). Meanwhile, although the Swiss Penal Code formulated in 1937 and coming into force in 1942 decriminalized adult homosexuality, it expressly criminalized abortion, with stiff penalties (up to five years' imprisonment) for those performing abortions. The only exception granted was in cases of danger to the life or severe danger to the health of the woman. Nonetheless, the handling of the law varied by canton, and in some places doctors could be found who interpreted the concept of danger to health broadly to encompass also threats to mental health and/or socio-economic welfare.

State intervention in private lives in Scandinavia and Switzerland in the 1930s and 1940s was also infused with eugenic concepts. Sweden had an extensive programme for sterilizing mental patients; under a law passed in 1934 and supported both by the Social Democratic government and the Lutheran Church, the sterilizations were technically 'voluntary', though they were generally not exactly freely chosen. More than 62,000 people would be sterilized from 1934 to 1975—Sweden sterilized more people than any other European state aside from Nazi Germany. And although Denmark's and Norway's

programmes were smaller, they too practised sterilizations—in Denmark also expressly without the individual's consent. More than 90 per cent of the individuals sterilized in Denmark between 1929 and 1934 had been deemed mentally handicapped.

In Switzerland, by contrast, sterilizations were more typically undertaken off than on the books. In the fifty years that the sole sterilization law (in the canton of Vaud) was in effect, 'only' 187 sterilizations were carried out. In other cantons, where there was no law shaping the practice, clinics carried out many hundreds more—about half in cases in which a patient, most often female, had been diagnosed with 'feebleminded-ness', but often also in conjunction with an abortion (for which two medical doctors needed to provide endorsement assessments). Psychiatrists became the arbiters of female sexuality and reproduction, as alcoholism, social conspicuousness, and inappropriate public comportment were all seen by professionals as signs of mental health problems that could warrant sterilization. Ironically, in the mixed-confessional country of Switzerland, in which both Protestant and Catholic churches were active in politics, it was the passionate ethical resistance of Catholic conservatives to putting eugenic notions formally into law that allowed medical experts to keep matters in their own hands—but also allowed Swiss eugenic practices to weather the pall cast on eugenics by Nazi abuses and thus to continue unchallenged for a long time into the post-Second World War era as well.

The First World War had already shown war's intrinsically contradictory impact on sex, and the Second World War amplified those countervailing tendencies exponentially. On the one hand, there was unimaginable brutality and terror, a continent covered in blood, human beings set loose on each other like feral beasts, and a system of concentration, labour, and death camps in which sadism, both banal and inventive, was routine. On the other hand, the war, through the theretofore unprecedented mobility of masses of peoples, not to mention an increasingly anarchic atmosphere, created enormous opportunities for exhilarating amorous experimentation and, even more frequently, countless occasions for sexual encounters that were more prosaic—consensual, but also, and above all, commercial or instrumental.

Violence soaked into the most intimate areas. The Nazis followed their sterilization programme with a programme for mass murder of the disabled. A month after Germany started the Second World War by attacking Poland, systematic murder of handicapped children began. Ultimately, and despite protests and resistance from the general public and clergymen and caregivers, over 5,000 German children and eventually more than 210,000 disabled and mentally ill individuals in total would be killed (70,000 of these at the six main killing facilities in 1940–1). An additional 80,000 patients of psychiatric facilities would be murdered in the occupied parts of Poland, France, and the Soviet Union. The killing of the disabled and the Holocaust of European Jewry, as well as the mass murder of Roma and Sinti, would be complexly intertwined, not only in the technology and personnel but also in the attitude towards 'lives unworthy of life'. Meanwhile, sexual liaisons among the staff, wild parties with extensive alcohol consumption, and pilfering of victims' property were routine.

Scholarship on concentration camps in Germany and Austria also makes clear that the guards there routinely dated the young women in the local population. In some camps in Poland, wives and children of guards lived on the premises. At some of the death camps in Poland, prostitution was common around the camp—not least because the prostitutes could acquire goods stolen from the murder victims. And in some camps which had both male and female staff, for instance at Ravensbrück and Auschwitz, there were affairs between guards. In general, the concentration and death camps provided cushy positions for guards—a way of avoiding the stresses of military service. But those were consensual relationships—the mundane continuities of daily life in wartime in areas not subjected to battle—and not to be compared to what else went on inside the camps, nor on the battlefields themselves.

Within the concentration camps, guards sometimes chose prisoners as sexual servants; in some cases the more powerful prisoners, the *Kapos* (frequently, though not always, those who had been criminals in the outside world), had other prisoners as sexual servants (generally of the same sex). Within ghettos and labour camps, sexual affairs—heterosexual or homosexual—could mean reprieve from deportation or selection. Within concentration camps, sex could be exchanged for a scrap of food or some needed object. In general, sex could mean survival. There were also brothels—for non-Jewish prisoners only—established by Himmler within ten of the concentration camps. The women forced into sex slavery in these brothels were generally killed after a few months.

Sexual humiliation of prisoners by the guards was constant, sexualized torture frequent. Women entering Auschwitz—whether driven into 'showers' and about to be killed or spared from immediate death and stripped and shaved and paraded for selections—were subjected to riding crops jabbed into breasts, ugly mocking commentary, defloration with fingers. Beatings and random killings were simply daily activities, but there was also a surfeit of terror that was specifically aimed at destroying the sexuality of the victims. The camps were laboratories in domination, and perpetrators clearly took pleasure in tormenting victims, or forcing them to abuse each other. Killing was not enough; the death of the soul was aimed at—and in the assault on their sexuality, the victims were targeted in their innermost selfhood. The grotesquerie of the violence became an end in itself, part of an escalating competition of mutual performance and diversionary entertainment among the guards. In addition, there was in the camps obscene intimate violence in the name of scientific inquiry.

Meanwhile, the war on the eastern front was a war of annihilation and it too was accompanied by extensive sexual violence. Despite directives officially prohibiting or restricting sexual contact between German men and 'ethnically alien women' or women considered 'racially inferior', the authorities found that *Wehrmacht* soldiers constantly ignored the rules against 'undesirable sexual intercourse'—both with rapes and sexual enslavement and with consensual encounters and liaisons. In any event, the authorities were also convinced that regular heterosexual intercourse was beneficial for soldier morale and performance. In this contradictory situation—with racist assumptions in conflict with beliefs about masculinity—the military sought to provide brothels and to

admonish soldiers to be attentive to the 'racial' qualities of women with whom they had contact. At the same time, the military leadership was continually concerned with preventing the spread of venereal disease (hence again the preference for brothels, where some kind of overview and disease control efforts could be maintained) as well as with preventing personalized intimacy and attachment with women of the local populations (so as to curtail the opportunities for enemy espionage and prevent any breakdown of the emotional boundaries between Germans and their enemies). And there was yet another concern: the leadership worried that out-of-control sexual violence could affect military discipline adversely.

Nonetheless, sexual violence was ubiquitous. It included mutilation of body parts—cutting off breasts, and letting women bleed to death. It included rapes followed by murders, and it included necrophiliac violation of women already killed. And it included gang rapes. (Gang rapes and other kinds of group sexual violence were also engaged in by local collaborators of various nationalities fighting in SS contingents.) Unlike in the camps, in which perpetrators were protected, the battlefields were dangerous territory, and the men were deeply dependent on each other in a hostile environment, and continually afraid for their own lives. Certainly the sexual brutalities terrorized the local populations and sent a message to the men of the enemy: *You cannot protect your own women*. But in addition there were the messages that the soldiers sent to each other—as well as to themselves. In sharing in horrific violence, they reaffirmed their bonds with one another (as well as the hierarchies that structured those bonds).

That the men had had contact with 'women of alien races' rarely caused a stir. So too was it simply taken in stride that the vast majority of women either choosing to, or forced to, work in the hastily assembled and heavily trafficked brothels (the lines of soldiers waiting their turn at the lunch hour or in the evenings snaked down many a city street across Latvia, Russia, the Ukraine, and other eastern lands) were not exactly 'Aryan'. There is a revealing and instructive parallel here with earlier shifts in Fascist Italian sexual politics in the course of the war in Ethiopia in 1937: while previously, Ethiopian women had been eroticized and their charms and appeal for Italian men described in the most glowing terms—the right to conquer these exotic beauties was dangled as one of the benefits of participating in the imperial project in northern Africa—after the declaration of the Fascist empire in 1936 and the subsequent turn to racism and concern with miscegenation, with an abruptness that was remarkable, long-term and especially loving and passionately attached relationships between white men and Ethiopian women were deemed an 'obscenity' and disgrace to Italian racial dignity. In 1937, love and attachment were criminalized, as police and courts alike worked to distinguish between legally tolerable, emotionally uninvolving 'episodic' relations like an occasional visit to a prostitute and the now suddenly unacceptable cohabitation or any kind of romantic or caring commitment to a specific individual Ethiopian woman.

In the Second World War, while on the eastern front battles were brutal and constant, with battalions continually on the move and the tide turning repeatedly both for and against Germany, on the western front, there were long stretches of time when occupation forces were not engaged in battle and thus had more opportunity for leisure. In

addition, there were fewer prohibitions, or in some countries like Norway or Denmark (whose populations were supposedly of kindred racial type) no formal prohibitions at all on consorting intimately and openly with the local population. And also in Belgium and the Netherlands fraternization was condoned.

Meanwhile, many men of the occupied nations were absent. Often they were imprisoned as POWs or had been conscripted into forced labour by the Nazis. Many had also volunteered to work for the Nazis and had become members of the German armed forces, while others worked in the underground resistance in their own nations. In any event, the local men were not at home—leaving their wives and lovers both with daunting new responsibilities and vulnerabilities, but also unprecedented freedoms. Women in the occupied nations negotiated carefully between attraction to the powerful new occupiers and the virulent hostility often directed at them by their countrymen for departing from national loyalty and the traditionally expected female sexual fidelity alike. In every language, the women were referred to as 'tarts' and 'sluts'.

Estimates are that one in ten Danish and one in five Norwegian women under the age of 30 were at some point during the war romantically and sexually involved with German men. A percentage of these relationships, in turn, resulted in illegitimate offspring. Out of a total population of 3 million people, some 40,000 Norwegian women got involved with German soldiers, and at least 9,000, although likely more, Norwegian-German children were born. For Denmark, the officially recorded number of children is 5,500; in the Netherlands, the number of Dutch-German children is calculated at between 12,000 and 16,000. For France, the numbers are much higher. German officials estimated the number of illegitimate children of French women and German men at 85,000 already as of 1943, and for the entire occupation period scholars have calculated the total number of French-German children at 200,000. Meanwhile, German women on the home front often had romantic and sexual relationships as well—not just with other Germans but also with many among the close to 4 million forced labourers—from such countries as France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Czechoslovakia—and almost 2 million POWs brought into the Reich to work in agriculture and military industries to compensate for German men at war.

The warring armies sought to use the ubiquity of fraternization against each other. Although probably less than 1 per cent of the millions of flyers and leaflets dropped during the Second World War were sexual in nature, there were still dozens of leaflets with suggestive images and messages that were designed by 'Psyop' (psychological operations) staff in the USA, Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union and then dropped en masse by aeroplane in enemy territory. The images were generally of a fraternizing woman betraying her boyfriend or husband who was risking his life on the battlefield. Soldiers frequently found the images sexy or funny and saved them as pin-ups. But the hope of their creators was that they would be perceived as deeply threatening. The idea was always to divide and conquer—above all to turn allies against each other. Thus, for example, a French woman would be found in the arms of a 'Tommy' (i.e. an Englishman), or an English woman would land in

the arms of an American GI. Or (in the case of Germans trying to divide the Free Polish Army from the Allies on whose side it was fighting in Italy), the propaganda suggested that wealthy Jews were stealing beautiful Polish women while Polish men were on the battlefield—the height of dreadful absurdity in view of the number of Polish Jews already murdered. In other cases the move (and this was a Soviet as well as British propaganda strategy) was to strike alarm in the hearts of German men that the German women and girls they had left behind were enjoying the sexual favours of foreign forced labourers.

While many soldiers may well have been more amused and titillated than made anxious or alarmed by the flyers, there is no question that the logic which informed them, no matter which nation's army was designing them, depended on a wholly transformed idea of female sexuality when compared with the assumptions still predominating before and during the First World War. What the flyers revealed was that the long-standing assumptions about vast differences between wives and prostitutes had collapsed. Wives had come to be understood as sexual beings who actively sought pleasure for themselves. There was no longer any difference in ardour between good girls and bad girls. And—no minor matter—from now on men would have to compete to be the objects of female desire. The rage at female disloyalty was measurable not least by the numerous humiliating hair croppings and head shavings meted out in the context of nationalist uprisings against the German occupiers (as in Denmark in August 1943) and the tens of thousands of hair croppings and head shavings meted out in the wake of the Nazis' defeat all across the formerly occupied nations to women who were accused of 'horizontal collaboration'.

However, and just as important: the reality of unmistakably widespread fraternization and infidelities among both men and women would be a key factor in fuelling the return to conservative sexual mores in the wake of the war. Sexuality had escaped from the marital framework in the years when the world turned upside down. Trying to repair ruptured relationships and restore a domesticated heterosexuality would become a project not only imposed from above by conservative governments and with the support of church leaders, but also a movement carried from below by the yearnings of countless ordinary people. That those countless ordinary people had, moreover, very often been witness to (or even participants in or at least beneficiaries of) barbaric persecutions and mass murder and horror on an unprecedented scale—that Europe had been convulsed by an existential cataclysm—as well as themselves suffering deprivation and loss, only intensified the desperate urgency of the search for a (however fragile) post-war normalcy.

Notes

* A much-expanded version of this chapter appears as 'State Interventions, 1914–1945', in Dagmar Herzog, *Sexuality in Europe: A Twentieth-Century History* Copyright © 2011 Dagmar Herzog. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.

1. RFSU, 'Our History', <http://www.rfsu.se/our_history.asp>.

2. Mino Maccari, Mario Carli, and Benito Mussolini, quoted in Sandro Bellassai, 'The Masculine Mystique: Anti-Modernism and Virility in Fascist Italy', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 10 (2005), 317, 328–9, 331.
3. Quoted in Werner Altmann, 'Zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie: Homosexuelle Emanzipation in Spanien nach Francos Tod', *Invertito*, 4 (2002), 150.
4. Georg Schliebe, 'Die Reifezeit und ihre Erziehungsprobleme', in Martin Löpelmann (ed.), *Wege und Ziele der Kindererziehung unserer Zeit* (3rd edn, Leipzig: Hesse und Becker, 1936), 148.

Further Reading

Beadman, Clive, 'Abortion in 1940s Spain: The Social Context', *Journal of Gender Studies*, 11 (March 2002), 55–67.

Bellassai, Sandro, 'The Masculine Mystique: Anti-Modernism and Virility in Fascist Italy', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 10 (2005), 314–35.

Herzog, Dagmar (ed.), *Brutality and Desire: War and Sexuality in Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

Warring, Annette, 'Intimate and Sexual Relations', in Robert Gildea, Olivier Wieviorka, and Anette Warring (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europe* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2006), 88–128.

CHAPTER 21

'AMERICA' AND EUROPE, 1914–1945

DAVID W. ELLWOOD

The Great Shift

At the end of the Great War, said the celebrated French poet Paul Valéry, we finally understood that Europe was mortal. The conflict cost European civilization its centrality in the world that the French Revolution and British industry had created: a universe of empires, nationalisms, class struggle, religious fervour, and extraordinary cultural creativity. Europe had never been more exuberant than at the turn of the century. The Austrian author Stefan Zweig wrote of his youth at that time: 'It was the golden age of security … of faith in progress … of liberal tolerance … and of limitless respect for artists and artistic creativity'.[1] All this was thrown away with the Great War, together with four empires, three monarchies, and the lives of anything up to 10 million human beings.

None of its upheavals had been remotely imagined by the powers that started the war. No one of significance imagined that the supreme beneficiary of it all would be the United States of America. Decades later the great British historian A. J. P. Taylor judged that when the American president Woodrow Wilson produced his Fourteen Point plan for a new world order in January 1918, at that moment Europe ceased to be the centre of the world. But no one took this prospect seriously at the time, neither Europeans nor Americans. The result was a tormented, disastrous twenty-three-year hiatus.

In 1941 a new US governing class faced the logic of Wilson's proclamation, and the consequences of ignoring it. Far more specific plans emerged, along with an unmistakable commitment to making them work: the Four Freedoms, the Lend-Lease Act with its free trade pledges, and the Atlantic Charter, embryo of the United Nations. It was Europe's colossal failures which pushed the United States into becoming a 'superpower' (an American expression of 1944). But as President Franklin D. Roosevelt put it, the US by that time had 'a rendezvous with destiny'. The second world war in twenty years simply determined when that appointment finally arrived.

Europe and the Start of the 'American Century'

American historians have treated their nation's 'rise to globalism' as a largely geopolitical phenomenon, tracing how the newly united and industrializing nation which emerged from the Civil War (1861–5) quickly began to make its presence felt in Latin America and in the Pacific. Variations on this theme have looked at the spread of connections of business, finance, trade, railways, and telecommunications from the 1870s onwards, linking nations in a dynamic of modernity which produced ever tighter forms of 'interdependence' (a notion originally introduced by Marx in the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848). Some societies flourished in this situation, others fell back: an unstable hierarchy of winners and losers gradually emerged.[2] The leading Americans seemed to see all the changes as the dominant imperatives of the time, and embraced them with relish. Their challenge to Japan of 1853 had already shown how they could impose them on others via commercial trade. As the old century ended they turned that impulse into a general principle. It was called the 'Open Door' (referring specifically to access to the China market). By defeating the Spanish Empire in the Cuban War of 1898, the United States made clear that they were not afraid of foreign entanglements any more: they acquired a semi-formal empire in the Pacific, and went on to push through the construction of the Panama Canal, whose opening coincided exactly with the outbreak of the First World War.

But all along, America's presence in world affairs—still meaning essentially European affairs—had demonstrated that it was a great power as no other, and intended proudly to remain so. Unlike all the countries of Europe, the US was officially a democracy before it became an industrial power; a democracy before it developed a fully fledged foreign policy; a democracy before it produced a world-class army or navy. The product of a revolutionary and intensely self-conscious experiment in nation-building, it brought an ideological and populist thrust to its activities abroad that could not but disrupt the imperial hierarchies of Europe, and the swings between war and diplomacy that states had long employed to resolve their differences. France's experiences with republicanism had not overturned these realities; America's would.

The Europeans had first noticed some of these differences when they encountered the waves of businessmen, products, agricultural exports, and personalities which started arriving from the US at the end of the nineteenth century. In general, they were not pleased. There was an arrogance, energy, and restlessness about the Americans, an impulse to moneymaking and myth-making which seemed to permeate everything they did, an overwhelming presumption that 'the future lay in America', as the great lay prophet of the time H. G. Wells put it, and that the others had no choice but to make way or adapt.[3] US historian Mary Nolan remarks: 'In the decades before World War I … the core countries of industrialized Europe did not accept these claims.'[4]

But the Great War quickly revealed how the members of the Entente, particularly Britain and France, would become dependent on the force and outlook of the United States. The longer the war went on, the more the resources of the Americans became indispensable to the very survival of the Allied war effort, and this of course placed the land of the future in an ever more powerful political position. An 'Associate' of the Entente, never a full member, four key currencies of power brought the United States to dominance by the war's end:

- *finance*. The world's primary debtor before the war, by 1919 the US was the supreme creditor, in fact the only one of rank. Britain liquidated $7.7 billion of its American investments in the war years, and still owed almost $5 billion to the US government at the end of them. By 1921 the outstanding debt of all the Allies, including interest, was thought to total $10.5 billion. France and Italy between them owed more than $5 billion; hundreds of millions more were due from Belgium, Italy, Russia, Greece, Romania, Serbia, and Czechoslovakia. Defence of the gold standard, central pillar of the British Empire, passed into American hands. The New York banks, which handled most of the loans made to the Entente powers (not the US government), prospered and swelled. Fortunately, as a J.P. Morgan chief executive put it: 'We were pro-Ally by inheritance, by instinct, by opinion.'[5]
- *fighting men*. Almost 2 million soldiers were sent to France, in a logistics operation of unprecedented speed and effectiveness: 'By the summer of 1918, America was landing seven soldiers and their equipment in Europe every minute twenty-four hours a day', write Eckes and Zeiler.[6] What struck the French and British populations who received them was their exuberance and opulence, and the conviction that they had come on a moral crusade to redeem their Old World roots. Fifty-three thousand of them died fighting for this vision, while perhaps another 65,000 died in uniform from other causes.
- *ideology*. President Woodrow Wilson raised the meaning of the war to a new level, leaving behind the old values of honour, patriotism, and duty, and putting in their place a language of democracy, law, and 'self-determination'. Wilson was convinced that America could only justify its participation in the war if it offered the benefits of America's historical beliefs and experience for the salvation of all suffering humanity. In his Fourteen Points programme, Wilson provided what today would be called a 'road map' for turning his revelation into reality. The Central Powers asked for an armistice based on this plan; the suffering masses of the world were enthralled by it. Wilson began to see himself and his nation as God's chosen instruments 'to make men everywhere free'.
- *communications*. Wilson was his own best propagandist, and his skills in building phrases, narratives, and rhetoric outshone his peers and rivals everywhere. But the American government as a whole quickly developed a capacity for communicating its purposes to the world which left no corner untouched. The historian Emily Rosenberg talks of 'the promotional state', referring to the use of cables, radio, news services, films, as well as personalities, committees, and public–private organizations such as the American Red Cross and the Young Men's Christian Association.[7]

> Wilson was quick to take advantage of the new film industry being born in Los Angeles, but also encouraged the creation of a vast, temporary propaganda operation led by a journalist, George Creel. The title of Creel's memoirs suggests its ambitions: *How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe*.[8]

It was the limitless pragmatism of attitudes towards the division between the public and the private spheres which guaranteed the committee's dynamism and its ever expanding scope, as in so many other areas of Washington's war effort. The American machinery of government, it turned out, could be redesigned and reconstructed as needs might be, giving it an unrivalled ability to invent new ways to project power. Behind the president's lofty visions, there stood a readiness among Wilson's associates to use food as a political weapon. They did not hesitate to buy up factories and industries in prostrate countries such as Poland. From the White House came the impulse to unite the US Navy with corporate interests in order to build a new global communications system. 'With the control of world public opinion, trade and dominion would follow', reflected a BBC television documentary later on Wilson's ambitions for his nation.[9]

None of this was on display, however, at the Versailles Conference of 1919. The great gathering in Paris of the winners and all their allies was called to rebuild the world after the war, and to lay the foundations for a Wilsonian peace centred on a new 'League of Nations'. Over all the proceedings lay the shadow of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, which seemed to demonstrate what could happen to a nation when order broke down completely, as it threatened to do in most of central Europe. But instead of dominating Versailles as he expected, Wilson found himself plunged into a maelstrom of claims, demands, denunciations, and threats which almost entirely neutralized his grand design, and undermined his personal authority. The 'soft power' of his vast moral prestige simply could not be translated into specific plans, based on his doctrines, for the future of nations new or old anywhere. Reduced to a highly personal, interminable round of horse-trading—of borders, peoples, clauses in treaties, colonies—between France, Britain, and the US, Wilson sacrificed all other principles to his one great castle in the sky: the League of Nations. When it became clear that, back home, his own Congress would never allow the derogation of national sovereignty the full league design implied, there was no hope. America's first experience as a European power was brought to a humiliating close.

The 1920s: At the Crossroads of Modernity

A straightforward narrative of European–American diplomatic relations in the 1920s reveals little of long-term significance in these years. Wilson's Republican successors,

Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge, played to the general reaction against the war effort and Versailles, and encouraged America—especially American business—to look to itself. This it did with spectacular financial success, down to 1929. International historians register the naval conferences of 1921, 1927, and 1930, which were supposed to open the way to an era of big-ship disarmament, but which only included Britain, the US, and Japan. They also acknowledge the Treaty of Paris of 1928, in which France and the United States led the way in calling for nations to renounce the use of war as a means of settling their international disputes. By 1933 sixty-five nations had signed up. The US was not present at the Locarno Conference of 1925, which stabilized Germany's western frontier, and symbolized a new, if fragile, era of peaceful cooperation in western Europe. Absence from the League and general detachment from Europe was rationalized in a new political culture of 'isolationism', which meant rejection of any form of foreign intervention in the western hemisphere and any participation in machinery to keep the peace outside it, including the Treaty of Paris.[10]

Much more significant to most Europeans at the time was the passage of a series of bills by Congress which emphatically closed the door to mass immigration into the US of the kind seen before the war. Shaky economic conditions and a fear of contagion from the radical ideologies spreading across Europe were the reasons the bills passed Congress with ease.

But the tangled web which linked the two sides of the ocean financially was quite another matter. The mountain of debts left by the war, and the inability of winners and losers alike to pay them, produced waves of hostility inside Europe, and between Europe and the US. 'United States leaders sought Europe's recovery without American sacrifice', writes Frank Costigliola; 'This matched Europe's hope to solve problems at American expense.'[11] The Americans hoped to promote a gradual process of movement away from the crushing financial provisions of the Versailles Treaty, 'without either entangling the United States or unleashing the forces of revolutionary change'. But they preached stability and prosperity for all while imposing the harshest forms of deflation. They pushed for expanded world trade while building ever higher tariff barriers around the US itself.

To deal with the tensions these methods produced, the US government summoned up the public–private collaboration in money which had spread US influence through Latin America before the war, and which had served the Allies so well during the conflict. Washington authorized the J.P. Morgan bank to set up a vast control system over German finances, based on a $200 million loan from the bank itself, the substitution of the currency, and the installation of a controller. Poland was subject to a strict regime of deflation, preparation for adherence to the gold standard, and supervision by an adviser who became a director of the Bank of Poland. Only Mussolini's Italy managed to combine help from European central banks together with support from Morgan & Co. without surrendering sovereignty. The Great Crash eventually destroyed these arrangements, but the underlying debts were not soon forgotten in America.[12]

Whatever the transient upheavals caused by the security and finance conflicts, the 1920s bestowed on posterity two developments coming from America which would shape the evolution of societies in the Old World—and elsewhere—permanently. The

first of these was the system of industrial production known in shorthand fashion as 'Fordism'; the second was the product of a specific place, the home of a new kind of mass media industry: 'Hollywood'. Arriving together in post-war Europe, these two forces of mass-production-for-mass-consumption added up to challenges which Europeans at all levels could not ignore, and were forced to come to terms with. The very effort of defining those terms would change the trajectory of European ideas of identity and modernity throughout the rest of the century.

Ford's impact was due to his ability to transform his assembly-line method for car production into system, brand, and ideology. During the war factories like his had spread across America's war industries, transforming the quantity and speed of arms production. Experts soon began to spread the word abroad about 'scientific' production, standardization, and productivity, new concepts which, according to them, could be applied to any form of output. Meanwhile the Ford brand reached out across the Atlantic with new factories selling cars far more cheaply than anything European manufacturers could offer. But it was Ford's urge to preach the messages he saw in his success which distinguished him from the average industrialist. His outspoken declarations about the democratization of technological progress expressed in the ever cheaper car, and its potential for rising standards of living everywhere, struck a profound chord across Europe. 'By 1924 [his autobiography] had been translated into every major European language,' reports Mary Nolan, 'with Germans buying over two hundred thousand copies and the Soviet Union going through four editions.'[13]

But 'Fordism' never truly spread as a system of manufactures in 1920s Europe, and no class of industrialists or businessmen was ready to set in motion the expansive chain reaction linking output, wages, and consumption that Ford propounded. Instead, Fordism emerged in the course of the decade at the heart of a new generation of criticisms of mass society coming from cultural authorities of all sorts: Left and Right, religious and lay, official and individual. André Siegfried, the leading light among the large number of French commentators on contemporary America and its effects, wrote in 1927:

> For so much luxury brought within reach of every worker a heavy price is being paid: nothing less than the transformation of millions of workers into automatons. 'Fordism', i.e. the essence of American industry, results in the standardisation of the worker-as-such. Craftsmanship … has no more place in the New World, and with it have gone certain conceptions of man that we in Europe do consider as the veritable basis of civilisation.[14]

In reality the menace or promise of the mass production system remained as such throughout the interwar years, a potential life transformer, not something that was really happening. Much more present and sensational were the effects of the American film industry's embrace of industrialized output, concentrated in its new base of Hollywood, California. Most European film industries had collapsed during the war, and failed to recover when it ended. Hollywood filled the void. By 1925 the American market share in

Britain was 95 per cent, in France and central Europe it was 70 per cent, in Mussolini's Italy 65 per cent. Even in the Weimar Republic, where a government-supported trust did much to keep production going, it was 60 per cent.[15] In Stalin's Soviet Union, an American observer complained in 1925 that Hollywood's products 'dominate, innundate, glut, overwhelm the Russian motion picture industry today'.[16]

Hollywood's dynamic presence amplified the impact of all the other mass cultural imports of the era—jazz, advertising, chorus girls, slang, streamlining, chain-stores—and brought a new aura of glamour to the myths America had created up to that point. The film industry's star system was the glittering crown on display at this parade, and signalled just how much Hollywood cared for its female audience, devoting to it an attention that was passionately returned. Traditionalists were deeply unhappy. Sovereignty over culture had always been taken for granted as a distinguishing feature of nationhood, notes the historian Victoria de Grazia. Now it was disrupted on all sides, at just the time when cultural authorities everywhere were anxiously engaged in trying to re-establish their positions in society in the wake of the war. The result was a 'highly visible effort to devise strategies of resistance' to the penetration of America's cultural industries.[17]

By the end of the decade governments had mobilized and so had churches. Spiritual protectionism, in the form of censorship—usually run by churchmen in Catholic countries—went hand in hand with fiscal and political versions. Taxes were levied on American films, their numbers might be controlled, or their access to local screens; formal diplomacy complained about the 'invasion', or the way Hollywood portrayed particular nationals. But in general, a feeling began to spread among the politicians, educationists, judges, clerics, intellectuals who thought about these things—all men—that Hollywood and all it stood for was subversive not just because of the consumer culture and immorality it allegedly advertised, but also because it split society horizontally. As intensely as the popular masses, the young, and the commercial spirits embraced the films, music, and dances the US sent over, so the cultivated elites denounced them and rushed to set up bulwarks against them, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation. Born in 1922, this semi-public agency consciously aimed to create a radically alternative model of broadcasting to the American model. The decade saw the first systematic, explicit use of the term 'anti-Americanism', and mass culture—the culture of the crowd, of popular democracy and commercial modernity—was the force which most often provoked its display.

The Great Crash Hits Europe

The pathological nature of 1920s interdependence across the Atlantic was quickly revealed by the shattering financial crisis of 1929–32. In October 1931 President Herbert Hoover finally acknowledged that the debt/reparation burden was impossible to bear. But he condemned the habit of former allies and enemies alike of paying for it using

masses of long- and short-term loans, all raised in the American private banking sector. The only way these obligations could be managed was by repeated bouts of inflation and devaluation, with potentially catastrophic effects on the survival of democracy in nations weakened economically in this way. Around Hoover, the arrangements that private bankers and experts had built to stabilize Europe after the First World War crumbled away. Protectionisms of all sorts burst out around the world, every one based on some variety of nationalism. America built its own tariff walls higher than ever. In 1934 Roosevelt devalued the dollar, and made clear that he put his domestic recovery first.

Hitler's rise to power in 1933 greatly accelerated the 1920s debate across the American governing class about the ills of Europe. From its beginning, following on from the Russian and fascist revolutions and the aftermath of the Great War in central Europe, this view of things linked in a very mechanical way the political stability of a nation to its basic economic welfare. 'Hunger does not breed reform', Woodrow Wilson had told Congress in his address announcing the 1918 armistice; 'it breeds madness and all the ugly distempers that make an ordered life impossible … Unhappy Russia has furnished abundant recent proof of that.' In the late 1930s, the theme was taken up by a number of American thinkers, most prominently Roosevelt's secretary of state, Cordell Hull. In his memoirs, Hull enlarged on the lessons he saw in his long experience:

> A people driven to desperation by unemployment, want, and misery, is a constant threat of disorder and chaos, both internal and external. It falls an easy prey to dictators and desperadoes.
>
> In so far as we make it easier for ourselves and everyone else to live, we diminish the pressure on any country to seek economic betterment through war.
>
> The basic approach to the problem of peace is the ordering of the world's economic life so that the masses of the people can work and live in reasonable comfort.

In the long term this meant developing in systematic fashion the promise of mass consumption that Ford and other pioneering thinkers had signalled in the teens and twenties to be the unique American contribution to humanity's material progress.[18] Walter Lippmann, one of America's most prominent political commentators, wrote in 1934 that liberal capitalism itself could only survive if it guaranteed to its people a decent standard of life, and that what this standard of life consisted of was constantly rising in public opinion: 'in 1898 it was a chicken in every pot, now it's the two-car garage'. Whether this was enough to guarantee the future of the middle class was not clear, Lippmann argued, but for sure only a constantly expanding middle class, with a solid material and psychological stake in the status quo, could guarantee the legitimacy and authority of capitalism's institutions.[19]

If capitalism was on trial in the United Sates in the 1930s, and was forced—in Roosevelt's 'New Deal'—to make quite radical adjustments to survive, in Europe the verdict had already been pronounced: classical economics and classical systems of suffrage were dead; in nationalism and collectivism lay the future. While fascism and Nazism were first of all lethal attacks on political democracy, communism in all its forms rejected laissez-faire industrial capitalism. In principle they all scorned the American

way and rejoiced in its humiliation in the crisis. But a closer reading of the relationships of the principle totalitarian states with 'America' was more complex than their ideologies or official statements would suggest.

The Soviet Union

In April–May 1929 the leadership of the American Communist Party was called to account in Moscow. It had acquired a reputation for claiming that the US represented a different kind of capitalism, more advanced technologically and dedicated to popular consumption as much as production. Stalin, however, insisted that the work of all Communists must be based exclusively on an understanding of

> the general features of capitalism, which are the same for all countries, and not its specific features in any given country. It is on this that the internationalism of the Communist Party is founded.[20]

In practice Stalinist Russia did not hesitate to recognize the superior technology, mass spirit, and can-do energy of the Americans, and when implementing their ferocious Five Year Plan of industrialization from 1928, the Soviets made a point of importing as much heavy plant, and as many engineers to set it up, as they could afford: 2,000–3,000 Americans may have been involved at some point. Electrical equipment and expertise, truck and tractor factories, vast steel works were all copied or built using American capital and experience.[21] To save dollars for this effort, imports of Hollywood films dwindled rapidly, but a much more promising avenue of earnings opened up after Roosevelt's diplomatic recognition of the USSR in 1933—'strictly a business deal', say Eckes and Zeiler.[22] This development also allowed a Soviet minister of food to study the industrial production of everything from hamburgers to ice cream, while other experts reproduced American ideas of consumption in magazines, or authorized the construction of department stores.[23] Officially, of course, capitalism as such remained as deplorable as ever, its degeneration into fascism almost certainly leading to a second world war, according to Soviet economists.[24]

Fascist Italy

None of the other dictatorships made protectionism a way of life as Mussolini's Italy did; none was more involved with America. This paradox reflects something of the complexity that surrounded the role of America's myths and models in the Fascist era. Given all the colourful variety of Italian–American traffic in the 1920s—credits, business, some investment, cinema, tourists, personalities—it would have been surprising had Mussolini turned churlish at the time of the 1929 crash.[25] Certainly the collapse of all the dreams of the 1920s had been a great shock, said the Duce, as 'we too on this side of

the water shared in the euphoria'. And the whole mass-production system was a fallacy, clearly demonstrating that Fascism's arrangements were superior. But Mussolini took great care to cultivate elite public opinion in the US, and could count on influential support among bankers, newspaper proprietors, university presidents, and others. Together with his self-appointed publicist (and lover), the Jewish intellectual Margherita Sarfatti, he supplied a stream of articles to the US press, and never attacked the nation openly for causing the crash.

But the crisis period of 1929–32 found most of the Fascist movement adopting a quite different outlook on the American turmoil. The moralizing tone of much commentary was greatly reinforced by Fascism's profound connections to the Catholic Church. Together their intellectuals allowed a sharp contrast to be drawn between the degeneracy thought to be rampant in 'the star-spangled Babylon', and the stern task of living in the heroic civilization of the spirit announced by the Duce, from his balcony high above the crowd.[26]

But always other forces worked in quite opposite directions. Hollywood cinema dominated the Italian market until 1938, when it was deliberately forced out following Mussolini's fateful decision to fall in behind Hitler. Consumerist modernity began to catch up with Italy in the 1930s. 'American products—from chewing gum to typewriters and from movies to gramophones—invaded the Italian market', reports a social historian. 'Young men dressed "alla Fox", and young women wanted to be slim and have their hair bobbed, trying to look like Hollywood stars.'[27] And Mussolini himself elevated certain kinds of technical achievement—particularly in aviation—to the highest place in his scale of values. For him the New Deal simply confirmed the value of his corporatist state; Roosevelt was praised for his 'intensive culture of dictatorship'. Had the Duce not chosen to demonstrate his pride in his revitalized Italian race by sending it to war in Ethiopia in 1935, and so upsetting everyone, his transatlantic fame might have remained unsullied. For long favourable American press coverage had made him the most admired statesman in Europe, the bringer of efficiency, discipline, and progress to this backward land.

Nazism

There was no limit to official Nazi contempt for the civilization on display in 1930s America. Besides the disgust Hitler and his cronies felt for the Jews, bankers, Masons who allegedly dominated that money-driven, mongrel society, there was an anti-bourgeois and anti-materialist line in Nazi thinking which it shared with conservative thought in many corners of Europe. In Germany this impulse was articulated by two of the Third Reich's most distinguished intellectual sympathizers, the philosophers Oswald Spengler and Martin Heidegger. 'There is an inner relationship between Bolshevism and Americanism', Spengler wrote in his 1934 volume *The Year of Decision*; '… life is organized exclusively from the economic side'. The 'Faustian will-to-power' was at work in both of them, 'but translated from organic growth into soulless mechanization'. It

dominated every consideration in both societies, and sacrificed every spiritual or cultural resource man had ever possessed for the sake of boundless physical well-being.[28] It was Heidegger who went furthest in expressing hopes that the new regime would save the Western world as a whole by reconnecting Being and national consciousness, and so revitalize Germany's vocation as 'the most metaphysical of nations'.[29]

But, as historians have repeatedly demonstrated in recent years, not even Nazi Germany could fully resist the irradiant force of American mass culture and the big businesses which stood behind much of it. About fifty books a year on the US appeared during the Nazi era, according to one account. Certain—not all—American advertising techniques were studied intensively and taken up.[30] When Heidegger began to distance himself from the Nazis in the later 1930s it was partly because he saw them becoming as enthralled as their enemies by modern media and technological development. The American companies Woolworth and General Electric, IBM and General Motors, Ford and Procter & Gamble all either started or expanded their operations under the new regime. The empire of Coca-Cola flourished and even began to imitate the style of Nazism itself. Jazz and Hollywood kept their appeal in spite of government efforts to channel or suppress them.[31] In 1934 the Führer declared that the German must have his cheap car just like the American. In 1938 the regime started to build a Ford-inspired plant to produce it. Bewitching images of future prosperity helped to stabilize and legitimize even a system like the Third Reich.

America's Great Resurgence

Roosevelt's New Deal, a massive but entirely pragmatic and unpredictable series of interventions by the state to revive American capitalism, aroused intense interest in Europe. Here was the power which government had so memorably mobilized for war, finally directed to peacetime purposes. And these objectives were not just temporary fixes, but aimed to use the gravity of the situation to carry through social and welfare reforms which no one had thought possible in America. The president himself told a journalist in 1938: 'If liberal government continues another ten years we ought to be contemporary [i.e. equal to best practice in Europe and elsewhere] somewhere in the late Nineteen Forties.'[32] The president's optimism, energy, and daring stood in stark contrast to the fatalism which seemed to be propelling Europe downwards, and to the sheer mediocrity of so much leadership in the fading democracies of the Old World.

In reality the governments of nations like France and Britain were deeply discouraged by the detachment which Roosevelt displayed in foreign policy, and his inability to rise above exhortation in front of the Nazi–Facist menace. Hobbled by the force of anti-European isolationism at home, which had forced through the first of a series of Neutrality Acts in 1935, Roosevelt stood aside when the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, and confined his protests to symbolic acts as Nazism's true nature became ever more apparent inside Germany.

But a different America was silently emerging from the chaos and misery of the 1930s, a consensus across that part of the governing class which called itself 'internationalist' that the time had come for a new kind of assertion of American power. This would not be military or commercial or financial, but it would offer a far more ambitious plan to reform the world than anything Woodrow Wilson had dreamed of, a project for the construction of nothing less than an 'American Century'. When the article which launched this famous phrase on its career was published in early 1941—from the pen of Henry Luce, founder of the Time Life publishing empire—it announced a quite new determination to bring America's solutions to benighted peoples everywhere, so that they might transform their living standards, their faith in the future, and their belief in America.

Behind this startling act of ideological projection lay a long intellectual maturation process, involving the great foundations, thinkers in universities, and analysts in newspapers as well as experts across business and government. This elite had built up a comprehensive diagnosis of the world's ills—and Europe's in particular—and had identified in America's experience of the connection between liberal democracy and capitalist economic progress a series of lessons which, they felt, all might emulate. In the blazing successes of the New York and San Francisco world's fairs of 1939–40, all the other nations were invited to contemplate exactly what these lessons were. Just as Europe plunged into the near-death experience of Hitler's war, here was the mass communications, civic, and business leadership of the United States daring to organize a pair of immense shows of national pride, dedicated to no less a theme than 'Building the World of Tomorrow'. Compared to the American cities of the future portrayed here, with their opulent suburbs, freeways, airports, telephone systems, and television for all, the majority of the European shows by contrast looked static and rooted in the past. Their ideal was the museum, the art gallery, the luxury restaurant.

The New York World's Fair suggested explicitly that democratic progress in the contemporary world meant giving the masses access to the fruits of technological progress. Some commentators took up this message to declare that this was precisely the point where Europe's traditional governing classes had failed, and where the totalitarians would find their mass support: not simply in mass misery and dislocation, but in the revolution of rising expectations which, unwittingly, mass democracy, mass production, and mass communication had unleashed since the Great War. In 1939 Vera Micheles Dean, journalist, political scientist, and international relations expert, wrote that what Nazism and communism represented was

> an effort to realize the promises held out by the political democracy of the 19th century, which the possessing classes had too often failed to translate into terms of economic democracy in an age of mass production.[33]

This was the key American perception and understanding of the roots of the world wars, of the Great Depression, of totalitarianism, which fed the determination of that nation's government to place the peace of the world on a different, non-European footing. By the

time America entered the war the world knew what that foundation would look like: the plans were already in place.

The New Deal Goes Global

In January 1941 the first formal move was made for this radical transformation of America's place in the world. Incorporated in the president's annual message to Congress of that month, the pledges known together as the Four Freedoms featured freedom of speech and of religion, freedom *from* want and from fear of war. And these were to be upheld 'everywhere in the world'. No simple sloganeering blasts from a faraway country still officially neutral, the Four Freedoms speech announced that henceforth America would take sides and play a full role in the ideological battle with Nazism–fascism.[34]

The next move came without warning two months later. The Lend-Lease system was devised to enable the Allies to receive war material of all sorts under a variety of credit or 'leasing' arrangements, without committing the US government to the war as such. Here was action of substance, and it was radically new in technique, purpose, and language. That unlooked-for American propensity first glimpsed at the end of the Great War—a startling, forceful ability to invent new ways to project power—now reappeared. There was indeed much more to the Lend-Lease scheme than a simple emergency lifeline. Those who signed up to the full programme would not only pay for or return American war materiel. They would also formally recognize the standards and the objectives which the benefactors were determined to set for what came afterwards. Article VII of the law spoke of 'the expansion … of production, employment and the exchange and consumption of all peoples … the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce … the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers'.[35] The British understood immediately that this provision threatened the economic foundations of the British Empire.

The Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, provided a more specific version of the Four Freedoms, but not so detailed as to risk the fate of Wilson's Fourteen Points. In the charter, production, employment, trade, and consumption were defined as 'the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples'. All along, economic objectives remained central to the vision. Right after the three charter pledges on self-determination, democracy, and peace came the fourth, promising to every nation equal access to 'the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity'. In the fifth principle, a synthesis which reflected the presence of Labour Party members in Britain's wartime government, the signatories promised for everyone 'improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security'.[36]

In this way the three great criteria for the construction of the post-war world under the aegis of America were now clear for all to see: collective security (redefined to correct the defects of the League of Nations), free trade (to end protectionisms of all sorts,

including America's own), and raising living standards everywhere, not just to cut the material ground from under the feet of would-be dictators, but to show how all could enjoy the fruits of prosperity on display in the United States. There was of course a utopian thrust to all this, but Roosevelt and his team knew that this was the only way to keep American opinion mobilized for the war, as well as to reconcile the nation's vast new productive potential with the future purchasing power of the rest of the world. The great wartime conferences in America which dealt with food (Hot Springs, May–June 1943), labour (Philadelphia, April 1944), money (Bretton Woods, July–August 1944), and civil aviation (Chicago, December 1944), crowned by the creation of the United Nations (Dumbarton Oaks, August–October 1944 and San Francisco, May–June 1945), were Roosevelt's method for turning these aspirations into functioning institutions. With the opening of the World Trade Organization in 1994, the design was finally completed.

In Europe, Different Realities, Different Agendas

But there were many facts of international life which the New Dealers of wartime Washington could not and would not face up to. Most obvious was the persistence in the world of the old-style 'power politics' they all deplored, above all the geopolitical realities created by the unfolding of the war itself. It was far easier to get a policy pronouncement on, say, raw materials out of Washington, whereas one on Poland or Greece, for instance, was completely out of the question until very late in the war. Washington could neither conceive the scale and depth of the misery the conflict had brought, nor understand that the more total it had become—with America's armies, weapons, and propaganda playing their special part—the more Europe's 'dread turmoil' had been aggravated, and the further away it had become from the universe of the Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, and all the rest.

But most importantly, wartime opinion in the United States failed to grasp the fact that amidst all the death and wreckage, the Europeans had worked out their own programmes for meeting those hopes and aspirations of decades that the war had brought so compellingly to the surface. Everywhere in Europe the Left was the great beneficiary of this surge in popular feeling. Left-wing parties, trade unions, and social movements were swelling everywhere. 'Private enterprise', said many, had had its day and was no longer a credible option. Exile governments, resistance movements, underground political parties all developed some form of collectivist, welfare-state programme to be built in their nations after the war. American leaders by way of contrast felt that the notion of 'sacrifice' had to be limited to the phase of actual military combat, and could be justified even then only by the promise of higher individual, *private* standards of living as soon as possible after the victory was won.

The imperial powers all realized sooner or later that this America willed their end, that if Roosevelt had his way Europe would be 'retired' from the international scene, as the US historian John Harper has put it.[37] Naturally they fought back. The British, as prime targets of this American grand strategy, used every personal, political, and propaganda means at their disposal to resist, but they were much too dependent on the military and economic succour of the great American war machine to offer open opposition. Churchill's soaring rhetoric on Britain and America was a throwback to the start of the century, when men like him had dreamed of a new transatlantic race harmony; it never deceived anyone in the States. Meanwhile his foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, wrote: 'Soviet policy is amoral, while American policy is exaggeratedly moral, at least where non-American interests are concerned.'[38] Other imperial powers much reduced by the war, specifically France and the Netherlands, also mounted political and propaganda campaigns to try to convince American opinion that they too had promoted democracy and development in their colonies. The Gaullist version of this confrontation, crystallized in the personal animosity which separated the two men of destiny, entered deep into post-war French ideas of sovereignty and identity, radically at odds with American wartime visions. Both the British and the French considered the Atlantic Charter a huge provocation in the Arab world in particular, and tried to have it banned.

America as a European Power: The Second Experience

The Americans of the Second World War had quickly been proved right when they had understood that the war provided a unique opportunity for radical change, and gave scope to impulses and energies in America and outside it which could remake the world. They did not have to wait long to see the confirmation of their belief that the end of the European empires was at hand. They had also been the fastest to understand the full implications of 'interdependence', and had been correct when they understood that a revolution of popular expectations had taken place in the twentieth century which the liberal democracies ignored at their peril, and which the American experiment was—in its unmistakable way—intensely ready to meet. The connection they made between prosperity and democracy, and the propositions they derived from this belief, would return to challenge successive generations of believers in liberal freedoms down to George W. Bush and Barack Obama. At the same time their faith in the capacity of the public and private institutions of the United States to invent new ways to project national power would be repeatedly upheld.

But the onset of the Cold War—which none of the visionary wartime schemes anticipated (unless it was the Pentagon's urge to plant military bases at every point in the world it had come to know)—forced the Americans to face geopolitical reality, whether they liked it or not. And the focus was once again Europe. While communism spread in

the misery of Greece, Italy, France, the Balkans, and Central Europe—confirming yet again the old beliefs about the roots of totalitarianism—the urge by the Soviet Union to project its new political, military, and ideological power wherever it could found the institutions invented by Washington in wartime totally inadequate and irrelevant. Post-war America quickly found it could not do without the old empires, the British version in particular. Another hiatus set in, while calculations were adjusted, analyses recast, politics reconfigured. Under even more urgent pressures from Western Europe than those of 1938–9, this one was much shorter than the previous version, lasting from the end of the war to the spring of 1947, when the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were launched. In radical contrast to the post-First World War period, this time round the federal government would not be leaving the chaos produced by a second world war in twenty-five years to chance and the money markets.

Notes

1. Stefan Zweig, *Il mondo di ieri: Ricordi di un europeo* (Rome: Newton Compton, 2013) (translation of 1942 edition), 28, 29, 34–5.
2. Emily Rosenberg (ed.), *A World Connecting, 1870–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 5–25.
3. H. G. Wells, *The Future in America* (1906; London: Granville, 1987), 13.
4. Mary Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890–2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 36.
5. Alfred E. Eckes Jr. and Thomas W. Zeiler, *Globalization and the American Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 43; financial statistics on 44.
6. Eckes and Zeiler, *Globalization and the American Century*, 49.
7. Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890–1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), ch. 4.
8. Details in Robert W. Rydell and Rob Kroes, *Buffalo Bill in Bologna: The Americanization of the World, 1869–1922* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 133–41.
9. David Dimbleby, *An Ocean Apart*, episode 2, BBC1 (TV) 1988. The sequence describes the founding of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) AQ.
10. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 373.
11. Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 100.
12. Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 166–83.
13. Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century*, 86.
14. Rob Kroes, 'Between Rejection and Reception: Hollywood in Holland', in D. W. Ellwood and Rob Kroes (eds.), *Hollywood in Europe: Experiences of a Cultural Hegemony* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994), 22.
15. Ruth Vasey, *The World According to Hollywood, 1918–1939* (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1997).
16. J. D. Parks, *Culture, Conflict and Coexistence: American–Soviet Cultural Relations, 1917–1958* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1983), 19.

17. Victoria de Grazia, 'Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas 1920–1960', *Journal of Modern History*, 61 (1989), 56.
18. Kathleen M. Donohue, *Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Idea of the Consumer* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), chs. 3–4.
19. Walter Lippmann, *The Method of Freedom* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), 15, 36.
20. Theodore Draper, *American Communism and Soviet Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1960), 272–5.
21. Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century*, 132–6.
22. Eckes and Zeiler, *Globalization and the American Century*, 91.
23. Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century*, 136–7.
24. Eugen Varga, *The Great Crisis and Its Political Consequences* (London: Modern Editions Ltd, 1935), 169–73.
25. Gian Giacomo Migone, *Mussolini and the United States: On the Origins of American Hegemony in Europe*, trans. Molly Tambor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), ch. 2.
26. Emilio Gentile, 'Impending Modernity: Fascism and the Ambivalent Image of the United States', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 28 (1993), 10–13.
27. Bruno P. F. Wanrooij, 'Italian Society under Fascism', in Adrian Lyttelton (ed.), *Liberal and Fascist Italy 1900–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 193.
28. James W. Ceaser, *Reconstructing America: The Symbol of America in Modern Thought* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 179.
29. Ceaser, *Reconstructing America*, 203.
30. Schäfer, 'The Study of Americanisation after German Reunification: Institutional Transfer, Popular Culture and the East', *Contemporary European History*, 1 (2003), 133–4; Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (New York: Viking, 2006), ch. 1.
31. Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century*, 142–6.
32. Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1998), 428.
33. Vera Micheles Dean, *Europe in Retreat* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1939), xv–xvi.
34. <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/fourfreedoms>.
35. Council on Foreign Relations, *The Problem of Lend-Lease: Its Nature, Implications and Settlement* (New York, April 1944).
36. <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm>.
37. John L. Harper, *American Visions of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 78–9.
38. David W. Ellwood, *The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 241.

CHAPTER 22

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ROMANTIC INTERNATIONALISM

MARCO DURANTI

In the first half of the twentieth century, European visions of the international order assumed contrasting orientations towards modernity. Technocratic internationalists shared a liberal faith in progress, reason, and science, believing they could harness for the good of humanity the material transformations wrought by capitalism, industrialization, and globalization. Romantic internationalists, by contrast, looked back nostalgically to an idealized deeper past as a basis for new transnational imagined communities that would overcome the evils of the modern age, conceiving of time as circular rather than linear. Technocratic and romantic forms of internationalism were by no means incompatible. Some internationalists cast technical innovations in romantic terms, while others drew on a technocratic vocabulary to give a modern sheen to their efforts to reverse the wheels of history.[1]

This dialectic between technocracy and romanticism was particularly evident in early twentieth-century efforts to achieve at once the material and spiritual unity of Europe, whereby European integration was conceived as a cultural and ethical project as much as an economic one. During the early stages of the European project, the principal exponents of the technocratic model of European integration were Aristide Briand and Jean Monnet, while the most influential romantics were Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and Winston Churchill. Just as proponents of 'ever greater union' today cast the European Union as much more than a technocratic endeavour aimed at generating peace through economic interconnectedness, the same was true of the romantic crusade for European unity before the creation of the European Communities in the 1950s.[2]

For romantic Europeanists, Europe could only emerge from the spectre of totalitarianism and total war through the recovery of an older Christian European civilization

from which they believed international human rights norms derived. They recalled a culturally and ethically unified Europe of a bygone age so as to imagine a more free and peaceful Europe of the future. Their rhetorical tropes were not dissimilar to the archaic imagery of rebirth that characterized practices of remembrance in the wake of the Great War.[3] Reconciliation within Europe was to be achieved through forgetting the domestic and international strife unleashed by the advent of modernity. Looking forward meant looking back, not to the death and destruction of the world wars, but to a Europe before the French and Industrial revolutions shattered the transnational norms of Christendom and the supranational authority of the medieval Church.[4] The new science of international law and organization offered the promise of translating old civilizational norms into new binding supranational constraints on state behaviour.

Technocrats have typically featured prominently in histories of internationalism, while romantics have been largely relegated to the sidelines. The intellectual origins of modern international law have been located in scientific liberal world views such as Enlightenment rationalism, French positivism, German doctrines of the *Rechtsstaat*, and British stadial theories of history.[5] The roots of international organizations have been traced to projects for constitutional reform such as schemes for the creation of imperial federations.[6] Restricting the history of international law and organizations to the study of technocratic manifestations of liberal ideology risks overlooking how transformations of the legal and institutional architecture of Europe often remained discursively oriented towards a pre-modern past.

When scholars of internationalism raise the subject of collective memory, it is usually with reference to what the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights described as 'acts that shock the conscience of mankind'.[7] But there was another dimension to internationalist memory culture, one that stressed the need to forget recent horrors and look to a deeper, more harmonious past in search of common ideals on which to build the free, united Europe of the future. Nostalgia, first diagnosed as a clinical condition during the US Civil War, was a common by-product of late modern conceptions of progress and practices of warfare.[8] Many early twentieth-century internationalists were deeply nostalgic for the days before the collapse of civilized norms at the hands of barbarous regimes wielding apocalyptic new ideologies and technologies in the service of mass indoctrination and terror. They yearned for an imagined cultural and ethical unity of a mythical Europe of ages past.

Romantic Internationalism in *Fin-de-Siècle* and Interwar Europe

In the first decades of the twentieth century, the language of internationalism fused the universal with the particular, as evidenced in the references in the 1899 Hague Conventions to the 'laws of humanity' and the 'society of civilized nations'. While the

former referred to ostensibly universal natural law principles, the latter was a transnational community in which membership was limited to those who shared a common culture and ethics. This meant that sovereignty was contingent on the attainment of a suitably European way of life, which in practice translated into the stripping of non-Western peoples of sovereign rights unless they possessed sufficient military might.[9]

The romantic dimensions of *fin-de-siècle* internationalism were visualized in the Peace Palace of The Hague, today the seat of the International Court of Justice. Completed in 1913, the Peace Palace was constructed from objects and materials representing the finest exemplars of national craftsmanship from each of the delegations to the Hague peace conferences, reflecting their claims to membership in this exclusive club of sovereign states. The allegorical artwork and statuary littering its halls conjured a Renaissance dreamscape divorced from the sociopolitical and technological realities of the modern age. Its classical motifs and Christian iconography illustrated the common standards of civilization required for the attainment of full sovereign rights. At the same time, they provided no purchase for the great mass internationalisms of the time, whether inspired by Karl Marx's appeal for proletarian solidarity across national frontiers or by Giuseppe Mazzini's dream of a Young Europe of fraternal and democratic nation states. The Peace Palace instead recalled an older cosmopolitanism suited to European elites who saw themselves as impartial custodians of peace unmoved by mass politics.[10]

Some of the bequests to the Peace Palace commingled nostalgic utopias with technocratic ones. The British government donated four large stained-glass windows in the Great Hall of Justice designed by Douglas Strachan, whose work was found almost exclusively in Scottish cathedrals. These illustrated the phases through which backward, warlike societies had evolved into civilized, peaceful ones. The pictorial narrative began with a tranquil Primitive Age peopled by hunters, shepherds, and harvesters living in communion under the astrological signs of the zodiac, a moment of innocence that came crashing to an end with the invention of metallurgy. A bloody Age of Conquest, in which Bellona, goddess of war, held sway, followed. The third pane highlighted the dialectic of the Present Age, in which the very forces of modernity that generated conflict also contained the seeds of peace. Personifications of Finance, Labour, and Science were seen creating the material conditions under which Philosophy and the Arts could fulfil their irenic potential. The final stained-glass window prophesied peace rising from the ashes, the principle of arbitration reigning supreme, and the Earth's peoples at last following the wise counsel of philosophers, scientists, and statesmen. Here, Strachan inscribed a quotation from Virgil's Fourth Eclogue: 'The Golden Age Returns'.[11]

The language of internationalism served as a mechanism for demarcating the boundaries of transnational communities of peoples, excluding those who did not respect civilized norms, whether the heathen 'savages' of Africa, the barbaric 'hordes' of Bolshevik Russia, or the 'Huns' of Wilhelmine Germany.[12] The British and French were particularly adept at invoking these norms to strategically position their countries within interlocking transnational communities—imperial, transatlantic, and European—while casting the Germans as barbarians and criminals whose violation of international law had rendered their sovereign rights forfeit. French jurists delineated the new frontiers of

international law by describing the war as a battle between the modern legal systems of the 'West', whose democratic governments were bound by higher principles of honour, justice, and liberty, and a 'medieval' German understanding of law as subordinate to an all-powerful aristocratic state.[13]

Interwar internationalism at the League of Nations was presumed to reflect the 'objective social facts' of the modern age such as the expansion of global communication and transport networks. These provided a basis for international cooperation, rationales for international organization, or arguments in favour of a world run by technocratic elites. Such ideas structured the bureaucratic apparatus of the League's International Secretariat, which comprised an impressive array of technical services—including a Social Questions Division and a Health Committee—that, it was said, collectively formed an 'international mind'.[14]

The League mandates system maintained the civilizational hierarchy between imperial powers and their colonial territories.[15] In the words of the League Covenant, it rested on 'a sacred trust of civilization' in which 'the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to the advanced nations'. There existed three tiers of mandates ostensibly according to 'the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances'. Even Japan, though recognized as a fully sovereign state under international law, could not overcome such civilizational prejudices, failing to convince the victorious European powers to affirm the principle of racial equality in the League Covenant. Though most liberals were sincere in their desire to reconcile sovereignty with nationhood, their rhetoric clashed with their imperialist assumptions about the cultural or biological superiority of 'advanced' societies over 'backward' ones. Internationalists of non-European descent, as well as women internationalists, found themselves drawn to transnational forums such as the Universal Races Congress, the Subject Races International Committee and the Pan-African Conference, the International Council of Women, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.[16]

The civilizational hierarchies of the League rights regimes applied to populations within Europe as well. Although the minorities treaties posed politically sensitive challenges for interwar international institutions, they did not alter the underlying cultural assumptions of international law. For centuries before the First World War, non-Western states such as the Ottoman Empire had signed treaties with various European great powers for the protection of the rights of Christians on its territory. In the interwar period, the old states of 'civilized Europe' continued to retain their full sovereign rights. The peoples in the defeated, enlarged, or new states of central and eastern Europe, by contrast, were divided into categories based on their level of 'maturity.' The most mature—such as the Czechs and Poles—were granted their own nation states, but with more limited sovereignty, as they had to agree not to discriminate against members of linguistic, racial, and religious minorities on their territory. These minorities, by virtue of their relative immaturity, were not entitled to national self-determination, but rather a degree of collective cultural autonomy, particularly regarding the use of minority languages, though it was expected that they would one day be assimilated into the majority culture.[17]

European Integration as a Romantic Project

Mainstream histories of the European project typically take as their starting point economic integration initiatives—in particular, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community. Projecting the European Communities paradigm backwards and forwards, these accounts usually give prominence to European unification projects only to the extent that they contributed to European economic integration, with a perfunctory nod to the failure of political and military integration to take off in the early 1950s. Scholars writing in this vein allow for a plurality of means to realize economic integration initiatives, as well as a plurality of motives behind them. But the long-standing assumption has been, firstly, that the means to realizing European unification have always been predominantly material rather than ethical or cultural; and secondly, that the birth of the 'Europe of the market' was independent from the birth of the 'Europe of human rights', with the two only becoming intertwined with the southward enlargement of the European Communities from the 1980s, then the eastward enlargement of the European Union to the present.

Histories of the European project have for the most part lavished attention on the technocrats at the expense of the romantics, considering the latter not to be the stuff of serious scholarship. Traditionally scholars located the origins of European integration in the domains of international relations or political economy, with the interests of state actors and national preferences as the point of departure.[18] Only recently have historians examined the role played by transnational politics in advancing European economic integration.[19] Historical accounts of European integration typically group their protagonists into two categories, 'functionalists' and 'federalists'—the former being pragmatists who advocated an ad hoc piecemeal process starting with economic integration, and the latter idealists who championed more radically supranational simultaneous action on economic, political, and military unification. In doing so, they have overlooked another split: the divergence between technocratic schemes and romantic models embracing the spiritual as well as material dimensions of European unity.

The overwhelming concentration on economic integration has buried concomitant efforts to realize the cultural and ethical (re)unification of Europe, in which transnational movements for European unity inflected their romantic vision of European civilization with liberal notions of fundamental rights.[20] After the Second World War, it was these movements that catalysed the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights in November 1950 by the Council of Europe, an organization of fifteen non-communist states founded the year before.[21] Much like earlier treaties, the European Convention conceived of fundamental rights as contextual rather than metaphysical, premising their existence on a historical community of peoples sharing common values rather than on abstract universal first principles.

During the interwar years, Briand's pursuit of a lasting peace in Europe rested on his faith that technical innovations in international organization would spontaneously generate a new climate of reconciliation through forging closer economic ties and contacts between peoples. From the mid-1920s to the early 1930s, the liberal French statesman alternated roles as foreign minister and delegate to the League of Nations. Briand and his German counterpart Gustav Stresemann won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1926 for their work on the Locarno agreements. These guaranteed the borders of states along Germany's western frontier alone, which in practice meant that the 'new Europe' arising out of the 'spirit of Locarno' was one in which the principle of collective security was applied unequally on either side of the Rhine.[22]

After negotiating a treaty to outlaw war across the globe, the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact, Briand turned his attention to a second European arrangement. In September 1929, he made a dramatic appeal to the League Assembly in Geneva for new measures to promote international peace. In addition to touching on subjects such as disarmament, he told his audience, 'I am convinced that, of those peoples that are grouped geographically, such as the peoples of Europe, there must exist a kind of federal bond'.[23] The unstated objective of Briand's proposal for the creation of a European federation was to contain the rising power of Germany by embedding its relations with France within a broader European framework. Briand stressed the economic advantages of federation in order to gain support from French and German industrialists who wished to form a Continental customs union in order to protect their business concerns from competition with the United States. British businessmen and advocates of imperial preference also warmly received his proposals, as they wished to undermine the free trade system favoured by both the United States and the dominant factions in Whitehall.[24]

Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder of the Pan-Europa movement between the wars, predicated his vision of European unification on the existence of an elastic sphere of European culture and ethics without any fixed geographical frontiers. In his view, 'Europe's culture is that of the White Race, which sprang from the soil of Antiquity and Christianity'.[25] The Czech nobleman did little to hide the aristocratic prejudices and elitism that suffused this project. Though often citing contemporary Switzerland as a template for a future European federation, his writings strongly suggested that the most salient historical model for a 'United States of Europe' was the 'cosmopolite and polyglot' Austro-Hungarian Empire in which he was raised, whose aristocratic political class had formed what he described as a 'supernational' government that for many years curbed the nationalistic tendencies of the middle classes.[26] He insisted that Europe should be governed by its 'greatest geniuses', those 'really educated statesmen' who would save the Continent from the 'half-educated' masses swayed by populist agitators of the extreme Left and Right.[27]

Even as he excoriated the nationalist forces that had sundered the world of his youth, Coudenhove-Kalergi mobilized the rhetorical tropes of nineteenth-century nationalism in the cause of European unity. Like romantic nationalists, he spoke not of the invention of a united Europe but of its regeneration, rebirth, and resurrection. Europeans, he claimed, were no longer conscious of belonging to 'one great cultural community'

founded on common humanist and Christian values.[28] 'Tomorrow the European sense of nationality will be awakened', he wrote. 'Englishmen and Frenchmen, Germans and Italians, Poles and Spaniards, and all the other peoples of Europe will realize that they are children of a common civilization, a common race, and a common continent, heirs of a common tradition, bearers of a common mission, bound together for ever in a community of destiny and life.'[29] Coudenhove-Kalergi called on the European 'nation' to free itself from the yoke of the two great foreign 'empires' of Russia and the United States that sought to dominate the Continent—even going so far as to apply the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination to continental Europe as a whole.

In stark contrast to his hostility towards the Nazi regime, Coudenhove-Kalergi made great efforts to persuade Fascist Italy to join his cause. Benito Mussolini's reputation as an uncultured demagogue did little to deter him from courting the Duce's favour, as he was convinced that Bolshevism and Nazism were greater evils than Mussolini's 'moderate' authoritarian rule.[30] In a letter to Mussolini penned several months after the Fascist 'March on Rome' in October 1922, he cast the newly appointed Italian prime minister as 'the successor of Marius and Caesar', a near messianic figure who would lead the construction of a 'United States of Europe' in defence of the Continent against the barbaric hordes of Bolsheviks that threatened invasion from the East.[31] For Coudenhove-Kalergi, the Bolshevik Revolution had placed Russia outside the pale of European civilization and thus it could not be a member of a European federation as long as it remained under communist rule.[32]

During the 1930s, Italian intellectuals and diplomatic officials experimented with recasting Mazzini's vision of a 'Young Europe' of new nations in a fascist mould as a substitute for liberal and socialist internationalism. 'Either old Europe or young Europe. We hold to a new pact of European fraternity and discard the old ideas', the journalist Asvero Gravelli wrote in 1932. 'Fascism is the gravedigger of old Europe. Now the forces of the Fascist International are rising.'[33] Also in 1932, Mussolini prophesied that 'In a decade Europe will be fascist or fascistized!'[34] Yet fascist internationalism was a problematic endeavour, not least because fascist doctrine exalted militant ultra-nationalism. Moreover, any attempt to define what constituted fascist doctrine, a seemingly necessary step to take before exporting it to the rest of Europe, risked appearing at odds with the fascist emphasis on acting over theorizing and spontaneous will over rigid intellectual dogmatism. Gravelli, the leading theorist of 'universal fascism', sought to resolve this dilemma by casting fascist internationalism as a Mazzinian project for promoting peace and collaboration between nations on the basis of respect for national particularities. 'Fascist ideology creates the spiritual basis that permits mutual understanding', he argued.[35] Mussolini, in his first systematic formulation of fascist ideology published in 1932, described the 'imperial power' of fascism as 'spiritual and ethical' as much as 'territorial, or military, or commercial'.[36]

Such illiberal internationalist visions were not limited to Italians.[37] During the Spanish Civil War, right-wing youth from across Europe volunteered to fight for the Nationalist forces under the command of General Francisco Franco in the name of what they described as the 'Latin spirit', 'Western civilization against Muscovite barbarism', and 'Christian civilization' against the Republican 'satanic hordes'; a number had earlier participated in the Congress of the Fascist International held in Montreux, Switzerland in 1934.[38] Throughout the 1930s, many right-wing French intellectuals championed

the creation of a European federation as an alternative to the League of Nations and a substitute for liberal and socialist internationalism. More practically, they envisioned a European federation as a vehicle for promoting Franco-German reconciliation and undermining the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Many of them would go on to become leading advocates of collaboration with Nazi Germany during the war and some remained influential advocates of European integration well into the post-war era.[39] Across the Channel, former Labour MP Oswald Mosley, leader of the British Union of Fascists, argued that a peaceful solution to European problems could be realized if Britain and France would only 'synthesize' their policies with that of Germany and Italy to form a united 'fascist Europe'. This union would be based not only on common 'material' interests but also upon a common 'spiritual' foundation. 'Upon the basic fact of an established community of interest the universalism of Fascism and National Socialism erects the majestic edifice of a new world idea which commands the mind and spirit of man with the fiery force of a new religion', Mosley declared.[40]

A number of Nazi officials deployed the rhetoric of European unity to persuade the populations of Axis-occupied Europe to collaborate with them to defend their common European civilization from Bolshevism, world Jewry, and Anglo-Saxon imperialism. Adolf Hitler, however, resisted endorsing projects for European economic and political union. 'Europe is not a geographical conception, it is a matter of the blood in one's veins', he told his subordinates. The eastern frontiers of Europe were, for the Führer, 'what separates the Germanic world from the Slav world. It's our duty to place it where we want it to be.'[41]

Whereas Briand had undermined the League system of minority rights guarantees in his pursuit of good relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland, Coudenhove-Kalergi had from the outset of his campaign for a European federation called for 'a true protection of minorities by the universal enforcement of a national edict of toleration—a Magna Carta of all European nations' that 'deprives the state frontiers of their national meaning'.[42] Shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, Coudenhove-Kalergi drafted a new programme for Pan-Europa in conjunction with a committee of British notables organized by the Conservatives Leo Amery and Duff Cooper, who viewed a united continental Europe as a means of incubating Britain and its Commonwealth from external threats. It required 'all European states, regardless of differences in their constitutions, to respect the rights of the human personality and the equality of their citizens belonging to ethnic or religious minorities'. Coudenhove-Kalergi insisted that 'only if this principle of national human rights is accepted can there be European reconciliation and perpetual European peace'.[43]

The Romantic Roots of the 1940s Human Rights Revolution

Of late, historians have debated whether the history of human rights in Europe is one of continuities or ruptures. Mainstream accounts locate the deeper origins of human

rights in the Reformation and Enlightenment. Beginning with early natural rights ideas and revolutionary rights declarations, most such narratives move onwards to nineteenth-century movements for greater civil liberties, democratization, humanitarian causes, and social protections, in addition to those on behalf of the rights of minorities, women, and workers. These histories typically draw a direct line from nineteenth-century activism to interwar liberal internationalism and the League of Nations rights regimes. According to them, it was the horrors of the Second World War and the Holocaust that finally prompted international organizations to adopt genuinely universal human rights standards. The invocation of human rights in statements of Allied war aims and the 1945 Charter of the United Nations gave birth to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which in turn inspired the human rights texts, movements, and politics of the following decades. The post-war human rights moment is therefore said to mark the fulfilment of a universalist 'inner logic' embedded in the fundamental rights texts, visions, and struggles of past centuries.[44]

This evolutionary narrative is accurate insofar as the pre-1945 phenomena it highlights did indeed inform post-war human rights ideas and practices. As regards the genesis of the Universal Declaration, the causal linkages it describes have great explanatory value. There can be no disputing, moreover, that these factors generated the preconditions essential for the creation of the European human rights system as well. Even so, tracing the genesis of post-war human rights norms along a linear trajectory that terminates with the Universal Declaration offers only a partial rendering of their origins. Any historical account that focuses too heavily on unearthing component parts of the Universal Declaration in the past risks becoming teleological and essentialist—that is, a history that ignores the many sources, meanings, and uses of human rights discourse that did not conform to the Universal Declaration paradigm or contribute to its formulation.

This is not to say that evolutionary narratives fail to account for the plural origins of post-war human rights. Indeed, many scholars writing in that vein stress the polygenetic quality of human rights discourse to such an extent that human rights ideas and practices appear common to every society across the globe—if not in the deeper past then certainly by the time of the adoption of the Universal Declaration. Histories of the drafting of the Universal Declaration have demonstrated how the UN Human Rights Commission drew on a wide range of legal, philosophical, and religious traditions in drafting this document. Foremost among these were Anglo-Saxon common law principles; Christian communitarianism, natural law, and social thought; early modern theories of natural rights; republican doctrines of the rights of man; Latin American socialism; and constitutional rights texts from around the world, from the US Bill of Rights to the socio-economic rights provisions of the Soviet constitution. Much of the final text of the Universal Declaration was also compatible with non-Western values. This was not only due to contributions made during the drafting process by delegates representing nations outside the West. Many Western delegates echoed their non-Western counterparts in conjoining human rights with human duties, positing that

individuals possessed human rights only as members of a community with reciprocal obligations towards one another.[45]

A growing number of historians of human rights have critiqued mainstream accounts for ignoring significant differences between contemporary human rights ideas and practices on the one hand, and the visions of universal rights and duties featured in the evolutionary narrative on the other. This new emphasis on historical ruptures, often arrived at through a functionalist analysis that stresses practical outcomes, has shed much-needed light on how rights texts have differed from one era to the next as well as the contingent circumstances in which they have arisen.[46] What narratives of rupture share with evolutionary narratives is a tendency to project a single paradigmatic definition of human rights backwards onto the past so as to differentiate between authentic human rights phenomena and those that were not the genuine article. This is useful as a rubric with which to distinguish past understandings of fundamental rights from the prevailing mainstream understanding of human rights today as supranational individual civil liberties that all human beings are entitled to enjoy in equal measure. The strong argument for discontinuity in human rights history encounters difficulties, however, once the hybrid and polyvalent quality of human rights discourse comes into play. Proponents of the discontinuity thesis have privileged diachronic comparison over synchronic comparison, searching for differences over time rather than within a particular era.

If we take as a model the Universal Declaration's conceptualization of what makes certain fundamental rights 'human', then the European Convention is not, properly speaking, a *human* rights text at all. Unlike earlier statements of fundamental rights, the Universal Declaration unambiguously and unequivocally stipulated that all human beings regardless of the social group or category to which they belong—including their colonial status—enjoyed the same fundamental civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Like the League of Nations rights regimes, the European Convention was meant to apply principally to a delimited social group—in this case Europeans—rather than the entirety of the human species. The ostensible universality of human rights and the territorial application of the European Convention were clearly in tension with one another in Article 63 of the original text (Article 56 of the European Convention today, as amended by Protocol 11). Here the European Convention established a double standard for the implementation of its provisions within colonial and non-colonial territories. A state party could choose whether or not the European Convention applied to any one of its colonies. Even once it did make such a declaration, the Council of Europe could take into consideration what were nebulously termed 'local requirements.'

Thereby the first treaty to ever have had the words 'human rights' in its title codified in international law the principle that European colonial powers are under no obligation to respect the fundamental civil liberties of all their subjects equally and universally. Or, put another way, the human rights of Europeans were not to be confused with the human rights of humanity. Considered today as an aberration at odds with the remainder of the European Convention, this colonial exceptions clause was in fact at the heart of the construction of the European human rights system. Post-war champions of a European human rights treaty envisioned it as a means of delineating the frontiers of what they

variously referred to as 'European civilization', 'Christian civilization', 'Western civilization', and 'Western European civilization'. This civilizational rhetoric, which had long fused the universal with the particular, was the bridge between their visions of the common attributes of Europe and those of humanity.

Both sides in the Second World War sought to inspire their populations through patriotic appeals coupled with calls for the defence of civilization against barbarism. The Continent was the site of bloody nationalist struggles against German occupation. 'Europeans unite!' was the favoured rallying cry of those collaborating with the Axis enemy.[47] In response, the Allied powers and Continental Resistance unequivocally repudiated the core tenets of National Socialism by affirming their fidelity to 'human rights', the 'rights of man', and the 'four freedoms', among other expressions that had currency at the time. Though such phraseology could be invested with a number of meanings, it typically denoted a commitment to promoting economic and social rights alongside civil and political rights. This signalled that the conclusion of the war would not only release Europe from the grip of Nazi terror, but also usher in a new era in which the advancement of social justice would be recognized as a prerequisite for the flourishing of true democracy and liberty.[48]

Contrary to the misleading title of Alan Milward's influential history of post-war European integration, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, the nation state as a sociopolitical entity was in no need of rescue after the Second World War, regardless of the precariousness of its finances.[49] The wartime experience reinforced the bonds of nationhood and popular support for a more interventionist state, one whose leadership would be at the service of their people rather than foreign powers. The ceding of any degree of hard-won national and popular sovereignty to a new European organization of states did not have broad appeal. Far from it. Western European economies may have emerged from the war crippled, as well as dependent on international cooperation and foreign assistance. Yet their enthusiasm for the nation state had surfaced stronger than perhaps ever before. In these circumstances, it was hardly surprising that calls for a supranational federation, or even a looser union of European states, were not met straight away with widespread enthusiasm. Many post-war statesmen considered such schemes to be impracticable and irksome distractions from more pressing domestic matters. Their focus rested squarely on economic reconstruction and social reforms, which they conceived as projects for national renewal to be implemented within the territorial framework of the nation state.[50]

Persuading Western Europeans to support new international arrangements that would constrain the freedom of action of their democratic institutions required taking a page from nationalist literature, then turning nationalist tropes on their head. The leaders of the European unity movements were well aware that they faced nationalist headwinds and that Axis propaganda to the same effect had left a bitter taste. For this reason, they conceived of European unification as a cultural and ethical project as much as an economic and political one. At the end of the eighteenth century, French revolutionaries had appealed to the nation as a vehicle for the overthrow of the old system of dynastic states, in whose place a new order would emerge on the principles of 'Liberty,

Equality, Fraternity'. They had equated national sovereignty with popular sovereignty and national belonging with national citizenship. Nineteenth-century nationalists had coupled—or substituted—this liberal revolutionary nationalism with an understanding of the nation as a historical people united through age-old bonds of culture and kinship.[51]

The creation of a united Europe entailed transposing these nationalist motifs to a European key. Advocates of European unity spoke of the recreation of a 'European family' whose ties preceded those of the nation and whose political expression was a European union or federation. They imagined Europeans as sharing a long history of cultural unity that stretched back to the united Christian Europe of the Middle Ages. This wider European community of peoples, they claimed, was also knit together by a shared commitment to individual freedom and the rule of law. These principles were not posed as recent liberal innovations but rather as part of Europe's Christian and humanist heritage. The formation of a European union thereby would mark at once an end to the cataclysmic age of total war and a nostalgic return to the lost unity of a bygone era.[52]

Human rights offered a vocabulary ideally suited to such a reinvention of European traditions. Understood as at once universal and distinctly European, human rights could be invoked as Europe's unique inheritance as well as its greatest gift to the world. In this interpretation, to be properly European meant to be free to exercise one's human rights. Hence 'Europe' and 'Western Europe' were now increasingly seen as one and the same, as the European peoples to the east had fallen under the shadow of a new oriental despotism. To construct a European union on this basis was not to plunge Europeans into an unknown future or compel them to break with their deeper past. Rather, it was to lead them back to the more enlightened, harmonious civilization of their ancestors.[53]

This was the vision of a united Europe that Winston Churchill, then leader of the Opposition in Britain, presented at the opening ceremonies of the Congress of Europe held at The Hague in May 1948, the first joint meeting of the major post-war European unity movements. Over the course of four days of florid speeches and freewheeling debates, an event that at first appeared destined to be remembered as no more than a fusty conclave of notables concluded with a dramatic call for a radical restructuring of Europe's economic, legal, and political architecture.[54] A united Europe was not to be built on material foundations alone. In his plenary address to the congress delegates, Churchill called for a European union under the guardianship of a council of Christian states whose historical ties had been sundered by a 'second Thirty Years' War'. Its boundaries would not conform, however, to the old frontiers of Christendom until all the states of Europe were governed in accordance with the principles of human rights and democracy. These were the common 'spiritual values' at the heart of European unity. To profess one's faith in them required subscribing to a 'Charter of Human Rights, guarded by freedom and sustained by law'.[55]

The defence of human rights was thereby consecrated at the Congress of Europe as the lodestar of the nascent post-war European project. Economic integration was to be accompanied by the adoption of a European human rights accord and the establishment of a European supreme court to implement its provisions. The European unity

movements resolved that a state's membership in a future European union or federation should be contingent on abiding by the convention's terms.[56]

Churchill was by no means the only delegate at the Congress of Europe who cast the construction of a European human rights system as a vehicle for the reconstruction of Christendom. Joining him, among others, were two neo-medieval Catholic intellectuals prominent in the European Union of Federalists: the Russo-French writer Alexandre Marc, a self-styled nonconformist thinker who was a seminal figure in the development of a communitarian philosophy known as personalism, and the leading French royalist intellectual Louis Salleron, a high-level political appointee in the Vichy regime who had been responsible for formulating and implementing its corporatist policies. Already a year before the Congress of Europe, Salleron had called for the creation of a 'European Tribunal of the Rights of Man' with 'supranational jurisdiction', while it was Marc who was charged with the sole responsibility for drawing up and presenting to the Congress of Europe the first full draft of a European human rights treaty. The institutional apparatus that he proposed—a commission and court of human rights jointly responsible for dealing with claims from states, private individuals, and non-state collectivities—found its way into all subsequent drafts, including the final text of the European Convention.[57]

The seeds of totalitarianism, in the view of Salleron and Marc, had been sown with the Reformation and French Revolution. The schism between Church and State had marked the end of the 'supranational' ecclesiastical authority that had served as a restraint on the arbitrary exercise of power by sovereigns over their subjects. As a result of the triumph of parliamentary democracy over the medieval system of communal privileges, individuals had been left entirely at the mercy of an all-powerful state. The solemn declarations of individual rights enshrined in Continental constitutions meant little when they had neither binding legal authority over parliamentary majorities nor judicial mechanisms of enforcement. Only the instantiation of what Marc described as 'supranational justice' could turn back the clock, ushering in a new Middle Ages in which a European human rights court would serve the same function that the Roman Catholic Church once had in ensuring that European rulers and their subjects act in accordance with a common moral code. As Salleron observed, 'Since there is no more Christianity, it is necessary to create something else.'[58]

Appeals for European unification in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War were as much a means of forgetting the recent past as learning from it. Churchill, in his audacious September 1946 broadcast from Zurich University, called for Franco-German reconciliation and a 'blessed act of oblivion' as the basis for a United States of Europe. The construction of the European human rights system was at once a technique for effacing collective German guilt and a way to say 'never again'. A widespread motivation for the European unity movements' campaign on behalf of supranational human rights guarantees was their belief that West German ratification of a European human rights treaty would go a long way towards exorcizing the demons of the Nazi past, dampen fears in France of resurgent German power, and smooth West Germany's re-entry into the 'European family'. The chief champions of a European human rights treaty were also among the most outspoken supporters of German participation in European integration initiatives.[59]

This was true of David Maxwell-Fyfe, one of the chief architects of the European human rights system and Churchill's one-time attorney general. As deputy British prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, he claimed that these proceedings had posed the fundamental question, 'What is the duty of a good European?' According to him, they had been necessary for 'the establishment of a sounder and saner Europe', reaffirming the principles of international law and offering Germans the opportunity to enter 'back into the European stream of thought and development'.[60] On another occasion, he observed,

> I am certain that the Nazi leaders felt and resented most keenly that they were considered by those who watched the trial to have poisoned the great stream of western European civilization. Again and again they displayed almost what the Romans termed 'desiderium' and the Greeks 'pothos'—a vain longing to be recognized as part of the European family.[61]

During the first session of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly in the summer of 1949, Maxwell-Fyfe described a future European human rights treaty as 'a passport to our midst'. 'I appeal to those nations who belong to and revere the great family of Western Europe and Christian civilization', he told his fellow delegates. 'Will they not adapt their governments so as to conform to opinions which are so redolent of that tradition and of that spirit?'[62]

In this way, the European unity movements forged wartime human rights discourse into an instrument for delineating the cultural and ethical space of Europe, making it coterminous with respect for 'human rights', which for them meant primarily civil liberties. In so doing, these movements hoped to legitimize the exclusion of communists from European organizations at a moment when many on the Western European Left and Centre still held hopes of holding together the wartime anti-fascist coalition. Concurrently, the leadership of the European unity movements and Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly believed that non-communist Germany's participation in a European human rights system would smooth its way into a European union or federation. Civilizational language also helped Churchill hedge on the extent to which the United Kingdom should participate in European unification projects, particularly those with a supranational component.

This was not dissimilar to how Europeans had deployed civilizational discourse to frame questions of international justice, law, and organization in earlier decades. Their aim had been not only to legitimate colonial rule, which the majority considered beyond dispute, but also to regulate which non-colonial societies could exercise full sovereign rights under international law. After the outbreak of the First World War, international lawyers and statesmen had been as likely to invoke civilization in order to place nations such as Germany, Russia, and Turkey outside the boundaries of what the Hague Conventions termed the 'society of civilized nations' as to provide a rationale for overseas empire. The Second World War witnessed not only a fracturing of this international community, but also a near fatal breakdown of the very idea of European civilization. In recent decades, the language of human rights and democracy has served the same

inclusionary and exclusionary function that internationalist discourse did in the first half of the twentieth century, facilitating the southward enlargement of the European Communities, the admission of former communist states into the European Union, and opposition to Turkish accession.

Although references to democracy and human rights were absent from the founding treaties of the European Communities, they have been ubiquitous in the treaty law of the European Union since its inception at Maastricht in 1992. These principles are said today to be at the heart of what it means to be a European. Even so, their precise valence and the uses to which they are put continue to vary widely. Under the surface of a common political vocabulary, stark differences exist between European nations and within them. It has become apparent that to describe democracy and human rights as the cornerstones of European solidarity does little to bind together the diverse peoples of Europe if there is no deeply felt sense of a common European cultural and ethical heritage to give these words substance. No new vision of a multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multinational Europe of the twenty-first century has generated enough emotive resonance to shore up the faltering popular legitimacy of supranational technocratic elites. Whether the European Union can continue to function as a 'society of civilized nations' without the romance remains to be seen.

Notes

1. On the history of internationalism more generally, see Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (New York: Penguin, 2012), 65–93; Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). For studies of technocratic internationalism, see Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Wolfram Kaiser and Johan W. Schot, *Writing the Rules for Europe: Experts, Cartels and International Organizations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). For studies of romantic internationalism, see Vanessa Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen: Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (1920–1970)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005); Stella Ghervas, *Réinventer la tradition: Alexandre Stourdza et l'Europe de la Sainte-Alliance* (Paris: Champion, 2008); Mark Hewitson and Matthew D'Auria (eds.), *Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917–1957* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012); Luisa Passerini, *Europe in Love, Love in Europe: Imagination and Politics in Britain between the Wars* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999).
2. On the cultural and ethical origins of European identity, see Ute Frevert, *Eurovisionen: Ansichten guter Europäer im 19. und 20 Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 2003).
3. Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
4. Philippe Chenaux, *De la chrétienté à l'Europe: Les Catholiques et l'idée européenne au XX^e siècle* (Tours: Éditions CLD, 2007); Chenaux, *Une Europe Vaticane? Entre le Plan Marshall et les Traités de Rome* (Brussels: Editions Ciaco, 1990); Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian*

Democracy and the Origins of European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

5. Martii Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Emmanuelle Jouannet, *The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: A History of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
6. Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
7. See, for example, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, *Human Rights and Memory* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010).
8. Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 8.
9. On the colonial implications of European theories of sovereignty, see Anthony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Andrew Fitzmaurice, *Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Koskenniemi, *Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, 98–178.
10. On the origins of the Peace Palace in the context of *fin-de-siècle* internationalism, see Arthur Eyffinger, *The 1899 Hague Peace Conference: 'The Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World'* (The Hague: Martinus Nihjoff Publishers, 1999), 93–108.
11. Arthur Eyffinger, *The Peace Palace: Residence for Justice—Domicile of Learning* (The Hague: Carnegie Foundation, 1988), 159; A. C. Russell (ed.), *Stained Glass Windows of Douglas Strachan* (privately printed, 1972), 48.
12. On the mobilization of European civilizational discourses in the international legal field, see Mazower, *Governing the World*, 65–93; Liliana Obregón, 'The Civilized and Uncivilized', in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 917–39
13. David Bates, 'Political Unity and the Spirit of Law: Juridical Concepts of the State in the Late Third Republic', *French Historical Studies*, 28/1 (2005), 76.
14. Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 30–41.
15. On the history of the mandates system, see Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
16. Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 34; Jay Winter, *Dreams of Peace and Freedom: Utopian Moments in the 20th Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 58, 68; Sluga, *Internationalism*, 26–36.
17. For the most comprehensive study of the minorities treaties, see Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
18. William Diebold, *The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950–1959* (New York: Praeger, 1959); Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, with the assistance of George Brennan and Federico Romero (London: Routledge, 1992); Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
19. See, in particular, Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie (eds.), *Transnational European Union: Towards a Common Political Space* (London: Routledge, 2005).

20. A notable exception is Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel (eds.), *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
21. The major studies of the genesis of the European human rights system are Ed Bates, *The Evolution of the ECHR on Human Rights: From Its Inception to the Creation of a Permanent Court of Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Mikael Rask Madsen, *La Genèse de l'Europe des droits de l'homme: Enjeux juridiques et stratégies d'État (France, Grande-Bretagne et pays scandinaves, 1945–1970)* (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 2010); A. W. Brian Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the ECHR* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
22. For studies of Aristide Briand, see Jean-Robert Pitte (ed.), *Aristide Briand, la Société des Nations et l'Europe, 1919–1932* (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 2007); Gerard Unger, *Aristide Briand* (Paris: Fayar, 2005).
23. 'Discours du M. Briand du 5 septembre 1929', in B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch and Georges Scelle (eds.), *L'Union européenne* (Paris: Librarie Delegrave, 1931), 34.
24. Cornelia Navari, 'Origins of the Briand Plan', in Andrea Bosco (ed.), *The Federal Idea* (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1991), 211–12; Robert Boyce, 'British Capitalism and the Idea of European Unity Between the Wars', in Peter Stirk (ed.), *European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), 78–81.
25. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1926), 29.
26. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Crusade for Pan-Europe: An Autobiography of a Man and a Movement* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1943), 46–7.
27. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite* (Glarus: Paneuropa Editions, 1939), 130–1.
28. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite*, 18.
29. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite*, 19–20.
30. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, *The Totalitarian State Against Man* (London: Frederick Muller, 1938), 118–20.
31. *Pan-Europe*, 79–80.
32. *Pan-Europe*, 67.
33. Asvero Gravelli, *Verso l'Internazionale fascista* (Rome: Nuova Europa, 1932), 95.
34. Cited in Massimo di Massimo (ed.), *Il pensiero politico di Mussolini* (Rome: Edizioni Internazionale, 1970), 248.
35. Asvero Gravelli, 'Universalità del fascismo e internazionalismo', Papers of Asvero Gravelli, box 4, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.
36. Benito Mussolini, *Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions* (Rome: Arditi Publishers, 1935), 30–1.
37. Dieter Gosewinkel (ed.), *Anti-Liberal Europe: A Neglected Story of Europeanization* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015).
38. Judith Keene, *Fighting for Franco: International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain during the Spanish Civil War* (London: Continuum, 2007), vii, 117, 135, 230.
39. Bernard Bruneteau, *Europe nouvelle de Hitler: Une illusion des intellectuels de la France de Vichy* (Monaco: Rocher, 2003); Antonin Cohen, *De Vichy à la Communauté européenne* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2012).
40. Oswald Mosley, 'The World Alternative', *Fascist Quarterly*, 2/3 (1936), 395.
41. Quoted in Walter Lipgens, 'General Introduction', in Lipgens (ed.), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, Vol. I (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), 12.
42. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 166, 170.
43. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite*, 120.

44. Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (3rd edn, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007). Cf. Jan Eckel, 'Utopie der Moral, Kalkül der Macht: Menschenrechte in der globalen Politik seit 1945', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 49 (2009), 437–84; Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, 'Introduction: Genealogies of Human Rights', in Hoffmann (ed.), *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1–26; Samuel Moyn, 'On the Geneology of Morals', *The Nation*, 16 April 2007.
45. Mary Ann Glendon, 'The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Human Rights Idea', *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, 16 (Spring 2003); Mary Anne Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: Random House, 2001), 221–34; Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights*, 225–32; Johannes Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent*, xii–xiii, 27–39; John S. Nurser, *For All Peoples and All Nations: The Ecumenical Church and Human Rights* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005); Susan Waltz, 'Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 23/1 (February 2001), 44–72; Jay Winter, *René Cassin and Human Rights: From the Great War to the Universal Declaration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
46. Mark Mazower, 'The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950', *Historical Journal*, 47/2 (2004), 379–98; Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).
47. On the European unity projects of the Axis forces, see Robert Edwin Herzstein, *When Nazi Dreams Come True: The Horrifying Story of the Nazi Blueprint for Europe* (London: Abacus, 1982); Hans-Werner Neulen, *L'eurofascismo e la seconda Guerra mondiale* (Rome: Giovanni Volpe, 1982); M. L. Smith and Peter M. R. Stirk (eds.), *Making the New Europe: European Unity and the Second World War* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990).
48. On the place of human rights in the war aims of the Allies and Resistance, see Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); Claire Andrieu, *Le Programme commun de la Résistance: Des idées dans la guerre* (Paris: Les Éditions de l'Érudit, 1984).
49. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*.
50. On Western Europeans' unabated commitment to the nation-state model after the Second World War, see David Edgerton, 'War, Reconstruction, and the Nationalization of Britain, 1939–1951', *Past & Present*, suppl. (2011), 29–46; Charles S. Maier, 'Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era', *American Historical Review*, 105/3 (2000), 807–31.
51. On the genesis of liberal and romantic nationalism, see E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1789: Programme, Myth, Reality* (2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 14–45.
52. On the deeper origins of the idea of Europe, see Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). On the history of post-war human rights in the context of European collective identity, see Tom Buchanan, 'Human Rights, the Memory of War and the Making of a European Identity, 1945–1975', in Martin Conway and

Kiran Klaus Patel (eds.), *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 157–71.

53. On the construction of Western European identity in opposition to an Eastern European or non-European 'Other', see Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994); Michael Wintle (ed.), *Imagining Europe: Europe and European Civilisation as Seen from its Margins and by the Rest of the World, in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008); Bo Stråth (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other* (Brussels: Presses interuniversitaires européennes/ Peter Lang, 2000).
54. For an overview of the Congress of Europe, see Jean-Michel Guieu and Christophe Le Dréau (eds.), *Le 'Congress de l'Europe' à La Haye (1948–2008)* (Brussels: Euroclio, 2009).
55. 'Congress of Europe, Vol. 1., Plenary Sessions', Papers of Duncan Sandys 9/1/8, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 6.
56. On the civilizational dimension of British involvement in European unity projects, see José Harris, '"A Struggle for European Civilization": T. S. Eliot and British Conceptions of Europe During and After the Second World War', in Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel (eds.), *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 44–59; Philip M. Coupland, 'Western Union, "Spiritual Union", and European Integration, 1948–1951', *Journal of British Studies*, 43/3 (July 2004), 366–94.
57. On the role of Alexandre Marc and Louis Salleron in the origins of the European Convention on Human Rights, see Marco Duranti, 'The Holocaust, the Legacy of 1789 and the Birth of International Human Rights Law: Revisiting the Foundation Myth', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 14/2 (2012), 159–86.
58. Louis Salleron, 'Pour un tribunal européen des droits de l'homme', *Terre d'Europe*, 5 (1947), 31.
59. Marco Duranti, '"A Blessed Act of Oblivion": Human Rights, European Unity and Postwar Reconciliation', in Birgit Schwelling (ed.), *Reconciliation, Civil Society, and the Politics of Memory* (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2012), 115–39.
60. David Maxwell-Fyfe, 'Prelude to European Unity: Notes for a Speech at the Literary Luncheon given by W. & G. Foyle Ltd. At the Dorchester Hotel on Friday, February 21, 1947', Kilmuir [Maxwell-Fyfe] Papers, box 7/2, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
61. David Maxwell-Fyfe, 'Notes for a Speech at Brussels made on Saturday 20th December 1947 at 4 p.m. to the Union Belgo-Britannique', Kilmuir Papers, box 7/2, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
62. 'Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, First Session (10th August–8th September), Reports, Part II', Council of Europe Archives, Strasbourg, 452.

PART VI

EUROPE AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

CHAPTER 23

WARTIME ECONOMIES, 1939–1945

Large and Small European States at War

JEREMY LAND AND JARI ELORANTA

Introduction

The Second World War was the costliest conflict in human history. The unprecedented death rate, destruction, and material loss stand as a monument to the destructive power of total war. Each European nation's economy, whether directly involved in the war or not, was confronted by critical challenges. Those directly involved in the war sought to mobilize their entire economies and populations to serve the war effort. Neutral nations were more interested in surviving the war without losing economic ground. Nevertheless, each state implemented similar economic strategies to confront the challenges of the wartime situation. Ultimately, rich, democratic nations were more successful in mobilizing their economies for war than, for example, the central and eastern European autocracies, which gave the Allies an edge in the gruelling conditions of total war. Offensive strategies such as various forms of economic warfare were not usually very decisive.

This chapter examines the various ways that states faced the wartime economic crisis. We begin with a comparative overview of the economic impact of the war and the mobilization efforts of various states. Next, we contrast the case studies of Great Britain and Germany, showing the various strategies each attempted to construct an efficient wartime economy. Following the analysis of the two great powers, we investigate the impact of the war on neutral and small states. Quite often the literature on the Second World War concentrates solely on the larger nations, ignoring the crucial contributions of the smaller states. Switzerland serves as our first case study of a neutral nation faced with major economic issues directly caused by the war. Surrounded by the German military machine that controlled access to international markets, Switzerland played a

dangerous game of give and take with both the Allied and Axis powers. Finally, we finish with a study of Finland's economy and the decisions behind joining the conflict. We conclude by showing that no nation was safe from the economic repercussions of the war, and that each had to find its own particular methods for economic mobilization. Successful mobilization often meant national survival.

Military spending choices and surviving the impacts of conflicts have been among the key fiscal problems in Europe's economic history. The age of total war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries encouraged European states to adopt more efficient fiscal systems, enabling some of them to dedicate more than half of their GDP to wartime needs by the early twentieth century. This new kind of mobilization, which became a more or less permanent state of affairs in the nineteenth century, and which was associated with industrialized and more centralized governments, required new ways of financing. Nineteenth-century reforms, such as centralized bureaucracies, reliance on detailed and balanced budgets, innovations in public banking and public debt management, and more permanent use of direct taxation for revenue, were crucial components of the modern European nation states. However, for the first time in history, these reforms were also supported by the spread of industrialization and rapidly rising productivity. The nineteenth century also featured the industrialization of warfare, which began in the mid-century yet developed at an exponential rate. By the 1880s, military engineering began to forge ahead of even civil engineering and innovations. Moreover, a revolution in transportation with steamships and railways made massive, long-distance mobilization possible, as shown by the Prussian example against the French in 1870–1.[1] With the beginning of the First World War in 1914, this military potential was unleashed in Europe with horrible consequences, costing as much as 692 billion 1938 US dollars.[2]

In the interwar period, the new democracies and the more established Western nations alike found it difficult to cut public expenditure, leading to a displacement of government spending to a slightly higher level for many countries. In many countries the budgetary share of military spending (= defence share, percentage) dropped noticeably, while their respective GDP shares of military expenditures (= military burden, percentage) stayed either at similar levels or even increased. This was the case despite the widespread anti-war sentiments in Europe in the 1920s. For example, the French military burden rose to a mean of 7.2 per cent in this period, which was substantially higher than it had been in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, in Great Britain the defence share dropped to 18.0 per cent mean level, although the military burden mean actually grew compared to the pre-war period. In turn, the mid-1930s featured the acceleration of an arms race which the authoritarian states had initiated. Nazi Germany increased its military burden from 1.6 per cent in 1933 to 18.9 per cent in 1938. Italy's military burden fluctuated between 4 and 5 per cent in the 1930s (5 per cent in 1938). Japan went much further in its military preparations with a 22.7 per cent military burden and over 50 per cent defence share in 1938. For many countries, such as France and Russia, the rapid pace of technological change in the 1930s rendered many of the earlier armaments obsolete only two or three years later.[3]

The Second World War, which was the most expansive and costly conflict in human history, developed in stages. The initial phase from 1939 to early 1942 favoured the Axis as far as strategic and economic potential was concerned. After that, the war of attrition, with the United States and the USSR joining the Allies, turned the tide against the Axis. The richer, more democratic European nations, along with the US, were able to mobilize further and absorb higher casualties during the multi-front phase of the war. For example, in 1943 the Allied total GDP was 2,223 billion international dollars (in 1990 prices), whereas the Axis accounted for only 895 billion. Also, the impact of the Second World War was much more profound for the participants' economies. At the height of the First World War, Britain incurred a military burden of about 27 per cent, whereas the military burden level consistently held throughout the Second World War was over 50 per cent.[4]

As Table 23.1 shows, the highest military burden was most likely incurred by Germany, even though the other great powers experienced similar levels. Only the massive economic resources of the United States made possible its lower military burden. Britain and the United States also mobilized their central/federal government expenditures for the military effort efficiently. In this sense, the Soviet Union fared the worst, and in addition the share of military personnel out of the population was relatively small compared to the other major powers. That said, the economic and demographic resources that the Soviet Union possessed ultimately ensured its survival during the German onslaught. Overall, the largest personnel losses were incurred by Germany and the Soviet Union, in fact many times those of the other major combatants.[5] In comparison with the First

Table 23.1 Resource mobilization by the great powers in the Second World War

Country and years in the war	Average military burden	Average defence share	Military personnel as a percentage of population	Battle deaths as a percentage of population
France 1939–45	..	..	4.2	0.5
Germany 1939–45	50	..	6.4	4.4
Soviet Union 1939–45	44	48	3.3	4.4
Britain 1939–45	45	69	6.2	0.9
USA 1941–5	32	71	5.5	0.3

Sources: Jari Eloranta, 'National Defense', in Joel Mokyr (ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30–33. The Soviet defence share only applies to the years 1940–5, whereas the military burden applies to 1940–4. These two measures are not directly comparable, since the former is measured in current prices and the latter in constant prices.

World War, the Second was even more destructive and lethal, and the aggregate economic losses from the war exceeded an astonishing 4 trillion 1938 US dollars. After the war, European industrial and agricultural production amounted to only half of the 1938 total.[6]

What of the performances of individual countries? Here we will first examine the mobilization efforts and success of two major European powers, Great Britain and Germany. After all, the tide of the war in Europe hinged on these two states, to a great extent.

Great Powers: Britain and Germany

Great Britain and Germany serve as ideal case studies for a comparison of wartime mobilization among the major combatant nations, given their pivotal roles in the conflict. It is clear that Germany sought to expand its military production prior to the outbreak of war, while Britain was forced to react to German aggression and mobilization more slowly. During the war, both powers attempted to install command economies in order to effectively and efficiently utilize their respective nations' industrial and labour capacities. And both found the limits of those efforts when they began to face massive labour shortages especially in the countryside.

When examining Germany's war economy, it is imperative that we first examine the famous military build-up of the Third Reich prior to war. The standard view has it that the rearmament was primarily responsible for the German recovery from the Great Depression. And there is much to be said for this view. From a peak of a little over 6 million and nearly 30 per cent of the working population out of work in January 1932, the number of unemployed Germans plummeted to virtually zero by January 1939.[7] By comparison, in 1939 Britain's unemployment rate stood at 6 per cent, and in the United States the unemployment rate was slightly over 17 per cent.[8]

However, while these significant efforts to re-establish a powerful military and armament industry allowed the German economy to experience nearly full employment, they also limited the economy's capacity to produce the necessary food and consumer goods that usually accompany booming economies. Between 1933 and 1939, the Nazi regime committed a greater and greater proportion of national output to the production of military goods. In 1933, military output as a share of GNP was at a low of 1 per cent, but by 1939 it stood at over 20 per cent. Tellingly, butter and meat were being secretly rationed in many German cities after 1935. After 1938, the balance between military and consumer goods was skewed even more dramatically towards supplying the military.[9]

More recently, however, scholars have questioned the primacy of the military build-up in the Nazi attempt at economic recovery. According to Werner Abelshauser, the Third Reich utilized other, non-military outlays to strengthen the civilian sector as well. For example, the 'marital loan' programme was intended to expand the consumption capacity of households. Providing RM1,000 to each couple and roughly RM206 million

in total, these 'marital loans' were intended to expand the population since the credit could be turned into a child allowance. However, its impact was greater on the economy than on the population. With extra cash in hand, German families were able to substantially increase their purchasing power. In much the same way, elimination of the vehicle tax sparked expansion in car production. When combined with the efforts to build more roads and automotive infrastructure, Germany experienced increased ability to transfer goods and labour where need existed. That being said, removal of the vehicle tax and expenditure on road building are often cited as military projects disguised as civilian ones. According to Abelshauser, this was not the case: the routes were not determined by military needs, since military planners much preferred railways. Observing the American experience, Hitler recognized that the roads would not be able to handle the traffic of his much-improved Germany economy. Therefore, road construction continued until 1941 even though it contributed little to the expansion of jobs that the Nazi regime sought. Thus, it is clear that the military build-up was not the only agenda in the minds of the leaders of Nazi Germany.[10]

As for Great Britain, we find that there was limited military build-up prior to hostilities, but its massive industrial capacity provided a great base on which to build a command economy. The scholarship on the British rearmament in the 1930s is somewhat conflicted. For example Mark Thomas has argued that it helped alleviate the effects of the recession in Britain, whereas Nicholas Crafts and Terence Mills recently found the impact of the government spending on military to have been fairly small.[11] With the onset of the war, the impact was undeniable. The British unemployment rate dropped to 3 per cent in 1940, and practically to zero throughout the remaining years of the war. To be sure, Britain had about 16–24 per cent of its population in the armed services. It surely lowered the unemployment rate to have so many in uniform, but it also likely indicates that there was a serious labour shortage. The government made significant efforts to effectively manage the distribution of manpower as it became clear that the workforce was not large enough to meet all the government's wartime needs. Therefore, it was necessary to reorient the labour distribution to certain industries.[12] Germany, on the other hand, was able to draft labour, both forced and voluntary, from the territories it controlled. Even so, Germany, too, had to deal with chronic labour shortages, and most often the solution was to use slave or forced labour, especially in the form of political prisoners, Jews, and POWs. The same applied to France, where half a million German POWs were used in farming and reconstruction from 1944 to 1948. Similarly, in Britain, Italian and German POWs formed about a fifth of the rural labour force in 1946.[13]

Though Britain and Germany had significantly different build-ups to war, the war itself brought forth extreme economic challenges in the form of mobilization and expansion of armaments production, while at the same time they experienced virtually zero unemployment. From 1933 to 1944, Germany's GDP and GDP per capita rose every year. Naturally, the end of the war brought economic collapse for Germany, with declines of 33 and 50 per cent respectively in 1945 and 1946. Similarly, Great Britain experienced significant economic growth during the period. By 1943, however, the British economy's momentum began to wane and it experienced a drop in its GDP in both 1944 and 1945.[14]

Both Germany and Britain were at least indirectly influenced by John Maynard Keynes's conceptualization of governmental direction and manipulation of the national economy during certain periods. In the lead-up to the war, Germany applied 'Keynesian' ideas even before Keynes had fully developed them, in reviving demand by employing the unemployed through extension of the government's fiscal role in the economy. Granted, the Germans went far beyond what Keynes imagined. Nevertheless, the Nazi government's economic policies, in keeping with the Keynesian approach, established a foundation from which the total mobilization of the nation's resources and manpower could be achieved. In response to the onset of war, the British government was nearly forced to adopt a more Keynesian approach primarily because of the economic and military shortcomings it faced in comparison with the Germans. Still, the British were concerned about the impact unrestrained government spending could have on the monetary policy options. Measures implemented to control the inflationary gap included incentives to savers and workers. For example, the increased income taxes paid during the war could be counted as post-war credits, allowing the government to reduce the gap while ensuring workers continued working. The British experience is traditionally considered merely a prime example of increased government power during a conflict. However, recent scholars have suggested that the role of incentives to motivate bondholders and workers may have had a larger role in the ability of the British to weather the storm.[15]

While the similarities are apparent, both nations' industries were affected in a variety of ways depending on the type of industry. Germany's total munitions increased monthly for every year of the war; in fact, it was not until September 1944 that monthly production began to wane. However, the output of machine tools declined consistently throughout the war, falling to 79 per cent of the 1939 level. Even the production of coal suffered a drop in productivity, falling to 75 tons per shift per worker from the 1939 peak of 100 tons. Britain also experienced a drop in the production of coal during the war. In 1939, it produced roughly 231 million tons of coal, yet by 1945 coal production had fallen to 183 million tons. Some of this productivity loss was due to labour shortages or disputes, but for Britain in particular, the strategic bombing of industrial facilities may have also been a factor. Although coal production in Britain fell during the war, the agricultural sector experienced a seemingly miraculous increase in efficiency. Though a good portion of its experienced workers were lost to the armed services and food imports fell by 70 per cent or more, the agricultural sector was able to increase the calories produced per employee by nearly 77 per cent from the 1937 levels. Employment in the sector increased even with the loss of its most experienced workers and their substitution by women, volunteer labour, and eventually POWs. Ultimately, the success or failure of a sector varied wildly from industry to industry.[16]

Finally, the war had immediate and long-term impacts on the strength of these economies. In Germany, rationing began even before the war, while the cost of living steadily increased for the average family and continued to rise throughout the entire war. In particular, by 1944 food prices had increased to 113 per cent of 1938 prices, and clothing had risen to 141 per cent of 1938 prices. As a result of these higher prices and rationing, the

average calorific intake for a member of a working-class family fell from 2,435 calories in 1939–40 to 1,412 by 1945–6. Of course, the dismantling of the German state and economy following the war left little doubt of the destructive power of the total war effort by the Allies, but all was not lost. West Germany, under the occupation of American, British, and French forces, actually experienced only a short decline due to immediate reconstruction. Nevertheless, gross fixed industrial assets were at 111 per cent of 1936 levels in 1948, indicating that the capacity for production remained high. Furthermore, West German GDP per capita grew at an average of 3.12 per cent each year during the period 1956–89, which nearly matched the 3.3 per cent rate of growth for the years 1920–39. Therefore, the defeated eventually became victors in the long-term economic contest. Even victorious nations such as Britain experienced major losses due to the war. Based on physical capital, the British lost 18.6 per cent of its pre-war wealth. This left many concerned that the state planned to continue nationalizing industries (though that fear never materialized). Even so, Britain quickly recovered, at least on the basis of GDP per capita, expanding from 5,983 (in 1990 US dollars) in 1938 to 6,847 in 1950. This did not necessarily mean an improvement in Britain's relative economic position in the world; in fact, it meant losing primacy to the United States in the West and a swift decline of its empire. Yet, Britain recovered relatively quickly and effectively regained elite status among the world powers.[17]

Neutral and Small States: An Overview

Neutral states have played important, albeit limited, roles in the continuation of commerce during times of conflict between belligerent nations. Likewise, small states helped to fill the gaps in global or regional trade when larger, more powerful nations did battle with one another. Thus during the Napoleonic Wars, Portugal, an old ally of the British Empire, endeavoured to increase its trade with the United States as a way of offsetting the major losses incurred from the disruptions of international trade. Since Britain and France were almost constantly at war, Portuguese merchants needed to find new markets for goods that normally would have found their way to Britain. Portugal's increased trade with the United States owed much to the efforts of American merchants, who took advantage of the significant opportunities that were opened up by the warring Continental powers.[18] In the Second World War, neutral states and their trade continued to be of great value to combatants. When embargoes were instituted and actual warfare closed traditional avenues of commerce, neutral states were among the few options for trade for both sides. Often the neutrals in fact did business with all the combatants, without qualms, if the opportunities were there to be exploited. Moreover, smaller states were not only pawns to be conquered during the war, but often served as important strategic allies in the war effort, as well as conduits for trade in the most important raw materials.

It is conventional in historiography to criticize neutral states for profiting from trade with Axis powers, seeing it as akin to profiteering. More recently, scholars have made a significant effort to understand the role of neutrals and place their decisions within a larger context. By examining trade by neutrals on an aggregate scale, we can gain a better understanding of the reasons for trading with the Axis powers. Thus, for example, Eric Golson has suggested that by focusing on individual goods (and usually military or industrial supplies) researchers may lose sight of the perspective of a neutral state in wartime. Switzerland provides one of the best examples of a neutral nation; it traded with Germany not because it wished to support Germany's war effort but because Swiss leaders took a realistic view of their very difficult predicament. If the Swiss chose not to trade, Hitler's Germany might have either invaded or prevented access to the food imports that Switzerland desperately needed to survive. Whether or not the Germans were willing to take punitive action in such circumstances, the Swiss understood the threat to be real and therefore acted accordingly. The profits to be made were an additional incentive for such actions.[19]

Those small states that did not stay neutral, due to geopolitical or other reasons, often joined or continued to trade with the Allied or Axis powers both willingly and begrudgingly. Finland, for example, willingly joined Germany in the fight against the Soviet Union. Other nations, such as Spain and Sweden, maintained their neutral status while continuing their economic relationships with the major belligerent powers. Sweden's ball-bearing and iron-ore trade with Germany allowed it to purchase food and other required goods. These same goods were traded with the Allies whenever the Allies could land their ships. Dependent on imports from both the Axis and Allies, Sweden needed the trade with the Allies in order to supply their coal and petroleum needs. Not cooperating with either side could result in limited access to necessities.[20]

Spain, on the other hand, took advantage of the Second World War to recover from its protracted and destructive civil war. In 1938, the Spanish economy stood at 29 per cent below its pre-civil war level of 1935. It was hardly surprising that at the beginning of the war the Spanish economy experienced a significant boost in production thanks to their neutral status. During the period 1939–44, Spain increased its economic production by 33 per cent. However, unemployment rates remained high—at times 40 per cent or more of the working population was unemployed, and yet skilled labour was quite scarce. Hence most Spanish exports were basic, primary products, such as food and raw materials.[21]

Thus, small and neutral states were subsumed by the war, at least diplomatically and economically. Each was forced to significantly shift its production and trade patterns to meet the growing demands of the belligerents, who at the same time threatened intervention (explicitly and implicitly) in order to get what they needed. Therefore, it is essential that we view the impact of the war on the economies of small states and non-belligerents. By analysing the often-ignored actors in the global political system we can gain a better understanding of the broader economic dimensions of the Second World War. Moreover, smaller states often played a pivotal role in the various alliances during the conflict—a role that has been ignored too often.

Neutral States: The Case of Switzerland

Often used as a synonym for neutrality, Switzerland provides a significant opportunity to examine the life of a neutral nation all but consumed by the war. For most of the Second World War, the country was surrounded by the German war machine, which is the main reason why it did not cease trading with Germany. Beyond goods and services like banking and monetary flows, Switzerland also provided labour to meet the voracious demands of a German war economy. Its neutrality was conditional on at least two factors. Firstly, Germany might have decided to invade Switzerland but would have done so at a serious cost in terms of military manpower and resources. Secondly, at the same time, however, Switzerland needed access to international trade for its survival; in order to trade with the Allies, especially between 1940 and 1944, the Swiss were forced to negotiate with Germany to gain access to Allied markets. Consequently, the Swiss *realistically* approached the situation and attempted to control, to the best of their ability, the terms of trade with Germany.

In 1938, Switzerland's GDP stood at 26.4 billion international dollars in 1990 prices, with an average of 6,302 international dollars per head.[22] Throughout the 1930s, economic development had been inhibited by Swiss adherence to a strong franc policy and the French-backed gold bloc. Switzerland finally recovered its pre-1930s level of development just before the war began. Nevertheless, the war contracted the size of the economy by roughly 4 per cent of 1938 values by 1943, although only 2 per cent of the population was unemployed during the crisis period of 1939/40, with 10 per cent under arms.[23]

Once the war began, the Swiss state attempted to negotiate agreements with both sides in an effort to establish conditions that were primarily conducive to its own interests. Since Switzerland depended on trade to get the necessary goods it needed to survive, especially food, the government's main objective was to ensure the consistent trade of essentials. It also had to contend with the fact that both the Allies and Germany sought to bully Switzerland into making concessions.[24]

Prior to the war, Switzerland's primary trade partners were France and Germany. France was the second largest with 12 per cent of overall Swiss trade, while Germany was the largest with nearly 20 per cent. British–Swiss trade accounted for roughly 8 per cent, and American–Swiss trade totalled slightly over 7 per cent. This preference for German and French goods was based primarily on proximity to both as distance made the United States and Britain less available trading partners. Thus, it is not surprising that Germany and France remained primary trading partners during the war, especially when Germany gained control of Swiss access to Allied markets. Regardless of political differences, Switzerland had *real* needs that foreign trade remedied. Once Germany controlled the continent surrounding Switzerland, the real test of Swiss independence, according to the Allies, was getting goods beyond the borders of the Nazi empire.[25]

According to Golson, Swiss–belligerent trade relations can be divided into four distinct phases. The first phase was from September 1939 to June 1940, which was not

much different to the pre-war period. Two separate war-trade agreements, one with the Allied powers and the other with the Axis, were negotiated. In October 1939, Germany and Switzerland formalized pre-war conditions in their agreement, which continued a 2:1 ratio of German imports to Swiss exports to cover German debts to Switzerland. In April 1940, the Allies (France and Britain) signed a war-trade agreement that significantly considered the possibility of re-export to Germany. The agreement contained multiple additions that prohibited or greatly restricted the re-export of Allied goods, especially rubber, nickel, and other industrial materials. Some goods such as nickel, rubber, and copper were prohibited from re-export to the Axis powers. Trade in such goods as iron ore, textiles, and aluminium was restricted by a commission that consisted of British, French, and Swiss officials. Needless to say, the Allied agreement was short-lived considering that it took effect in May 1940, a month before the fall of France.

In the second period that ran between June 1940 and the end of 1942, Switzerland took great care to negotiate with both sides so as to maintain imports and the ability to trade outside the German Continental bloc. In exchange for significant German coal shipments and access to Allied trading, the Swiss were forced to eliminate their 2:1 ratio of German–Swiss exports and established pre-war limits on Allied–Swiss trade. To the Allied powers, these conditions appeared to be pro-Axis. As a result, the Allies established the Swiss ability to trade outside the Axis bloc as the requirement to continue receiving Allied recognition of Swiss independence. This condition was clearly on the minds of Switzerland's leaders in its continued negotiations with both sides.[26]

As a result, Switzerland attempted to diversify its trade by working out a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in early 1941. Under this agreement, the Soviet Union was expected to take delivery of Swiss exports that totalled as much as Swiss exports to Germany during the pre-war period. Though these arrangements and orders were never actually completed or delivered, the deal was established to ensure Swiss economic survival. However, shortly after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, the German government renegotiated its agreement with Switzerland to take advantage of its significant military and political ascendancy. The June 1941 agreement handed over control of border and customs patrols to the Germans, which essentially closed off Allied–Swiss smuggling. Britain had difficulty condemning Switzerland since the British understood the difficulties of breaking Germany's virtual blockade. There were attempts by the Allies to limit Swiss exports, but they effectively cut the Allies off from Swiss goods as well.[27]

The third period, from the end of 1942 to the beginning of 1944, marked the return of effective Allied domination of Swiss trade policy. Not surprisingly, as Hitler's grip on the Continent loosened, the Allies were better able to make demands, and yet Switzerland could still maintain its economic ties with Germany. In December 1942, Germany allowed Switzerland to reopen legal trade with the Allies, including the Soviet Union, which was worth as much as 2.5 million francs. Though the full amount was not always used, the Swiss provided a trade loan worth 37 million francs to Britain and began receiving much-needed raw materials in return. Nevertheless, the entire period was defined by constant struggles between the Allies and the Swiss to lower the amount of trade to and from Germany. It was not until the end of the war that Switzerland switched its focus to Allied trade.[28]

Finally, January 1944 to the end of the war marked the fourth period with a clear shift towards Allied demands with the collapse of the Nazi empire. The quantity of many finished products exported to Germany was reduced by 50 per cent or more. Furthermore, all remaining deliveries required the approval of a mixed Allied commission. The Swiss government did allow some additional trade credits to Germany beyond the 1 billion Swiss francs that Germany already owed, but the Allies would not allow any more than the 10 million to be provided after January 1944.

If prior to 1944 the Allies targeted individual firms for their allegedly pro-Axis trading practices, from January 1944 the Allies agreed to cease blacklisting certain companies in order to expand trade that benefited all parties. As the Allies penetrated deeper and deeper into Europe and eventually Germany itself, Allied–Swiss trade dramatically increased while German–Swiss trade decreased by 50 per cent of 1942 levels.[29]

Throughout the war and especially towards the end of hostilities, there were chronic shortages of numerous goods, especially fossil fuels and basic necessities. Coal and steel were two of the primary goods that Switzerland had normally obtained from Germany. Unfortunately, even by 1942, deliveries of coal and steel had fallen by 25 per cent or more. Switzerland's difficulties were compounded by the fact that, more than ever, it was essentially forced to rely on Germany for its energy needs since the Allies would not allow shipments of fuel to Switzerland for fear of Axis appropriation.[30]

However, this trade remained important for Switzerland and indeed for Germany. Switzerland exported electricity to Germany up until 1944 at a relatively flat amount, hovering around 2.2–2.5 billion kilowatt hours per year. As much as Germany attempted to increase the amount of electricity that was transferred, Switzerland either could not (because of, at times, limited coal supplies) or would not expand the export of electricity. As with Spain, Switzerland allowed transitory labour to move into German territory and work for factories all along the Swiss–German border: some 1,800 workers travelled to Germany each day to take advantage of the German shortage of labour. This transfer of labour was common prior to the war, but the Swiss state sought to limit the movement of Swiss labour to German factories somewhat in order to protect its neutral status.[31]

Other neutral nations faced similar conditions and difficulties, and had no choice but to negotiate with both warring camps. Even when surrounded by the German war machine, states such as Sweden continued to trade with the Allies, whether officially or illicitly. Maintaining neutrality while meeting basic economic needs proved to be a difficult act indeed. For mainly practical reasons, therefore, the experience of a neutral was one of constant negotiation.

Less than Neutral States: The Case of Finland

Although Finland is usually viewed as a minor combatant in the Second World War, its role as German ally requiring strategic war materiel offers valuable insights into

how Berlin allocated resources. When Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, Finland issued its declaration of neutrality within days. Initially, the conflict was of limited scale, but by the end of the year it consumed the whole country, with three different wars during the years 1939–45. Finland's first entry into the war was with the so-called Winter War, which began in November 1939 and ended in March 1940. This involved just Finland and the Soviet Union, the latter of which was the aggressor in the conflict. While Finns amassed some impressive victories with clearly smaller military force than the Soviets, ultimately the superior resources of their enemy threatened a military collapse. Through the threat of intervention by the Western powers and a final stand by the Finnish military, the war ended with a stalemate that favoured the Soviets. The next phase was the so-called Continuation War (1941–4), in which the Finns joined the Germans in Operation Barbarossa. Technically the Finns insisted that they were not in a formal alliance with the Germans, at least until the end of the war. Once again, the tide of the war turned against the Finns, and only massive concentration of resources during the summer of 1944 prevented a military catastrophe. The eventual peace treaty contained some harsh conditions and loss of land that the Finns had to accept while at the same time retaining their sovereignty. The last phase was the so-called Lapland War that lasted from September 1944 to April 1945. In this conflict the Finns had to expel, as per conditions of the peace treaty, German troops from Lapland. At first the war was simply make-believe—theatre played for the benefit of the Soviets. However, eventually both sides had to fight for real and the Germans retreated as their own state collapsed.

The outbreak of the Second World War was not unexpected in Finland. A temporary law meant to improve national defence needs, giving special powers to the president of Finland during wartime, had already been approved in June 1939.[32] Finland also had developed some plans for its war economy in the 1920s and 1930s. The key issue was how to ensure the flow of essential goods to the military and civilian sectors. Trade in liquid fuels and lubricants as well as iron scrap was put under state control.[33] The plans for the regulation of the Finnish war economy were ready but not formally accepted when the Second World War started. A Ministry of Supply was organized in late September 1939, after the guidelines developed earlier in the 1930s by the Economic Defence Council that included various stakeholders in Finnish politics.[34] The level of preparations was at its highest since 1919, a conscious effort based on the fact that the hoarding of grain had led to widespread malnutrition during the First World War in the wake of the collapse of the Russian logistical system in 1917.[35] Finland was in a good position in terms of food production at the beginning of the war in 1939, as the total acreage under grain cultivation had almost doubled during the first two decades after gaining its independence from Russia in 1917. The country was more self-sufficient in cereals; abundant crops were furthermore boosted by warm summers in 1930s and imported fertilizers.

The 1930s were generally good times for Finland, with high economic growth rates after the initial depression years. The country was also able to catch up considerably with the other Scandinavian countries and western Europe in terms of living standards. In fiscal terms, Finland reduced its foreign debt during the 1930s from about a third of

GDP to nearly zero on the eve of the Second World War, giving the Finns a good reputation in the international debt markets, especially in the United States.[36]

The coming of world war became more and more apparent in the two years preceding the conflict, as the Soviet Union stepped up pressure on Finland concerning the issue of Karelia—a region of south-east Finland that was fairly close to Leningrad—until the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was signed. The secret protocol in this treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union divided Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland into their respective spheres. When war seemed imminent, the Finnish navy took up its combat positions in September 1939. A general mobilization was ordered in October and at the beginning of the Winter War which raged between 30 November 1939 and 13 March 1940. By 1940, Finland had mobilized 220,000 or 37 per cent of all men aged between 20 and 40. In contrast, the Soviet Union mobilized only 6 per cent of its equivalent male population. The rate of mobilization did not immediately affect the highly agrarian Finnish economy during the winter months, since the men were usually employed in the export-led forestry industry at that time of year.[37]

After the peace treaty was concluded in Moscow in 1940, which brought the Winter War to conclusion, Finland continued to maintain *c.*100,000 men in arms. In 1940–1, Finland invested heavily in its army, navy, and air force, and relations with the Soviet Union remained tense. Finland joined the ongoing world war again in June 1941, this time on the side of the Germans, assisting Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union, in the so-called Continuation War. Many politicians and scholars in Finland have in the past maintained that this war against the Soviet Union was a separate war from Germany's Operation Barbarossa, although more recent historical scholarship has weakened this argument. For the Soviet Union, the war against Finland was merely another front of the Great Patriotic War; and for the Germans, Finland's war was a small part of its general war effort. Among the Allies, Britain declared war on Finland on 6 December 1941.

Ultimately, the tide in the eastern front turned for the Finns as well as for the Germans. Despite a desperate and ultimately successful stand in the summer of 1944, which halted a major Soviet offensive, the Finnish government ended the hostilities with a ceasefire on 4 September 1944, as did the Soviet Union twenty-four hours later. Finland was required to expel all German troops from its territory within fourteen days. As the Germans did not leave Finland within the given deadline, the Finns fought their former allies in the Lapland War from 1 October 1944 to 25 April 1945.[38] The formal conclusion of the so-called Continuation War was ratified in a peace treaty signed in Paris in 1947, a part of the Paris peace treaties that concluded the Second World War. The Finnish government declared on 3 March 1945 that Finland and Germany had been at war since 15 September 1944. The rationale for the declaration was grounded in the expectation of war reparations from Germany, since the latter had practised a scorched earth policy in northern Finland and Norway. It was only on 12 March 1954 that the government of Finland considered the war with Germany to be over.[39]

The historiography on Finnish foreign policy in the lead-up to and during the Continuation War has focused on the issue of culpability and geopolitics, and has

given fairly little attention to economic issues. Finland is often cited as having been a 'co-belligerent' with Germany in 1941–4, a term used by Finns during and after the war to distinguish their position from a formal alliance. Technically, Finland was not one of the Axis powers but acted in close cooperation with Germany. There were German troops on Finnish soil (especially in the northern theatre) and a Finnish Waffen-SS battalion was fighting in the East. There was extensive naval cooperation, as well as broad exchanges of materials, goods, and information.[40] Finland's geopolitical situation, however, left it with fairly limited choices. Obviously, the Soviet Union was a major threat, as proven by the Winter War and by subsequent experiences. With no allies to count on during the Winter War, it eventually chose to align itself with Germany, especially given the early success of Operation Barbarossa. The failure of the assumption of Finnish war plans that had been based on a vigorous initial defence, to be followed by international assistance, left Germany as the natural ally. However, the Finns also wanted to reclaim territory from the Soviets and punish them for the earlier war.

The final accounting of the costs of the Second World War for Finland represented almost 100 billion Finnish marks in 1938 prices, or about 2.5 times the Finnish GDP in 1938—a huge burden for the relatively small Finnish economy. In part, this demonstrates the high value placed by Finland on its independence. For example, between 1940 and 1944, the annual war expenditure for each year cost almost one year's national product. The cost of the war was also high in terms of economic development—for instance, the real economic activity, measured by real GDP, fell by 10 per cent between 1938 and 1940 and remained depressed until 1943. Output collapsed again in 1945, after which the economy joined the post-war global recovery. Trade was another casualty of the war for Finland—while Finland had an export boom in the 1930s, aggregate trade more or less collapsed during the Second World War. Despite its economic weaknesses, Finland was able to mobilize considerable resources for the war effort in 1941, which was supplemented by German military and economic aid.

The diversion of resources to the war effort had drastic effects on consumption. One way to measure privation is to examine the consumption of various food items and calories by ordinary workers and other groups. The food rationing guaranteed 1,000–1,500 calories daily per capita for workers in light work and 2,000–2,800 calories for those in heavy work. The actual calorific intake was higher due to the black market and some non-rationed foodstuffs. According to continuous surveys on private consumption conducted during the war years, Finns consumed only modestly above their very minimal rations and these conditions worsened in 1943 and 1944.

In sum, threatened by the Soviet Union and unable to secure alternative allies, Finland became an ally of Nazi Germany even though their war aims differed considerably. A revanchist Soviet Union hoping to recover all or a part of the lost Grand Duchy of Finland fought the Finns during the Winter War when for the most part Nazi Germany remained neutral because of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Once Hitler embarked on Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Finland became a valuable ally in securing Germany's northern flank. By participating, Finland was able to regain its lost territory, but in spite of German pressure, it stopped at the pre-war boundary and did not participate in the

siege of Leningrad. When the tides of war shifted, the Moscow armistice was signed with the Soviet Union and Britain that reinstated most of the terms and territorial concessions made to the Soviet Union after the Winter War. The agreement obliged the Finns to drive out the remaining German army, precipitating the Lapland War. The brutal and lengthy wars took a huge economic toll on the population, due to the extensive mobilization of men and resources, numerous casualties, and shrinking consumption. Although vulnerable given its geographic position, Finland resisted many German requests and negotiated conditions for their foreign trade that provided considerable resources for Finland's war effort. In fact, Finland was able to set terms in some of the dimensions of the trade between itself and Germany, since Finland contained many important strategic resources like copper. By mobilizing its domestic human and other resources to a level matching some of the most involved belligerents and extracting transfers from Germany, Finland was able to preserve its independence against the aggression of a vastly bigger neighbour, that is, the Soviet Union. It was a difficult balancing act that enabled the Finns to maintain their independence while some of their close neighbours, like the Baltic States (which were geopolitically and geographically in a much more threatened location), lost theirs.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the challenges and solutions states adopted to deal with wartime economic mobilization and other issues. We first provided a comparative overview of the economic impacts of the war and mobilization. Then we utilized the case studies of Great Britain and Germany to examine the strategies used to create efficient wartime economies, followed by analysis of the impacts on neutral and small states. Switzerland provides a useful case study of the challenges faced by a neutral country with very powerful and aggressive neighbours. In fact, Switzerland had to play a dangerous game of give and take between the Allies and the Axis powers. We concluded our examination of the smaller states by looking at Finland's wartime economic performance and manoeuvring between the great powers. In sum, we showed that no nation was safe from the economic repercussions of the war, and each had to find the particular methods that helped their economies mobilize for war.

What about the broader economic impacts of the world wars, particularly the Second World War? Economic globalization and trade were definitely disrupted by the world wars and during the interwar period, and the volume of trade declined substantially compared to the years before the First World War. In many ways, although separated by a twenty-year 'interwar period', the two world wars can be understood as a single historical process to which the European dimension was fundamental; Europe was the theatre of a long 'civil war', fuelled by rising nationalism and the clash of empires. The First World War was fought primarily by European powers in Europe; some non-European

participants and colonial polities played a minor role while others intervened late in the process. The Second began in Asia before spreading across the world; most participants understood, however, that the conflict in Europe would be decisive for the outcome. Ultimately, the processes leading to the First World War and its impact produced a fragmented Europe that had spent vast amounts of physical and human capital, leading to reparations and debts, and yet which failed to solve the institutional dilemmas necessary to produce political and economic stability.

The losses of the First World War were dwarfed by those of the Second. At least 55 million people died prematurely, and half of these were citizens of one country, the Soviet Union. The rate of human losses was varied: in the Soviet case it was astonishingly heavy. Despite this, the loss of life incurred in combat or by civilians touched by the war was everywhere exceeded by the rate of physical destruction; this was made possible by the new technological ability to substitute strategic aerial bombardment for territorial incursion.

In effect, three main changes had occurred as a result of the processes that connected the two world wars. Firstly European economic growth, integration, and prosperity had lost its association with empire. No doubt to the surprise of Europe's nineteenth-century leaders, had they lived to see it, it proved possible to acquire wealth and wield influence without claiming imperial sway over vast stretches of faraway peoples and their lands and oceans. Secondly, Europe's leaders had a new sense of the importance of cooperation. They now cooperated with the United States in exchange rate coordination and tariff reduction, with each other in laying new foundations for European integration, and with developing countries in dismantling the empires and development assistance. Thirdly, Europe's leaders had learned to use the power of the state to regulate economic life. In wartime, governments had wielded immense authority over their people, production, and consumption. Learning the appropriate limits of government control over the market economy was a major challenge of the post-war period, especially once Keynesian economic policies took hold.

Notes

1. See especially William McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
2. See table 1.13 in Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, 'The Economics of World War I: An Overview', in Broadberry and Harrison (eds.), *The Economics of World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
3. Jari Eloranta, 'External Security by Domestic Choices: Military Spending as an Impure Public Good among Eleven European States, 1920–1938', dissertation, European University Institute, 2002; Eloranta, 'National Defense', in Joel Mokyr (ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30–3; Carolyn Webber and Aaron Wildavsky, *A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).

4. Eloranta, 'National Defense'.
5. Mark Harrison, 'The Economics of World War II: An Overview', in Harrison (ed.), *The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparisons* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Eloranta, 'National Defense'.
6. Rondo Cameron and Larry Neal, *A Concise Economic History of the World: From Paleolithic Times to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Broadberry and Harrison, 'The Economics of World War I: An Overview'.
7. Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 48–9.
8. Stephen Broadberry and Peter Howlett, 'The United Kingdom: "Victory at All Costs"', and Hugh Rockoff, 'The United States: From Ploughshares to Swords', both in Harrison (ed.), *The Economics of World War II*, 55 and 101 respectively.
9. Harrison, 'The Economics of World War II: An Overview', 21; Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction*, 659–60. See also Christoph Buchheim and Jonas Scherner, 'The Role of Private Property in the Nazi Economy: The Case of Industry', *Journal of Economic History*, 66/2 (2006), 390–416.
10. Werner Abelshauser, 'Germany: Guns, Butter and Economic Miracles', in Harrison (ed.), *The Economics of World War II*, 126–8. On the investment side, see e.g. Jonas Scherner, 'Nazi Germany's Preparation for War: Evidence from Revised Industrial Investment Series', *European Review of Economic History*, 14/3 (2010), 433–68. On German occupation of France, for example, see Marcel Boldorf and Jonas Scherner, 'France's Occupation Costs and the War in the East: The Contribution to the German War Economy, 1940–1944', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 47/2 (2012), 291–316.
11. Mark Thomas, 'Rearmament and Economic Recovery in the Late 1930s', *Economic History Review*, 36/4 (1983), 552–79. Cf. Nicholas Crafts and Terence C. Mills, 'Rearmament to the Rescue? New Estimates of the Impact of "Keynesian" Policies in 1930s' Britain', *Journal of Economic History*, 73/4 (2013), 1077–104.
12. Broadberry and Howlett, 'The United Kingdom', 63.
13. Hanna Diamond, '"Prisoners of the Peace": German Prisoners-of-War in Rural France 1944–1948', *European History Quarterly*, 43/3 (2013), 442–63; Johann Custodis, 'Employing the Enemy: The Contribution of German and Italian Prisoners of War to British Agriculture during and after the Second World War', *Agricultural History Review*, 60/2 (2012), 243–65.
14. Abelshauser, 'Germany: Guns, Butter and Economic Miracles', 124; Broadberry and Howlett, 'The United Kingdom', 44–5.
15. Abelshauser, 'Germany: Guns, Butter and Economic Miracles', 125–6, 131; Broadberry and Howlett, 'The United Kingdom,' 48, 72.
16. Abelshauser, 'Germany: Guns, Butter and Economic Miracles', 152, 157; Broadberry and Howlett, 'The United Kingdom', 61–3.
17. Abelshauser, 'Germany: Guns, Butter and Economic Miracles', 154–5, 168–9; Broadberry and Howlett, 'The United Kingdom', 72–3; Harrison, 'The Economics of World War II: An Overview', 38–9.
18. Jari Eloranta and Cristina Moreira, 'Importance of "Weak" States during Conflicts: Portuguese Trade with the United States during the Napoleonic Wars', *Revista de Historia Económica/Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*, 39/3 (2011), 393–423. See also Leos Müller, *Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce: The*

Swedish Consular Service and Long-Distance Shipping, 1720–1815 (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2004).

19. Eric Bernard Golson, 'The Economics of Neutrality: Spain, Sweden and Switzerland in the Second World War', PhD Diss., London School of Economics, 2011, 24–9, 468–70.
20. For more on the trade of strategic goods, see e.g. Raymond Dumett, 'Africa's Strategic Minerals during the Second World War', *Journal of African History*, 26/4 (1985), 400–4; Leonard Caruana and Hugh Rockoff, 'A Wolfram in Sheep's Clothing: Economic Warfare in Spain, 1940–1944', *Journal of Economic History*, 63/1 (2003), 100–26; Leonard Caruana and Hugh Rockoff, 'An Elephant in the Garden: The Allies, Spain, and Oil in World War II', *European Review of Economic History*, 11/2 (2007), 159–87.
21. Golson, 'The Economics of Neutrality', 47–9.
22. Harrison, 'The Economics of World War II: An Overview', table 1.4. This figure is slightly lower than that of Angus Maddison in Maddison, *The World Economy: Historical Statistics* (Paris: OECD, 2003), table 1b, so the more conservative estimate was chosen.
23. Golson, 'The Economics of Neutrality', 47–8, table 1.1.
24. Golson, 'The Economics of Neutrality', 252.
25. Golson, 'The Economics of Neutrality, 246–7, 252. See also Stephen P. Halbrook, *Target Switzerland: Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009).
26. Golson, 'The Economics of Neutrality', 249–53.
27. Golson, 'The Economics of Neutrality', 252–4.
28. Golson, 'The Economics of Neutrality', 255–60.
29. Golson, 'The Economics of Neutrality', 260–2.
30. Golson, 'The Economics of Neutrality', 255, 294. See also Jari Eloranta and Ilkka Nummela, 'Finnish Nickel as a Strategic Metal, 1920–1944', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 32/4 (2007), 322–45 on the trade of strategic metals and resources.
31. Golson, 'The Economics of Neutrality', 292–3, 427–30.
32. Vilho Tervasmäki, *Puolustushallinto sodan ja rauhan aikana. Puolustusministeriön Historia II*, Sotatieteen laitoksen julkaisuja xvii (Hämeenlinna: Sotatieteen laitos, 1978).
33. Ilkka Seppinen, *Suomen ulkomaankaupan ehdot 1939–1944*, Historiallisia Tutkimuksia 124 (Tammisaari: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1983), 20–1.
34. See e.g. Ilkka Nummela, 'Kansanhuoltoa koskeneet ennakkosuunnitelmat', in Toivo Nygård (ed.), *Suomen sisä- ja ulkopoliittisia ongelmia itsenäisyyden alun ja toisen maailmansodan aikana: Jyväskylän yliopistossa kesällä 1980 pidetyn Historian Opettajien Täydennyskoulutuskurssin ja SUOMA:n seminaarin esitelmät* (Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopiston historian laitos, 1981).
35. Heikki Rantatupa, Heikki, *Elintarvikehuolto ja -säännöstely Suomessa vuosina 1914–1921*, Studia Historica Jyväskyläensia 17 (Tampere: Jyväskylän yliopisto, 1979).
36. Riitta Hjerppe Vappu Ikonen, '"The Only Honest Thing to Do"—Sotavelat, Suomi ja Hooverin moratorio 1931', *Kansantaloudellinen aikakauskirja*, 93/1 (1995), 11–20.
37. Jarl Kronlund, *Suomen puolustuslaitos 1918–1939: Puolustusvoimien rauhan ajan historia*, Sotatieteen laitoksen julkaisuja xxiv, Sotahistorian toimisto (Porvoo: WSOY, 1989), 529, 533, 541; Mark Harrison, 'Resource Mobilization for World War II: The USA, UK, USSR, and Germany, 1938–1945', *Economic History Review*, 41/2 (1988), table 5.

38. Sampo Ahto, *Aseveljet vastakkain, Lapin sota 1944–1945* (Hämeenlinna: Kirjayhtyma, 1980); Ilkka Nummela, *Lapin sodan hävitysten arvo*, Scripta Historica viii (Oulu: Oulun historiaseura, 1983).
39. Tuomo Polvinen, *Jaltasta Pariisin rauhaan*, Suomi kansainvälisessä politiikassa iii (Juva: WSOY, 1981), 62–3.
40. Mauno Jokipii, *Hitlerin Saksa ja sen vapaaehtoisliikkeet: Waffen-SS:n suomalaispataljoona vertailtavana* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2002).

CHAPTER 24

AXIS IMPERIALISM IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

SHELLEY BARANOWSKI

The Axis alliance of the Second World War, composed of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and imperial Japan, coalesced from a series of agreements: the Rome–Berlin Axis of 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1937, the Pact of Steel of 1939, and the Tripartite Pact of 1940. Its membership expanded to include the German and Japanese satellites Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Thailand. In addition to reflecting the globalization of great-power imperialist rivalries since Japan's victories in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–5 and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–5, the alliance embodied its members' dissatisfaction with the Wilsonian-inspired world order enshrined after the Great War. The Axis powers shared other characteristics that shaped their insecurities and ambitions, such as their late arrival as nation states and the rapidity of industrialization, social transformation, and nation-building. Axis leaders suppressed domestic enemies, beginning with the Left, and rejected liberal democracy as inimical to national cohesion. To achieve organic, harmonious nations devoid of conflict, they mobilized their peoples around common 'racial' identities while excluding those who did not conform.

The Axis exemplified a modern paradox: empires in all their diversity were the dominant form of political organization until after the Second World War, but the competition among empires from the French Revolution to the mid-twentieth century encouraged states to nationalize and homogenize their citizens.[1] Despite the challenges that anti-colonial resistance posed after the First World War, even to the victorious empires, imperialism was essential to the Axis. Empire offered the 'only' way to overcome the hardships of the Great Depression, the perceived subordination to Anglo-American liberal capitalism, and the threat of Bolshevism. Ultimately codified in the Tripartite Pact, the Axis claimed regionally defined autarkic trading blocs, which guaranteed abundant natural resources, outlets for exports and investment, reliable supplies of labour, and land for the settlement of surplus populations.[2] Imperialism was also the route to alleviating domestic divisions and creating the organic nation. For a time, the Axis nations successfully exploited the weaknesses in the post-war order, one of the purposes of which was

to preserve the western European empires. Yet the lack of coordination within the Axis, the self-defeating brutality it inflicted on subject peoples, and its inability to match the resources of the coalition against it, brought the Axis to ruin.

Fascism as Nationalization

When the Fascist leader Benito Mussolini became prime minister in October 1922, Italy became the first to pursue the aims that later typified the Axis nations. Having only become a territorial state in 1870, Italy's internal divisions and regional economic disparities posed serious obstacles to internal cohesion. Aside from pockets of industrialization in the north around Turin, Genoa, and Milan, the nation lagged behind its European competitors in its access to coal and other resources essential to economic and military power. Tenacious rural poverty and illiteracy, especially in the south, a weak state apparatus, and pervasive distrust of the central government in Rome, meant that Italy was united in name only. Its underequipped and antiquated military, the supposed 'school of the nation' that integrated regionally and socially diverse draftees, proved no match for its rivals during the First World War when in 1917 at Caporetto (Koarid in present-day Slovenia), countless Italian soldiers deserted or surrendered en masse to Habsburg forces.[3]

Although Italy sided with the Entente during the Great War, the liberal state struggled to manage the war's liabilities: inflation and crippling indebtedness, conflict between landowners and peasants, workers, and employers sparked by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and disappointment over the meagre rewards that Italy received at the Paris Peace Conference. Having switched alliances in 1915 believing that the Entente would grant Italy's claims at the expense of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy's modest payoff—the Tyrol to the Brenner Pass, Istria, and Trentino—inflamed deep nationalist sensitivities to the slights of the great powers and underwrote Mussolini's determination later to challenge the League of Nations.[4] In addition to frustrated nationalism, which was especially volatile in Italy's border regions, bitter social conflicts hastened the emergence of a new politics embodied in Fascism, the fusion of anti-liberal and anti-socialist populism, militant nationalism, paramilitary violence, and charismatic leadership. The assaults of the Fascist blackshirts on strikers won the support of employers and landowners and the tolerance of the state, but the Fascists also drew considerable backing from the middle and lower middle classes, peasants, and workers.[5]

As a movement that celebrated violence as virile and unifying—a lesson that Mussolini and his followers drew from their wartime combat experience—ruthlessness characterized Fascist interwar colonialism. The Fascists built upon the imperialism of the post-Risorgimento liberal state launched by an elite determined to will away Italy's poverty, underdevelopment, and its standing as the 'least' of the great powers.[6] Despite its humiliating defeat in 1896 by Ethiopian forces at Adua, pre-war Italy occupied parts of Somalia and Eritrea, and wrested Libya and the Dodecanese islands from the Ottoman

Empire before the First World War. It pioneered the use of aerial bombardment, mass deportations, and internment to quell indigenous resistance.[7] Yet the Fascists fetishized violence to rebuke the liberal state for having failed to 'make Italians'. It deployed poison gas in Libya and Eritrea, despite signing the 1925 League of Nations protocol banning its use. Its military engaged in forced marches and population transfers, and constructed miserably provisioned internment camps in its genocidal campaign against the Sanusi Brotherhood in Libya's Cyrenaica region.[8] In 1935, it invaded Haile Selassie's Ethiopia to avenge its defeat at Adua. Emboldened by the League of Nations' weak response to Nazi Germany, Mussolini committed Italy to the aggressive revision of the post-war settlement, backed by over 100,000 troops, extensive bombing, and the gassing of civilians.[9]

A surge of nationalism accompanied the Ethiopian campaign, seemingly completing what the Risorgimento had not achieved.[10] Subjugating Libya and Ethiopia also promised to resolve the most embarrassing evidence of Italy's poverty, the emigration of millions of Italians to northern Europe and the Americas. Merging colonialism and nation-building, the settlement schemes of the Fascists would have provided living space for millions of Italian peasants and workers, who otherwise would have abandoned their homeland, but inadequate financing undermined that goal.[11] Although by 1939, 130,000 Italians resided in Italy's East African colonies, that number was but a fraction of the Italian population of New York City.[12] Italy grew increasingly dependent upon Germany after 1935 once it withdrew from the League of Nations and joined Germany to support the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War. Because of Italy's rupture with Britain and France, Germany became a critically important market for Italian exports and a source of jobs for unemployed Italian workers.[13] Although mimicking the strategy of nationalist elites since unification to raise Italy's profile by allying with stronger powers, Italy's ties to Germany would bring worse consequences than its paltry gains at the peace table in 1919.

Economically and militarily stronger than Italy, Japan's emergence as a great power by the early twentieth century was more difficult to contest. Having remained aloof from the international order until the arrival of American gunboats in 1853, the Meiji era industrialization allowed Japan to escape the unequal treaties that the Western imperialist powers imposed on China. Japan's modernization paid dividends in its victory over China in 1895 and, even more stunningly, over the Russian Empire ten years later. Although the Japanese military suffered huge casualties in the Russo-Japanese War—a sacrifice of blood and treasure that justified calls for future expansion and forged a domestic consensus in favour of imperialism—Japan became the dominant power in East Asia.[14] By the First World War, the Japanese Empire included the Ryūkyūs, Taiwan, Korea, south Sakhalin Island, and control of the South Manchurian Railway, an asset that fuelled Japan's industrial and economic development of that territory.[15] After the First World War, Japan's attempts to build upon its wartime gains—which included the seizure of China's Shandong province and Germany's Pacific islands, and the occupation of Manchuria and Siberia—increased tensions with the Western powers, especially the United States. Japan's inability to win a clause affirming racial equality at the Paris Peace Conference and the ban on Japanese immigration by the United States, Canada,

New Zealand, and Australia exacerbated deep-seated Japanese sensitivities to Western racism.[16]

Internally, two agendas competed for influence. The first advocated universal suffrage to empower previously excluded groups, notably workers and tenant farmers. It also pushed for collective security, believing that cooperating with the Anglo-American post-war order and exploiting the precedents of international law would best serve Japanese interests. The second agenda rejected liberal capitalism and democratic reformism, and affirmed unilateralism and confrontation with the United States, Japanese hegemony over China, and continental expansionism. At home, it championed authoritarianism and the elimination of parliamentary power.[17] American economic support for the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-Shek, who promised to keep China's markets open, the multiple crises of the Great Depression, the collapse of global commodity prices, conflicts between landlords and tenants, and violent disputes between management and labour, strengthened the advocates of authoritarianism at home and confrontation with the West. The annexation of Manchuria in 1931, Japan's withdrawal from the League in 1933, and its assault on north-west China and the Chinese Pacific sea coast in 1937 signified the triumph of the anti-Western course.[18]

Debate persists over the extent to which Japan's military and bureaucratic leaders who led it into war were 'fascist'. Unlike Italy or Germany, Japan lacked a charismatic leader with mass appeal. No explicitly fascist mass party challenged the independence of the military and bureaucracy or, as in the case of Nazi Germany, subordinated both. Nevertheless, the deification of the Showa emperor, Hirohito, flourished in films, books, mass rituals, heritage tourism, consumerist displays at department stores, and in the construction of war memorials.[19] The cult posited the divine origins of the Japanese imperial line and the Japanese people, or the 'Yamato race', named after the place where Emperor Jinnu descended from the gods in 660 BC. In addition, fascism became compelling as the radical nationalist answer to the crisis of capitalism and social discord. It attracted intellectuals and a new class of technocrats in the military and civil administration, including the future general and prime minister Tōjō Hideki. They promoted militarily oriented state planning, the Taylorized refashioning of labour to eliminate class consciousness, and an enlarged empire that would destroy the 'plutocratic' and 'materialist' European empires in Asia. Expansionism and national integration joined the suppression of dissent with incentives, such as raising workers' wages and improving working conditions, to blend national integration and imperialism. Envisioning an empire that extended from Manchuria and the Yangtze valley in China, to Eastern Siberia in Russia, to Australia and India, and to the Pacific islands, Japan's conquests would ensure access to the resources to realize prosperity and a new hierarchical and functional social order.[20] This generation advanced utopian centrally planned and financed schemes, especially in Manchuria, where a projected 12 million Japanese farmers, exemplars of the superior 'Yamato race', would settle.[21]

As the answer to Germany's post-war economic and political crises, the National Socialist movement was the last to come to power, eleven years after the Italian Fascists and two years after the annexation of Manchuria. In the decade before the First World

War, imperial Germany had surpassed Great Britain as the strongest industrial power in Europe. Yet its insufficient resources, vulnerability to the Entente blockade, and the weakness of its allies brought about its defeat in the First World War. The Treaty of Versailles was not as harsh as Germans subsequently claimed.[22] Nevertheless, most Germans would have seen Italy's minimal reward at the peace settlement as a bonanza. Germany lost 13 per cent of its pre-war territory, including Alsace and Lorraine and much of the eastern Prussian provinces, which Frederick the Great had annexed in the eighteenth century. The peace settlement drastically cut Germany's armed forces, assessed huge reparations, and confiscated its overseas empire.[23] The French military, which included colonial troops from Algeria and West Africa, occupied the Rhineland until 1930. Together with the peace settlement, the 'black horror' on the Rhine encouraged Germans to see themselves as 'colonized' by the Entente. Although the Weimar Republic that succeeded the imperial German monarchy withstood the wave of right-wing putschism, political violence, and hyperinflation of the first five years of its existence, arriving at a brief period of stabilization afterwards, the Great Depression exacerbated management–labour conflict, demolished federal and state budgets, and undermined the legitimacy of parliamentary politics. Like the Fascists and the Japanese bureaucratic-military elite, the Nazis exploited the inability of liberal democracy to manage economic crisis and social conflict. The Nazis benefited from Germany's socially diverse electorate, attracted by the party's promises of a harmonious 'racial community' (*Volksgemeinschaft*), as well as from its conservative elite, who opted for Hitler as the German Mussolini who would break the back of organized labour and prevent a communist revolution.[24]

At minimum, the Nazis demanded the destruction of the Versailles settlement. Their long-term goal, an expanded 'living space' (*Lebensraum*) to assure Germany's biological and economic prosperity, was crucial to eliminating divisions at home. Like Japan, the core of the Nazi empire-to-be was Continental: eastern Europe to the Urals would become the equivalent of Manchuria, but unlike Manchuria, Hitler's version of settler colonialism rejected the assimilation of indigenous peoples. As Hitler remarked to the commanders of the various German army districts within days of taking office, the conquest of *Lebensraum* meant Germanizing the soil, not Germanizing peoples, who would simply be deported.[25] Hitler did consider a Central African empire after his armies defeated France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940, in part to satisfy the lobbies that yearned for the return of Germany's pre-war maritime empire.[26] But while the German victories in the west in 1940 and Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 enabled Japanese expansion into South East Asia, the failure of the Germans to defeat Britain in the autumn of 1940 ruled out a German equivalent. Regardless, an overseas empire was secondary to Hitler, who condemned the imperialism of the Second Empire as too 'bourgeois', too 'commercial', too focused on acquiring a 'blue water' empire, and too unmindful of the need for 'living space' in Europe itself to ensure the growth and racial vitality of the *Volk*.[27]

Like Japan and Italy, the Nazi regime developed diverse means to mobilize popular enthusiasm for an authoritarian and organic nationalism. Through youth organizations,

the labour service, the Strength through Joy leisure organization, the promotion of genealogies to prove Aryan backgrounds, many Germans acclimatized themselves to Nazism and all but ignored the lethal repression that the regime inflicted on its political and racial 'enemies'.[28] Rearmament-generated full employment, the restoration of 'order' against the Left, and Hitler's assault against Versailles reinforced approval of the regime. The Third Reich adhered to the principle that purifying the nation of its 'community aliens' was essential preparation for war and empire. For the first time, concentration camps, which the regime established during the first year of its existence to incarcerate socialists, communists, and other opponents, emerged on metropolitan soil to imprison metropolitan citizens.[29] The 'Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Progeny' of July 1933, which legalized the sterilization of Germans with mental and physical conditions deemed genetic, laid the groundwork later for 'euthanasia', the termination of 'lives unworthy of life'. The regime allowed the genetically compromised to neither weaken the *Volk* through procreation, nor even to survive until the end of their natural lives. Certainly eugenics attracted an international following. Yet its appeal to health care, criminology, and social policy professionals ran especially deep in Germany after the First World War, providing a foundation that Nazism further radicalized.[30]

Nazi anti-Semitism was even more menacing. The Third Reich targeted the mythical 'Jew' as the underlying source of Germany's misfortunes: the liberal, Catholic, and Social Democratic coalition that formed the Weimar Republic and signed the punitive peace treaty, Anglo-American finance capitalism that cramped German sovereignty and extorted reparations, parliamentary gridlock, and Marxist-inspired class conflict. Although appearing first in Russia in 1905, the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion'—the forgery depicting a globalized Jewish plot in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War—then spread widely to explain economic catastrophe and political disintegration, the Bolshevik Revolution and other leftist uprisings in its wake, and the British- and Zionist-inspired founding of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.[31] What became the Holocaust, the attempt to exterminate every Jew in German-occupied territory, emerged from the German invasion of the Soviet Union which commenced in June 1941. Yet well before the outbreak of the European war in 1939, the regime's dragnet against the Left and the spiderweb of anti-Jewish legislation that segregated, impoverished, and expelled Jewish Germans spoke once more to the Nazi integration of purification at home and war abroad.

Murderous Futility: Axis Imperialism in Wartime

The Axis could not accomplish its goals without war because its leaders valorized it as proof of their superiority and because the defenders of the post-war order would not yield their long-term imperial interests.[32] Having allowed Nazi Germany to remilitarize

the Rhineland, annex Austria, and dissolve Czechoslovakia, the British and French drew the line when Germany threatened Poland. Having challenged American interests in China and the Pacific, and aspiring to British, French, and Dutch holdings in South East Asia, the Japanese Empire confronted an American embargo that deprived it of crucial resources, among them scrap metal and oil. War was thus the 'only' alternative, even if over the long term, the strength of its enemies outstripped the ability of the Axis powers to win it.

The problems with the Axis war appeared first in Italy, which depended on Germany to deliver supplies and equipment that its own economy could not produce.[33] Yet the Fascists did not lack utopian ambitions because a new Roman empire would 'make Italians'. Between Italy's invasion of Greece in the autumn of 1940 and Mussolini's overthrow in 1943, Fascist leaders and intellectuals imaged a *spazio vitale* (the Italian translation of *Lebensraum*) that extended from southern France in the west, from Tunisia to Egypt in Africa, to Greece and the Balkans, and (finally) to Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Palestine. Yet Italy's relatively modest returns—small parts of metropolitan France, Corsica, southern Slovenia and south-western Croatia, the Dalmatian coast, Montenegro, most of Kosovo, western Macedonia, and a large part of Greece and its islands—exposed an unpleasant reality. Italy's gains resulted entirely from German initiatives: Germany's defeat of France in the spring of 1940, its intervention in Romania to prepare for the invasion of the Soviet Union (autumn 1940), its dismemberment of Yugoslavia, and its bailout of Italy's failed attack on Greece (1940–1). The Germans retained the most resource-rich territories and Italian occupying armies could do little without German authorization. Regardless, the performance of Italian armies, although at times not exhibiting (in the view of Fascist leaders) the virility that testified to racial superiority, applied methods used previously in East Africa, such as racial mapping and segregation, mass internments, populations transfers and expulsions, and wholesale reprisals.[34] The failures of the Italian military, which included its reverses in North Africa and Sicily in 1942 and 1943, led to Mussolini's overthrow.

By contrast, Japanese and German conquests were impressive and frighteningly rapid. By the end of 1942, Japan exercised formal and informal control over 350 million people from Korea, Manchuria, and parts of China, to the Solomons in the mid-Pacific, to the Burmese–Indian border in South East Asia, to the islands of Alaska.[35] By autumn 1942, the Nazi Empire extended from the Atlantic in the west to Stalingrad and the Caucasus to the east, and El Alamein in Egypt. Yet if more successful than Fascist Italy's fecklessness in Greece and its subsequent defeats in North Africa, the Japanese and German blitzkriegs betrayed a scarcely concealed dread that only a high-stakes knockout blow would defeat more powerful and better-resourced enemies. Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and South East Asia in December 1941 expressed the conviction that the egoistic and plutocratic America lacked the 'spirit' of the Yamato race and would wilt after one massive strike, discouraging the military to plan for what might happen if the Americans fought back. The absence of planning for anti-submarine warfare would come back to bite when American attacks on Japanese shipping undermined Japan's ability to feed its armies in the field and its population at

home.[36] Yet Japan's gamble also testified to the fear of being starved of resources, which would hinder its challenge to the liberal order. The context for the attack, the stalled Japanese invasion of China which drained it of fuel and manpower in the face of furious Chinese resistance, pushed the regime to attempt further expansion and further challenges to the United States to extricate Japan from its quagmire.

Similarly the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 commingled bravado and desperation: the racist overconfidence that the *Wehrmacht* could quickly defeat the Red Army and the foreboding that the military and industrial potential of its enemy would soon outstrip Germany's.[37] Although addressing the immediate challenge of a formidable enemy, the invasion reflected a long-standing tension in German nationalism: the aspiration to imperialist expansion and the simultaneous fear of annihilation by imperialist rivals.[38] Along with the *Wehrmacht*'s foreboding, the inability of the Third Reich to defeat Great Britain, the Soviet Union's moves to secure interests on its western borders, and the increased conflicts with the United States in the North Atlantic dictated a preventive war to destroy 'Jewish Bolshevism' before it could destroy Germany. As was true for Japan, an overextended Germany ratcheted up its brutal and exploitative occupations to meet the demands of total war, and increased resistance to Axis rule in turn.

Consistent with its claim since the Meiji era to political influence in Asia and guardianship of Asians against European predators, Japan sought to capitalize on the post-First World War surge in anti-colonialism.[39] In 1938, as the Japanese offensive against Chinese nationalist forces slowed, prime minister Konoe Fumimaro announced the creation of a New East Asian Order, the complement to the authoritarian 'new order' at home, as an ostensibly equal partnership between China and Japan. In 1940, the planned extension of Japanese forces into Indochina transformed the New Order into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to include South East Asia. Instead of the apartheid, exploitation, and subordination which characterized European colonialism, the Japanese promised equality and mutuality among Asians. In fact, the Japanese industrialization of Manchuria and Korea did depart from the customary European pattern of extracting resources and mobilizing indigenous labour. Its attempts to assimilate Taiwanese and Koreans, although episodic, derived from European practices in adjacent colonies, and although anything but benign, distinguished them from the Europeans' avoidance of similar approaches in their maritime empires.[40] Japan's success in defeating the European empires in 1940 inspired many South East Asians, such that attempts to restore European control after 1945 ended in failure. Japan found many willing to serve in its armies, staff its bureaucracies, and work on its farms and in its corporations.[41]

Japan's greatest successes in containing resistance occurred in Taiwan and Korea, where its control extended back to the nineteenth century. In Taiwan, its local administration had developed over time, integrating Taiwanese practices, values, and history. Despite meeting Japanese demands for food and labour, local administrators encountered less resentment than in recently acquired territories such as Indonesia. Even Taiwanese aborigines, who occupied the bottom rung of the colonial hierarchy, played to the metropole's advantage, when after their failed uprising against Japanese control, they volunteered to fight for the emperor to raise their status.[42] Korean entrepreneurs,

as well as Japanese settlers in Korea, flocked to Manchuria after its annexation to take advantage of business opportunities. Koreans fought for Japan to escape their colonial status and earn imperial citizenship. Although Japan refused to extend the political and constitutional rights of its citizens to colonial subjects, the relationship between the Japanese and indigenous peoples lay on broader foundations than repression.[43]

Nevertheless, consolidating Japan's wartime gains proved impossible over the long term. Institutionalizing the Co-Prosperity Sphere received little priority until the Pacific war turned against Japan in 1942 and 1943. Moreover, the plans for its implementation, the redirection of economies and labour markets to serve Japanese interests, the presumption of Japanese political and cultural supremacy, and the permanent subordination of native peoples belied the nostrums of equality and mutuality.[44] Horrific Japanese occupation practices provided the most egregious evidence. In 1937, the Japanese march through China's Pacific provinces, which reached the Kuomintang capital of Nanjing before the invasion slowed, became the picture of total war murderousness. Japanese troops left hundreds of thousands of Chinese dead and committed an equally countless number of rapes of Chinese women and girls, testimony to frustration with Chinese resistance and the sense of entitlement that permeated all ranks.[45] Supporting national liberation movements against the British, French, or Dutch carried little weight among Japanese commanders on the ground, whose armies provisioned themselves by stealing from the conquered or raising their own food, even in the inhospitable soil of the Pacific islands.[46] The extraction of raw materials and food to meet the demands of total war and the ruthless dragooning of labour eroded whatever goodwill the Japanese acquired after overthrowing the Europeans. What support the Japanese did extend to indigenous nationalists could bring disaster, as the dismal fate of the Indian Nationalist Army under the command of Subhas Chandra Bose makes clear. Having joined the Japanese attempt to invade India from Burma in the spring of 1944, thousands of his men starved to death or died of disease.[47] Even nominally independent Thailand chafed under ceaseless Japanese demands for manpower and food.[48] Wartime exigencies, the Japanese belief in their own superiority, and the unsettling dependence on local knowledge to negotiate unfamiliar terrain fuelled draconian occupations. To be sure, the Japanese never perpetrated a 'final solution'. Yet summary executions and exemplary punishments, mass killings of civilians, including patients and medical personnel in hospitals, mass incarcerations in concentration camps, medical experiments conducted on prisoners of war, the enforced prostitution of countless 'comfort women', and the cruel starvation and punishments of commandeered workers all became standard operating procedure.[49]

Having criticized imperial Germany for ignoring the biological necessity of expansion eastwards, the Third Reich first looked to interwar Fascist colonialism as a model. Contacts proliferated between Fascist and Nazi colonial experts, which included the SS (*Schutzstaffel*), the Nazi regime's avatar of European racial transformation. In addition to involving the SS *Reichsführer* Heinrich Himmler, exchanges included Konrad Meyer, one of the architects of the massive ethnic cleansing and settlement scheme, the General Plan East, drawn up in the spring of 1941 in preparation for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The Fascist militarization of the Italian population to create an organic, united

nation, its inculcation of a 'warlike spirit,' its brutal 'pacification' of colonial resistance movements, its imagined demographic utopias of peasant soldier-settlers, as well as urban reconstruction to segregate Italians from the 'natives', all proved attractive. What is more, such measures collectively differentiated Fascist colonialism from that of the British and French in that they were initiated, planned, and paid for by the state.[50]

Yet Nazism went beyond reinforcing racial hierarchies, privileging racial elites, segregating racial superiors from their inferiors, practising mass internments, and eradicating troublesome populations in regional pressure points. The German *Lebensraum* project in Poland and the Soviet Union annihilated populations, not just because of their potential for resistance but because, in contrast to Japan and Italy, which expected to govern as well as expel indigenous peoples, Nazism emphasized expulsion and murder.[51] Thus, SS planners counted on the death by starvation or disease of up to 30 million Soviets, whose food supply would be transferred to the Reich or to the *Wehrmacht* in the field, and whose territory would provide for future transplants. Up to 3 million Soviet prisoners of war died until military reverses in the summer and the autumn of 1941 required captive labour.[52] Nazi Germany became the most extreme evidence of the tension between nation and empire, seemingly collapsing the distinction between them by privileging homogeneity.[53]

To be sure, the SS aspired to recover traces of German blood in the east—the presumed legacy of the German migrations of the Middle Ages and the German presence in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire—thus contradicting Hitler's desire to Germanize land, not peoples. The infamous German Ethnic Register (*Deutsche Volksliste*), first introduced in the annexed Polish territories, and used to classify peoples according to their racial suitability, often relied on sociocultural as opposed to racial criteria to determine who would be expelled and who would remain. Frequently, the acute need for labour or simply the opposition to Himmler's interventions encouraged gauleiters to be flexible.[54] The SS campaign in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia to Germanize Czechs with the right racial characteristics and eject the rest faced similar constraints.[55] Elsewhere, SS proposals to restructure western Europe along racial lines and dissolve the existing nation states came to naught because of resistance from the foreign office, the *Wehrmacht*, and German business.[56] Yet there is an obvious point that tempers the significance of those qualifications: the Third Reich left behind millions of dead and unprecedented destruction.

The apocalyptic distinctiveness of Nazism plumbed even greater depths in the regime's attempt to destroy the Jews, which was most thoroughgoing in Poland and the Soviet Union, ground zero of German settler colonialism. The slowing invasion of the Soviet Union by mid-July 1941 was a turning point, for the frustration of SS mobile killing squads and the *Wehrmacht* with the resistance of 'Jewish Bolshevism' prompted both to murder not just Jewish men, but also Jewish women and children.[57] Moreover, the prospect of a long war placed a premium on diverting food supplies to the Reich and to the German military, which hastened the construction of the death camps in Poland that murdered most ghettoized Jews.[58] The Third Reich met with less success in rounding up Jews in puppet states, such as Vichy, or among allies such as

Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, where turning over non-native Jews to the Germans while keeping their own preserved a measure of sovereignty against German intervention. Regardless, the attempt to annihilate the Jews evolved into an empire-wide campaign extending across German-occupied or -subordinated Europe.[59] By comparison, the Fascist regime imposed racial laws upon Italy's small Jewish minority, not because of German pressure but because sexual relationships between Italian occupiers and indigenous women in Italian East Africa demanded renewed efforts to improve racial consciousness by banning 'racial mixing' in the empire and at home.[60] Callousness and (at best) opportunism defined the conduct of Italian commanders towards Jews in Italian-occupied Europe.[61] The Fascist regime did not hold back from marginalizing Jewish Italians, turning away Jewish refugees, or cooperating with Germans to deport Jews from the Republic of Salò where Mussolini ruled under German protection after his overthrow. Yet the persecution and elimination of Jews was not the priority that it became for the Germans.

German military reverses at Stalingrad and North Africa in late 1942 and early 1943 increased the pressure on occupied Europe to supply food, labour, and military hardware. That in turn increased resistance to the occupation and provoked Germany's allies to desert a sinking ship, examples being Romania and Hungary. Pushed by home-grown fascist movements and Germany's expanding hegemony, both joined the Axis after the fall of France. Yet mounting war-weariness resulted in the overthrow of the government of Ion Antonescu in 1943 and Romania's turn to the Allies. In order to prevent Hungary from withdrawing from the war in the wake of the Romanian decision, the Germans overthrew its regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy, and installed the Fascist Arrow Cross. While the German military kept Hungary in the fold, the costs of occupying a formerly independent state became a further drain on the Reich's resources. The SS and the Arrow Cross devastated Hungary's large Jewish community, who to that point had endured the Horthy regime's discrimination but had remained alive.[62]

Conclusion

Could the Axis have won the war? Had the Axis faced only Britain and France, it might have succeeded, although Italy would have survived only as a vassal of the Third Reich. Indeed the Japanese attack on South East Asia exposed the fragility of European control, such that with the fall of France, the Japanese negotiated their occupation of Indochina by agreement with the Vichy regime. The failure of the League of Nations to prevent Mussolini's attack on Ethiopia, the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, the annexation of Austria, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in 1931 irrevocably destroyed the interwar order. Because the Paris peace settlement sought to prevent the spread of Bolshevism as well as to contain

Germany, the fear of the Soviet Union contributed significantly to the reluctance to stop Italy, Germany, and Japan. It also hastened the conclusion of the Molotov–Ribbentrop agreements in August 1939 that kept the Soviet Union neutral while allowing Hitler to attack Poland.

Ultimately the vital interests of the two powers most responsible for the defeat of the Axis prevailed. The United States saw autarkic blocs as a threat to its global economic interests, and it would not allow Great Britain to fall, especially after the defeat of France. In mid-1941, the Third Reich tossed aside its alliance of convenience with the Soviet Union and attacked its former ally, threatening the latter's very survival. Even had the Axis had greater resources at its disposal, its lack of coordination strengthened its enemies. Stunned by the Molotov–Ribbentrop agreements, which allowed the Soviet Union to inflict a military defeat on the Japanese in Manchuria, Japan later concluded a neutrality agreement with the Soviet Union, which left the Germans to fight the Soviets on their own. Yet the German–Soviet war also meant that Japanese designs on South East Asia would entail two wars, one against China and the other against the Allies.[63]

Despite the catastrophic defeat that the Axis nations suffered, the length and destruction of the Second World War begs the question as to how the alliance survived as long as it did. Mussolini's removal in July 1943 by King Victor Emmanuel III and the Fascist Grand Council, which paved the way for Italy's withdrawal from the Axis, suggests some answers. Mussolini's popularity reached its height after the Ethiopia campaign, but eroded following the defeats in Greece, North Africa, and Sicily, and in the process exposed the shallowness of Fascist control. The military, bureaucracy, and the king had retained considerable autonomy since Mussolini's ascension, and could remove him when popular resentment at Allied bombing and the war's privations bubbled over. The Germans' re-establishment of Mussolini and Fascist radicals in the Republic of Salò in northern Italy may have tapped into Fascism's geographical and social roots and delayed the Allied advance through Italy but it could not conceal the failure of Fascist nationalization. Increasingly disaffected and apathetic, the primary commitments of Italians remained the family, the locality, and the Church.[64]

By contrast, Nazi Germany and Japan fought to the bitter end. Ironically, the very overextension of their empires—the result of military triumphs that eluded the Italians—sufficed to protect their homelands until early 1945. Japanese control of its northern peripheral territories, Korea and Hokkaido, prevented an Allied ground invasion, leaving the Allies no option but to fight vicious battles from one Pacific island to another before American bombers could reach the Japanese mainland.[65] Despite the relentless Allied strategic bombing of Germany, the Allied ground war to reach Germany's borders consumed unimaginable casualties, especially in the East where between January and May of 1945 alone, some 800,000 Soviet soldiers were killed or captured.[66] In the meantime, the food, labour, and resources of German-occupied Europe protected the Germans from the demoralizing shortages of the First World War. The refusal to negotiate an end to the war was equally important, and not just because the Allies insisted

on unconditional surrender. In addition to Hitler's determination to fight to the death, fanatical Nazis at regional and local levels, who had good reason to fear for their futures after an Allied victory, executed at will those suspected of 'defeatism'.[67] The Japanese military did likewise, pushing civilians to commit mass suicide rather than surrender and enlisting young men to fly kamikaze missions by playing on their patriotism and commitment to self-sacrifice.[68] Unlike Italy, where elites withdrew their support from the Duce, Japanese elites fought on until two American atomic bombs forced the emperor to surrender. In Germany, a group of civilian bureaucrats and officers attempted to assassinate Hitler in July 1944, but the plot failed, partially because of a misplaced bomb, partially because commanders assigned to take over government offices wilted under pressure. Otherwise, the *Wehrmacht* fought on to avoid the collapse of 1918, causing the deaths of nearly 1.5 million soldiers in the last three months of the war.[69] Having generally supported their leaders' war for empire and celebrated their victories, German and Japanese civilians simply struggled to survive. The Axis fusion of nation and empire-building exacted a high price.

Notes

1. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 1–11; Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2010), 565–672.
2. Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin, 2012), 282–8.
3. MacGregor Knox, *To the Threshold of Power, 1922/1933: Origins and Dynamics of the Fascist and National Socialist Dictatorships,* Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 106–9; Christopher Duggan, *Fascist Voices: An Intimate History of Mussolini's Italy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1–6.
4. R. J. B. Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Fascist Dictatorship, 1915–1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 277–306.
5. Alexander J. De Grand, *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany* (2nd edn, New York and London: Routledge, 2004), 17–18.
6. R. J. B. Bosworth, *Italy: The Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy before the First World War* (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
7. See Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller, 'Introduction', in Ben-Ghiat and Fuller (eds.), *Italian Colonialism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Nicola Labanca, 'Italian Colonial Internment', in Ben-Ghiat and Fuller (eds.), *Italian Colonialism*, 2–36.
8. Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, 'When the Subaltern Speak: Memory of Genocide in Colonial Libya 1929 to 1933', *Italian Studies*, 61/2 (2006), 175–90.
9. Angelo Del Boca, *The Ethiopian War, 1935–1941*, trans. P. D. Cummins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Nicola Labanca, 'Kolonialkrieg in Ostafrika 1935/1936: Der erste faschistische Vernichtungskrieg?', in Lutz Klinkhammer, Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, and Thomas Schlemmer (eds.), *Die 'Achse' im Krieg: Politik, Ideologie und Kriegführung 1939–1945* (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, and Zurich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010), 194–210; Alberto Sbacchi, 'Poison Gas and Atrocities in the

Italo-Ethiopian War (1935–1936)', in Ben-Ghiat and Fuller (eds.), *Italian Colonialism*, 47–56.
10. Duggan, *Fascist Voices*, 249–82.
11. See, for example, Federico Cresti, 'The Early Years of the Agency for Colonization of Cyrenaeca (1932–1935)', in Ben-Ghiat and Fuller (eds.), *Italian Colonialism*, 73–82.
12. Haile Larebo, 'Empire Building and Its Limitations: Ethiopia (1935–1941)', in Ben-Ghiat and Fuller (eds.), *Italian Colonialism*, 90.
13. Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy*, 396–430, esp. 406.
14. Frederick R. Dickinson, 'Commemorating the War in Post-Versailles Japan', in John W. Steinberg, Bruce W. Menning, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David Wolff, and Shinji Yokote (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero* (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill: 2005), 523–43.
15. Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2001), 5–6.
16. Mazower, *Governing the World*, 252–5.
17. Frederick R. Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), 239–58.
18. Matsusaka, *Making of Japanese Manchuria*, 347–87; Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 21–52.
19. Kenneth J. Ruoff, *Imperial Japan at Its Zenith: The Wartime Celebration of the Empire's 2,600th Anniversary* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2010).
20. On the appeal of fascism, see E. Bruce Reynolds (ed.), *Japan in the Fascism Era* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Alan Tansman (ed.), *the Culture of Japanese Fascism* (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2009); and especially Janis Mimura, *Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2011).
21. Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 482–3.
22. Sally Marks, 'Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918–1921', *Journal of Modern History*, 85/3 (2013), 632–59.
23. Hugh Strachan, *The First World War* (New York: Viking, 2003), 333.
24. Richard J. Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich* (New York: Penguin, 2004), 232–308.
25. Reinhard Müller, 'Hitlers Rede vor der Reichswehrführung 1933: Eine neue Moskaus Überlieferung', *Mittelweg*, 36/1 (2001), 73–90.
26. Klaus Hildebrand, *The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich*, trans. Anthony Fothergill (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), 96–100.
27. Jens-Uwe Guettel, *German Expansionism, Liberal Imperialism, and the United States 1776–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 161–232. See Hitler's critique of Wilhelmine imperialism in *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 126–56, and *Hitler's Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler*, ed. Gerhard L. Weinberg, trans. Krista Smith (New York: Enigma, 2003), 76–82.
28. Peter Fritzsche, *Life and Death in the Third Reich* (Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008).
29. Birthe Kundrus, 'Kontinuitäten, Parallelen, Rezeptionen: Überlegungen zur "Kolonialisierung" des Nationalsozialismus', *WerkstattGeschichte*, 15/43 (2006), 58.

30. Geoff Eley, *Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology, and the Ground of Consent in Germany 1930–1945* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 212.
31. Roberta Pergher and Mark Roseman, 'The Holocaust—An Imperial Genocide?', *Dapim*, 27/3 (2013), 44; Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate* (New York: Henry Holt, 1999), 33–56.
32. Mazower, *Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe* (London: Allen Lane, 2008), 576–81.
33. Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy*, 466.
34. Davide Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire: Italian Occupation during the Second World War*, trans. Adrian Belton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 144–83, 332–61.
35. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), xi–xii.
36. Ian Kershaw, *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940–1941* (New York: Penguin, 2007), 331–81; John Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 259–60.
37. Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 396–512.
38. Shelley Baranowski, *Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 4, 272–95.
39. Thomas W. Burkman, *Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914–1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 17.
40. Mark E. Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2009), 16–17; Ruoff, *Imperial Japan*, 177. On the Taiwanese case, see Leo T. S. Ching, *Becoming 'Japanese': Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 98–103.
41. Peter Duus, 'Introduction', in Duus et al. (eds.), *Japanese Wartime Empire*, xi–xlvii; Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, *Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), esp. 106–207.
42. Hui-yu Caroline Ts'ai, *Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), ch. 6; Ching, *Becoming 'Japanese'*, 133–73.
43. Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945* (Cambridge, MA and London, 2011), 355–402; Mark R. Peattie, 'Introduction', in Ramon H. Myers and Peattie, *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 29.
44. Dower, *War without Mercy*, 262–90; Ken'ichi Gotō, 'Cooperation, Submission, and Resistance of Indigenous Elites of Southeast Asia in the Wartime Empire', in Duus et al. (eds.), *Japanese Wartime Empire*, 274–301.
45. Honda Katsuichi, *Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame*, ed. Frank Gibney and trans. Karen Sandness (Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999).
46. Lizzie Collingham, *The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food* (New York: Penguin, 2012), 302–48.
47. Bayly and Harper, *Forgotten Armies*, 370–83.
48. Dower, *War without Mercy*, 262–90; E. Bruce Reynolds, 'Anomaly or Model? Independent Thailand's Role in Japan's Asian Strategy', in Duus et al. (eds.), *Japanese Wartime Empire*, 243–73.

49. Bayly and Harper, *Forgotten Armies*, 208–68.
50. Patrick Bernhard, 'Die "Kolonialachse": Der NS-Staat und Italienisch-Afrika 1933 bis 1943', in Klinkhammer et al., *Die 'Achse' im Krieg*, 147–75.
51. Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 307–98.
52. Christian Gerlach, *Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord: Deutsche Vernichtungspolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Zurich and Munich: Kendo, 1998), 11–53.
53. Pergher and Roseman, 'The Holocaust—An Imperial Genocide?', 46–7; Baranowski, *Nazi Empire*, 237–43.
54. Gerhard Wolf, *Ideologie und Herrschaftsrationalität: Nationalsozialistische Germanisierungspolitik in Polen* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2012), 191–342.
55. Chad Bryant, *Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and Czech Nationalism* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2007), 83–4, 139–78.
56. Ulrich Herbert, *Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft 1903–1989* (Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., 2001), 295–8.
57. Alex Kay, 'Transition to Genocide, July 1941: Einsatzkommando 9 and the Annihilation of Soviet Jewry', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 27/3 (2013), 411–42.
58. Tooze, *Wages of Destruction*, 513–50.
59. Pergher and Roseman, 'The Holocaust—An Imperial Genocide?', 48.
60. Duggan, *Fascist Voices*, 283–317; Michele Sarfatti, *The Jews In Mussolini's Italy: From Equality to Persecution*, trans. John and Anne C. Tedeschi (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 95–211; Michele Sarfatti, '"Autochthoner Antisemitismus oder Übernahme des deutschen Modells": Die Judenvervolgung im faschtischen Italien', in Klinkhammer et al. (eds.), *Die 'Achse' Krieg*, 231–43.
61. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, 362–407.
62. Christian Gerlach and Götz Aly, *Das letzte Kapital: Der Mord an den ungarischen Juden 1944–1945* (Frankfurt am Main; Fischer, 2004), 249–414.
63. L. H. Gann, 'Reflections on the Japanese and German Empires of World War II', in Duus et al. (eds.), *Japanese Wartime Empire*, 340–1.
64. See the summary in Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy*, 561–71, and Paul Corner, *The Fascist Party and Popular Opinion in Mussolini's Italy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
65. Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies*, 201–2.
66. Fritzsche, *Life and Death*, 290.
67. Ian Kershaw, *The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944–1945* (New York: Penguin, 2011).
68. Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 484–5; Emiko Ohnuki-Teirney, *Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
69. Michael Geyer, '"Endkampf" 1918 and 1945: German Nationalism, Annihilation, and Self-Destruction', in Richard Bessel, Alf Lüdtke, and Bernd Weisbrod (eds.), *No Man's Land of Violence: Extreme Wars of the 20th Century* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), 37.

Further Reading

Bosworth, R. J. B., *Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Fascist Dictatorship, 1915–1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005).

Duus, Peter, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Knox, MacGregor, *Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Mazower, Mark, *Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe* (London: Allen Lane, 2008).

Myers, Ramon H., and Mark R. Peattie, *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Tooze, Adam, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (London: Allen Lane, 2006).

CHAPTER 25

EVERYDAY LIFE IN WARTIME EUROPE

CHRISTOPH MICK

It is difficult to write about everyday life whatever the circumstances. There are myriads of different 'everyday' lives, all influenced by factors such as class, gender, age, race, profession, and location. Changes to everyday life are generally slow in peacetime, but in times of war circumstances can change rapidly. The history of everyday life looks at daily practices and how they were affected by structures, mentalities, and the political environment.[1]

Life in wartime Europe differed enormously—depending on whether people lived in war zones; whether they lived in cities, towns, or villages; whether their regions were occupied or not; whether they were the occupiers or the occupied; and what place they held in the 'racial hierarchy' of National Socialist Germany or the 'class hierarchy' of the Soviet Union. It mattered whether the territory in question was annexed directly by Germany, whether it was placed under civilian or military administration, whether local and regional administrations continued to function, whether the region had an agrarian surplus or a deficit.[2]

In this chapter I will be looking at the everyday experiences of Europeans during the Second World War. I will focus on the lives of those directly affected by the war, on persons living in countries which were occupied or directly involved in the war. Neutral countries such as Sweden, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, or Switzerland could not completely escape the effects of the war, but they were not exposed to the gruesome spiral of killing, suffering, and dying experienced by the populations in war zones.

There were also significant differences between territories which were occupied—whether by the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Italy, or their allies—and Britain, the only European state participating in the war whose territory (with the exception of the Channel Islands) was never occupied. The Soviet Union is another special case. On 22 June 1941, Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union and went on to occupy Soviet Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. Before the attack the Soviet Union was an aggressor, an occupying power, having previously annexed the Baltic States, Bessarabia, and

eastern Poland, started a war against Finland, murdered tens of thousands of people, and deported hundreds of thousands more.

All over Europe people faced similar challenges. People feared getting caught in military action or becoming targets of repression.[3] Life under foreign occupation forced Europeans to ask themselves the same moral questions. Complying with the rules laid down by the occupiers was necessary for survival. In the post-war period societies went on to recalibrate what was considered as collaboration and what was a tolerable compromise dictated by the wish to survive. But during the war, boundaries between 'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' behaviour were fuzzy and varied from individual to individual, from region to region, and from month to month. Working in an ammunition factory could protect a worker and her family from repression and starvation. Was this treasonable, as such work directly benefited the enemy? Was working in a coal mine more acceptable? But the occupier also needed coal. What of those persons who volunteered to work in Germany? Were they traitors? Under occupation many local women had sexual relationships with German, Romanian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, or Italian soldiers and officers. Were these women traitors even if this sexual barter helped their families survive?

I will not be discussing the everyday life of soldiers at the front or persons surviving in Jewish ghettos, in concentration, death, or labour camps, but will concentrate on how the civilian population outside the camps and killing fields experienced the war. I will be looking at four aspects of everyday life: the procurement of food and other daily necessities; working and living in cities and towns; the changing roles of families and the importance of networks; and the impact of terror, destruction, and insecurity on society. The main focus will be on territories occupied by the Axis powers. Everyday life was to a large degree determined by the policy of the occupiers which will therefore also be discussed. I will begin with some general remarks on everyday life in wartime Europe.

General

Poland was the first to experience what was to become, at one stage or another, an experience common to most Europeans. After the German attack the authorities ordered a general blackout. Street lights were switched off at night to prevent enemy aircraft from finding their targets. People attempted to prevent their windows from being broken during air raids by covering them with cardboard and tape. Sirens sounded in cities with good air-raid alert systems and the inhabitants hurried to find refuge in cellars, air-raid shelters, caves, or anywhere offering a minimum of protection. Air raids, shelling, and other military actions did not affect all regions and countries all the time but most Europeans experienced regular air raids over longer or shorter periods.

War disrupted public and private life. Reservists and relevant age cohorts left their families and reported to the conscription offices. Those remaining behind—the majority of them women—did not know whether husbands, brothers, fathers,

lovers, friends, or sons would ever return, whether they would return whole or mutilated and traumatized. The constant worry about loved ones was a universal experience.

The German attack on Poland was accompanied by atrocities against the civilian population. In the first few months approximately 54,500 Polish civilians (7,000 of them Jews) were murdered. Within the space of one year some 840,000 Polish citizens had been forced out of their homes in the western territories of the former Polish state annexed by Germany, with some Polish areas repopulated by German evacuees from the Soviet sphere of influence. Most Poles were 'resettled' in the *Generalgouvernement* or were sent to labour camps.[4] At the same time Germany and France carried out large-scale evacuations of border areas in their own countries. People were forced to leave their homes and find refuge with their families and friends living further away from the border or in temporary accommodation provided by the state.[5] These are only some examples of forced migration within Europe. During and after the war Europe was full of refugees, evacuees, prisoners of war, and displaced persons, which put pressure on housing and services.

Poland did not only suffer under Nazi rule. On 17 September the Soviet Union invaded eastern Poland and annexed it together with the Baltic States and Bessarabia. Both Hitler and Stalin targeted the political, intellectual, and economic elites of the Second Polish Republic.[6]

After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, German *Einsatzgruppen* and *Sicherheitspolizei* continued on a larger scale what they had been doing in the German–Polish war. Living conditions under German, Italian, or Romanian occupation varied, depending on the location and ethnic composition of the population. Life in western Europe was hard, but in eastern Europe the chances of survival were considerably lower. The death toll of the civilian population in Yugoslavia, Poland, Greece, the Ukrainian and Belarusian Soviet Republics, and in occupied Russian territories was immeasurably higher than in France, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, or Czechoslovakia—with the exception of the Jewish population. Jews or those considered by the Nazis as Jews were targeted everywhere, as were Sinti and Roma, homosexuals, the congenitally disabled, and the mentally ill, irrespective of age, race, or class. The majority of these victims finally perished in eastern Europe, on killing fields, in ghettos, and in the concentration, labour, and death camps set up by Nazi Germany and its allies.

The longer the war continued, the more the war caught up with the civilian populations of the Axis powers. British and American troops landed in Sicily and advanced northwards up the Italian peninsula. Mussolini was replaced in a *coup d'état* to be soon reinstated by the Germans. For one and a half years the Italian population experienced Nazi terror at first hand.[7] Early in the war British and later US bomber squadrons had already begun flying attacks on German cities and towns, but the most severe attacks occurred in 1944 and 1945. As a result many German towns and cities were razed to the ground. These air raids and 'firestorms' cost between 300,000 and 600,000 lives.[8]

Food

For all Europeans the first priority was getting hold of sufficient food. The war disrupted the economies of occupied countries. In Greece the 1941 harvest of stable crops was 15 to 30 per cent lower than before the war.[9] Money lost its value, local currencies were still in use, but their exchange rate to the German mark was unfavourable, further reducing the population's resources.

All over Europe food, clothes, tools, and household equipment were in short supply. Leningrad was at one end of the spectrum. The German blockade of Leningrad lasted for 900 days; it cost the lives of 1.1 million of the city's inhabitants, the majority of whom starved to death.[10] At the other extreme was Britain. Key food products in Britain were rationed but there was still enough to eat all through the war, even if the diet was monotonous and largely excluded dairy or meat products. Potatoes became one of the key nutritional staples. Yet people in Britain were eating more healthily than before the war as the share of vegetables in the diet increased. The limited availability of meat products, fat, and sugar had a positive effect on public health in Britain.[11]

But Britain was atypical. Hunger was a common experience for the majority of Europeans. Not all countries and not all classes of the population suffered hunger all the time. Staples such as flour, bread, potatoes, and meat were rationed but the rations changed considerably over time, and differed between countries and within countries. Throughout the war eggs were extremely difficult to get hold of, as the authorities diverted the crops used for chicken feed to human consumption. In cities and towns rationing meant that milk was only available for pregnant women, young mothers, and small children, and the milk provided was often skimmed or semi-skimmed. For many people butter was just a nostalgic memory and fat in any form was a rarity.[12] In France 'obtaining bread was a particularly difficult and complicated affair'. It was usually of poor quality and the quantities were insufficient.[13] In the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine bread was made completely of millet, sometimes with the addition of lupin, barley, and chestnuts.[14] In some French regions bread was replaced by potatoes as the main source of nutrition. In other parts of Europe people used anything remotely edible. In Kiev and Warsaw pancakes made of potato peels were considered a delicacy.[15] Cats and dogs disappeared in many cities, ending up in cooking pots. In certain extreme cases, for example in Leningrad, there were even incidents of cannibalism.[16]

The majority of Europeans rarely enjoyed the luxury of sweets or sugar. Jam was often the only 'sweet stuff' available. In some countries sugar could be replaced by saccharine. Coffee and other 'colonial' products were rare. Ersatz or substitute products for almost everything were created, and housewives became quite inventive at preparing meals using ingredients they would have considered inedible before the war.[17] In Germany *Milei*, made of milk protein, replaced eggs in cakes and noodles. *De-Pu-Me* was made of potato starch and was used in German puddings and soup powders.[18] In Norway housewives were advised on how to produce a soup from horse chestnuts. Tomasz Szarota

quotes a Warsaw underground newspaper describing the deterioration in the quality of food:

> Breakfast consists of rationed bread, which contains the highest percentage of sawdust which will still allow it to be baked, and of jam, whose ingredients, with the exception of beets and dyestuffs, are not known; black coffee, also made of beets, is sweetened with saccharine—that is what the first meal of the day looks like under German occupation.[19]

Food theft was common and was severely punished. But often there was no choice. Theft could be a necessary strategy for survival. In Warsaw black marketeers managed to bribe German officials and get hold of several freight cars whose contents were earmarked for German food factories. The cars contained turtles and for a few days Warsaw's black markets were swamped with turtles. In many households turtle soup or other turtle dishes brought a welcome change to the usually vegetarian diet.[20]

In most countries procuring food was the most time-consuming and important task and shaped people's behaviour and actions. In the hinterland women were in the majority. In the absence of young or middle-aged men it was the women who carried the main burden of providing and preparing food for their families as they continued to be mainly responsible for running the household and looking after their children. All of this had to be done after work. In the unoccupied zone of France in October 1941, a factory worker earned between 1,200 and 1,800 francs and the Vichy government subsidized a wife with two children with just 840 francs a month. These benefits were later increased but the rise was not in line with inflation. Women had to work to fill the income gap.[21]

Peasants

As a general rule peasants—as the producers of food—had it easier than urban populations. The state, the army, the inhabitants of the cities all depended on the fruits of their labour. Wealth drained from urban areas to the villages. In most parts of Europe peasants produced more than they needed for survival or to meet delivery quotas. Peasants took their surplus food to legal markets and black markets, sold it on to middlemen, or traded directly with visitors from urban centres who brought their valuables to the farms to swap them for food.[22] Peasants did not usually suffer hunger but there are exceptions to this rule. The occupiers lived off the country and troops requisitioned grain which was transported back to the occupiers' homeland. German *Ernährungsplaner* hoped that two-thirds of German troops in the East (*Ostheer*) would be fed from the produce of the occupied Soviet territories.[23]

The National Socialists ensured that Germans always had enough to eat by systematically exploiting the natural resources of the occupied countries, leading to hunger and mass starvation in large parts of Europe. In Ukraine and Belarus peasants were

sometimes deprived of food as soon as they produced it. This was not a new experience for these peasants. When the German troops arrived, many peasants were already undernourished and their homes destitute. In the 1930s 5 million (the majority of them Ukrainians) had died as a result of a man-made famine following the collectivization of agriculture. In the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine peasants had more food than under Soviet rule. Even in the Kiev region (although not in the city itself) access to food was better than before the war.[24]

In the occupied parts of the Soviet Union the Germans did not initially abolish collective farms. These farms were useful for controlling the peasants and getting easy access to the harvest. German *Landwirte* (agriculturalists) were sent to oversee production. But supervision was lax. After the war peasants remembered that it was easier to hide grain from the Germans than from the Soviets. It became easier 'to steal' (keeping at least some of the results of their own labours). According to Karel Berkhoff, peasants on farms in some regions of the *Reichskommissariat* worked hard, while in other regions they worked as slowly as possible, focusing all their efforts on their own small private plots of land.[25] But throughout the war Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants were better provided with foodstuffs than the urban population—and this was a major difference to the 1930s.[26] After the defeat of the Battle of Stalingrad the occupiers rethought their policy towards collective farms, and from spring 1943 in some regions peasants were allowed to distribute the land themselves. Privatization went hand in hand with stricter control of 'thefts' as the occupiers used machinery and tractor stations to exercise a tighter control over the peasantry.[27]

In Poland occupation initially also improved the market position of the peasantry. The prices for food in pre-war Poland were low. In the first two years of occupation the relationship of industrial products to agricultural products was reversed. The authorities paid prices equivalent to between 25 and 45 per cent of the very high black market prices. In the first two years delivery quotas were still moderate and the cooperative sector flourished. This improvement for the peasants ended in 1942–3 when the German authorities increased the delivery quotas all over eastern Europe. At the same time the terror increased, as any sabotage attacks, withholding of grain, and other transgressions were countered by carrying out mass executions based on the principle of collective responsibility.[28]

The urban population

The urban population was worse off. Inflation everywhere was high, and food prices on the free market continued to increase dramatically. Rationing was introduced. The official system only provided a percentage of the calories individuals needed to survive. In many countries under German occupation it was not possible to survive by relying only on the official rations. The exceptions were Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia where, in the first two years, the standard of living developed in parallel to that of Germany. In the Netherlands conditions were bearable (1,500 and

2,000 calories per person per day) until the spring of 1944, when rations dropped dramatically. The situation in Norway was more precarious. The worst-affected countries in western Europe were France and Belgium, but conditions there were still much better than in the *Generalgouvernement*, in Belarus, Ukraine, or Russia.[29]

In Warsaw the ration cards for 1941 allotted 2,613 calories to Germans, 669 to Poles, and 184 calories to Jews. During the war the allotted daily rations for Poles fluctuated between 600 and 735 calories.[30] Other sources give the value of ration cards in Warsaw in 1944 as 900 calories. In 1942 the cards in Lviv were only worth 600 calories.[31] Conditions in Belarus and Ukraine were just as bad (see Table 25.1).

Inventiveness was the key to survival. Urban populations took up gardening wherever possible, growing potatoes, cabbages, and other hardy vegetables. Public parks were turned into farmland.[32] People who had a garden (usually from the more prosperous classes of society) were considered lucky. Flower gardens were converted into vegetable patches.[33] Some people kept rabbits and poultry in their houses.[34]

Hunger in Greece was widespread as the country suffered under the blockade of the British and the population had to feed two—the Italian and the German—armies. There are many reports from June 1941 of German soldiers robbing passers-by in Athens of their valuables and stealing from houses. But such 'unauthorized requisitioning' occurred alongside depredations of the *Wehrmacht*, which did not hesitate to requisition anything they considered useful. Many units had their own 'specialists'—designated troops whose main occupation was to rob the local populations of food, means of transport, and often also valuables. Within three weeks after the start of the occupation 4,500 lemons, 25,000 oranges, and 100,000 cigarettes were shipped out from the Greek island Chios alone.[35] In Belarus troops requisitioned whatever they needed and even robbed the transports of the German agricultural administration. Officers and soldiers participated equally in plundering the country. Requisitioning, plundering, and the

Table 25.1 Maximum daily rations (from 4 November 1941) for Belarus and most of the *Generalkommissariat* Ukraine (in grams)

	Bread	Potatoes	Meat products	Fat	Calories
Workers	214	571	14	14	1,200
Schwerarbeiter [persons doing heavy labour]	285	714	28	21	No information
Non-workers	214	286	0	10	850
Jews and children under 14 years of age	107	143	0	5	420

Source: Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde. Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik inWeißrußland 1941 bis 1944* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999), 276.

destruction of property 'just for fun' were all part of the experience of local populations with the occupiers. Matters got so out of hand that the German authorities tried to put a stop to excess looting, fearing its potential to create unrest in the hinterland behind the front.[36]

But many amongst the authorities of the occupying powers were corrupt and it was often possible to find a way around restrictions. Black markets mushroomed and some people became rich. The prices on the black market in the Donbass region in December 1942 were between ten and thirty times higher than the legitimate prices.[37] Officially the occupiers were opposed to black markets but most of the time the markets were tolerated. From time to time the occupiers raided the black markets but they soon reappeared.[38] Many people traded on the black market; others set up businesses or traded luxuries with the occupiers.[39]

Many families in cities or towns only survived because they had connections to farmers or had peasant relatives.[40] In France peasants were allowed to send food parcels to their relatives in the cities. In memoirs many Parisians remember how the parcels from friends or relatives in rural areas saved their lives.[41]

All over Europe city dwellers travelled to the countryside, bartering, begging, and sometimes simply stealing produce—digging up potatoes, harvesting grain, and taking chickens.[42] Traders but also women, men, and children travelled by train, bicycle, or cart, very often also simply on foot to surrounding villages to beg or swap valuables in return for food. It was still cheaper to buy the food from local producers than to buy it on the black market.[43] But the food obtained in this way had to be brought back home and the risks could be high. Controls were set up at entry points to the city. People were devastated when they were deprived of the food they had acquired with such great difficulty. They were forced to return home empty-handed, with another day of hunger and despair awaiting them. Sometimes this could be the last straw and starvation was the consequence.[44] Tanja Penter quotes a city dweller from the Donbass region: 'Life was very hard, especially for women with children. In winter they went, whatever happened, to the villages, to barter for food.' Many froze to death.[45] The Germans tried to control the movement of people by issuing *Passierscheine* (travel permits). Such attempts at control were largely disregarded, but those caught risked their lives if they were found to be involved in illegal trading. The restrictions were introduced not merely for reasons of security but explicitly to prevent supplies for the urban population from entering the city through the black market.[46]

Famine

Many people not only faced hunger; they actually starved to death. In some areas and for certain periods of time the allotted calorie intake fell below sustainable limits and the result was mass starvation. The availability of food differed greatly between countries, between different regions within the same country, between the countryside and the cities. It could also change significantly over time, going from better to worse or the

other way round.[47] In Greece and Athens the winter of 1941–2 was the worst; for the Netherlands and Amsterdam it was the winter of 1944–5.[48] Not counting the deaths in the ghettos and camps all across Poland, around 500,000 people died from malnutrition and disease. Tens of thousands starved in Lithuania and Latvia; between 140,000 and 300,000 people died of malnutrition in Greece. People in western Europe were also starving but there were no famines. The only exception was the Netherlands, where around 86,000 people are believed to have starved to death in the winter of 1944–5.[49]

Conditions were even worse in the occupied Soviet territories. People starved in their millions. This mass starvation was intentional: Hitler did not only intend to exterminate the entire Jewish population and kill off a large percentage of the Polish population, he had also approved a plan to destroy 30 million Soviet citizens. This plan was directed against people considered to be living in regions where agrarian supplies were deemed insufficient or where Nazi population experts detected agrarian overpopulation such as central and north Russia and Belarus. The general urban population in the Soviet Union was also targeted.[50] Consequently the occupiers put the populations of big Soviet cities on hunger rations. In winter 1941–2 the occupiers set up patrols and controls to intercept food supplies meant for Kiev. The Ukrainian Red Cross and other organizations obtained food from the peasants but they were unable to get the food into the city. On 10 October, unemployed people were allotted just 200 grams of bread per week. Rations improved slightly over the following months to 700 grams weekly in May 1942, rising to 1,500 grams in August 1942, but this was still far from enough to survive. Survivors reported that the streets in Kiev were full of starving people begging for food or money. Hitler's plan of starving 30 million Soviet citizens to death proved to be difficult to implement. The German military feared revolts and increased resistance in the hinterland. Moreover, it was difficult to completely prevent food from being smuggled into the cities, where it found its way onto the black market. There were also complaints from the administrations responsible for running factories. In 1943, the food situation in Kiev had improved somewhat (not least because of the murder of Kiev's Jewish inhabitants) and more food became available.[51] Many people had starved to death but the death toll was nowhere near the figure intended by the Nazis, as a considerable proportion of the urban population had fled to the countryside. This murder through hunger was more 'successful' in other Soviet cities such as Rshev, Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv, and in Crimea. Between January and August 1942, the city administration of Kharkiv registered 11,185 deaths from starvation.[52] In the Donbass region with its coal mines—highly important for the war effort—the death toll from famine and hunger was considerably lower (see Table 25.2).[53]

Fewer civilians in the cities and towns of Belarus starved to death than in Ukraine, but this does not mean that the supply of foodstuffs was good or even adequate. Children in orphanages were starving and the streets were full of begging children. Furthermore, in Belarus the *Wehrmacht* arranged the mass killing of prisoners of war by starvation. By 1942 almost 500,000 Soviet prisoners of war had died, mostly from hunger. The population in the five biggest cities in Belarus dropped by 70 per cent (from 684,000 to 204,000) while rural populations in villages only decreased by 12 per cent. All in all, the

Table 25.2 Demographic development in occupied Soviet Ukrainian cities

	Population in 1939	Population in 1943*
Kiev	847,000	180,000
Kharkiv	832,913	233,200
Salino	462,395	148,507
Zaporizhzhja	289,188	120,000

Source: Penter, *Kohle für Stalin und Hitler*, 186–191.
* The figure for Kharkiv is for 1942.

population of Belarus decreased by 20 per cent during the war.[54] By the end of the war around 6 million Soviet citizens had starved to death.

Life and Work

Work

The war destroyed factories and interrupted established supply lines. Unemployment increased, but the German authorities soon began forcing the populations in occupied territories to work. People in cities were expected to register for work, usually in German Labour Offices. In August 1941 the *Reichsminister* for the occupied eastern territories introduced a law making work mandatory for all inhabitants between the ages of 18 and 45 years and for all Jews between the ages of 14 and 60.[55] The *Wehrmacht*, the SS (*Schutzstaffel*), and other Nazi institutions set up as entrepreneurs, establishing factories for which they recruited members of the local population. Workers in factories turning out products for the war were given more food and in Ukraine supervision in 1943 was sometimes less harsh than under Soviet rule. 'The significant autonomy notwithstanding, the risk of German intervention was always there.'[56] People working in German offices were also better off than the rest of the population. The biggest employer in many cities was the auxiliary administration, as the Germans had to rely on existing structures due to a lack of manpower. In Poland these administrations dramatically increased in size and offered a modicum of protection and access to food for members of the intelligentsia.[57] The situation was similar in Smolensk where members of the educated classes joined the administration.[58]

In agriculture and factories women, the elderly, and children took the places of the men. Women worked in all of the areas where men had previously worked, but most

women only remained in those jobs while there were not enough men available.[59] Having a job was necessary for survival but it was not always easy to get one. The German authorities issued labour cards in an attempt to control the labour market. A 'good' job could prevent someone from being deported to work in a labour camp or in Germany.[60] Overall, between 8 and 8.5 million people worked in Germany at some time during the war. In the beginning many people volunteered to work in the Reich, attracted by the tales of better food and higher wages in Germany; later many were simply deported as stories filtered back about broken promises and bad treatment.[61] German occupiers hunting down people for forced labour and subsequent deportation was a common experience.

Lack of essentials

It was not only the lack of food which cast a pall over everyday life. War disrupted life in modern cities and towns more than it did in villages. The urban population had got used to the permanent availability of electricity, to a central water supply, and to a functioning public transport system. In many parts of occupied Europe these public services could no longer be upheld, with dramatic consequences for daily routines. The quality of shoes and clothes deteriorated. All over Europe wooden shoes or shoes with wooden soles became a common sight as leather shoes disappeared from shops.[62] Clothes could not be easily replaced, and by the end of the war the inhabitants of even the capital cities of Europe looked shabby—at best. The occupiers also requisitioned warm clothes for the *Wehrmacht*. In many cases, especially in eastern Europe, rags were the only clothes left. Soap had also become difficult or even impossible to obtain.[63]

Winter brought more hardships, especially in eastern Europe with its Continental climate. Temperatures of minus 20 or minus 30 degrees Celsius were not uncommon. Heating materials were rare. Coal was extremely expensive,[64] and most of it was used by the German army. In many countries including Germany, public parks lost many or all of their trees. All over Europe in winter people not only tarved, they also froze to death because of the lack of heating or warm clothes. Again, this was more of a problem for the urban population than for the peasantry.

Time

The war also changed the experience of time. Queuing was one aspect many people remembered long after the war was over. 'As soon as the markets opened at five or six in the morning queues began to form, and women sometimes waited several hours on the way to work.' People adjusted the way they lived to be able to join a queue whenever necessary. Many hours or even days of every week were spent queuing.[65] In Kiev long queues formed in front of bread stores. One eyewitness reported that a long queue had already formed even though she had got up at 5 a.m. Waiting in the queue took many

hours and even then she could not be sure that she would receive her rations, as she was sometimes turned away and had to leave empty-handed.[66] It was an experience she shared with many other people in occupied Europe.

Living under Soviet occupation changed everyday life as well. In November 1939 Lviv residents were already being forced to participate in *subbotniki*—work without pay carried out on workers' days off for the benefit of the state. In December 1939 Moscow time was introduced to the region. People had to start work two hours earlier; Sundays became workdays. Both changes upset traditional patterns of life. People had to rise in the middle of the night to reach their workplaces in time.[67] Old church feast days and national holidays were replaced by Soviet celebrations. 'This completely unexpected change shattered the general rhythm of life, preventing the continuation of customs that had existed since generations, or ordinary, familiar, friendly, sociable contacts.'[68]

Another important change was the imposition of curfews all over occupied Europe. People breaking the curfew were severely punished. In Kiev the curfew in mid-October 1941 lasted from 6 p.m. to 5 a.m. People violating the curfew were shot on sight and the following day many corpses were found scattered in the streets.[69]

Space

War and occupation also changed urban spaces and disrupted public transport. In cities with trams or streetcars separate carriages were often reserved for Germans while the carriages transporting the local population were usually overcrowded. Cars were seized by the authorities, and taxis disappeared from the streets. In many cities bicycle rickshaws and horse-drawn carts became the common forms of transport.[70] In Kiev the (non-Jewish) population was allowed to use streetcars but Ukrainians or Russians were only permitted to enter them at the back. From 1942 on most streetcars were used to collect rubbish or transport specific groups of workers to factories. In Paris only a few metro lines were open to the public and then only at specific times to allow the population to get to and from work. In many occupied cities people had to walk to work and often spent hours just getting to work and back.[71] People walked, travelled in carts, or—in western Europe—rode their bicycles. In France the bicycle was a major means of transport. In 1942 there were 10,711,808 bicycles, up from 8,320,042 in 1939—despite many of them having been requisitioned by the Germans.[72]

In the cities and towns of occupied Europe the presence of the occupier was always felt. The best restaurants, shops, cinemas, cafés, and hotels were reserved for Germans. It was different in the countryside where the occupying forces were more thinly spread. Everyday life was less affected as interactions with the occupier did not occur on a daily basis.[73]

In many Soviet cities a considerable percentage of dwellings were destroyed, forcing people to find shelter with friends or to share their apartment with strangers.[74] In 1939 German bombing raids destroyed a large part of Warsaw. Initially the city population grew as many refugees arrived in the city, rising from 1.3 million to 2 million. Five or six

families often lived in a single room; cellars were transformed into flats.[75] Everywhere across occupied Europe the occupiers took the best houses and flats for themselves, creating German neighbourhoods and forcing out the local population. All of this contributed to the general housing shortage.

Family, Solidarity, and Networks

Children

In unoccupied countries everyday life still had a semblance of normality. Children attended school, people went to work, social life continued. But also in occupied Europe children adapted quickly to the extraordinary circumstances created by the war. Where they could, they played: war games, football, tag. In some cases children shocked older people as they played next to corpses.[76] Lucky were the children who had at least one parent or close relative who looked after them. Many children in cities, towns, and villages were left orphans. They roamed the streets, sleeping outside or sheltering in barns or ruins. In some areas they banded together and roamed the countryside in search of food. One relief worker in Greece worried about the 'psychological effect on the children' the 'atmosphere of fear and mistrust' would have.[77] Youth crime was a major problem, with thousands or even tens of thousands of children living on the streets.[78]

Solidarity

Historians cannot agree on whether war and occupation atomized society, with individuals only looking out for themselves or the interests of their closest family members, or whether the war strengthened solidarity and increased mutual support networks. Did the war make people more selfish or were people more prepared to show solidarity? The answer cannot be a simple yes or no. There are many examples of both types.[79] Solidarity and mutual support significantly increased the chances of survival. Those who had a network of friends and families on whom they could rely benefited. And there was also something approaching a national or ethnic solidarity, a willingness to help members of their own 'imagined community'. Examples of solidarity across ethnic, religious, or local boundaries were rarer. New arrivals and social outsiders generally had it much harder than 'insiders'. Refugees and evacuees usually suffered more than local populations. This was the case—on a different scale—in England and Germany as well as in France and Poland. New arrivals were often not well received as they were a drain on scarce resources and locals were often forced to house them. Refugees exerted additional pressures on housing and food supplies. In the town of Limoges the population increased within the space of just a few months from 92,000 to 120,000. The

population in the Limousin region of France experienced the Alsatian refugees—with their German accents and their German dialect—as different, but relations with them were better than with Gypsies or the Jewish refugees arriving in the region. Ultimately, Alsatians were accepted—as elsewhere in southern France—as French compatriots despite their accents.[80]

Compromises

It was impossible to maintain high moral standards and to refuse on principle to enter into any compromises with the occupiers. Everyone was forced to make compromises, even those who eventually joined the resistance. People tried to find a modus vivendi with the occupiers which would make it possible to survive. In western Europe this approach usually worked. Refraining from active resistance paid off and made survival likely, while in eastern and southern Europe many more people were killed in acts of collective retribution or just starved to death. In those regions collaboration did not necessarily protect the collaborator.

There are always people who make use of opportunities offered by the occupiers. All over Europe people profited from the suffering of Jews, took their flats and property, denounced Jews to the German authorities for rewards, or joined the auxiliary police. While such people helped Nazi Germany implement its murderous plans, the 'collaboration' of the majority of the population was much more limited. But the compromises required to survive could bring such 'collaborators' into conflict with the 'national' resistance and patriotic values. It was often very hard to survive without violating the 'norms' of one's own group.[81] Some Soviet workers tried to defend their factories, machines, and mines from destruction when the Red Army withdrew in the summer of 1941 in the expectation that this would allow them to continue working under German occupation and would guarantee their own survival and the survival of their families.[82]

In eastern Europe collaboration did not pay off. This was one of the reasons for the strength of the resistance movement in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Greece as well as in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. The extent of collaboration has long been problematic for national historiographies which focus on resistance. In many countries resistance to the Axis powers played an important role in national narratives. Everyday life is less glamorous, made messy by the necessary accommodation and compromises.[83] But was a woman who brought her children through the war by prostituting herself or working herself half to death or giving her rations to her children any less heroic than a man blowing up a railway line or attacking a German depot?

After the retreat of the Germans French society ostracized all women who had had sexual contact with Germans. This affected women who had bartered sexual favours to survive or to secure the survival of their families and women who had had love relationships with German soldiers. There are many reports of women having their heads shaved and being publicly humiliated or beaten. They served as collective scapegoats for collaboration. French society penalized one form of 'compromise' reached with

the occupiers—sexual barter—although other forms of compromise—working for the German war effort or helping Germans administer the country or hunting down Jews or other targets of the German terror—were seen as less problematic.

France was not an exceptional case. All over Europe women bartered sexual favours for food and to obtain protection for themselves and their children.[84] There were many opportunities to enter into sexual relationships not only with occupiers but also with prisoners of war and forced labourers. The 'nation' denied women the ownership of their bodies. National societies had clear ideas about what was permissible and what was not. Women who transgressed these boundaries were ostracized, punished, scapegoated.[85] This also applied to German women who had sexual relationships with—for example—Polish prisoners of war or *Ostarbeiter* (eastern workers) in Germany. The information service of the (illegal) Social Democratic Party of Germany reports on an incident in early 1940 where a married woman was sentenced to five years in prison for having a relationship with a Polish prisoner of war.[86]

Terror, Destruction, and Insecurity

The war brought a feeling of insecurity. There was not only the possibility of being killed in the shelling, in an air raid, or through gunfire. The blackouts at night made staying outside after sunset more dangerous. People breaking the curfew not only ran the risk of being arrested by soldiers or the police who patrolled the streets, but they also risked being attacked by criminals.

German and Soviet occupation policies created numerous regulations, and any violations of regulations could be severely punished, with mistreatment or death a probable outcome. Any infractions could be followed by deportation to a labour camp or execution.[87] But nobody came through the war without breaking the rules. There were too many rules, too many restrictions, and for many people breaking rules was an act of low-key everyday resistance.

People lived in omnipresent fear of being taken hostage and being executed in retribution for acts of resistance, or of being sent to a concentration camp or hanged for 'theft'—a theft which was sometimes no more than stealing a few potatoes from a field—or of being 'kidnapped' and sent to Germany for work.

Across large swathes of Europe, resistance was limited as long as the *Wehrmacht* continued victorious. After Stalingrad many more people joined resistance movements. They were most significant in the countries which had suffered most under occupation, with the strongest resistance movement being in Belarus, followed by Yugoslavia, Poland, and Greece. Even in Poland no more than 6–8 per cent of the population were ever actively involved in acts of armed resistance but the percentage of the population supporting them was much larger.[88]

Instead of reducing them, increased repression and acts of collective retribution strengthened the resistance movements in southern and eastern Europe.[89] Pressure by

the occupiers often forced the population to give up their passivity and make a decision—resistance or collaboration—especially towards the end of the war.[90] In Ukrainian Chyhyryn one woman made a vulgar gesture at a German officer who was demanding butter. The officer hanged the woman from a nearby tree. In Belarus and Ukraine villages were collectively punished and public hangings were common. Such acts did not make people more compliant to German demands, but instead led to increasing numbers of peasants joining the resistance.[91]

From a national perspective resistance was heroic, but from the perspective of the local communities it was often seen as irresponsible as the assassination of German officers, soldiers, and officials usually led to collective reprisals, the execution of hostages from the local population, and, in some cases in western Europe and in many cases in eastern Europe, the destruction of whole villages and the murder of all the inhabitants.[92]

In Greece fear of 'random arrest or execution by German troops disrupted the working routine of men in the provinces'. As in Poland and the occupied Soviet territories 'good' behaviour was not protection against repression. This motivated many people to go underground.[93] In Poland the underground state, with its highly developed organization, tried to maintain a form of Polish statehood with an underground judicial system, police, army, schools, and universities. It also offered employment to members of the intelligentsia.[94]

Conclusion

Between 1939 and 1945 Europe lived through the worst period of its history. The Second World War was a total war, mobilizing and victimizing civilians and soldiers. It is not that previous wars did not devastate countries but these wars had been more limited spatially if not temporally. In the First World War soldiers perished in their millions but 'collateral damage' was limited. With the notable exception of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire, deliberate mass killings of civilians did not occur. Civilians starved to death or died of disease but not to the extent that occurred in the Second World War. Again there is one exception—the flu pandemic of 1918–20 also hit Europe. About 250,000 people in Britain died and 400,000 in France. In the Second World War, the civilian death toll in eastern Europe was close to or even exceeded that of soldiers (see Table 25.3).

Subjective suffering cannot be measured just by looking at statistics. Nazi rule was most terrible in Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. People living in these countries were not only exposed more to terror and mass crimes but their living standard was also much lower than in western Europe.

Everyday life in wartime is per se extraordinary but there are still daily routines. Some of them do not differ much from those in peacetime, others have to be adapted to the new conditions, and yet others are completely new. Without black markets, without travelling to the countryside and bartering consumer goods, jewellery, furniture, or whatever valuables people possessed for food, even more people would have starved.[95]

Table 25.3 Civilian population losses in the Second World War

	Number of losses	Losses as percentage of total population
Poland	6,000,000 including 3,000,000 Jews	19
Soviet Union (occupied and unoccupied Soviet territory)	17,000,000 to 20,300,000	8.6–10.3
Germany (in borders of 1937)	2,000,000 plus 1,260,000 Germans in eastern territories	6
Yugoslavia	581,000*	4.1
Greece	300,000	3.4
Czechoslovakia	415,000	2.8
Netherlands	200,000	2.2
France	600,000	1.5
Italy	410,000	0.95
Belgium	60,000	0.7
Denmark	4,400	0.1

Source: Numbers (except for the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) are from Robert Gildea et al., 'Introduction', in Gildea et al. (eds.), ***Surviving Hitler and Mussolini***, 2. The actual number of Soviet civilian victims is not known. The numbers referring to Soviet civilian casualties are based on Steven Rosefielde, ***Red Holocaust*** (London: Routledge, 2009), 72.* Historians still use the number of 1,700,000 war dead. This number was given by the Yugoslav government soon after the Second World War. According to new research the number of Yugoslav casualties was rather 1,014,00 (581,000 of them civilians). *Yugoslavia—Manipulations with the Number of Second World War Victims* (Zagreb: Croatian Information Centre, 1992), <http://www.hic.hr/books/manipulations/index.htm>, last accessed 5 February 2015.

The Second World War atomized society and corrupted moral standards in human relations.[96] This is, however, only one side of the coin; on the other side there was a solidarity which, for most people, focused on a core group of people consisting of family and close friends. The war could weaken society but it could also strengthen the coherence of society. Everyday life in occupied Europe had many faces.

Notes

1. Alf Lüdtke (ed.), *The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life*, trans. William Templer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Detlev J. K. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life*, trans. Richard Deveson (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).

2. For a more detailed discussion, see Robert Gildea et al., 'Introduction', in Gildea, Olivier Wieviorka, and Anette Warring (eds.), *Daily Life in Occupied Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 2006), 1–4.
3. Tomasz Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy* (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1995), 6.
4. Wlodzimierz Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2010), 193.
5. Shannon L. Fogg, *The Politics of Everyday Life in Vichy France: Foreigners, Undesirables, and Strangers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 119–30.
6. Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens*, 194–7.
7. Richard Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Dictatorship* (London: Allen Lane, 2005); Gerhard Schreiber, *Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen in Italien: Täter, Opfer Strafverfolgung* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1996); Kerstin von Lingen, *Kesselrings letzte Schlacht* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004).
8. Jörg Friedrich, *Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940–1945* (Rheda-Wiedenbrück: RM Buch-und-Medien-Vertrieb, 2003); Richard Overy, *The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe 1940–1945* (New York: Viking, 2014).
9. Mark Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–1944* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 26.
10. Jörg Ganzenmüller, *Das belagerte Leningrad 1941 bis 1944: Die Stadt in den Strategien von Angreifern und Verteidigern* (2nd edn, Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007), 254; Brian Moynahan, *Leningrad: Siege and Symphony* (London: Quercus Editions Ltd, 2013); first-hand account in *The Diary of Lena Mukhina: A Girl's Life in the Siege of Leningrad*, trans. Amanda Love Darragh (London: Macmillan, 2015).
11. Harold L. Smith, *Britain in the Second World War: A Social History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 7.
12. Eyewitness account in Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Sopade) 1934–*1940,* Vol. VII (1940; Salzhausen: Verlag Petra Nettelbeck, 1980), 53–4.
13. Hanna Diamond, *Women and the Second World War in France, 1939–1948: Choices and Constraints* (London: Longman, 1999), 52–3.
14. Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 171.
15. For example, in winter 1941/2 in Kiev: Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 171. For Warsaw: Tomasz Szarota, *Warschau unter dem Hakenkreuz: Leben und Alltag im besetzten Warschau 1.10.1939 bis 31.7.1944*, trans. Claudia Makowski and Ryszard Makowski (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1985), 132.
16. Anna Reid, *Leningrad: The Epic Siege of World War II, 1941–1944* (New York: Walker and Co., 2011), 285–8; Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941–1995* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 238.
17. Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 38.
18. Eyewitness account in *Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Sopade)*, vii. 64. On *ersatz* in France, see Diamond, *Women*, 61–2. On surrogates, see also Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 39, 131.
19. Szarota, *Warschau unter dem Hakenkreuz*, 131.
20. Szarota, *Warschau unter dem Hakenkreuz*, 124.

21. Diamond, *Women*, 20–4.
22. Fogg, *Politics of Everyday Life*, 27–9.
23. Christian Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrußland 1941 bis 1944* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999), 253–65.
24. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 127–31; Tanja Penter, *Kohle für Stalin und Hitler: Arbeiten und Leben im Donbass 1929 bis 1953* (Essen: Klartext, 2010), 192–3.
25. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 131–3.
26. Penter, *Kohle für Stalin und Hitler*, 185.
27. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 138–9.
28. Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens*, 229–31.
29. Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 31; Vojtech Mastny, *The Czechs under Nazi Rule: The Failure of National Resistance, 1939–1942* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 80–5; Werner Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation, 1940–1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963), 79.
30. Szarota, *Warschau unter dem Hakenkreuz*, 113.
31. Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens*, 220.
32. For Warsaw, see Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 31.
33. For Warsaw, see Szarota, *Warschau unter dem Hakenkreuz*, 134–5.
34. Polymeris Voglis, 'Surviving Hunger: Life in the Cities and the Countryside During the Occupation', in Gildea et al. (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini*, 16–41.
35. Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece*, 23–4.
36. Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde*, 261–3.
37. Penter, *Kohle für Stalin und Hitler*, 194.
38. Szarota, *Warschau unter dem Hakenkreuz*, 118–30.
39. Voglis, 'Surviving Hunger', 16–41.
40. Laurie R. Cohen, *Smolensk under the Nazis: Everyday Life in Occupied Russia* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2013), 70.
41. Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 34.
42. For Ukraine: Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 181. For France: Fogg, *Politics of Everyday Life*, 51.
43. Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 34.
44. Diamond, *Women*, 58; Penter, *Kohle für Stalin und Hitler*, 193.
45. Penter, *Kohle für Stalin und Hitler*, 193.
46. Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde*, 219.
47. For more on this, see Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 34.
48. Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 65.
49. Voglis, 'Surviving Hunger', 16–41.
50. Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde*, 51–2.
51. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 170–86.
52. Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde*, 289–90.
53. Penter, *Kohle für Stalin und Hitler*, 186–8.
54. Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde*, 51, 289–92, 423.
55. Penter, *Kohle für Stalin und Hitler*, 180.
56. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 155–6.
57. Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens*, 200, 227.
58. Cohen, *Smolensk under the Nazis*, 64.

59. Diamond, *Women*, 47.
60. For Kiev, see Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 144–5.
61. Penter, *Kohle für Stalin und Hitler*, 199–201.
62. For France, see Diamond, *Women*, 63. For Warsaw, the Netherlands, and Paris, see Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 73.
63. Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 76–8; Szarota, *Warschau unter dem Hakenkreuz*, 143–53.
64. Szarota, *Warschau unter dem Hakenkreuz*, 159.
65. Diamond, *Women*, 54–5.
66. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 170–1.
67. Grzegorz Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie 1939–1944: Życie codzienne* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 2000), 65–6, 144.
68. Kazimierz Żygulski, *Jestem z lwowskiego etapu* (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy PAX, 1994), 117; Christoph Mick, *Kriegserfahrungen in einer multiethnischen Stadt: Lemberg 1914–1947* (Wiesbaden: Böhlau, 2010), 446.
69. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 147.
70. Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 95–7.
71. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 146; Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 91.
72. Diamond, *Women*, 58; Penter, *Kohle für Stalin und Hitler*, 193.
73. Szarota, *Warschau unter dem Hakenkreuz*, 251–7; Cohen, *Smolensk under the Nazis*, 68.
74. For Kiev, see Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 142–3.
75. Szarota, *Warschau unter dem Hakenkreuz*, 154–62.
76. Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece*, 186.
77. As quoted in Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece*, 185.
78. Penter, *Kohle für Stalin und Hitler*, 219.
79. Bernhard Chiari, *Alltag hinter der Front: Besatzung, Kollaboration und Widerstand in Weißrußland 1941–1944* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1998). Also discussed in Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 141.
80. Fogg, *Politics of Everyday Life*, 21–3, 56–75, 119–130, 140–2; Diamond, *Women*, 2.
81. Robert Gildea, Dirk Luyten, and Juliane Fürst, 'To Work or Not to Work?', in Gildea et al. (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini*, 42–87.
82. Penter, *Kohle für Stalin und Hitler*, 180–1.
83. See also Gildea et al., 'Introduction', 5.
84. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 182.
85. Anette Warring, 'Intimate and Sexual Relations', in Gildea et al. (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini*, 88–128.
86. Eyewitness account in *Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Sopade)*, vii (1940), 101.
87. Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 98–106.
88. Szarota, *Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy*, 55.
89. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 131–3.
90. Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde*, 214.
91. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 134.
92. Geraldien Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, 'Resistance, Reprisals, Reactions', in Gildea et al. (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini*, 177–205; Robert Gildea, *Marianne in Chains: In*

Search of the German Occupation of France 1940–1945 (London: Macmillan, 2002), 245.

93. Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece*, 185.
94. Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens*, 230–3.
95. On barter and the importance of black markets in France, see Diamond, *Women*, 58–9.
96. Jan Tomasz Gross, *Polish Society under German Occupation: The Generalgouvernement, 1939–1944* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).

CHAPTER 26

THE HOLOCAUST IN EUROPEAN HISTORY

MARK ROSEMAN

The Question of the Century

The Holocaust is the term now most commonly used to describe the Nazi genocide of European Jews.[1] Between 1939 and 1945 mass shootings, gassing in specially constructed extermination camps, murderous labour, starvation in ghettos, and other measures resulted in the deaths of between 5.1 and 6.2 million Jews. The Nazis themselves referred to their anti-Jewish measures as the 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question'. At first this verbal formula did not necessarily mean outright murder, but evolved through various plans for the expulsion and territorial concentration of European Jewry. Certainly by the end of 1941 it had become a euphemism for a programme of extermination that sought to eliminate some 11 million Jews. The Jewish genocide was the most comprehensive, systematic, and unrelenting element of the Nazis' exterminatory goals that was actually implemented. Yet the Nazis targeted many other groups too, killing, directly or through neglect, millions of Polish and Soviet civilians, Soviet prisoners of war (POWs), Roma, and the mentally and physically handicapped (homosexuals were viciously persecuted but not the subject of mass killings). The projected territorial cleansings for future settlement in Poland and on Soviet territory, if realized, would undoubtedly have entailed murdering even larger numbers.

Ever since victims and other contemporaries first began to grapple with the enormity of what was happening, we have had difficulty making sense of the Nazi war against the Jews. Every grand project in history aspiring to the mass murder of other human beings has provoked consternation and examination, but none has given rise to the profound reflection among historians, philosophers, moral theorists, and the European and North American public that followed the Holocaust. The unprecedented attention has produced great works of literature, philosophy, and social analysis, and has shaped our understanding of the modern world. It has not, however, led to consensus on the Holocaust's causes, character, or implications. Indeed, the sheer volume of texts now constitutes almost a hindrance to our understanding.

One influential strand of writing on the Holocaust in fact questioned whether we could ever hope to understand it.[2] Even while the events were unfolding, many victim diaries written *in extremis* explicitly discussed the impossibility of conveying what was happening around them.[3] By now, sophisticated reflection on the problem of representing the past, much of it provoked by the Holocaust, has influenced the historical discipline as a whole.[4] As a result scholars have grown impatient with the idea of the Holocaust as a unique blind spot and believe it to be as open to human understanding as other challenging historical phenomena.[5] Nonetheless, we are left with a number of profound and interrelated questions on which observers continue to disagree.

The first is whether the post-war construct of the 'Holocaust' (as against the undisputable fact of the murder of millions of Jews by gas and shootings) obscures more than it reveals by differentiating one aspect of a more comprehensive body of Nazi policies. In the post-war Nuremberg trials Nazi actions against Jews were simply one element in a litany of Nazi crimes. Until well into the 1970s, English- and German-language historians of the Nazi period gave the Holocaust little separate attention if they mentioned it at all. It was simply the most irrational of the disastrous consequences of the key historical fact demanding explanation: that a wild, brutish, rabidly nationalist, and racist party had come to power in 1933. Only since the 1980s has the vanishing point on the historical canvas, as one historian put it, definitively shifted from '1933' to '1941', that is, to the year in which genocide crystallized into policy.[6] It is fair to say that for a long time many German and Anglo-Saxon historians failed to recognize the enormity of the Holocaust. Nowadays, however, when the Holocaust's distinctness as a separate phenomenon is challenged, it is because the impulses and ideas that led to it are seen as part of something on an even more horrific scale. Scholars of Nazi planning and territorial settlement have argued that the murder of Jews was merely a down payment on a truly gargantuan plan of territorial cleansing, reorganization, and settlement planned for eastern Europe.[7] Other historians have drawn attention to the Nazis' comprehensive racial agenda at home and abroad, of which again anti-Jewish measures are seen as just one lethal instalment.[8] Even if good reasons remain to see the war against the Jews as more than just a subset of a larger enterprise, it is clear at the very least that the Holocaust must always be considered with an eye to other contexts of murderous social engineering.

For many observers, and this has been true particularly since the 1960s, the special status of the Holocaust is a given. The issue has been whether and how to connect so singular a phenomenon to the more general characteristics of the modern world. In other words, was the Holocaust in the end somehow embedded in larger phenomena or processes? Whilst the first impulse of the post-war world was to marginalize the Holocaust as a horrific anomaly, there were, from the start, observers who felt that it raised profound questions about human progress and civilization.[9] More than other modern mass violence the Holocaust has raised questions about modernity, partly because Germany, a source of culture, knowledge, and skilled manufacture, had long epitomized civilization and intellectual sophistication. What is more, the Jewish genocide clearly depended on planning, bureaucracy, the division of labour, industrial machinery, telegraph and

telephone, rail and truck, and other trappings of modern society; its iconic invention—the extermination camp—chillingly repurposed the technology and practices of factory production to the task of murdering human beings, extracting value from their bodies, and incinerating them. All this cried out for meaning. In response historians and social scientists offered a wide variety of broader contexts in which to place the Holocaust as, for example, totalitarianism,[10] modernity per se,[11] imperialism,[12] anti-Semitism,[13] or comparative genocide.[14] But the task of reconciling the singular shock that the Holocaust has occasioned, and the evident links between it and other features and happenings in the modern world, continues to be a challenging one.

This search for the Holocaust's relationship to the modern world shades into another key debate which has exercised scholars in recent decades, namely how it compares with other examples of mass violence.[15] In recent times scholars have not only grown impatient with the idea that the Holocaust is hidden within a 'sacred sanctum' of inaccessible reality, but also come to see an untenable moral claim in the idea that the Holocaust is unique.[16] But if it is not unique, why has it received more attention than any other mass murder? It can be plausibly argued that a certain Western narcissism or myopia is at work when we obsess about violence in our front yard, ignoring tragedies further afield, and indeed ignoring past colonial violence in which we may have been involved. In part, the Holocaust's resonance in the West reflects Jewish intellectual and cultural presence in the US and elsewhere, which encourages identification with the victims among influential thinkers and opinion makers. Doubtless it also feeds off Judaism's historically contested place in Christian cultures, which enhanced the shock value of such massive Jewish martyrdom in the West, as evidenced by the very significant changes in official church positions towards Judaism since 1945. All this may mean that the Holocaust has appeared more singular than it unfortunately is.

What is clear is that the Holocaust was not the only, and, sadly, was far from the largest mass murder in recent history (Stalin and Mao were both responsible for many more deaths), and that the twentieth century saw all too many mega-murders and efforts to eliminate entire peoples. We are thus bound to ask whether the Nazis' genocide follows some shared logic. Yet even in such dismal company, the territorial scope of the Nazis' genocidal aspirations is striking—covering the length and breadth of the Nazi Empire, and aided by collaborators across Europe, the Nazi murder of European Jewry is the only pan-imperial genocide in history. The Nazis even putatively aimed at global murder, encompassing territories over which they had no control and no aspiration to rule, implying a remarkable commitment to total elimination of a people. What makes this commitment even harder to fathom is the fact that the Holocaust seems singularly pointless. All mass murders require that some myth of evil be created around the victims so that the perpetrators can convince themselves that they are acting in self-defence. But the Holocaust not only constructed the Jews as an imaginary enemy but also more unusually strove for few tangible benefits—it brought in no territory, responded to no military or paramilitary threat, cleared no ground for population settlement, removed no obstacle to economic development, and stole resources that, while sufficient to finance the killing programme, were totally disproportionate to the moral thresholds crossed.

One of the oddities of the current state of historiography is that while many scholars strongly reject the idea that the Holocaust was unique, every effort to fit it into common pattern with other genocides or mass killings has failed. Here, as in other areas of Holocaust scholarship, a moral tussle may stand in the way of analytical clarity.

Crisis

Extreme violence is often a function of some kind of extreme societal crisis. In this respect, the Holocaust fits the general pattern, albeit in a highly idiosyncratic way. For one thing, it took three different kinds of crisis to produce the Holocaust. The first and furthest removed from the murderous events of the 1940s was yet at the same time in some ways the most important: namely the crisis of defeat and revolution after the First World War when the German monarchy collapsed, and revolution broke out in Berlin followed by a quasi-civil war. It was in this political tumult that the National Socialist German Workers Party, Nazi Party for short, emerged as a political and paramilitary movement, and acquired its ideology, character, and style. Hitler rapidly imposed his stamp as leader and principal ideologue, even whilst allowing his underlings considerable latitude as to particular stances and policies. At the end of 1923 Germany's crisis passed its peak, political and financial conditions were stabilized, and the Nazi Party went into the political wilderness.

However important the post-war crisis was for forging the party's goals and character, the Nazis would have been at best a footnote in history had not a second crisis, the World Depression ushered in by the Wall Street Crash of October 1929, terminally weakened post-war Germany's fragile political legitimacy. It was only in 1932, in the wake of 6 million unemployed, a government fiscal policy that was indisputably making things worse, fears of communist growth, and a series of massive votes for the Nazis, that Hitler and his peers were given the elite backing that enabled them to gain control of the levers of state. Arguably, this second crisis did not fundamentally change the party's mission. True, the Nazis were now obliged to produce a solution to unemployment in order to deliver on their election promises, and they also had to take some care not to alienate important political, business, and military elites until their position was impregnable. But what this second crisis delivered was power: a radical band of ideologues and street thugs now had at its disposal one of the most effective and advanced bureaucracies in the world, a potentially powerful economy, and the still functioning core of a lethal war machine.

The third 'crisis' comprised the strains and demands of total war that provided the backcloth for the Nazis' embrace of genocide in the Soviet Union in summer 1941. As we will see in the following section, war created the exigencies and opportunities that pushed the Nazis over the cliff into genocide. But while all these crises were clearly important they were more obliquely linked to murder than in Armenia, Cambodia, or Rwanda (though the Armenian and Rwandan prehistories contain longer-term caesurae

of their own).[17] The key crisis that gave the Nazis their character took place more than two decades before the Holocaust. The 1930s saw the Nazis moving their Jewish policy forward at top speed to the extent that within just five years Germany's prosperous Jewish community of 1933 had been almost completely ejected from the economy and from society. But this was while the Nazis were solving almost all the problems that had catapulted them to power. By 1938, when the Nazis unleashed the pogrom night of Kristallnacht, destroying most remaining Jewish businesses and synagogues and imprisoning over 30,000 Jewish men, they had ended unemployment, utterly crushed the threat from the Left, dissolved the trade unions, rallied a cheering nation behind their foreign policy, restored Germany's standing in the world, and reversed virtually every territorial, military, and symbolic restriction imposed by the Versailles Treaty. At the same time, the Nazis' pace of rearmament was putting huge strains on the economy, and Hitler's foreign policy was testing the limits of the Allies' patience with an increasingly risky foreign policy. In that sense the Nazis were creating their own crisis, and, as we will see, anti-Jewish measures sharpened in tandem.

Ideology

It seems obvious, indeed axiomatic, that anti-Semitism made a major contribution to the Holocaust. Anti-Semitism had a long history in Germany and in the countries where the killings were carried out. The Nazi Party was associated with and indeed virtually defined by virulent anti-Semitism from its inception. Theirs was a European-wide project: the Nazis extracted Jews from countries under their occupation to murder them in camps in occupied Poland; in Soviet territories under Nazi rule, Jews were murdered *in situ*; some states allied with the Nazis voluntarily handed over their Jews for murder. The Nazis' success in soliciting collaboration or at the very least impeding resistance was in many cases closely linked to their ability to mobilize anti-Semitic sentiment. Here again the Holocaust fits into a more a general pattern: both at the level of the decision-making elites and of the grass-roots participants (or those simply willing to look the other way), every genocide and mass killing depends on the existence of tensions and resentments which are more or less pre-formed. Those pre-existing notions help define the victim group, on the one hand, and remove inhibitions to killing them, on the other. However, the comparative frame with other genocides, while underlining the need for a genocidal motive, at the same time raises questions that go beyond anti-Semitism about how any given motive becomes murderous. Are there some particular hatreds in the world into whose fabric is woven a special seam of murderous, eliminatory potential? Or do anti-Semitism, 'Tutsiphobia', 'kulak hatred', and so on merely provide the local instantiation of legitimacy, while we need to look elsewhere, beyond such hatreds, to find the common ingredients that make for a genocidal constellation?

In the Nazis' case, the fact that killing the Jews brought so few obvious real gains in terms of land, resources, or weakening a real enemy has made the Holocaust seem the

ideological genocide par excellence. However, for many post-war observers it was precisely the lack of obvious real benefits to the Holocaust that cast doubt on the importance of convictions at all. For much of the post-war era, after all, materialist models predominated in the social sciences and historical research. Within this context it was hard to make any kind of sense of the Holocaust, which seemed so far removed from recognizable class interests or material interests of any sort. That is why many historians long assumed that the Holocaust could not be located in any kind of broad logic; instead they emphasized the irrationality of a leadership which had managed to insert itself into power at a time of great crisis, and the more rational secondary motives—loyalty, fear, ambition, greed—which enabled that leadership to fulfil its murderous obsessions. The famous debate between 'intentionalists' and 'structuralists' that took such hold of historical writing on Nazi Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, now looks less like a debate than a consensus: both sides took an 'accidentalist' position, explaining the Holocaust by recourse to the peculiarities of a Nazi rule that was established in crisis—the disagreement was about what those peculiarities were. Was the Holocaust the result of a top-down system, run according to Hitler's plan, and sustained by charisma, loyalty, and fear, or did it accrue from a more ramshackle regime, in which ambitious subordinates enjoyed untrammelled opportunities to assert their position by running with the leader's rhetoric?[18]

The more distance we have from the 'intentionalist' and 'functionalist' debates, the more unhappy we are with models in which the vast majority of participants did not 'really' believe in what they were doing. However, even if we accept the power of ideas in general and anti-Semitism in particular, we still face the problem that since the early modern period Jew hatred had not been associated with mass murder, and even in the early period murderous outbreaks had been few and far between. As many German Jewish observers were first confronted with Nazi violence on city streets, the comparisons that came to mind dated even further back, namely to the Middle Ages. That is why from the start serious analysts of the Holocaust like Hannah Arendt, even while recognizing anti-Semitism's importance, also felt that some profound rupture had to have taken place, separating the Holocaust from previous developments.

One option has been to see the Nazis as having developed or inherited some particular sub-form of anti-Semitism—'eliminatory anti-Semitism',[19] 'redemptive anti-Semitism',[20] 'racial anti-Semitism',[21] that explains why theirs became so violent. Such interpretations assume that at some point, whether in the half-century before the Nazis or in the fervent pathways of Hitler's own brain, anti-Semitism morphed into something much more murderous and destructive than it had been. The idea that, for example, biological thinking helped to give rise to a murderous 'racial anti-Semitism' seems plausible given the biological elements in Nazi thinking. The problem is that the idea of a clearly defined 'racial' anti-Semitism is an illusion. Anti-Judaism *did*, true enough, change in important ways in the century following the Enlightenment. In the emergent age of nation states, while retaining many of the negative associations that they had suffered in Christian popular culture, Jews' principal 'evil' shifted from being 'not Christian' to 'not belonging to the nation'. Moreover, organized Jewish responses to anti-Semitism

since the mid-nineteenth century, and in particular the creation of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in 1860, helped cement the image of a potent international Jewry. Self-consciously 'racial' anti-Semitism was not very distinct from this more vaguely national/international critique; its most well-known exponents tended to be at least as cultural as biological in their prejudice. There was, to be sure, recurrent biological language of pollution and contamination in the Nazi assault on the Jews. Yet when we find the same kind of language in Bolshevik attacks on the kulaks—the parasites and bloodsuckers of the nation—we understand that this was the modern metaphor of the national enemy as much as it was a clearly defined biological conception giving rise to specific policies.

There is more mileage in linking ideology to a sense of crisis. The specific conditions of the post-First World War crisis helped give anti-Semitism an emotional and political meaning for Germany's radical Right that remained an abiding marker of Nazi politics. In the immediate aftermath of the First World War a genuine global panic about Jewish influence emerged. The outbreak of 'godless' revolutions in St Petersburg, Berlin, Budapest, Vienna, and elsewhere was the principal source of this fear. Jews were over-represented amongst the revolutionary Left though not a bit as influential as contemporaries feared. In addition, the huge pre-war and wartime flows of Russian Jews into Western countries, and the signs of Jewish influence in international diplomacy (of which Britain's 1917 Balfour Declaration supporting the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, and the Jewish role in advocating for the Minority Treaties at Versailles, were the most visible and again frequently overblown examples) all added to fears of a global Jewish cabal. The translation into English in 1919 of the mischievously concocted 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion', and the publication in 1920 of 'The International Jew: The World's Foremost Problem' reflected and reinforced the scare. No less august an institution than the *London Times* took the Protocols seriously for a year or two. The first large-scale massacres of Jews in modern times happened in this moment, in the Russian Civil War, as Whites and Cossacks targeted Jews. In eastern Europe, the counter-revolution would exact a lesser tribute in blood, but in Hungary and elsewhere see a wave of vicious anti-Semitism in the early post-war years.

In defeated and revolutionary Germany, this global phenomenon took on particular forms, with radical anti-Semitism emerging as the common language of a variety of right-wing groups. Already before the war, Jews had become a ready trope as insiders who were deemed outsiders—citizens since emancipation, and yet somehow 'not us'. The privations of war had enhanced agitation against speculators, and unwarranted rumours had circulated that Jews were shirking their duty at the front. Then as revolution broke out in Russia and socialist anti-war agitation accompanied Germany's defeat, the myth was allowed to take hold that Jews had fomented internal sedition and thus brought down the Reich. Contemporary Jewish observers in Germany felt the mood very strongly, and sensed pogroms in the air. The evidence is suggestive that Hitler had not been particularly anti-Semitic before the war, and was possibly not yet politically committed even when war ended. He certainly arrived in the Nazi Party almost by accident, on a commission from the army to monitor political activity. He may well have acquired his violent anti-Semitism only then. However Hitler acquired his anti-Semitism, he then made it both a

strategic choice in a political battle within Germany as well as an increasingly compelling explanation for internal and external threats.

One can see here obvious parallels with, say, the Ottoman genocide of the Armenians or the Hutu murder of the Tutsis: at a time of extreme domestic and international stress an internal group was identified as extremely dangerous because somehow connected to external threats. At the same time, we are struck by the peculiar degree of abstraction and speculation required to construe such a threat out of loyal Jewish citizens, patriotic, not globally organized, and not claiming anything as a group other than civic equality. More significantly, the genocide we are seeking to explain was carried out more than two decades after this moment of crisis. Yet the importance of removing the threat of internal sedition to prevent a rerun of the First World War continued to have a strong hold on the Nazi imagination, as evinced in Heinrich Himmler's infamous 1943 Posen speech to a select group of SS (*Schutzstaffel*) leaders and others in which he justified the Holocaust in these terms. This genocidal trope of inner security thus remained potent, or at least rhetorically useful, but we will need to find other reasons for the persistence of its power.

Anti-Semitism on its own moreover cannot explain the Nazi mass killings of other groups—the handicapped, Roma and Sinti, Soviet POWs, and others. Even if none of these killing programmes attained the scope or sustained character of the Holocaust, they suggest that the Nazis' murderous impulse cannot be reduced solely to hatred of Jews, and possibly even that anti-Semitism's role was secondary to some other motive or factor.

One obvious general point is that the Nazis adopted a ruthless form of biopolitics, in terms of focusing on the healthy and removing the weak. The under-provision for Germany's institutionalized mentally ill in the First World War, before the Nazis even existed as a party, had already been lethal, suggesting a strong shared sense of them as expendable. The Nazis joined a growing field of experts arguing that the future of the nation depended on state policing of population quality. Already in the 1920s Hitler made some radical remarks about culling a significant minority of children for the health of the nation. Measures to improve racial 'fitness' were introduced as soon as the Nazis came to power. These policies did not directly target Jews. They reveal an important shared characteristic, however—a ruthless prioritizing of the nation over the individual. While involuntary sterilization had some parallels and advocates abroad, the killing of the unfit was *sui generis*. The gassing of the mentally ill allowed an important threshold to be crossed, both in terms of general policy, but also specific institutional practices. The killers from the eugenics institutes would be the core staffs of the first extermination camps (though the killing of Jews by shooting, by then well under way, was carried out by different organizations, so the personnel continuity should not be overstated).

An equally important set of ideas that took firm shape in Hitler's mind in the 1920s were Nazi plans for expansion in eastern Europe—the idea of 'living space'. For Hitler, Germany's future as a world power lay in acquiring territory in the East, most of it then in Soviet hands, as part of an expanded Germany. The land would be a material resource,

but also provide a stimulus for German population expansion—akin to the expanding Western frontier's material and psychological role for the US. Though Hitler's approving references to the British in India are often quoted in connection with German settlement of the Ukraine, this was not imperialism in one of the many forms it had been practised until the First World War. Germany's future territories should not lie overseas, Hitler opined, nor did he aspire to create traditional-style colonies of extraction, trade, or with clearly demarcated subordinate status. In this, Hitler, like the other radical expansionist powers of Italy and Japan, was responding to the distinctive characteristics of the interwar period, when traditional imperialism was losing its legitimacy all around the globe, and when restrictions to multilateral trade and transatlantic population movements encouraged a new search for autarky. Like the commitment to the population's racial health, these ideas and policies did not specifically target Jews, but they reflected the Nazis' notion that an epochal moment of crisis and struggle was at hand, when the obstacles to such an empire would need to be overcome, and Jews were clearly understood as the source of global opposition to German revival. Moreover, the predilection for clearance rather than coexistence in eastern occupied territory that happened to contain a large part of the world's Jewish population, contained disastrous potential from the start.

A Penchant for Violence

Looking at these priorities, anti-Semitism, eugenics, and living space, one is struck less by their originality, and more by the extraordinary radicality and violence the Nazis brought to them. We will return in a moment to the issue of violent *capacity*, which was a function above all of the democratic legitimacy that the Nazis combined with dictatorship. But sticking with *propensity* for a moment, from their very beginnings the Nazis were characterized by a violent and extremist style that was characteristic of their epoch, but above all born of the particular conditions pertaining in the party's crucial formation period after the First World War. The party's rhetoric was extreme in its ruthlessness, its willingness to embrace the ultimate sanctions for the national good. It was also millenarian in its sense of all-or-nothing struggles that would determine the fate of the people for a thousand years. This was absolutist politics with no restraints. The counterpart to such no-holds-barred ambition was a day-to-day thuggishness. The party maintained a paramilitary arm, and many of its members were street brawlers. Some of its members carried out political murders in the 1920s and early 1930s.

In many of these characteristics the Nazis were symptoms of their moment. Defeat and revolution were accompanied by apocalyptic and utopian language on left and right. All-or-nothing speech about 'Vernichtung' was commonplace, as was the language of destiny and liberation. The civil war that followed the revolution saw war-tested troops and young would-be soldiers dragging cannons and wartime brutality onto Germany's bitterly divided streets. Political assassinations, attempted or successful, were all too

common in the Republic's early years. A cohort of young right-wingers accepted the need for a ruthless realism as the route to reviving the nation's fortunes. But to restore order and greatness their parents were almost equally ready to call for extreme measures. The future SS leader, Heinrich Himmler, and his father, a dignified headmaster, went to radical right-wing political gatherings together. Senior older judges pardoned young would-be assassins of the Republic's leaders on the grounds of sincere convictions and national fealty. What helped the Nazis was that in Hitler they had found someone who could package apocalypticism and urgency in a way acceptable to those normally nervous of street violence. With that 'cover', the Nazis would actually electorally benefit in the early 1930s from their street thugs. Street violence suggested the Nazis could defeat the feared Communist uprising. But from our point of view the important thing is that practices and discourses of violence and extremes were the defining characteristics of the Nazi Party, transforming every borrowed prejudice into distinctively murderous ambition.

The Dark Side of Democracy?

Unlike most other twentieth-century genocides or mass murders, the Holocaust was carried out by a government that had been democratically elected (give or take some elite backstairs machinations that helped nudge an ageing president towards offering the Nazis government offices).[22] In their last year before gaining power, the Nazis' electoral results made them the most popular political party in German history hitherto. When in 1933 the Nazis came to command the resources and know-how of an established, law-bound, and highly effective state apparatus, their rule was thus sustained by the twin legitimacy of having lawfully acceded to power and of riding a wave of massive popular enthusiasm.

But was that popular enthusiasm for genocide? It is by now a commonplace that the Nazis followed a 'twisted path' to Auschwitz.[23] The Nazi leadership had no idea in 1933 that within eight years it would be promoting genocide, even if Hitler spoke in annihilatory terms. The measures it promoted in the 1930s were not aimed at the territorial confinement or the physical destruction of Jews; on the contrary, they aimed at dislodging them and forcing them to flee to the far corners of the earth. A large variety of groups were involved in shaping Jewish policy without all sharing the same agenda. Party radicals sought to accelerate the pace towards a Jew-free Germany, and civil servants absorbed and deflected party pressure with measures of their own. When it was coined in the 1970s, the 'twisted path' metaphor was a useful corrective to the idea that Hitler had a definitive idea of where he was going and that everything happened according to plan.

But by now this metaphor has itself become misleading, obscuring the extraordinary energy that a democratically legitimated regime brought to cleansing Germany of Jews. Fundamental changes to rights and citizenship, radical intrusions in property rights and business contracts, impassable new barriers to professional accreditation and

membership, enforced employment dismissals, new educational limits, censorship of printed and spoken word, ejections from the cultural sphere, and periodical massive street violence all added breathtaking pace to the process. Within two and a half years of the Nazis seizing the reins, by the time of the Nuremberg Laws in September 1935, Jewish community leaders already recognized there was no future in Germany for Jewish youth. By the time of Kristallnacht in November 1938, an affluent, acculturated, highly successful, and well-integrated Jewish community had been completely ejected from Germany's economic, social, and cultural life. The only aspect of ethnic cleansing the Nazis were not engaging in was that (except for limited action in October 1938) they were not willing to risk the diplomatic consequences of simply pushing Jews over the border. Apart from that, the commitment to Jews' total exclusion and removal was powerfully in evidence from the beginning.

In fact, the Nazis were moving forward on three different, though interrelated, agendas. Apart from the anti-Jewish measures, in the first half of the 1930s the regime also made significant steps towards promoting the 'fitness' of the population, by, for example, linking marriage loans and later marriages themselves to fitness criteria that blurred physical health and adherence to certain social norms. These policies intersected with anti-Jewish ones, and drew on some of the same rhetoric of expunging elements injurious to the health of the people. But they mobilized the energies of different experts and groups, and were largely about promoting national efficiency rather than waging war on enemies of the Volk. The mounting body of anti-Roma decrees similarly was about targeting a supposedly anti-social, rootless minority and not an anti-German conspiracy. Even more energy was devoted to the Nazis' third goal—gearing up society and army to wage the future battles that would be needed to expand the Reich. This policy, as we have seen, was not explicitly directed against Jews. But the more international tensions and domestic pressures grew, the more the assault on Jews intensified. War-wary conservatives, who had also favoured some restraint on the anti-Jewish agenda, were now sidelined. With unemployment solved, the economic necessity of shielding Jewish businesses from attack disappeared. As diplomatic tensions increased, so the notion that a hostile world Jewry was fomenting opposition to Germany became more usable and persuasive for the Nazis.

How popular were these policies? Almost all genocides involve broad participation, and almost all are carried out by populist regimes that mobilize popular involvement. The Nazis were no exception. They were unusual only in the clarity of the democratic mandate they enjoyed. At every stage, their racial and their anti-Semitic policies involved widespread, un-coerced initiative, from well-placed elites in the civil service, the medical sphere, and the universities, from new party organizations, and from ordinary people in all walks of life. The scale of local activism was powerfully evident in the violence of Kristallnacht, when, at central behest, marauding gangs, including many youngsters in the Hitler Youth, terrorized and destroyed Jewish homes and businesses across the length and breadth of Germany.

Yet to talk about consensus or democratically mandated policy would be equally misleading. This was a dictatorship with no open discussion of policy goals. There is no

evidence that the bulk of Hitler's voters in 1933 were signing up for the complete removal of Jews from Germany. In fact, local anti-Jewish actions in the early 1930s proved to be an instrument for the Nazi Party to assert its hold over city streets and render more pliant the population as a whole. During the war this paradoxical interplay between consent and coercion intensified. Violence against Jews in Poland in the early war years and then the killing spree in the Soviet Union would depend on the participation of hundreds of thousands of policemen, soldiers, administrators, and other Germans. With experiences on the front being conveyed back home by letter and word of mouth, by the end of 1941 it was common knowledge that a murderous war against the Jews was under way, even if the details of the extermination camps would remain for many in the realm of rumour. As Goebbels came to recognize, because it was widely believed that Jewish interests were helping to shape the Allied war effort, the knowledge that Germany was carrying out genocide made the German people to some extent hostages to the regime. Fears of the reprisals that would follow German defeat helped to keep the population fighting to the end. In that sense perpetrating genocide was as much communal fate as shared mission.[24]

The population's anticipation of the calamity that might follow defeat only reinforced the core sentiment in the Nazis' stump speech before 1933 and their trump card since the outbreak of war in 1939, namely, patriotic support for a nation under siege. Beleaguered nationalism was the unwavering bedrock of support for the Nazis, the sentiment Hitler was able to count on, at times reinforced by anti-Semitism, at times rather *despite* the Nazis' anti-Semitism. It was not a mandate for murder, but it gave the Nazis popular legitimacy until the moment of Hitler's suicide in April 1945, as the nation continued to fight right up to an unprecedented, total defeat.

War and Imperialism

The Holocaust could not have happened without the Second World War. War brought millions of Jews under German rule, as against the less than 200,000 left in Germany in 1939. War licensed radical solutions and gave cover for murder. The outbreak of war in September 1939 ushered in radical anti-Jewish measures in Poland, with Nazi security police and ethnic German units engaged in brutal murders of non-Jewish Poles and Polish Jews on a significant scale. German administrations began a programme of uprooting Polish Jews from the economy, with disastrous humanitarian consequences. The year 1940 saw some implicitly genocidal planning at various levels of the Nazi administration, most ambitiously in terms of Foreign Office and SS initiatives at establishing an overseas 'reservation' for European Jews on the island of Madagascar. When that went nowhere, more provisional, local reservations were created by walling in catastrophically under-resourced Polish ghettos.

The invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, and the all-out war against 'Judaeo-Bolshevism', saw the outright transition to a policy of direct mass murder. Aided and

abetted by the Wehrmacht, this policy encountered so little internal resistance that by the end of 1941 Hitler and the core policymaking community on Jewish matters had clearly shifted to the notion that murder could serve as the solution to the entire European Jewish 'problem'. It was in the fall of 1941, while the murder units were expanding in the Soviet Union, that planning began for that unprecedented phenomenon, the extermination camp, in occupied Poland. Small, unobtrusive killing camps (Chelmno, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka) came into operation from December 1941 and continued for around eighteen months, murdering nearly 2 million Jews, and leaving only a couple of hundred survivors. The mixed extermination and concentration camp, Auschwitz, would outlast them all, home to the murder of over a million Jews, but also to many more survivors than the other extermination camps. This was partly because the camp had a labour function as well as an exterminatory one, but also because one huge Jewish contingent, namely the Hungarian Jews, were brought there so late in the war that they had a little more chance than others to survive.

It was only in late 1941 that SS staff began to sketch out the dimensions of a historically unprecedented global extermination programme, the earliest archival traces of which can be found in the minutes of the infamous Wannsee conference of 20 January 1942. The meeting's greatest significance in retrospect is in the survival of the minutes, which offer us a window onto a moment in German policy when continent-wide murder had crystallized as policy, the possibility of global elimination was being at least scoped out, and the exact balance between direct extermination and short-term labour exploitation had not yet been established. That balance would continue to shift back and forth throughout the war, as the push and pull of genocidal mission and wartime labour needs led to flurries and eddies in the murky sea of Nazi policy. But once conjured into the world, the underlying commitment to complete eradication of the Jews never disappeared from the agenda.

But if the war indeed created context and opportunity, it would nevertheless be wrong to see genocide as a response to the crisis of war. For one thing, as we have seen, the conflict was a product of Nazi planning and ambitions, and in that sense not an accident that happened to them but the logical corollary of their policy. The radicalizing consequences of approaching war could be felt well before hostilities began. For another, even compared with the perverted kaleidoscope of other genocidal imaginations, it took a particularly twisted and distorted view of reality to see Jews in alliance with the enemy or their removal in any way helpful to the war's progress.

Moreover, the crucial point was that from the beginning the Nazis were engaged in territorial cleansing and settlement (though as we will see in a moment, the link to the Holocaust was not direct here either). As the various wartime iterations of the Nazis' 'General Settlement Plan East' would reveal, the presence of non-Germanic peoples on future German soil would be at best conditional, with expulsions and decimation of populations an integral part of settlement planning. Early instalments of this kind of policy could be seen in the violent expulsions of Poles from the provinces absorbed into Germany in 1939, and even more lethally, in the resource planning for Operation Barbarossa in 1941, which unabashedly envisaged the decimation of tens of millions of

Soviet citizens as a way of ensuring that foodstuffs and other resources flowed to the Wehrmacht and potentially back to Germany. The latter plans were never fully realized, though they did have direct consequences for the utterly catastrophic neglect of Soviet POWs, leading to the death of 3 of the 5 million Soviet troops in German hands. The failure to win the war would limit the realization of such grand plans. The mass deaths of non-Jews in Eastern Europe that did take place were often less the product of settlement plans than of the ruthless appropriation of resources for military needs and the despoliation of entire regions by way of anti-partisan warfare. The fact remains that in their planning for the East, the Nazis seem at their most similar to other instigators of genocide, whose actions were often linked to transformational agrarian projects. Timothy Snyder has drawn attention to the double victimization of the 'bloodlands' where both Stalin's and Hitler's conflicting ambitions for harnessing land and grain took a terrible toll.[25]

Although we now know that planners and technocrats saw the removal of Jews as a logical step in the transformation and Germanizing of agricultural lands in Poland and the former Pale of Settlement, it is clear that the imperial plans in the East were not themselves the source of the Nazis' anti-Jewish animus, which as we have seen was at once domestic, European, and indeed global. Yet the Nazis' imperialism was in many respects the Holocaust's most decisive precondition. It entailed a commitment to control and clear territories that were the historical heartland of Jewish settlement, thus putting the Nazis in a position to preside over the fate of a large proportion of European Jewry. It rested on the acceptance of murderous mega-population-planning to create the expanded nation-empire of the future. Initially, the focus on ejecting Poles to make way for ethnic Germans actually slowed down Jewish removals, but in the longer term the intellectual and policy climate of clearance and settlement in eastern Europe made it easier and more logical to contemplate eliminating Jews. Thus, for example, hunger planning for the Soviet Union in 1941 was not a directly anti-Jewish measure, but it did facilitate the transition to genocide of Jews. Initially, the mass killings of Jews targeted adult men as potential agents of Judaeo-Bolshevism. But in the context of ruthless resource control, that security concern was rapidly supplanted by a more economic one that led to an increasingly all-out extermination of Soviet Jewish women and children as 'useless eaters', and the retention of small numbers of Jewish men as essential labour. Roma found themselves the victims of the same murderous calculations.

Yet in looking at this interplay between territorial goals as a whole and anti-Jewish and indeed anti-Roma policy, we should be mindful as much of Nazi methods as of their ambitions. The Nazis were imperial amateurs, with little experience in colonial rule, and with national-imperial visions untested by experience of rule. They were in a desperate hurry, driven in part by the economic and military logic of having to knock out the huge array of potential opponents to their territorial ambitions before the other powers could out-arm them, and in part by Hitler's private agenda of wanting to transform the world while young enough to do so. Hitler was so unmoved by the fate of millions who fell under German rule that he acquired land without even the barest details of the native population's treatment being resolved. In occupied Soviet territory in particular that murderousness was only aggravated by occupation forces having to feed themselves off the land.

Collaboration

Even if the Nazis' imperialism was not quite the *cause* of the Holocaust, what makes the Holocaust stand out against all other ethnic cleansings is that it was the first and only pan-imperial genocide, carried out in every corner of its empire. As a pan-imperial policy, the 'Final Solution' was subject to the very varied diplomatic and war-related logics of imperial rule in different parts of Europe, and conducted through the equally varied local structures and dynamics of rule pertaining in the different parts of the empire. Anti-Jewish measures became an implicit or explicit object of bargaining with the Nazis' subalterns. Sometimes, as in parts of the occupied Soviet Union and eastern Europe, the policy provided a limited measure of pay-off for locals where Hitler was otherwise disinclined to make any conciliatory gestures. In a curious way, anti-Semitism became the Nazis' one imperial 'offer', a policy that might briefly conceal the lack of overlap between Nazi goals and local interests. Sometimes, as in Hungary, this offer was much more explicit, with German staffs planning an expropriation of Jewish assets to reform Hungary's social structure without targeting its ruling elite. Resources could be divided up between imperial rulers and locals, and the removal of Jews could be presented as enhancing regional autonomy and cohesion. Sometimes, by contrast, particularly where some degree of national sovereignty had been preserved underneath German rule, anti-Jewish measures might test the imperial contract and have to be modified or abandoned altogether, in order to ensure the continuing 'goodwill' of the dominated, as in the case of Denmark. The leaks of information to Denmark that allowed it to rescue most of its Jews, for example, may not have been 'official' leaks, but they complemented a relatively hands-off approach to rule in that country and deference to local sentiment. In this sense the Holocaust was powerfully conditioned by empire, and performed imperial functions.

The reasons for collaboration varied according to local culture and sentiment, and to the degree and level of national autonomy the Nazis allowed within different regions of their empire. In former Soviet states where the apparatus of government was completely destroyed, individual decisions to join killing squads were probably largely driven by material considerations, bolstered or eased by existing anti-Semitism. In the transition from Soviet to Nazi rule in the Baltics and eastern Poland in 1941, the widespread local feeling that Jews had been stooges of the short-lived Communist rule (a misperception based on the fact that left-wing Jews had enjoyed greater influence and visibility under Communist rule than in the preceding nationalist governments) led to a limited wave of ferocious local violence against Jews, encouraged by Nazi units. In western Europe, national bureaucracies cooperated in anti-Jewish policy for the same pragmatic and functional reasons that they cooperated with other occupying measures. Everywhere, however, there were groups for whom anti-Jewish measures imposed by the Nazis resonated with their own anti-Semitic sentiments. These varied national stories of collaboration disappeared underground after the end of the war, and in some Eastern European

and former Soviet states remain even now hotly contested elements of wartime history.[26] Yet vital and disturbing though the breadth of European participation was for facilitating the Nazi project, no European actors, not even the Romanian government—the most independently murderous agent of Jewish deaths—would have embarked on this genocidal project without the Nazis.

Victims, Agents, Witnesses

Contrary to what is often asserted, German Jews were neither slow to spot the danger the Nazis represented nor complacent.[27] Already in 1935, Jewish leaders saw as their most important task preparing young people for emigration. A large majority of German Jewish youngsters survived the war in safety as a result. As violence and persecution in the smaller towns intensified, Jews moved to the anonymity of Berlin and other big cities. After Kristallnacht in 1938, all recognized that life with dignity would be impossible in Germany and only the most elderly and immovable did not at least try to leave. Mass murder was, however, on no one's intellectual horizon. After the invasion of September 1939, the German assault on Jewish bodies and Jewish livelihoods in Poland was so brutal and intense that a few far-sighted Polish Jewish observers like Chaim Kaplan did now wonder if the Nazis had a plan for extermination.[28] But it was in Vilna in December 1941, in the wake of the unfolding campaign of mass shootings, that the Jewish resistance first clearly discerned the genocide under way. From spring through early autumn of 1942, that insight percolated through the Polish ghettos and became chilling certainty among Polish Jews.

Jews were far from passive in the face of the Nazi threat. Before 1933 Jewish leaders campaigned actively, warning of the Nazi danger. After 1933, within the shrinking room for manoeuvre allowed them, German Jewish leaders sought to intervene with the authorities, mobilize assistance abroad, and support emigration. From 1939 onwards, however, Jewish organizations under Nazi rule were subject to direct and brutal control. To a degree unprecedented in any genocide, and using a mixture of threats, lies, and murder, the Nazis enlisted the help of Jewish organizations to facilitate persecution—be it relocation and resettlement, forced labour, or deportation to death. Even so, new Jewish groupings emerged as the nuclei for resistance in ghettos, in partisan activity in eastern Europe, through cooperation with gentile rescuers in France and the Low Countries, and so on. Up to 1941, when the Nazis banned all further Jewish emigration, international Jewish organizations sought to help Jews find passage and a place abroad. The American Joint Distribution Committee continued for as long as humanly possible to find ways of providing assistance in Europe—be it to the welfare bodies of the Warsaw ghetto, to Jewish refugees in Romania en route to Palestine, or to Jews stranded in Lisbon. Jews evaded, circumvented, and resisted genocide in camps and ghettos, cities and countryside, and in both eastern and western Europe. Yet all this made only a tiny dent in Nazi actions. Like other genocides, the Holocaust was predicated on the myth

of victims' power and malevolence and on the reality of their weakness. Despite Jews' international contacts and resources, the Allied war effort did not in any way respond to their needs. To facilitate the opening of a second front, for example, the Allies in 1943 encouraged Hungary to secede from the Axis, knowing full well that German invasion would follow and that Hungary's 800,000 Jews would be endangered. Well over half of them perished.

During the war Jews were confronted not only by the increasingly certain prospect that they would be murdered, but also by unbelievable individual cruelty and brutality, particularly in eastern Europe. In retrospect the Holocaust has often been seen as an industrial, bureaucratic affair, characterized by well-coordinated transports bringing victims to the gas chambers. But eastern European Jews in particular knew of a chaotic world of wilful individual acts of quite extraordinary savagery and sadism. Indeed, to the extent that Nazi policy was met with passivity, it was because the victims were all too aware there were fates worse than death. Even more profoundly disabling was the message that both violence and systematic murder conveyed, namely that the victims were excluded from the circle of humanity. Before the war, the most bitter lesson for many German Jews had been that they could be ejected from their social position and robbed of their national identity. It was the Nazis' power of exclusion that hurt most. During the war, for many Jews almost as painful as the prospect of death was the fact that their humanity was being denied altogether. As the scale of murder became clear in 1942, chronicles and diaries show their writers struggling with this total denial of their right to life—and with the very real possibility that not just they but all traces of Jewish life would be eradicated. It is this prospect of total extinction, with no trace of communal life left behind, that makes the genocidal experience so distinctive.

That crushing prospect faced victims of other genocides too. Where Jews stood out was in the degree to which they recorded what was happening to them. The great profusion of diaries and chronicles was a result partly of the extended months of incubation of Nazi policy, during which Jews became aware they were experiencing something unprecedented. The quality of the written record reflects also Jews' high levels of literacy, and, particularly in eastern Europe, a practice of scientifically recording persecution that had emerged from earlier waves of twentieth-century violence. We are still learning much from the observations recorded at the time.[29] Yet for all the recent emphasis on recovering victims' voices and agency, in the end the mystery of the Holocaust was theirs to observe and to suffer, but caused by forces completely out of their control.

Notes

1. Footnotes in this chapter have been kept to a minimum, and are used only for citations or to refer to historical debates or controversies mentioned in the text. The best current syntheses are Saul Friedländer's two-volume work, *Nazi Germany and the Jews* (see notes 3 and 20) and Donald Bloxham, *The Final Solution: A Genocide,* Oxford Histories (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Two important recent surveys of

Holocaust historiography are by Confino and Stone, see note 5. An excellent short account of the Holocaust is Doris L. Bergen, *War & Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust*, Critical Issues in History (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). A succinct review of the evolution of Nazi policy can be found in Mark Roseman, *The Villa, the Lake, the Meeting: Wannsee and the Final Solution* (London and New York: Penguin Books, 2003).

2. Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History* (New York: Routledge, 1991).
3. See the discussion in Saul Friedländer, *The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939–1945*, 1st edn (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007).
4. Most notably Saul Friedländer, *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the 'Final Solution'* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
5. Alon Confino, *Foundational Pasts: The Holocaust as Historical Understanding* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 30; Dan Stone, *Constructing the Holocaust: A Study in Historiography* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2003).
6. Helmut Walser Smith, *The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), ch. 1.
7. Götz Aly, *Architects of Annihilation: Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
8. Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, *The Racial State: Germany, 1933–1945* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
9. Most famously Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 1st edn (New York: Harcourt, 1951).
10. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.
11. Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
12. Jürgen Zimmerer, *Von Windhuk Nach Auschwitz?: Beiträge Zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust* (Berlin: Lit, 2011).
13. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, 1st edn (New York: Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1996).
14. Bloxham, *The Final Solution: A Genocide*.
15. See the debates in Alan S. Rosenbaum, *Is the Holocaust Unique?: Perspectives on Comparative Genocide*, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001).
16. Daniel Feierstein, *Genocide as Social Practice: Reorganizing Society under the Nazis and Argentina's Military Juntas*, Genocide, Political Violence, Human Rights Series (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2014), f. 71.
17. On these three events, see Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930–1975*, 2nd edn (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
18. On the intentionalist–functionalist debate, see Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, 4th edn (London and New York: Arnold; co-published in the USA by Oxford University Press, 2000); Mark Roseman, 'Beyond Conviction? Perpetrators, Ideas, and Action in the Holocaust in Historiographical Perspective', in Frank Biess, Mark Roseman, and Hanna Schissler (eds.), *Conflict,*

Catastrophe and Continuity: Essays on Modern German History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007).

19. Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*.
20. Saul Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
21. See the excellent discussion of the latter in Peter Pulzer, 'Third Thoughts on German and Austrian Anti-Semitism', *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies*, 4/2 (2005), 137–78.
22. The subheading is a reference to Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
23. Still worth reading on the topic is Karl A. Schleunes, *The Twisted Road to Auschwitz; Nazi policy toward German Jews, 1933–1939* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970).
24. For an account that hovers between assertions of consensus and communal fate, see Thomas Kühne, *Belonging and Genocide: Hitler's Community, 1918–1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).
25. Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
26. Witness the recent debates following the appearance of Jan Tomasz Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Antony Polonsky and Joanna B. Michlic, *The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
27. See the evidence presented in Jürgen Matthäus and Mark Roseman, *Jewish Responses to Persecution*, Vol. I: *1933–1938*, 5 vols, vol. 1, Documenting Life and Destruction (Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press; in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2010).
28. Chaim Aron Kaplan and Abraham Isaac Katsh, *Scroll of Agony: The Warsaw Diary of Chaim A. Kaplan*, 1st edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). Kaplan's predictions are explored in David Engel, '"Will They Dare?" Perceptions of Threat in Diaries from the Warsaw Ghetto', in Robert Moses Shapiro (ed.), *Holocaust Chronicles: Individualizing the Holocaust through Diaries and Other Contemporaneous Personal Accounts* (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1999).
29. See Boaz Cohen, *Israeli Holocaust Research: Birth and Evolution*, Routledge Jewish Studies Series (New York: Routledge, 2013); Laura Jockusch, *Collect and Record!: Jewish Holocaust Documentation in Early Postwar Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

CHAPTER 27

EUROPE'S CIVIL WARS, 1941–1949

AVIEL ROSHWALD

On 22 February 1943, in the course of the Battle of Neretva, the Fourth Brigade of the Communist-led Yugoslav Partisans took the town of Jablanica from an Italian battalion, capturing the commander in the process. On learning that their prisoner was a proud veteran of the pro-Franco Italian contingent in the Spanish Civil War, his counterparts among the Partisans demanded his immediate execution. The Italian officer returned the salutation in a manner of speaking, requesting that his shooting be carried out by one of those former volunteers for the Spanish Republic. The request was denied, and he was shot by military couriers instead.[1]

Did the Italian commander die in a global conflict, in an internecine Yugoslav struggle, or on one of the multiple fronts of a transnational civil war? One could truthfully answer yes to each of these questions. This was certainly an episode in the Second World War. It could also be construed as part of a Yugoslav civil war, insofar as Serb Chetnik units fought alongside the Italian and German forces arrayed against their shared Yugoslav Communist foe on the Neretva River.[2] Clearly, in the Italian officer's own mind, his death in Bosnia also constituted a coda to the Spanish Civil War. The very denial of his request for a 'Spanish' executioner may have constituted a rejection by his adversaries of any pretence of mutual respect between veterans of the opposing sides in that conflict, rather than a denial that the current encounter was connected to that earlier struggle. Conversely, perhaps it did indicate a rejection of the notion that the war between foreign occupiers and Yugoslav resisters could be understood as a legitimate sequel to the clash between foreign participants in the Spanish Civil War.

The ambiguous, multilayered nature of this incident reminds us how problematic any simplistic use of the term 'civil war' can be in the context of the twentieth century's greatest international and global conflict and its immediate aftermath. On the one hand, the term could be applied to almost every country that fell under Axis control: wherever occupation took place, societies were divided in their responses, and these divisions frequently led to bloodshed. On the other hand, the term can be seen as inappropriate

in many such cases, insofar as these confrontations really pitted collaborators against resisters. To label these fights civil wars may seem to imply that the fundamental source of conflict was internal to the society in question rather than exogenous (in the form of foreign conquest by Germany or its allies). Such an implication is bound to be controversial in most cases; it may prove misleading in many; yet it may also contain a strong element of truth.

It is this chapter's premise that there is analytical utility in advised use of the term 'civil war' in the context of wartime occupation, with the understanding that it need not be employed to the exclusion of other frames of reference, such as the more conventional pairing of collaboration and resistance. There is no single label that can conceivably do justice to the complexity of such conflicts. Just as 'civil war' has its limitations, so too does 'resistance and collaboration', which risks reducing the complex and fluid mixes of motives that coloured the ever-shifting responses to occupation to an overly simplistic binary opposition between noble patriotism and treacherous service of foreign interests.[3] A flexible terminological approach that includes the concept of civil war allows us to explore the *interplay* of exogenous and endogenous factors in shaping the violent conflicts that wracked occupied European societies during the Second World War and (in some cases) into the early Cold War.[4]

This chapter will concentrate on three European cases that best fit conventional notions of civil war in terms of the intensity and duration of fighting among co-nationals: Greece (1943–5 and 1946–9), Yugoslavia (1941–5), and central/northern Italy (1943–5). It is my hope that some of the questions and insights associated with these cases may prove applicable to other countries under Axis occupation in wartime Eurasia.

The Southern Mediterranean as Civil War Zone

It is striking that all three full-on European civil wars of the 1940s took place in southern European countries, seemingly following in the wake of the region's last such conflict—the Spanish Civil War (1936–9). There is a suggestive echo here of the 1820–1 revolutions, which had begun in Spain and spread to Italy and Greece.[5] In that earlier sequence, the unrest had followed the upheaval of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic occupations of Spain and Italy. In the twentieth-century instance, the outbreaks either preceded Continental-scale warfare (in Spain's case) or began in the very midst of brutal foreign occupations. Even in the case of Spain, the country's civil war very rapidly became intertwined with the broader, Continental and global rivalries among communism, fascism/Nazism, and liberal democracy.

Why was the southern Mediterranean the locus of these civil wars amidst the Second World War? Such civil wars tended to arise from the context of armed resistance movements, and Yugoslavia, Greece, and central/northern Italy all became sites

of particularly intense resistance activity. Among their salient shared characteristics, the most obvious is that of German and Italian military occupation (and German occupation of central and northern Italy as of 1943) combined with geographical proximity to Anglo-American-controlled territory in North Africa (British-controlled Egypt throughout the war, and the rest of North Africa from 1942/3 on) and, from 1943, southern Italy. This meant that the British and Americans were in a position to fly across open water (rather than over enemy anti-aircraft installations) to airdrop advisers and supplies over Greece and Yugoslavia, as well as to transport key figures via submarine. In Italy's case, the Anglo-American Allies were already consolidating control of the south of the peninsula as the battle against German occupation of the centre and north got under way, giving the anti-Nazi resistance a relatively secure rear. All this meant that the Anglo-Americans were not only particularly well placed to help sustain these resistance movements, but were also in a position to influence the balance of forces *within* each of them. To an extent, so was the Soviet Union, by dint of its political influence over the Communist parties that figured large in each of these movements.

The geography of Yugoslavia and Greece themselves was also a major factor. Both countries included extensive areas of mountainous terrain that overstretched occupation forces were hard put to secure in the face of determined guerrilla action. Both countries had significant peasant populations with a tradition of engaging in irregular warfare that stretched back to nineteenth-century rebellions against the Ottomans as well as the Balkan Wars of the early twentieth century. Urban intellectuals and activists might play key leadership and organizational roles in guerrilla movements, but the crucial scene of action was usually the countryside and rural populations tended to supply the bulk of the manpower as well as playing a critical logistical role (whether willingly or under duress).[6] Of necessity, Partisans fought in, and lived off, the countryside.

Italy does not quite fit this pattern. Certainly, the central and northern countryside and peasantry were important factors in the fighting, but it was the distinctive post-1943 combination of occupation by Allies in the south and Germans in the north that created the geopolitical context and opportunity for resistance, and that determined its overarching geographical distribution.

Why did intensive, armed resistance against occupation give rise to civil-war-like conditions? Firstly, there was the matter of indigenous collaboration with the occupiers. Given the latter's perennial manpower shortages, collaborationist forces and officials were often tasked with responsibility for holding and policing territory, managing low-level administration, and so on. This made them easily accessible targets for resistance attacks, against which they would seek to retaliate. Insofar as collaborators represented significant interest groups within the country, rather than just constituting a handful of bad apples (as subsequent myths of the Resistance would have had people believe), such fighting can be characterized as civil war.

Secondly, resistance movements were generally loose coalitions (at best) of parties, organizations, and ideological factions that had little in common beyond a shared belief that the Germans would eventually lose the war. The key question, then, was who among them would inherit power at war's end. Indeed, this was the variable that the activities

of resistance movements were most likely to play a significant role in determining, given that German defeat was ultimately a function of the shifting strategic balance among the great powers. This issue was felt most acutely in those countries where armed resistance movements were successful in seizing and administering significant swathes of territory in the midst of the war. In all three of our cases, as well as across many other occupied zones of Eurasia, it was Communist-led formations that constituted the most militarily and politically effective element among resistance forces and that therefore seemed primed to reap the greatest political rewards upon liberation. In both Yugoslavia and Greece, the resultant competitive jockeying for power led to fighting *between* pro- and anti-Communist resistance groups. Indeed, particularly in the Yugoslav case, so all-consuming did such civil wars within the Resistance become that the entire distinction between resistance and collaboration could be blurred beyond recognition.

Analysis

Continuities and ruptures

Debates over whether or not violent conflicts in occupied societies should be considered civil wars tend to be politically loaded and are very hard to settle based on any objective standard. So is the related problem of assessing historical continuities and ruptures in countries that fell under enemy control in wartime.

Among our three main case studies, in Italy, Mussolini's German-backed Italian Social Republic (RSI) claimed legitimacy by virtue of its connection to the Fascist regime that had been overthrown a few months earlier. Indeed, the Social Republic's leaders and activists claimed that they were recapturing and implementing the uncompromising, purist, transformative idealism of the early Fascist movement, before it had been eroded by Mussolini's pragmatic compromises with the established institutions of the monarchy, the military, the Church, industry, and civil service. It was in the name of this uncompromising 'return' to first principles that Party Secretary Pavolini militarized the Republican Fascist Party and authorized the perpetration of atrocities against civilians by way of Nazi-style reprisals for resistance activity. Yet this did not prevent local RSI officials from occasionally negotiating unauthorized truces and other pragmatic working arrangements with elements of the often-fragmented resistance formations.[7]

In Yugoslavia, the inter-ethnic tensions that created political deadlock and periodic violence (such as the assassination in Marseilles of King Alexander alongside French foreign minister Barthou by Ustaša operatives in 1934) in the interwar years clearly served as a significant backdrop to the massive violence of 1941–5. For its part, Greece's interwar political life had been deeply divided between monarchists and republicans (Venizelists)—a split that itself originated as a division over how the country should respond to the opportunities and pitfalls of the First World War and its aftermath. Both

monarchists and Venizelists, in turn, had remained wedded to clientelist forms of politics that—land reforms after the First World War notwithstanding—failed adequately to address the income compression of the smallholding peasantry amidst global economic depression.[8] Political turmoil associated with ideological differences and rural unrest arising from socio-economic tensions had been a typical feature of pre-Second World War Greece, where Metaxas's authoritarian rule (1936–41) had put a temporary lid on internal divisions without resolving any of them.

Having pointed to these antecedents to occupation-era struggles, we must remain on guard against accepting at face value the *invented continuities* propagated by participants in these conflicts. After all, it was crucial to most indigenous political actors to portray themselves as being fully in line with one element or another of their societies' political traditions, all the more so precisely if there was little real precedent for their positions and actions. Thus, Ante Pavelić's Axis-sponsored Croatian Ustaša government made a point of convening a political council (Sabor) composed of various surviving members of pre-Yugoslav Croatian assemblies, dragged out of mothballs in an unconvincing effort to patch together a mantle of historical legitimacy for the extremist new regime.[9] This reconstituted Sabor had no real power or authority; the Ustaša state was actually dominated by figures whose political praxis of assassination and terrorism had crystallized in interwar exile, under the sponsorship and protection of Italy and Hungary.

In central/northern Italy, the resistance movement of 1943–5 could find little inspiration in the haplessness of the suppressed Italian Left during the immediately preceding two decades of Fascist political hegemony. But a sense of what one might term *punctuated historical continuity* could be cultivated instead. For some resistance activists, the fight they were in was round two of the 1919–21 industrial-strike movement, lockouts, and running confrontations between Socialists and Fascists that had divided much of the country, which had been concentrated in the industrialized north and had led to Mussolini's assumption of power in 1922. The name of the most powerful resistance formation—the Communist-led Garibaldi Brigades—harked back to the mid-nineteenth-century Risorgimento. This point of reference underscored the Communists' claim to be at the forefront of a broad-based liberation movement that was designed not merely to drive out the enemy but to foster a substantive, mass-based national unity that had eluded the original architects of Italy's political-territorial unification.[10]

In Greece, the monarchists could claim institutional continuity with the immediate, pre-war past. But by the same token, they sought to distance themselves from the Metaxas dictatorship that had been established with the recently restored king's blessing in 1936. As for the country's Communists, they sought to portray their EAM/ELAS resistance movement as an expression of deep-rooted national traditions by referring to its fighters as *andartes*, after the Greek peasant warriors who had formed irregular fighting units in the country's nineteenth- and early twentieth-century uprisings and wars against the Ottomans.

Such invented continuities commonly masked fundamental disjunctures. Stathis Kalyvas has argued that the Greek Civil War, like many others, was not necessarily an outgrowth of the country's pre-war divisions. Political polarization, Kalyvas points out,

is often the result rather than the cause of the violence associated with civil wars. Even if the leaders of rival sides in civil wars had staked out their positions well in advance of the conflict, most of the country's population was likely to have remained uncommitted until the conflict's outbreak forced ordinary people to choose sides.[11] In the case of Greece, it is worth noting that the political elite's traditional feud between monarchists and Venizelists was largely suppressed by the experience of occupation and/or wartime exile. The two sides were encouraged by the British to patch over their differences in the interest of resisting the Axis enemy. More significant was their shared hostility (also encouraged by the British) to the Communist-dominated EAM/ELAS movement that seemed potentially poised to displace republicans and monarchists alike in the aftermath of liberation. Rather than simply exacerbating traditional tensions, occupation brought about a fundamental *realignment* of Greek politics and a polarization of society along novel lines.

As for Greece, so for the other parts of Eurasia that fell to the Axis during the war: it would stretch credulity to contend that nothing fundamentally changed in societies that came under occupation by Nazi Germany and its allies. The experience necessarily constituted a shattering rupture that wrought drastic changes in the geopolitical, economic, and ideological environments of the defeated. Elites and masses alike had to scramble to adapt to rapidly shifting and extraordinarily dangerous conditions. The alternative was to perish, politically and/or literally.

Hence, rather than forcing a false choice between an emphasis on underlying continuities and a recognition of radical change, it may be more productive to examine how pre-war conditions and experiences shaped responses to the violent paradigm shift of 1941 (or 1943 in the Italian case). In particular, what unintended and unforeseen roles did pre-existing networks of affiliation, patterns of identity, and ideological commitments play under the transformed circumstances of wartime occupation?

A loose analogy from neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology may be useful here. The concept of punctuated equilibrium proposed by Eldredge and Gould suggests that long periods of slow, incremental evolution give way to dramatic cascades of change in the face of sudden, exogenously precipitated alterations in environmental conditions.[12] Many species cannot adapt to a suddenly inhospitable environment, while a few happen to include individuals with pre-existing features ('exaptations', Gould and Eldridge dubbed them) that lend themselves to survival in the short term and that can further evolve, over generations, in 'unanticipated' directions that permit new ways of thriving in a transformed world. The mass extinction of the dinosaurs and adaptive radiation of the mammals in the wake of the massive meteorite impact 65 million years ago is a classic case in point.

An observer of Yugoslavia, Greece, and possibly Italy in 1944 might well conclude that if Hitler's unleashing of war was the meteorite whose impact had cast the European world into sudden darkness, the three countries' conservative establishments (notably their monarchies and officer corps, and the social classes associated with them) were duly playing out the role of the dinosaurs, while the Communists stood poised to inherit the earth. Now, this would actually be a distorted and overly simplistic conclusion: the

conservative establishments were to prove far from done for in Greece and Italy. Even in post-war Yugoslavia, the triumph of communism and Communist-promoted inter-ethnic 'brotherhood and unity' was ultimately to prove more superficial and transient than the reign of the mammals.[13] Nonetheless, the analogy is useful in drawing our attention to how certain pre-existing qualities—exaptations, if you will—of the Communists lent themselves to their bearers' success amidst the catastrophically altered sociopolitical landscape of wartime occupation. Indeed, it should be noted that in all three countries, the Communists had constituted a much less significant political force prior to the onset of wartime occupation. By the same token, in all three they had been persecuted and suppressed. It was precisely their experience of operating, perforce, largely underground and conspiratorially that prepared them to take the lead in organizing resistance against occupation. Their pre-war experience combined with their belief in the historically inevitable ultimate triumph of their cause also prepared them to endure and tenaciously rally and reorganize in the face of repeated and often catastrophic setbacks—most notably and dramatically in the case of the remarkably resilient Yugoslav Partisan movement.

As Mark Mazower has pointed out in the case of Greece, the Communists enjoyed a particularly acute advantage in countries and regions where other parties' social penetration of the countryside remained largely limited to clientelist networks that came under severe strain or broke down altogether amidst the dislocation of occupation and the Germans' rapacious economic exactions and ruthless counter-insurgency tactics. The Communists' techniques of mass mobilization through the creation of dense associational and institutional networks at grass-roots level gave them a comparative advantage in the exploitation of niches in the rural sociopolitical environment into which enemy occupation had suddenly thrust them. Resistance activities also provoked massive reprisals by the Germans, which in turn drove more of the rural population into the arms of Communist-led forces. The fecklessness of collaborationist authorities in the face of harsh occupation conditions could also provoke townsfolk into joining underground resistance networks, as was the case in the wake of the massive 1941–2 famine brought on in Greece's urban centres by German crop seizures and the resultant inflationary pressures and speculative hoarding of remaining grain stocks by the country's farmers.[14] But it was in the countryside that the diffuseness of population across broad expanses of often difficult terrain made policing a challenge for overstretched occupation forces and their indigenous collaborators, affording the Resistance a potential territorial foothold.

In some of the lands that composed Yugoslavia, from the late nineteenth century on, nationalist parties had arguably sunk deeper organizational roots among portions of the rural population than had their Greek counterparts. But parliamentary politics had been suspended in favour of monarchic dictatorship for most of the dozen years preceding the Axis invasion. Moreover, the mutually antagonistic agendas of mainstream Serb, Croat, and other ethnonational movements undercut any potential for a concerted response to the Axis powers' divide-and-rule tactics. For its part, the military's rapid collapse in the face of German armed might (in stark contrast to Serbia's protracted

resistance to the Austrian invasion in 1914–15) was a severe blow to the credibility of the monarchist *ancien régime* and the elites associated with it. Once again, this left openings for the Communists to exploit, especially as the economic and physical ravages of wartime occupation and the inability of either collaborationist regimes or old-school nationalist movements to offer any protection against German violence and rapacity served to alienate ever broader swathes of the population.

And so it was that the conditions arising from total warfare created particularly fertile ground for Communist mobilization precisely in those parts of Europe that were relatively under-industrialized and a large proportion of whose populations still consisted of peasants. Enemy and collaborationist control of the cities meant that it was to the peasantry rather than the urban proletariat that Communist-led resistance movements had to turn for logistical support and manpower recruitment. Given the culturally conservative orientation of this social base along with the unusual circumstances of enemy occupation—as well as the wartime dictates of the Comintern—the Communist struggle for power in each of these countries had to be defined for the time being as a war of national liberation rather than a working-class revolution. In other words, this was not a scenario the Communists had planned for. But it was one to which their previous experiences and pre-existing qualities and capabilities (which included a Leninist tactical flexibility in the pursuit of ostensibly fixed strategic-ideological goals) allowed them to adapt remarkably effectively.

On the Right, the conditions of occupation also favoured the rise to power of extremist movements that had played much less substantial roles in their country's political scenes before the war, but whose earlier experiences shaped their response to the novel political environment in ways that maximized their impact while the war lasted. This can even be said of post-1943 northern/central Italy, where Fascists had ruled all along, yet where the Social Republic attracted to its ranks the most extreme purists who had felt shut out by the bureaucratization and institutional deal-making of Mussolini's previous regime. The fact that the newfangled Fascist Republic owed its very existence to the whim of the Nazi occupiers freed its personnel of the need to seek common ground with potential partners among their fellow Italians. Instead, they could live out their totalitarian fantasy to a fuller extent than had previously been possible. By the same token, the very extremism in which the RSI indulged helped ensure widespread popular alienation. This was aggravated by the German practice of reserving the bulk of their own overstretched manpower for the battles against the advancing Allies, leaving Italian Republican Fascist formations to take on the brunt of the fighting (and many of the associated atrocities and reprisals) against the Resistance.

Croatia's Ustaša regime is another case in point. The most influential political movement in interwar Croatia had not been the Ustaša but Vladko Maček's Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), which had advanced a moderate nationalist agenda: the party demanded substantive autonomy for Croatia within a federalized Yugoslavia—an aim that was briefly realized in the country's grand but eleventh-hour political bargain of 1939. The HSS had generally sought to operate within democratic, parliamentary norms and in cooperation with Croatia's Serb minority's leaders during the intervals when this was

possible under the periodically repressive, Serb-dominated Yugoslav monarchy. On the eve of the German takeover in April 1941, Maček declined the opportunity Berlin offered him to collaborate in the creation of a nominally independent Croatian state under German protection. This left the field open to Ante Pavelić's Ustaša.[15] Given that Maček subsequently avoided active resistance to the occupation or to Pavelić's collaborationist regime, his movement was effectively sidelined by the circumstances of the war. Political moderation had no grounding in the violently radicalized political environment of wartime Yugoslavia. For its part, the Ustaša's rejection of the Yugoslav idea in any shape or form had led it down a relatively marginalized path of assassination and terrorism in the 1930s. Its leadership had operated from exile in Italy and Hungary, and had been catapulted into power in Zagreb by the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia. It was, arguably, the Pavelić regime's pre-war experience as a foreign-backed terrorist organization that had predisposed it to collaborate unreservedly with Berlin and Rome and to violently abuse any power such collaboration afforded it, in pursuit of its purist vision of a Croatian nation state. It was in the transformed context of an Axis-occupied and partitioned former Yugoslavia that the Ustaša's exterminationist logic (directed against Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies) could appear as a viable mechanism for the consolidation of an ethnically homogeneous Croatian nation state in a Nazi-dominated Europe. Once unleashed, that logic quickly took root to varying degrees among significant portions of the population. Hundreds of thousands of Serbs perished in the atrocities that ensued.[16] As the surviving Serbs of Croatia fled, they found refuge among Serb-royalist Chetnik and Communist Partisan formations; conversely, many ethnic Croats rallied to the Ustaša for fear of being overrun by vengeful Serbs. Regions of high ethnic diversity and intermingling, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (allotted to Pavelić's Croatia by the Nazis) were the most prone to such inter-ethnic polarization and violence, and this is where the Communist Partisans were able to recruit much of their manpower (disproportionately, though not exclusively, from among the region's harried ethnic Serbs). The Ustaša's aims were ultimately frustrated and reversed by the Communists' creation of a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. But the Pavelić regime's adaptive exploitation of the circumstances of German victory had long-term consequences for Yugoslav ethnic politics, which remain with us to this day.

Identities

The Yugoslav case brings us to the broader question: what respective roles did ethnic, national, and internationalist identities play in the context of Europe's civil wars of the 1940s? On the face of it, the Yugoslav example seems to suggest a sharp bifurcation between the forces of internationalism as represented by the Communists and forces of ethnic and national chauvinism as in the examples of the Ustašas and Chetniks. Yet on closer examination, familial, ethnic, patriotic, and internationalist identities and commitments of this era were not necessarily mutually exclusive. What one tends to find instead are context-driven shifts of emphasis and priority among the multiple identities

available to any given population. The convulsive upheavals of societies caught up in civil wars amidst wartime occupation, and the rapidly changing fortunes of the parties to those struggles, created an environment in which the ability to recognize and exploit the fluidity of affective ties and political commitments became an essential survival skill for masses and political elites alike.

To be sure, there are plenty of wartime examples of the stereotypical contrast between cosmopolitan ideological and political elites and parochial subalterns, as in the case of the Yugoslav peasant who thanked Milovan Djilas for explaining the war to him in terms of Serbian historical myth instead of the incomprehensible lectures about anti-fascist struggle to which he had been subjected by other Party operatives.[17] But there are also some striking reversals of this trope. To begin with, we should note that the official post-June 1941 position of the Comintern was virtually the opposite of Lenin's position during the First World War. Rather than calling for the war among nations to be converted into a civil war between classes, Communists were instructed to form coalitions with other anti-fascist movements in pursuit of the shared goal of national liberation from enemy occupation. Patriotism was to be emphasized rather than internationalism; national liberation rather than social revolution. To the extent that the Yugoslav and Greek Communists did experiment with or discuss the possibility of social revolution in the areas they controlled during the war, it was in the face of countervailing pressures from Moscow rather than with Stalin's blessing. In 1943, Stalin dismantled the Communist International altogether, transferring its functions to the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Stalin's concern was to avoid any provocative revolutionary rhetoric or action that might alienate his British and American allies at a time when the rollback and defeat of Nazi Germany was Moscow's number one priority. He also appears to have been perennially concerned over the threat to his own legitimacy that might be posed by any autonomous Communist revolution unfolding beyond the sphere of Soviet control.

Against this background, it was sometimes the rank-and-file membership of Communist-led resistance movements that sought to express internationalist and revolutionary sentiments in defiance of the official line. Claudio Pavone notes that many members of the Garibaldi Brigades who were not well versed in the niceties of Marxist dialectical thinking, and were not necessarily even members of the Communist Party, demanded that they be allowed to don Communist and Soviet-style insignia such as red stars on their caps as a way of expressing their identification with a Soviet Union whose Red Army was heroically driving the Nazis back towards Berlin and (as they imagined) bringing victory and liberation to all freedom-loving peoples. Some Italians associated with the Resistance speculated eagerly about the prospects for a post-war, Soviet-led European federation of nations on the model of the USSR, even as the Party leadership frowned upon such musings as a left-wing deviation from the patriotic official line.[18] Among Yugoslav supporters of the Partisans, identification with the Soviet Union could take forms associated not only with revolutionary utopianism but also with more traditional pan-Slavic and Eastern Orthodox sentiments, as in the case of the peasant who spoke to Milovan Djilas in awed terms about the fall of holy 'Kievo' (Kiev) to the Germans.[19]

Just as the rank and file's internationalist spirit could leap ahead of the official party line, there were, conversely, cases of ostensibly ideological choices being determined by very parochial and even personal factors such as family loyalties and inter-clan feuds. Djilas noted that neighbouring villages in Montenegro and Bosnia might be pro-Partisan or pro-Chetnik based on the affiliation of a key family in each one—or on inter-village rivalries that long antedated the war.[20] Clashes that constituted parts of a national and global conflict could at one and the same time be strangely intimate, as in the case of Djilas's brother Aleksa, who was shot and killed by members of a collaborationist militia who recognized him personally.[21] Kalyvas has documented how the keeping of personal scores of gratitude and revenge could shape villagers' decisions to shelter or denounce EAM/ELAS operatives in occupied Greece.[22]

It will not come as a surprise to learn that collaborationist militias were prone to indulge in the most unapologetic and extreme forms of ethnic chauvinism and violence in areas of ethnically mixed population. But right-wing, ethnocentric agendas could be informed by transnational perspectives of their own. In fact, the more vicious the victimization of helpless civilians and the more intimate the familiarity between perpetrator and victim, the more likely the perpetrators were to frame their actions in terms that transcended their immediate surroundings. Thus, in German-occupied Poland, the denunciation or direct murder of Jews by their ethnically Polish or Ukrainian neighbours was commonly justified in the context of a notional war against the 'Judaeo-Communist' or 'Judaeo-Muscovite' enemy, even if (perhaps particularly if) among the murderers were people who had formerly collaborated with the Soviet occupation authorities.[23] Judaeo-Communism may have been a fanciful construct that bore no relation to political realities, but it was a form of globalizing rationalization (or perhaps one should say irrationalization) for violence all the same. In Yugoslavia, the Ustaša's genocidal assault against Serbs and Jews was at least indirectly inspired by the Nazis' eliminationist approach to the reconfiguration of national space—a sadly all-too-common example of transnational influences among fascists. For their part, the Italian neo-fascists of the RSI saw themselves as fighting for a purist ideal of which the Italian people themselves had proved unworthy. It was to the SS (*Schutzstaffel*) that they looked for inspiration in their self-invention as the forgers of a new Italian nation, and they reversed the pattern of pre-1943 Italian fascism by taking active part in the round-up of both foreign and Italian Jews for transfer to the German concentration- and extermination-camp system instead of sheltering Jews of all citizenships as before.[24] Thus, across occupied Europe, hatred and fear of the propagandistically linked images of communism and Jewry formed the core element of a negative, fascist internationalism that contributed no less than communist or liberal internationalism to shaping the dynamics of local conflicts and civil wars. By the same token, the portrayal of Germany's war effort as a defensive campaign on behalf of European civilization was a dominant theme in the recruitment propaganda of the Waffen-SS, whose non-German divisions drew thousands of volunteers from across Europe into active duty not only in their own regions (as in Yugoslavia, where Bosnian Muslims were organized into a Waffen-SS division that fought the Partisans) but also on the eastern front against the Red Army.

Before leaving the realm of the transnational, we should point to the mutual influences among the civil wars themselves. The incident with which this chapter opens draws our attention to the powerful role that memories of the Spanish Civil War continued to play in the minds of its veterans across the Mediterranean. The Spanish legacy also played a broader role as source of ideological inspiration and political iconography as well as combat experience for the Communist-led resistance movements. Tito's Yugoslav Partisans pointedly adopted the Spanish Republic's clenched-fist salute,[25] and favoured experienced veterans of the Spanish conflict for appointments to key military commands.

In a different manner, the circumstances that placed Italy on the path to civil war in 1943 had a substantive impact on the civil wars already under way in Greece and Yugoslavia: as soon as word arrived of the post-Fascist Badoglio regime's reversal of alliances in September, Italian occupation forces in the Balkans found themselves stranded and facing an uncertain future. The occupiers became the occupied, as Germans troops competed with resistance forces to fill the local vacuums created by the Italian armistice. Given the Italian forces' logistical limitations and the generally chaotic circumstances of the political-diplomatic realignment, few Italians abroad were fortunate enough to be immediately repatriated. The majority fell into German captivity, while many Italian soldiers—eager to evade the Germans, but desperate for access to food, shelter, and a modicum of security—sought to join the resistance movements in fighting the Germans. EAM/ELAS and the Yugoslav Partisans were eager to seize whatever Italian arms and supplies they could get their hands on. They were ambivalent over the utilization of Italian manpower; the ideological conversion of Italian officers was viewed with particular suspicion by Communist resistance leaders.[26] Nonetheless, thousands of rank-and-file Italian soldiers ended up participating in the Greek and Yugoslav resistance campaigns instead of their own country's civil war and war of liberation.[27] Albania's small-scale civil war between Communist Partisans and various collaborationist elements also got under way in the wake of Italian collapse and German takeover.[28]

Whereas mutual isolation had been the initial experience of resistance movements, the steady retreat of their enemies allowed some of those movements to establish direct links with one another, forming a loosely interconnected archipelago of civil wars across south/south-eastern Europe. The opportunity this presented to act on their internationalist commitments came at long-term political cost to the Communists in some cases. Notably, Italian Communists in north-eastern Italy, following instructions from the Party leadership, joined up with Tito's Partisan forces in the ethnically mixed, Yugoslav-claimed border region (eastern Friuli and Venezia Giulia). This put them directly in confrontation with the region's non-Communist Italian resistance formations that were fighting Tito's forces in an effort to keep the disputed territories in Italian hands. In the most notorious incident associated with this intra-Italian conflict, Italian Communist forces summarily executed (on charges of collaboration with Fascists) twenty-one members of a Catholic-affiliated Italian resistance outpost in an Alpine pasturage known as Porzûs.[29] Such conduct obviously risked undercutting the Italian Communists' patriotic

credentials; by September 1945, Togliatti, the leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), was already realigning himself with the Italian nationalist mainstream in opposition to Yugoslav annexationist demands over Trieste and Venezia Giulia.[30]

Somewhat analogously, during the 1946–9 round of the Greek Civil War, Communist forces increasingly relied on logistical support from Tito's newly established government in Yugoslavia. For manpower and local support in this post-liberation phase of the fighting the Greek Communists came increasingly to rely on members of the country's Slavic minority in Greek Macedonia, on the border with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (where Tito had recently carved out a Macedonian Republic as one of the country's new federal units). By the end of the Greek Civil War in 1949, half the Communists' military manpower consisted of Macedonian Slavic-identified recruits.[31] The Greek Communist Party's renewed stance (reprising the position they had held in line with the Comintern's position on the Macedonian question in the 1930s) in support of Macedonian demands for autonomy was consistent with a certain Communist-internationalist perspective on national-minority rights, but it served to isolate them from the mainstream of Greek national opinion.

These exceptional examples of internationalist commitments as hindrances to Communist parties' broader domestic popularity at the tail ends of the Italian and Greek civil wars only serve to highlight how effective the Communists' general adherence to patriotic themes was in generating and maintaining their mass followings during the critical years of the Second World War. Indeed, having taken note of the complex, multilevel frames of reference that coloured the perceptions and actions of participants on all sides of Europe's civil wars, let us not forget that patriotism and/or nationalism were evoked as the ultimate legitimizing framework by virtually all parties to these conflicts.[32] It has been argued that if both collaborators and resisters, Right and Left alike, claimed to be fighting on behalf of the nation, their claims effectively cancel one another out, leaving us unable to point to nationalism as an explanation for people's political choices under occupation.[33] But the point is that the idea of the nation state defined the *core terrain(s)* over which competing factions fought. Multiple combatant forces might share a roughly common conception of the nation state's basic territorial configuration, as in Greece or Italy. They might have radically different pictures of the national 'geo-body',[34] as in Yugoslavia, where the Partisans took up the tarnished banner of supra-ethnic Yugoslavism that had once been brandished by members of now-marginalized liberal-nationalist elites,[35] whereas the Ustaša defended a narrowly ethnic vision of Croatian separatism (and expansionism), and the Chetniks fell between the stools of Greater Serbian nationalism and a no-longer-sustainable brand of Serb-dominated, monarchist Yugoslavism.[36] Or they might represent two rival nationalisms each claiming the same territory for their own would-be nation state, as in the case of Poles and Ukrainians in wartime Eastern Galicia and Volhynia.[37] One way or the other, the idea of the nation state was a fundamental factor in shaping the contours of these conflicts, even as the clashing armies of the world war swept across and reconfigured the very geopolitical and ethnic spaces in which the era's civil wars were fought.

Outcomes

The ultimate downfall of collaborationist regimes across Europe was obviously a function of the overall defeat of the Axis. Yet much of the fighting in the Yugoslav and Greek civil wars took place among the rival forces that presented themselves (with varying degrees of credibility) as resisters. For its part, Italy was a locus of tensions and occasional violence among the constituent elements of the resistance coalition, as well as between that coalition and the Italian government in the Allied-held south. Who came out on top following liberation and what sort of society and government emerged from occupation and civil war depended partly on endogenous factors, but was also shaped to a significant extent by the larger geopolitical context and the evolution of relations among the Allied great powers.

In countries that British and American troops liberated from German occupation, Communists had little hope of establishing their political hegemony by dint of armed might. In Italy, the Communists recognized this, and modulated their conduct accordingly by remaining within the larger resistance coalition, not challenging the authority of the Royal Italian Government (the government of the Italian Republic as of 1946) directly, but focusing instead on gaining influence through electoral and coalition politics as well as by infiltrating the official police forces that assumed security responsibility throughout the country as the war came to a close.[38] From 1947 on, American political pressure contributed to the exclusion of the Communists from Italian governing coalitions. In Greece, the matter of post-war political supremacy was only resolved by two rounds of fighting, first between EAM/ELAS and the British in 1944 and then through renewed civil war between Communist forces and the British- and American-backed constitutional monarchy in 1946–9. It should be noted that secret contacts between the outgoing collaborationist Rallis administration and the incoming government under Georgios Papandreou helped facilitate a relatively smooth transition during the initial British liberation of Athens, as did the British recruitment of the veterans of the Rallis regime's anti-Communist Security Battalions into the new National Guard.[39]

In Yugoslavia, the Partisans' direct control of significant chunks of territory and their clear military superiority over all rival formations by 1944 along with the advance of the Soviet Red Army through a swathe of the country helped ensure Communist victory—as did Britain's 1943 decision to abandon the fickle and ineffectual Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović in favour of Tito's forces.

The broader geopolitical context of these civil wars' outcomes is also highlighted in Philip Minehan's argument about the significance of timing: the Spanish Civil War raged during the height (or depth) of Anglo-French appeasement policy, which undercut any inclination they might have had to support the Republic. The Yugoslav conflict reached its climax at the height of the East–West alliance against Nazism, when even such a staunch anti-Communist as Churchill was prepared to do business with Communists if they offered the best shot at defeating Nazism. The Greek Civil War's climactic round took place during the early Cold War, when the Anglo-Americans were

once again preoccupied with the containment of communism as their top priority.[40] The Italian case falls outside Minehan's discussion, but actually fits his formula quite nicely: commencing two years after the start of the Yugoslav conflict and at least a year after the beginning of serious fighting in Greece, the Italian Civil War took place while the Anglo-Americans were already beginning their long, hard advance from the south. The combination of timing and geopolitics was such that the Italian Communists were never tempted to imagine they could seize power as long as Allied forces controlled the country—a prudence reinforced by the object lesson of the Greek Communists' abortive struggle against British forces in Athens in 1944. This, along with Moscow's restraining influence with regard to a country Stalin recognized to be in the Anglo-American sphere of control, helps account for the Italian Communists' generally cautious conduct as members of a broader resistance alliance, their participation in the Badoglio government in the south, and their avoidance of any action in the northern conflict zone that might provoke a military confrontation with Allied forces.[41] That said, Tito's success in Yugoslavia was a source of inspiration to Italian Communists, and their relations with non-Communist resistance partners were certainly not completely conflict-free, even outside the Yugoslav border zones where the PCI made common cause with Tito's forces against other Italian resistance forces.[42]

If political power could not be seized through direct military action in Italy, participation in the electoral process did show some long-term promise for the PCI, which remained a force to be contended with in the country's politics well into the 1980s, thanks in part to its legacy as the leading element in the wartime Resistance. Similar prestige was long enjoyed by French Communists, whose electoral support during the decades of the Cold War correlated quite closely to the regions that had witnessed the most active French-on-French (resistance vs. collaborationist) violence in the course of liberation and its immediate aftermath.[43] By the same token, this linkage speaks to a long-term weakness: as memory of the war faded, the strength of Communist support was liable to decline.

Conclusion

The end of the convulsive warfare of the 1940s also marked a close to three to four decades of violent internal conflicts that had variously and periodically afflicted many European countries—from the United Kingdom (Ireland) to Russia, from Finland to Spain—amidst the clashes and collapses of rival empires since the First World War and its aftermath.[44] Throughout Europe, liberation in 1944–5 was followed by quick yet relatively superficial purges of leading collaborators (and/or losers in the civil wars), followed—especially in the West—by the wholesale reintegration of collaborationist sectors of society and the marginalization of troublesomely utopian resistance movements.[45] In the context of post-war economic recovery, this actually proved an effective,

if cynical and morally hollow, formula for transcending or burying the divisions of the recent past.

Most of the century's second half was defined by a Cold War that—though we might like to think of it figuratively as a European and German civil war—divided the Continent into territorially well-demarcated, ostensibly homogeneous, rival geopolitical blocs and that really did remain cold within Europe. The radical scaling-down in levels of political violence in post-1949 Europe was due in part to the wonders of nuclear deterrence, but also to the all-too-horrific effectiveness of ethnic-disaggregation campaigns and related redrawing of borders that, in many parts of Central and Eastern Europe, virtually eliminated the presence of minorities who could serve as either the targets of continued violence or the sources of secessionist rebellion and territorial disputes between neighbouring states.[46]

If, taking into account its current economic travails and its tensions over the new, migration-fuelled, ethnic diversity, today's Europe remains a relative success story, it is worth remembering at what enormous cost this success was gained and on how many graves it rests. Reasonable (and reassuring to the patriotic ego) as it is to associate the bulk of this suffering with the violence of invading armies, an honest accounting will reveal that a good many Europeans in the first half of the twentieth century fell victim to fighting among co-nationals. Much as some may bridle at the European Union's infringements on national sovereignty, it may well be that it is only in the context of the integrative project that the *internal* divisions of European societies, let alone their international ones, can be contained.

Notes

1. Milovan Djilas, *Wartime* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 223.
2. The Chetniks directly coordinated their movements only with the Italians: Walter R. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies, 1941–1945* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973), 101.
3. For a succinct critique of the traditional collaboration/resistance model, see Timothy Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 4.
4. See Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 32–5.
5. Cf. Richard Stites, *The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
6. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), ch. 2.
7. Claudio Pavone, *Una guerra civile: Saggio storico sulla moralità nella Resistenza* (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1991), ch. 5.
8. Seraphim Seferiades, 'Small Rural Landownership, Subsistence Agriculture, and Peasant Protest in Interwar Greece: The Agrarian Question Recast', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 17/2 (1999), 277–323.
9. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 132–3.

10. Pavone, *Guerra civile*, ch. 5.
11. Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence*, 74–6.
12. Niles Eldredge and Stephen J. Gould, 'Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism', in Thomas J. M. Shopf (ed.), *Models in Paleobiology* (San Francisco, CA: Freeman, Cooper and Co., 1972), 82–115.
13. See Max Bergholz, 'Sudden Nationhood: The Microdynamics of Intercommunal Relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina after World War II', *American Historical Review*, 118/3 (2013), 679–707.
14. Mark Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–1944* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), ch. 3 and 112–13.
15. Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 49–52.
16. Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), 106.
17. Djilas, *Wartime*, 321.
18. Pavone, *Guerra civile*, 384–403 and 410–12.
19. Djilas, *Wartime*, 73.
20. Djilas, *Wartime*, 120.
21. Djilas, *Wartime*, 78.
22. Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence*, 307–9.
23. Jan Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (New York: Penguin, 2002), 33 and 109; Gabriel N. Finder and Alexander V. Prusin, 'Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian Police and the Holocaust', *East European Jewish Affairs*, 34/2 (2004), 95–118.
24. Roberto Chiarini, *L'ultimo fascismo: Storia e memoria della Repubblica di Salò* (Venice: Marsilio, 2009), 78–82.
25. Djilas, *Wartime*, 77.
26. 'Report of Captain Winston W. Ehrgott on Greece' (undated, but apparently from early 1944), OSS Papers, RG 226, Entry 154, Box 39, Folder 564, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland.
27. Marcia Kuarapovna, *Shadows on the Mountains: The Allies, the Resistance and the Rivalries that Doomed WWII Yugoslavia* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 187.
28. Bernd J. Fischer, *Albania at War, 1939–1945* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1999), 198–237.
29. Tommaso Piffer (ed.), *Porzûs: Violenza e Resistenza sul confine orientale* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012).
30. Glenda Sluga, *The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity and Sovereignty in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 122.
31. John S. Koliopoulos, *Greece: The Modern Sequel: From 1821 to the Present* (2nd edn, London: Hurst & Co., 2007), 94–101.
32. On the centrality of nationalism to resistance against foreign occupation, see David M. Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 10–12.
33. Matthew A. Kocher, Adria K. Lawrence, and Nuno P. Monteiro, 'The Rabbit in the Hat: Nationalism and Resistance to Foreign Occupation', draft paper cited with authors' permission.

34. Cf. Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1994).
35. Djilas, *Wartime*, 335.
36. Tomasevich, *The Chetniks*, 172–6.
37. Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), ch. 8.
38. Pavone, *Guerra civile*, 587–8.
39. Unsigned report dated 20 August 1944 to G-2-USAFIME [Military Intelligence–US Army Force in the Middle East], OSS Papers, RG 226, Entry 120, Box 29, Folder 199, NARA; Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece*, chs. 22–3.
40. Philip B. Minehan, *Civil War and World War in Europe: Spain, Yugoslavia, and Greece, 1936–1949* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), introd.
41. Silvio Pons, 'Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3/2 (2001), 3–27.
42. Paolo Pezzino, 'Un termine di paragone: Casi di conflitti interni alla Resistenza toscana', in Piffer (ed.), *Porzûs*, esp. 151–4.
43. Philippe Buton, 'Experiences of War, Memories of War, and Political Behavior: The Example of the French Communist Party', in Jörg Eschternkamp and Stefan Martens (eds.), *Experience and Memory: The Second World War in Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), esp. 178.
44. Enzo Traverso, *A Ferro e Fuoco: La Guerra Civile Europea* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), ch. 1; Stanley G. Payne, *Civil War in Europe, 1905–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
45. In Greece, many Communist veterans of the Resistance languished in prison or exile for up to two decades on account of their roles in the 1946–9 phase of civil war, while here as elsewhere many former collaborators and fence-sitters rose to institutional and political prominence: Mark Mazower, 'The Cold War and the Appropriation of Memory: Greece after Liberation', in István Deák, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
46. Keith Lowe, *Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2012), chs. 16–21; Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 6.

PART VII

RECASTING EUROPE, AGAIN

CHAPTER 28

NATION-BUILDING AND MOVING PEOPLE

ALEXANDER V. PRUSIN

In October 1939 Franklin Roosevelt gloomily predicted that by the end of the war between 10 and 20 million people would become refugees; in January 1946 his wife Eleanor pointed to the mass movement of displaced people who were 'against the present governments and if they stayed at home or go home will probably be killed'.[1] Indeed, at the end of the Second World War the victorious Allies and the Eastern European states initiated the most massive population movement in human history, which, while varying in scope, duration, and intensity, affected and disrupted the lives of millions of people.

Forcible migrations of people constitute a fundamental phenomenon in the history of humankind and have occurred time and again. As early as the ninth century BC the Assyrians deported thousands of people as a measure in restructuring the socio-economic profile of the Middle East. To prevent the resurgence of their arch-rival Carthage, in 146 BC the Romans destroyed it and deported its remaining population. The Balkan Wars of 1912–13 initiated a new stage in population policies in the twentieth century, while the Great War and its aftermath could be dubbed a 'great rehearsal' for the mass displacement of people on the basis of the pre-war demographic censuses and ethnic categories. The 1923 Greek–Turkish agreement of reciprocal population transfer in particular provided a crucial precedent for forcible resettlements of populations under international auspices.

The fall of the multi-ethnic empires left in its wake a number of 'conflict zones' where the European governments were constantly seeking more efficient methods of detecting, diffusing, or suppressing potential separatist or irredentist tendencies, sometimes by rearranging the local ethnic composition. For example, the French government forced about 150,000 Germans out of Alsace-Lorraine, which had been reacquired by France after the First World War.[2]

The two totalitarian regimes—Nazi Germany and the USSR—made mass resettlements of populations a state policy. In November 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union

signed a treaty of population exchange between the two states. For Hitler it served to 'Germanize' the annexed western Polish territories, while for the Soviets it fulfilled security requirements to remove potentially disloyal elements from the sensitive border areas. The resettlement also served economic objectives. When in 1940 about 124,000 Germans (as well as those who claimed to be of German background) left Soviet-annexed Bukovina and Bessarabia for German-occupied Poland, they left behind land, livestock, and agricultural implements. By the summer of 1941 the Soviet government had deported more than 300,000 potential 'troublemakers' from the newly acquired western provinces.[3]

At the end of the Second World War Belarus and Ukraine signed bilateral agreements with Poland (Ukraine signed a separate agreement with Czechoslovakia) for the exchange of populations. At the same time, the Soviet security organs deported to remote areas hundreds of thousands of people suspected of collaboration with the Axis powers. The Soviet deportations certainly demonstrated how targeted groups could be removed internally to places where their allegedly dangerous qualities could be rendered harmless.

Such methods, however, were unacceptable to the post-war Eastern European governments, which were determined to eliminate the minority questions once and for all through the total removal of the groups belonging to the 'enemy nations'. The patterns of removal varied from expulsions outside the state borders to 'voluntary migration' (whereby most individuals emigrated under pressure) or population exchanges on the basis of international agreements. Significantly, regardless of the methods, the population transfers were supported by many segments of the populations, for popular resentment towards the Germans, Hungarians, and Italians ran so deep that the governments needed little effort to articulate it.

In turn, the Allied policymakers realized that the Eastern European governments would not accept a return to the interwar minority policies. Hitler's utilization of the large German minorities in Eastern Europe in particular demonstrated that the minority question was potentially combustible. Consequently, Washington, London, and Moscow considered population transfers as geostrategic and prophylactic measures to guarantee border security and international stability. The British favoured population transfer as long as it was carried out 'according to the requirements of order and stability'. The US policymakers also consented to population transfer although they were uncertain about its effects on the situation in Europe and popular reactions in America. On the other hand, forcible resettlement of people was central to the Soviet concept of security. Stalin therefore supported and approved it as the tool to resolve internal ethnic disputes and to secure the borders with the Western states.[4]

The literature on the population transfers after the Second World War is immense and it seems futile to add anything new to this well-charted story. The bulk of existing studies have emphasized the militant nationalism that promoted the exclusivity of nations, whose survival ostensibly depended on the elimination or assimilation of ethnic minorities. The convergence of nationalism, modern technology, and state aspirations to control population demographics made forcible migrations particularly violent.[5]

An important role in these processes was played by 'historical places'—multicultural regions known for long-standing ethnic tensions.[6] This chapter examines population transfer within a larger framework of East European history and politics—namely, as a tool to facilitate nation-building processes and political homogeneity. In this context, the population policies in western Poland, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast appear suitable for a transnational comparison.

'Historical Places' in Context

Since the second half of the nineteenth century the eastern German regions—West Prussia, Silesia, and Posen (Poznań)—had become the site of a growing Polish–German conflict. The Polish cooperative movement and financial institutions gained strength, claiming thousands of members. The German imperial government looked upon such activities with considerable concern and launched a vast colonization drive to redefine the demographic and socio-economic space of these regions. Still, by 1910 Poles constituted about two-thirds of the total population and Polish delegates became a permanent feature in the Reichstag. Since West Prussia and Poznań linked central Polish regions with the Baltic region and were the most industrialized areas of partitioned Poland, Polish nationalists considered them of crucial importance for resuscitating national statehood.[7]

After the Versailles Peace Treaty assigned parts of these regions to Poland, interwar Polish politics were largely dominated by Roman Dmowski's vision of the 'national' state, whereby criteria for 'otherness' rested on religious and cultural affiliations allegedly connected to the individual's political loyalties. The bulk of the Polish political parties (with the exception of the illegal Communist Party) more or less followed Dmowski's logic and stressed the primacy of 'Polishness' in politics and national economy. Accordingly, the government reduced the number of German schools—in 1926–7 there were 254 German public schools and 160 German classes in Polish public schools, but in 1933–4 only 60 schools and 92 classes remained intact. The 'Polonization' campaign in the economic sphere entailed the reduction of German landownership by one-third. In accordance with the law of 14 July 1920 Polish officials could expel all German farmers from the public domain together with all those who lacked legal documents of ownership. Still, in 1928 there were approximately 670,000 Germans in the Poznań area, Pomerania, and Silesia.[8]

Conversely, German nationalists never accepted the status quo and the Nazi Party utilized such sentiments, making territorial expansionism a focal point of its ideology. Poland occupied a prominent place in Hitler's *Lebensraum* planning—both as a vital economic region and as a hateful embodiment of the post-First World War settlement. Poland thus was destined to become an ethnic and socio-economic realm resting on predetermined racial and social criteria. At this junction Nazi racial ideology coalesced with German economic expansionism and popular resentment of the Versailles Treaty.[9]

After the invasion of Poland, in October 1939 Hitler decreed the integration of Poznań and West Prussia into the Reich as a new province of *Wartheland*. Since ethnic Poles constituted 85 per cent of the total population, the Nazi leadership embarked upon a Germanization drive that included the confiscation of Jewish and Polish property and mass expulsion and deportation of Jews and Poles to the General Government (the administrative unit that encompassed the bulk of occupied Poland). However, in early 1942 the ethnic Poles farmed half the cultivated areas, clearly undermining the Nazi illusions of turning the land into a thriving German agricultural realm.[10]

As part of the Hungarian kingdom within the Habsburg Empire, Slovakia was traditionally exposed to a double cultural pressure—from more advanced Czechs and from the Hungarian nobility. As a result, many Slovaks became assimilated into Hungarian culture and some Hungarian nobles felt connected to Slovakia. Until the first half of the nineteenth century Hungarian–Slovak relations remained relatively tranquil, but Slovak national awakening and the revolution of 1848–9 put the two national groups on a collision course.[11]

After the *Ausgleich* (compromise) of 1867 the Hungarian parliament passed the nationality law that guaranteed equal rights to all ethnic groups. In reality, zealous to preserve its interests and privileges, the Hungarian nobility identified itself as a distinct national-political class—*nation hungarica*. Concerned about the demographic predominance of the Slovaks, the Hungarian administration reduced the number of Slovak-language schools (out of 2,000 in the 1860s, only 140 would remain in 1918) and shut down Slovak educational institutions. Aiming at the complete assimilation of the Slovaks, the government also cut down or kept to a minimum the number of Slovak civil servants—in 1910, out of 6,185 only 164 were of Slovak background.[12]

In the wake of the Great War, the victorious Entente took into consideration the strategic and economic interests of Czechoslovakia, and the Treaty of Trianon and the Paris Peace Conference set the Czechoslovak–Hungarian border further south than the Slovak–Hungarian language border. The Hungarians thus were relegated to a minority status in the area they had dominated for a long time—890,000 Hungarians made up about 22 per cent of the population of 2,900,000. Still, out of all the countries of eastern Europe, the Czechoslovak constitution was the most liberal in nature, according ethnic minorities a wide range of political and civil rights. Native languages received official status in areas where the minorities accounted for at least 20 per cent of the population, and Hungarian schools, press, and associations operated unhindered. The Hungarian parties also participated in the national elections.[13]

Slovak–Hungarian relations, however, were tense. Poised to diminish Hungarian cultural influence, the Slovak National Assembly passed a series of regulations that dismissed Hungarian state and public officials. Old symbols, monuments, and markers were removed, city and street names were changed, and the Hungarian national holidays were banned. A deeper point of contention was landownership. According to the land reform of April 1919 the state sequestered the bulk of large land estates (mostly German and Hungarian) and distributed 80 per cent to the Slovak nationals. In addition, the Czechoslovak government encouraged Slovak settlers to claim land in the

Hungarian-speaking counties. Thousands of Czechs and Slovaks migrated to Slovakia, where they received landholdings or state subsidies to buy farmland. By 1922 this situation had forced about 160,000 Hungarians to emigrate.[14]

The Hungarian community responded by forming political groups that promoted autonomy or self-determination. During the Munich Crisis these groups formed the Hungarian National Council, which demanded the reintegration of the Hungarian–Slovak areas into Hungary. Under the provisions of the Vienna Accords on 2 November 1938 Czechoslovakia was forced to cede to Hungary 771 municipalities in Slovakia with a population of 854,217 residents. In some places, the Hungarian population of Slovakia greeted the Hungarian troops as liberators, thus corroborating Czechoslovak official and popular suspicions.[15]

In March 1939 Germany invaded the truncated Czechoslovak state and Slovakia became 'independent' as a junior satellite of Nazi Germany. The Hungarians in the Slovak Republic received preferential status (alongside the Germans) as naturalized citizens (a status denied to the Czechs and Jews). Still, the Slovak regime of Josef Tisso was suspicious of the Hungarian political groups and insisted that the Slovaks living in Hungary proper were given the same preferential treatment.[16]

Istria and Dalmatia constituted a specific region of the Habsburg Empire, where the fusion of the Italian, Austrian, and Slavic cultures generated an atmosphere of pluralism, propitious for cooperation between the political activists of the three ethnic groups. After the wars of Italian unification, this traditional pluralism was gradually sidelined by ethnic nationalisms which fuelled Italian and South Slavic irredentism. While Italian nationalists hoped that South Slavs (the Slovenes, Serbs, and Croats) would embrace, and eventually become assimilated into, the 'superior' Italian culture, the South Slavic activist groups tended to embrace 'Yugoslav' ideology, envisioning Istria and Dalmatia as a Slavic condominium in the Balkans. The conflict was facilitated by differences in socio-economic status—Italian artisans and middle-class professionals dominated the urban areas, whereas the countryside was largely the domain of the Croatian, Slovene, and Serb peasantry.[17]

The main Croatian political group—the Party of Rights—increasingly advocated the 'Croatization' of Dalmatia and turning Croatia into the heartland of the Southern Slavs. It gained influence within the provincial Austrian administration, which strove to replace Italian as the language of instruction in public schools and refused to finance Italian schools. In turn, the Italian nationalist press emphasized the 'suffering' of the Italians in Dalmatia, alleging that Vienna deliberately supported Croat and Slovene aspirations in the Adriatic. Accordingly, Italian nationalist groups objected to the Triple Alliance (between Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany) and advocated war against the Austro-Hungarian Empire to claim Istria and Dalmatia.[18]

Ethnic tensions erupted after the Great War, when Dalmatia was integrated into the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (from 1929 Yugoslavia). The Italian political establishment considered such division of the spoils unfair and blamed the Entente for unfulfilled wartime promises. In September 1919 the nationalist poet Gabriele D'Annunzio and his supporters seized the city of Fiume (Rijeka) and created a

separate 'republic'. On 12 November 1920 the Treaty of Rapallo demarcated the Italian–Yugoslav border, whereby Istria, the Dalmatian city of Zara (Zadar), and a number of islands in the Adriatic were assigned to Italy; Fiume received the status of 'free city'. Italy's expansionist aspirations in the Adriatic thus seemed fulfilled.[19]

The border settlement was followed by the 'Italianization' drive that entailed the removal of Austrian historical marks and monuments. Under increased pressure, the former civil servants, professionals, and middle-class men of Austrian, Hungarian, and Slavic background emigrated to Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Simultaneously, social opportunities attracted many individuals from Italy who sought advancement in Istria and on the Dalmatian coast. To demonstrate the 'Italian' character of the new territories, the official census of 1921 artificially inflated the number of Italian residents to 58 per cent (in reality they never exceeded 35 per cent).[20]

After Mussolini came to power, the Fascist regime began a full-scale campaign to suppress the national identity of the Croats and Slovenians. In 1923 a reform of the school system began with the replacement of the Croat and Slovenian teachers with Italian ones. By 1927 about 500 Croatian and Slovenian schools had been transformed into Italian schools. A series of laws banned the Slovenian and Croat languages in the administration, court, and public places and liquidated Slovenian and Croatian cooperatives, associations, and clubs. In April 1927 a special decree stipulated the 're-Italianization' of personal names (more than 107,000 individuals changed their names under duress).[21] As a result of these policies, about 70,000 Slovenes and Croats emigrated from Istria to Slovenia and Croatia; cities like Pule (Pola), Fiume, and the region of Gorizia lost more than two-thirds of their Slavic populations. In turn, the Yugoslav government utilized the influx of these immigrants as a vehicle for anti-Italian propaganda.[22]

After the Axis attack and dismemberment of Yugoslavia in April 1941, the Italian authorities removed about 10,000 'aliens' from the Fiume district. The Italian administration also incarcerated about 25,000 Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs in concentration camps and planned mass deportations of Slovenians and the resettlement of Italians into the 'emptied' territories. The outbreak of full-scale resistance put these plans on hold.[23]

With regard to population transfer, the views of the Allies, the liberal European politicians, and the Communists did not diverge too widely. By summer 1943 the British government had consented to the transfer of ethnic Germans from eastern and south-eastern Europe to Germany, in cases 'where this seems necessary and desirable'. Churchill bluntly admitted that many Germans would be killed in the process and the Labour Party warned that the Germans might face the choice between 'migration and massacre'. In November 1943 in Tehran Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill agreed that the eastern Polish territories would be incorporated into the Soviet Union, and Poland would be compensated at the expense of East Prussia, Danzig, and the German lands east of the Oder River. On 2 August 1945 the Allies signed the Potsdam Declaration, which legitimized the coercive population transfer of millions of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. To coordinate expulsion (termed 'repatriation'), in October 1945 the Allied Control Council set up a special organization—the Combined Repatriation Executive.[24]

Despite profound ideological differences, by the early 1940s most east European statesmen and political activists concurred that the coexistence of the new political systems and the minority groups that had lost their titular status—the Germans, the Hungarians, and the Italians—was no longer possible. It meant that in contrast to the aftermath of the First World War when European statesmen prioritized strategic objectives over the ethnic question, now they conceived ethnic homogeneity as crucial for territorial integrity and ideological uniformity. To this end, national revival was associated with the dominance of the ethnic majorities. Such thinking ran afoul of the policies dictated by the Versailles Minority Treaties, which had long since lost their appeal. Particularly in the 'conflict zones', minority rights came to be viewed as minority problems, which had to be solved if necessary by radical means. Backed by the Soviets, the communist parties aimed at replacing the old order with the new one, and also conceived the removal of politically and socially 'alien' groups for ideological, economic, and political purposes.

In other words, the concepts of national security and nation-building became intertwined with the ideas of ethnic homogeneity and consolidation of the post-war territorial acquisitions. The population transfer in Poland, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia, therefore, was connected to several interrelated issues and was driven by assumptions that the targeted ethnic groups were potential troublemakers. Personal qualities and affiliations of individual Germans, Hungarians, and Italians were irrelevant.[25]

National Patterns of Population Movement

By 1943 the main Polish political organizations—the government-in-exile, the National Democrats, the Peasant Party, and the Communists—realized that the eastern territories lost to the Soviet Union (according to the Molotov–Ribbentrop agreement) could not be recovered. To compensate for territorial losses, the government-in-exile repeatedly asked the British Foreign Office whether Poland could receive the territories along the Baltic coast. In February 1940 in a letter to the British government, the former foreign minister August Załeski accentuated the resettlement of the ethnic Germans from West and East Prussia as one of Poland's war objectives. In August 1944 the Polish government-in-exile issued a memorandum emphasizing that the Germans and Poles could no longer exist side by side. Those Germans who did not leave on their own would be expelled after the war. Similarly, the leader of the Peasant Party, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, since 1943 prime minister, did not mince words when he insisted that 'no mercy and no weakness can be expressed in defining an exemplary punishment of German fascism and Hitlerism'.[26] These pronoucements clearly identified all Germans with the Nazi regime, providing the official carte blanche for population transfer.

Polish Communists also considered the removal of the German population as crucial for economic reconstruction and the post-war struggle for power. Counting on acquiring popular support, in November 1943 the Polish Workers' (Communist) Party issued a statement in which it aspired to all 'ethnographic' Polish territories in the west. On 22 July 1944 the Soviet-sponsored Polish Committee of National Liberation released a manifesto that called for new Polish borders along the Neisse and Oder rivers and the 'return' to Poland of its 'primordial' lands of the Baltic coast, East Prussia, and Upper Silesia.[27] Identifying all Germans with fascism, in February 1945 the future president of Poland Władysław Gomułka stated that the entire German nation, which 'in its mass supported and tolerated Hitler's regime', should be held responsible for the war and its atrocities. Accordingly, Gomułka stated in April 1945 that ethnic transformation along the newly established borders was the only adequate punishment that could 'compensate the sufferings of the Polish people'.[28]

The first expulsions from the newly acquired western provinces (termed, in official Polish parlance, 'recovered territories') began in the winter of 1945, when the Soviet offensive forced thousands of civilians to flee for Germany proper; tens of thousands were killed during the last months of the war and many left under the threat of violence. The German occupation of Poland and war devastation rendered an exceptionally propitious psychological atmosphere, whereby the removal of the Germans appeared as a just revenge for the Nazi atrocities. Whether fleeing or evicted, masses of expellees trudged westwards, suffering assaults, robbery, and rape by the Polish and Soviet soldiers and Polish civilians.[29]

The situation of the Germans was aggravated by the influx of thousands of Polish refugees from the western provinces of Ukraine and Belarus (incorporated into the USSR). Radicalized by their experiences, they unleashed their frustrations upon the German population. Opportunities to plunder with impunity drew to the 'recovered territories' many unscrupulous individuals, who used the chaotic situation for personal enrichment. In many ways, these territories became the Polish 'Wild West', leaving deep scars in German and Polish popular memories. For example, a Polish film *Prawo i pieść* (Law and Fist), directed by Jerzy Hoffman and Edward Skórzewski in 1964, tells the story of a group of men who pretended to be government officials in a deserted town. Most group members turned out to be petty criminals determined to loot the town, while a lone survivor of a concentration camp resisted them.

Carried out in a haphazard fashion, 'wild' expulsions caused immense difficulties for the Allied occupation authorities in Germany, who had to deal with thousands of destitute people. The Polish government was also concerned that instead of becoming the domain of the state, abandoned property in many villages and towns was providing easy pickings for ravaging civilians and troops. These concerns were exacerbated after the fall of Berlin, when in the hope that expulsion would stop in peacetime, masses of German refugees began returning to their homes in western Poland. Gomułka, who was appointed minister for the 'recovered territories', reacted promptly and sent out orders to the party officials in unequivocal terms to 'expel all the Germans'. Somewhat later he wrote that conditions should be created for the Germans such that 'they won't want to return'.[30]

In May the Communist Party plenum issued a directive to build a 'uniformly Polish state'. Accordingly, in June the Polish troops began more systematic expulsion of the Germans to the Soviet zone in eastern Germany. The majority were forced out, often without basic commodities and food supplies. By early July about 350,000 Germans had been removed from western Poland. Simultaneously, at least 100,000 Germans from Silesia were deported to the USSR as POWs and forced labourers.[31]

The impact of expulsion on the victims was horrific. It dissolved traditional family ties, destroyed the precious memories of childhood and youth, and signalled an uncertain future in an unknown environment. The Polish authorities turned some Nazi concentration camps into transition or detention camps, which were not equipped to provide for the masses of destitute people, who suffered from disease, hunger, and mistreatment by the Polish guards. Thus, the main camp in Łódź was so overcrowded that inmates slept in shifts. Nor did the camp have a heating system, and many people, especially children, soon collapsed as a result of epidemics and the cold.[32]

Expulsion was accompanied by a widespread 'Polonization' campaign—towns and streets were renamed, German signs removed, markers and memorials destroyed or defaced. In April 1946 speaking German in public was prohibited. Even the distinct ethno-cultural groups such as the Kashubians and the Mazurians, who spoke dialects rather than 'high Polish', were liable to fines or expulsion. Soon, however, the Polish administration realized that the removal of the Germans was causing further economic disruption, since it deprived the 'recovered territories' of a crucial labour force and professional skills. Hence, the local officials exempted some Germans from expulsion, if there were no Polish specialists to replace them. Thousands of Germans chose or were forced to apply for 'verification' as 'new' Poles. They were treated as second-class citizens, especially with regard to wages and food supplies. The so-called 'abandoned wives' were also compelled to seek divorce.[33]

In the end, Roman Dmowski's vision of the Polish 'national state' was largely realized. According to the Polish census of 1946, there were 2,036,400 Germans in the 'recovered territories', which would become an important industrial region of the Polish Republic; 417,000 Germans applied for the process of 'verification' as 'new' Poles and remained in Poland, but their numbers gradually dwindled. In 1950 in accordance with a bilateral agreement between the People's Republic of Poland and the East German Republic, 60,000 more Germans were repatriated.[34]

As in Poland, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and the Communist Party leadership began planning 'solutions' to the German and Hungarian questions early in the war and both counted that targeting the 'enemy nations'—especially in the economic sphere—would elicit popular support. Equally important was the expectation that an anti-Hungarian drive could harness Slovak backing for the unified Czechoslovak state after the war. In January 1942 the figurehead of liberal democracy in central Europe Edvard Beneš stated that national minorities, particularly in eastern and central Europe, were a 'real thorn in the side of individual nations' and that ethno-linguistic homogeneity could be attained only by extensive population transfers. This, he argued, should be

carried out on a larger scale than after the Great War in 'as humane a manner as possible [and] internationally organized and financed'.[35]

The first anti-Hungarian campaign was attempted during the Slovak national uprising in August 1944, when the Slovak National Council dissolved the Hungarian Party and placed restrictions on German and Hungarian education and religious services. On paper, the manifesto of the liberated Slovak Republic in February 1945 promised that the new Czechoslovak state did not intend to persecute the Hungarians as long as the latter 'did not cherish any revisionist aspirations' and remained loyal to the state.[36]

The Czechoslovak Communists acted in a more direct fashion. Between 28 February and 1 March 1945 the conference of the Slovak Communist Party in Košice elaborated plans for the removal of the Hungarians from Slovakia. Although the party stressed that those individuals who did not compromise themselves by collaboration with the enemies would be treated as loyal citizens, it simultaneously blamed the majority of Hungarians for welcoming the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and acting as the main allies of Nazi Germany.[37]

In February 1945 the Yalta Conference reversed the Vienna Accords and returned Hungary's borders to those of December 1937, effectively reinstating the confines of the Trianon Treaty. On 5 April the Czechoslovak government adopted the Košice Programme, which was supported by the liberal and social democratic parties. The programme blamed all Germans and Hungarians for foreign occupation and war crimes, stipulated the expropriation of German and Hungarian property, and provided for the deportation of Germans and Hungarians to their mother countries. A special clause made all Hungarians who did not have Slovak citizenship before 1 November 1938 subject to resettlement.[38]

In May 1945 a directive of the Slovak Communist Party further stipulated that Hungarians must not be accepted into the party despite the fact that a number of German and Hungarian anti-fascists had long been members. In a similar fashion, the chairman of the Slovak National Council and a representative of the Democratic Party (headed by Beneš) stressed that Slovakia 'won't tolerate a minority that undermined the foundations of our state'.[39] Accordingly, thousands of Hungarians were interned and in May–June about 32,000 left under pressure for Hungary; they were allowed to take along a mere 50 kilos of goods. In July the economic commission of the Slovak Communist Party issued a directive that stipulated the forced employment of able-bodied Hungarians in agricultural and reconstruction works.[40]

In contrast to ethnic Germans, the Potsdam Conference did not specifically mention the Hungarians as the US, British, and Soviet leadership assumed that their fate would be decided by an agreement between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Such assumptions provided the Czechoslovak leadership with wide latitude of action. Determined to turn the country into a 'two-nation' state, on 2 August Beneš issued Constitutional Decree 33 which revoked the citizenship of Hungarians (and Germans), dissolved their associations and parties, withdrew their social benefits, and dismissed them from the civil service and institutions of higher learning. The use of Hungarian in public life and in publications was banned and the Hungarian-language schools were shut down,

depriving 100,000 children of education in their native language. Still, at the end of the year Beneš complained that there were a 'bit more Hungarians in Slovakia than in Hungary'.[41]

On 27 February 1946 the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments reached a bilateral agreement regarding 'voluntary population exchange', but this did not expedite the process as Prague and Budapest expected that the issue would be resolved under the auspices of the Allies. Internally, the Czechoslovak government initiated the nationalization of land that resulted in the confiscation of 292,000 hectares, of which 108,000 hectares had been Hungarian-owned. The Slovak courts began a series of trials of Hungarians charged with war crimes, which were accompanied by a vehement anti-Hungarian propaganda campaign. Altogether the so-called people's tribunals indicted 23,192 individuals for wartime collaboration; in some cases, even a name change (from Slovak to Hungarian) was adjudged a crime. To ameliorate severe labour shortages in northern Czechoslovakia (after the departure of the Germans from the former Sudetenland) the Slovak authorities deported to the region 42,000 Hungarians as forced labour.[42]

At the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers in April–July and at the Peace Conference in July–October 1946 the Czechoslovak delegation sought international approval for the total removal of the Hungarian minority. The Soviet representative, the notorious Andrej Vyshinskii (chief prosecutor during the infamous Stalinist purges), supported the Czechoslovak requests, suggesting that the ethnic problem would be solved if a state were 'deprived of those segments of population that subscribe to the population of another state'.[43] However, the British and American representatives remained lukewarm about the proposal. From their point of view, the mass expulsions in 1945–6 had created so much havoc and so many economic problems that merely dumping the Hungarians across the border was no longer desirable. Hence, the Czechoslovak delegation was advised to negotiate with its Hungarian counterpart to finalize the border settlement and the population exchange. Counting on international support and financial compensation, the Czechoslovak government consented to the Allied requests and entered into negotiations with Budapest. The expulsions, therefore, were slowed down and by the end of 1947 only about 83,660 (13 per cent) of the Hungarians had left Slovakia. By December 1948 the number had risen to 90,000; conversely, 73,000 Slovaks left Hungary for Slovakia.[44]

The year 1948 proved decisive for Czechoslovak–Hungarian relations. In February the Communists took power in Czechoslovakia and in June the Berlin Crisis heightened Cold War tensions. The Soviet government, therefore, became increasingly concerned over the situation in Eastern Europe, particularly after the break with Yugoslavia. The unity of the Soviet camp became a priority and Moscow promoted the normalization of Czechoslovak–Hungarian relations. In April the Soviet leadership criticized the Czechoslovak Communist Party for 'nationalism', which was taken by Prague as a direct order to reconsider its relations with Hungary.[45]

Accordingly, in October the Czechoslovak government passed legislation that restored citizenship to the Slovak Hungarians; expropriation of their land was stopped. The Hungarian deportees to the Sudetenland were allowed to return to Slovakia.

Hungarian became an officially recognized language, bilingual signs appeared in the Hungarian-dominated counties, the Hungarian professional and educational associations were reopened, and in April 1949 the Czechoslovak–Hungarian treaty of friendship settled financial disputes between the two countries. In 1950 Hungarian elementary and middle schools resumed their activities. In a process that resembled 'reacquiring' German ancestry through joining the so-called *Volksliste*, about 410,000 Hungarians applied to change their nationality; 326,000 were accepted as 'Hungarianized Slovaks'. In some counties up to 90 per cent of those who in the 1930s claimed to be Hungarian 'rediscovered' their Slovak roots.[46]

As a result, when Czechoslovak–Hungarian relations began warming up, most Hungarians in Slovakia decided to stay. After Hungary became a member of the communist bloc (in 1949) they also had to take into account that the economic situation in war-devastated Hungary was much worse than in Slovakia, which suffered comparatively little. In 1954 Hungarian deputies entered the Czech and Slovak national assemblies and the Czechoslovak constitution of 1960 guaranteed all citizens equal political and civil rights. Although more Hungarians would leave in the 1950s, in 1961 the Hungarian community in Slovakia numbered 518,000 people, a vivid sign that a relatively liberal regime and strong economy (by Eastern European standards) proved more attractive to the Hungarians than the call of their 'historic' homeland.[47]

The situation in wartime Yugoslavia rendered ethnic relations more complicated than in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Facing a bitter civil war, which in some areas was fought along ethnic and confessional lines, the Yugoslav government-in-exile was reluctant to formalize specific ethnic policies although it understood that the 'enemy nations'—the Germans, Hungarians, and Italians—would eventually have to leave. Some intellectuals associated with the government-in-exile advocated the removal of ethnic Germans, Hungarians, and Albanians as the key to Yugoslavia's post-war stability. The ideologists of the Chetnik movement—the nationalist resistance, which acted as the armed extension of the government in London—promoted the idea of the 'Greater Serbia', entailing a post-war territorial readjustment and a forcible transfer of about 1 million people. Still, such plans were to affect the Croatian, Slovenian, and Bosnian-Muslim populations more than the German, Hungarian, and Italian minorities.[48]

In contrast, the Yugoslav Communist leadership aimed at a complete political and socio-economic reconstruction of the country along Soviet lines. Such an objective involved the unification of the country, nationalization of the economy, and the total dominance of the Communist Party. In this context, Yugoslavia's Germans, Hungarians, and Italians appeared not only as belonging to the 'enemy nations' but also as members of the 'bourgeois' class targeted for elimination. On the Adriatic coast these ideas crystallized in September 1943, when after the fall of Mussolini the Communist forces temporarily seized power in many areas. On 20 September 1943 the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) declared the reunification of Fiume and Istria with Croatia. While, in accordance with its 'class' ideology, the AVNOJ promoted friendship between Italians and Slavs, the revolutionary tribunals charged scores of Italians with war crimes and collaboration. Some were shot without trial and tossed into

mountain crevices, known as *foibe* (Karst caves). The *foibe* executions deeply affected the collective memories of the Italian population, especially when on 26 September the AVNOJ-convened popular assembly issued a declaration that stipulated the unification of Istria with Yugoslavia and declared that Italians who had arrived in the region after 1918 would have to leave.[49]

In November 1943 the AVNOJ Second Congress announced that post-war Yugoslavia would become a federal state, built on the principle of self-determination and equal rights of its composite nations. Simultaneously, the congress made a decision to disenfranchise Yugoslavia's Germans. Although the declaration did not mention the Italians, cultural localism in Istria and Dalmatia certainly militated against the Communist project of 'socialist reconstruction'. In this context, the Slovenian and the Croatian Communist leadership was particularly determined to homogenize Istria and Dalmatia by radical means.[50]

In 1944 the combination of the Communist offensives and devastating bombings by the Allied Air Forces generated the first exodus of Italians from Dalmatia and Istria. Fiume alone lost 20,000 refugees. In November 1944 the Partisans entered Zara and the Communist administration began destroying the historical marks of the Venetian Republic.[51] According to biased Italian accounts, between 2,000 and 5,000 Italians also fell victim to the Partisan terror. In May the whole of Dalmatia and Istria were liberated and the local authorities encouraged mob violence against the Italian population.[52]

Terror and violence were accompanied by regulations that directly affected the economic status of the Italian community. In June and August 1945 the so-called Confiscation Law and the Law of Agricultural Reform and Colonization stipulated the partial nationalization of land. The reform limited the amount of privately owned land property and particularly targeted the German and Hungarian large estates (numbering 240 out of a total of 369). These measures found support among the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian peasants, who joined the Partisans during the war.[53]

Although these decrees did not directly refer to the Italians, the post-war 'socialist reconstruction' was bound to affect them as well. In October 1944 the Soviet–British accord stipulated the equal division of spheres of influence over Yugoslavia. Consequently, although the Partisans had played a key role in liberating the port city of Trieste, under Allied pressure they had to abandon it. The so-called Free Territory of Trieste was placed in the Allied-controlled Zone A, whereas most of Istria became the Yugoslav-controlled Zone B. Against this background, Tito considered Istria and Dalmatia (the latter was integrated into the Yugoslav Republic) as crucial in the geostrategic confrontation with Italy and the Western Allies. The ethnic question and territorial disputes at the Adriatic coast thus became closely intertwined.[54]

To eliminate Italy's potential territorial claims, the Communist administration was determined to get rid of the Italian minority and to achieve this it relied largely on socio-economic pressure. Confiscation of property and official robbery on a grand scale indeed proved to be the most powerful inducement for 'voluntary emigration'. The first to leave were factory and business owners, who lost their businesses and enterprises to the nationalization campaign. Those who opted to leave became destitute overnight,

leaving behind property, motor vehicles, sewing machines, and electric appliances. Each family was allowed to take along 50 kilos of goods and 25,000 Italian *lira* (replaced by *dinar*, its value went down from a ratio of 1:3 to 1:1). All remaining financial means and valuables were to be deposited at state banks. At the border they were still subjected to 'searches' and often robbed of their remaining possessions by the guards.[55]

By mid-June about 20,000 Italians had left Istria for the Allied-controlled zone of the demarcation line. Italian associations and institutions were shut down and individuals accused of political opposition to the regime were arrested and imprisoned. In addition to the fear of reprisals, the economic situation in Dalmatia and Istria rapidly deteriorated as most industries and ports came to a standstill and inflation soared.[56]

The Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers in April–July and the Peace Conference in July–October 1946 determined the demarcation lines between Italy and Yugoslavia; in February 1947 these lines were confirmed as permanent. Istria became a part of Yugoslavia (albeit Slovenia lost a large part of its coastal strip, where Slovenians made up 90 per cent of the population). Upon the agreement, the Yugoslav government issued a directive by which the residents of the coastal areas had to declare Italian or Yugoslav citizenship.[57] Those who declared themselves Yugoslav citizens were officially granted all civil and political rights, but their situation remained precarious. The administration looked upon individuals of 'bourgeois' origins and those who settled in Yugoslavia after 1918 as potentially disloyal elements. But more importantly, the loss of status compelled many to reconsider their decisions to stay. After dominating the civil service, education, and medical fields, the Italians found themselves in a subordinate position to the Slovenes or Croats. Italian peasants saw their economic livelihood threatened by the suppression of private trade; they had to depend on state-regulated trade and were forced to join cooperatives. Although the new political system officially proclaimed the freedom of religion, it was hostile to the Catholic Church and especially the clergy, many of whom had collaborated with the Axis powers and the Ustaša regime in Croatia. Religious Italians, therefore, were concerned that eventually the State would turn against the Church and thus disrupt their centuries-long traditions.[58]

Being convinced that 'socialist reconstruction' was superior to capitalist economy, the Communist authorities were unwilling or unable to foresee the economic consequences of Italian migration, which caused severe disruption in the regional economies. The situation forced the Yugoslav government and the Italian Communist Party to agree upon a 'counter-exodus' as Italian volunteers arrived in Fiume and Pule to fill the vacancies in industries and shipyards. In addition, until the Italian–Yugoslav border settlement was internally formalized, the official Italian propaganda attempted to persuade the Italian minority in Istria and Dalmatia to stay, but its numbers continued to dwindle.[59]

In 1954 the Memorandum of London assigned the former Zone B to Yugoslavia, while Zone A became part of Italy. Consequently, between October 1953 and August 1956 the last wave of Italian emigration—25,000 people—left Zone B. All in all, between 1946 and 1956 about 200,000 (the exile publications claimed as many as 350,000) Italians left Yugoslavia. In 1981 only 3,000 Italians lived in Yugoslavia (barely 10 per cent of the 1910 census).[60]

Summary

The three case studies presented here were not exceptional in the history of the forced migrations in post-war Eastern Europe. Between 1945 and 1947 approximately 2 million Ukrainians and Poles were 'exchanged' between the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Union; up to 10 million Germans were expelled from Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. These numbers certainly dwarf the fate of smaller groups such as the Italians, Bulgarians, and Turks.

The permanent ejection of the minority groups in Eastern Europe offers a striking case study of post-war ideology, state consolidation, and border settlement. In the context of the Cold War, the Communists in Poland and Czechoslovakia could claim that the removal of the Germans made the new borders a barrier against German revanchism. The Czechoslovak government utilized the pernicious images of the Sudetenland as a potential conflict zone and the Munich Crisis to rally popular support against any revision of the border settlement. For the same purpose, Belgrade could resuscitate Italy's expansionism in the interwar period to manipulate public opinion in Yugoslavia. The border settlement and minority policies in post-war Czechoslovakia only temporarily resolved the Slovak–Hungarian conflict, which remained dormant until the early 1990s. Soon after Slovakia became independent, the situation of the Hungarian minority worsened as the new Slovak government embarked upon the old path of trying to turn the country into a 'national state'. Ethnic relations in Slovakia have remained tense ever since.

While the methods of removal of the 'undesirable' ethnic groups from the traditional 'conflict zones' varied from country to country, there were several crucial commonalities in its causes and dynamics. The Eastern European governments were concerned that in the border areas, affected by long-term ethnic tensions, 'socialist reconstruction' would face the most determined resistance. Hence, the population transfers in Poland, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia were carried out to achieve several objectives at once: ethno-political homogeneity, border security, and elimination of potential territorial disputes with a neighbouring state.

The rightful outrage over many acts of devastation and brutalities committed by the Axis powers only partially motivated the advocates of forced migrations. Most of the communist and nationalist politicians equated ethnic homogeneity with internal stability. Having witnessed political instability and unrest among the disaffected minorities after the First World War, by 1945 the East European political leaders embraced the expulsion of the 'enemy nations' as the lasting solution to ensure the border settlements and to remove those who could obstruct the creation of a new society. In this regard, the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav communist parties effectively discarded the 'class' approach to the nationality question and moved into the realm of ethnonationalism, emulating the 'bourgeois' governments and dictatorships of the interwar period. Accordingly, the target groups were selected not according to their actual activities, but according to their ethnicity and socio-economic status.

The exodus of so many skilled individuals undermined the socialist socio-economic reconstruction and the administrations often took the liberty of applying the principle of collective responsibility selectively, retaining individuals who for some time were considered indispensable to the economy. The remaining 'out-groups' faced relegation to second-class citizenship and under constant pressure faced a choice to emigrate or become assimilated.

Acting out the long-term tensions in the multi-ethnic areas, the communist and non-communist leaderships utilized the negative collective memories of war and co-opted the populations to participate in the population transfers. Conversely, although many Poles, Slovaks, and South Slavs resented the imposition of Communist rule, they approved the expulsions, expecting to reap palpable economic benefits after the Germans, Hungarians, and Italians were gone. In addition, the expulsions served another important political and social function—they fused official ideological objectives and the popular desire to place the blame on selected groups for what essentially was a large-scale popular accommodation with the enemy. In other words, expulsions and forced migration were integral elements of building a national community, for the population at large had a vested interest in permanent socio-economic changes at the expense of ethnic minorities.

Such convergence of official policies and popular desires became essential for consolidating the Communists' grip on internal politics and the eventual establishment of the Communist regimes.

Notes

1. Gerard Daniel Cohen, *In War's Wake: Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3.
2. Philipp Ther, 'Ethnic Cleansing', in Dan Stone (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 147–8.
3. T. S. Ilarionova, 'Obmen naseleniem mezhdu SSSR i Germaniei nakanune i v nachale vtoroi mirovoi voiny', *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 4 (2004), 56–8; Vassyl Cholodnytckyj and Sergij Osatchuk, 'Zur Geschichte der Umsiedlung und Deportation der Bevölkerung der Nordbukowina in den Jahren 1940/1941', in Cécile Cordon and Helmut Kusdat (eds.), *An der Zeiten Ränder. Czernowitz und die Bukowina: Geschichte, Literatur, Verfolgung, Exil* (Vienna: Theodor Kramer Gesellschaft, 2002), 178–9, 182.
4. Matthew Frank, 'Reconstructing the Nation-State: Population Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe, 1944–1948', in Jessica Reinisch and Elizabeth White (eds.), *The Disentanglement of Populations: Migration, Expulsion and Displacement in Post-War Europe, 1944–1949* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 31–4; Arie M. Kacowicz and Pawel Lutomski (eds.), *Population Resettlement in International Conflicts: A Comparative Study* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), xvii–xviii.
5. For example, Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Phillip Ther and Ana Siljak (eds.), *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Pertti Ahonen Gustavo Corni, Jerzy

Kochanowski, Rainer Schulze, and Tamas Stark, *People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and Its Aftermath* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2008).

6. Marina Cattaruzza, 'Der "Historische Ort" der Vertreibungen im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts', in Ralph Melville, Jiři Pešek, and Claus Scharf (eds.), *Zwangsmigrationen im mittleren und östlichen Europa: Völkerrecht, Konzeptionen, Praxis (1938–1950)* (Mainz: Von Zabern, 2007), 39.
7. Robert L. Koehl, *RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939–1945: A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 2–4.
8. Stephan Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919–1939: A Case Study* (New York: Vantage Press, 1961), 95, 128, 134–9.
9. Włodzimierz Jastrzębski, *Hitlerowskie wysiedlenia z ziem polskich wcielonych do Rzeszy w latach 1939–1945* (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1968), 13–14; Susanne Heim and Gőtz Aly, 'The Holocaust and Population Policy: Remarks on the Decision on the "Final Solution"', *Yad Vashem Studies*, 24 (1984), 47–9.
10. Martin Broszat, *Nationalsozialistiche Polenpolitik, 1939–1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961), 34–7, 42; Jerzy Marczewski, *Hitlerowska koncepcja polityki kolonizacyjno-wysiedleńczej i jej realizacja w 'Okręgu Warty'* (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1979), 97–8, 207–8; Koehl, *RKFDV*, 58–9, 67.
11. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), 109, 113.
12. Július Mésároš, 'Some Deformations in the Interpretation of Censuses in Recent Magyar–Slovak Controversies', in Pavol Števček (ed.), *Slovaks and Magyars: Slovak–Magyar Relations in Central Europe* (Bratislava: Správa kultúrnych zariadeni MK SR, 1995), 79–81; Kirschbaum, *History of Slovakia*, 136.
13. Juraj Zvara, *Maďarska menšina na Slovensku po roku 1945* (Bratislava: Nakladeľstvo Epocha, 1969), 24.
14. Attila Simon, 'Czechoslovakia: Slovakia', in Nándor Bárdi, Csilla Fedinec, and László Szarka (eds.), *Minority Hungarian Communities in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 58–60, 203–6; Attila Simon and Attila Kovács, 'Minority Hungarians and Central European Land Reforms', in Bárdi et al. (eds.), *Minority Hungarian Communities*, 158–9; Štefan Šutaj, *Maďarská menšina na Slovensku v rokoch 1945–1948* (Bratislava: Veda Vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej Akadémie Vied, 1993), 13.
15. László Szarka, 'Outcomes and Inconsistencies in Hungarian Policy on Territorial Revision', in Bárdi et al. (eds.), *Minority Hungarian Communities*, 144–5; Simon, 'Czechoslovakia: Slovakia', 203; Zvara, *Maďarska menšina*, 29–30; Šutaj, *Maďarská menšina*, 18.
16. Árpád Popély, 'Slovakia', in Bárdi et al. (eds.), *Minority Hungarian Communities*, 262–3; Zvara, *Maďarska menšina*, 42.
17. Dragovan Šepić, *Hrvatski pokret u Istri u XIX. i na početku XX. stoleća* (Račice: Reprezent, 2004), 39, 103.
18. Luciano Monzali, *The Italians of Dalmatia: From Italian Unification to World War I* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2009), 178–9, 308–9, 312; Šepić, *Hrvatski pokret*, 49, 106, 341.
19. Arrigo Petacco, *A Tragedy Revealed: The Story of the Italian Population of Istria, Dalmatia, and Venezia Giulia, 1943–1956* (Toronto and Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 12.

20. P. Flaminio Rocchi, *L'esodo dei giuliani fiumani e dalmati* (Rome: Difesa adriatica, 1970), 42; Šepić, *Hrvatski pokret*, 537–8; Darko Dukovski, 'Egzodus talijanskog stanovništva iz Istre 1945–1956', *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, 3 (2001), 635.
21. Enrico Miletto, *Istria allo specchio: Storia e voci di una terra di confine* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2007), 21–4; Hrvoje Mezulić and Roman Jelić, *O talijanskoj upravi u Istri i Dalmaciji 1918–1943: Nasilno potalijančivanje prezimena, imena i mjesta* (Zagreb: Dom i Svijet, 2005), 23–4, 63–6.
22. Raoul Pupo, *Il lungo esodo. Istria: Le persecuzioni, le foibe, l'esilio* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2005), 42–3, 49–52.
23. Mezulić and Jelić, *O talijanskoj upravi*, 29–37, 49–52; Antun Giron, *Zapadna Hrvatska u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Rijeka: Adamić, 2004), 82–3; Amleto Ballarini, 'Povijesni pregled događaja', in Amleto Ballarini and Mihael Sobolevski (eds.), *Le vittime di nazionalitá italiana a Fiume e dintorni (1939–1947)* (Rome: Societá di studi Fiumani; Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2002), 104–5.
24. R. M. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2012), 21–2, 160–1; Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 122–3.
25. Frank, 'Reconstructing the Nation-State', 27.
26. T. David Curp, *A Clean Sweep? The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing in Western Poland, 1945–1960* (Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press, 2006), 8–9; Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 124.
27. Curp, *Clean Sweep*, 37–8.
28. Edmund Dmitrów, *Niemcy i okupacja hitlerowska w oczach Polaków: Poglądy i opinie z lat 1945–1948* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1987), 265–7, 273.
29. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane*, 90–1, 109.
30. Curp, *Clean Sweep*, 53–4; Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 124–5.
31. Curp, *Clean Sweep*, 53–4; Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 131.
32. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 129–30.
33. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 134–5.
34. Grzegorz Janusz, 'Die rechtligen Regelungen Polens zum Status der deutsche Bevőlkerung in den Jahren 1938 bis 1950', in Manfred Kittel, Horst Möller, Jirí Pesek, and Oldrich Tuma, *Deutschsprachige Minderheiten 1945: Ein europäischer Vergleich* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 142–4.
35. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane*, 21.
36. Árpád Popély, 'Czechoslovakia', in Bárdi et al. (eds.), *Minority Hungarian Communities*, 300; Zvara, *Maďarska menšina*, 48–50.
37. Zvara, *Maďarska menšina*, 51–2; Šutaj, *Maďarská menšina*, 33.
38. Šutaj, *Maďarská menšina*, 45.
39. Zvara, *Maďarska menšina*, 69; Šutaj, *Maďarská menšina*, 36, 50–1.
40. Szarka, 'Hungary and the Situation of the Hungarian Minorities', in Bárdi et al. (eds.), *Minority Hungarian Communities*, 280–1; Šutaj, *Maďarská menšina*, 60, 63.
41. Árpád Popély, 'Czechoslovakia', in Bárdi et al. (eds.), *Minority Hungarian Communities*, 300–1; László Szarka, 'Hungary and the Situation of the Hungarian Minorities in 1945', 279–81; Šutaj, *Maďarská menšina*, 34, 60.
42. Popély, 'Czechoslovakia', 301–3; Šutaj, *Maďarská menšina*, 80; Zvara, *Maďarska menšina*, 56.
43. Šutaj, *Maďarská menšina*, 80, 110–11.
44. Šutaj, *Maďarská menšina*, 137–9.

45. Frank, 'Reconstructing the Nation-State', 38–40.
46. Mihály Zoltán Nagy, 'The Losses of Hungarian Minorities', in Bárdi et al. (eds.), *Minority Hungarian Communities*, 289; Zvara, *Maďarska menšina*, 58–9; Šutaj, *Maďarská menšina*, 73, 100, 117.
47. Popély, 'Czechoslovakia', 403–5; Šutaj, *Maďarská menšina*, 134–5.
48. Ahonen et al., *People on the Move*, 67–8; Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), 125–6, 130–1.
49. Gaetano La Perna, *Pola–Istria–Fiume 1943–1945: La lenta agonia di un lembo d'Itali* (Milan: Mursia, 1993), 81; Petacco, *Tragedy Revealed*, 37–8, 41–3.
50. Krzysztof Marcin Zalewski, 'Polityka i symbole: Komunistyczna partia Jugosławii wobec społeczności wieloetnicznej. Przykład Suboticy (Wojwodina)', *Studia z dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, 40 (2005), 145; Dukovski, 'Egzodus talijanskog stanovništva', 642.
51. The armed forces of the Yugoslav Communist movement.
52. Gustavo Corni, 'The Exodus of Italians from Istria and Dalmatia, 1945–1956', in Reinisch and White (eds.), *Disentanglement of Populations*, 80–1; Petacco, *Tragedy Revealed*, 80–1, 84–5; Pupo, *Il lungo esodo*, 99–100.
53. Srđan Cvetković, *Između srpa i čekića: Represija u Srbiji 1944–1953* (Belgrade: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2006), 445–6.
54. Pupo, *Il lungo esodo*, 100–1.
55. Petacco, *Tragedy Revealed*, 108–11; Dukovski, 'Egzodus talijanskog stanovništva', 648.
56. Ballarini, 'Povijesni pregled događaja', 124–6; Pupo, *Il lungo esodo*, 101; Miletto, *Istria allo specchio*, 111, 117; Petacco, *Tragedy Revealed*, 99–100.
57. Mihael Sobolevski, 'Fiume, una istoria complessa', in Ballarini and Sobolevski (eds.), *Le vittime di nazionalitá italiana*, 164; Corni, 'Exodus of Italians', 79.
58. Miletto, *Istria allo specchio*, 162.
59. Rocchi, *L'esodo*, 177; Dukovski, 'Egzodus talijanskog stanovništva', 650; Petacco, *Tragedy Revealed*, 125–31; Miletto, *Istria allo specchio*, 166–7.
60. Pupo, *Il lungo esodo*, 124–5; Corni, 'Exodus of Italians', 82–3; Miletto, *Istria allo specchio*, 136.

CHAPTER 29

EUROPE, THE WAR, AND THE COLONIAL WORLD*

MARTIN THOMAS

The Second World War is still regarded by some scholars as a watershed so obvious in its effects on European colonialism that little or no examination of the precise connections between global conflict and colonial collapse is required. Texts on decolonization frequently take 1945 as their starting point, making the implicit assumption that empire was increasingly untenable for Europe's imperial powers. It is easy to see why; after all, the supportive evidence abounds. Britain and France, Europe's pre-eminent imperial nations, were each bankrupted by the war. By 1945 they faced massive tasks of domestic reconstruction that necessarily drew primordial attention and demanded vast resources. For the Dutch and Belgians, as well as the French, defeat and occupation promoted forms of wartime collaboration that mocked any ethically presumptive 'right to rule' other societies. Ruthlessly extractive 'imperial war efforts' in Africa and Asia, and heightened wartime restrictions on people's freedom to move, to consume, and to meet, alienated local populations who were compelled to work harder for a conflict they never owned. And, for all of western Europe's imperial nations, an enduring reluctance to confront the obvious political implications of a supposedly 'just war' in defence of freedom made it harder still for empire administrators to claim that they had colonial communities' best interests at heart. A struggle between competing ideological systems, one of which made racial politics its core rationale, the war ultimately rendered colonial injustice more visible. Speaking in Arlington, Virginia, on Memorial Day, 1942, hadn't Sumner Welles, Roosevelt's idealistic under-secretary of state, justified American involvement in the Second World War by calling publicly for a global, anti-colonial crusade?

> If this war is in fact a war for the liberation of peoples, it must assure the sovereign equality of peoples throughout the world … Discrimination between peoples because of their race, creed or color must be abolished. The age of imperialism is ended.[1]

Anti-colonial rhetoric might force Europe's imperial rulers to rethink their arguments for empire, but, in the short term, changing military fortunes proved more critical. Devastatingly rapid imperial collapses in the face of Japan's onward march through mainland Asia destroyed any residual belief in European imperial invincibility. But Japan's victories in Asia in early 1942 were not the first disasters for Europe's imperial powers. Others were made by the warring Europeans themselves. Three weeks after Marshal Philippe Pétain announced the French surrender, on 10 July 1940 British service chiefs cast around for an alternative to the imminent consolidation of a French regime that seemed likely to bend to German and Italian wishes. The one option discussed related to General Charles de Gaulle. The self-proclaimed leader of Free France, de Gaulle and his supporters had formed a nascent resistance movement, headquartered in London and eager to fight on. To assist him, the British generals discussed whether a small 'Gaullist' expeditionary force might sail to Algiers. The Royal Navy would escort it; American-supplied weapons would equip it. Algeria was deliberately chosen. France's one substantial settler territory, it was constitutionally integrated with mainland France. From a location that was administratively—and symbolically—both the heart of the French Empire and 'home soil', de Gaulle could declare the Free French intention to reconquer metropolitan France, probably via invasion and defeat of Fascist Italy.[2] It was heady stuff. And it was hopelessly unrealistic. De Gaulle's movement was—and would remain—acutely resentful of its de facto dependency on stronger allies. More importantly, every tenet of the service chiefs' discussion was misplaced. Algeria's settlers, if not yet solidly united behind Pétain's Vichy regime, were politically and temperamentally inclined to reject Free France and its presumptuous leader. After all, the General's British partners had killed almost 2,000 French sailors during a bombardment of the port of Oran only a week earlier.[3] Nor could Algeria really be considered a part of France. It was a colony in which ethnic discrimination, typified by the political marginalization, economic neglect, and cultural denigration of the Muslim majority, would erupt into political violence at war's end.

Not surprisingly, the proposed Algiers landing never occurred. Instead, in late September 1940 de Gaulle was ferried to Dakar, administrative capital of the French West African federation, in a remarkably similar—and equally misguided—operation. Perhaps understandably, the failure of the Dakar expedition mattered most to Britain's imperial administrators because of its wider implications for British Africa, and for the established colonial order more generally. Colonial Secretary Lord Lloyd put things bluntly:

> Our strategical ideas for Africa were formed on the basis of the French Alliance. Since the French collapsed we have had to do a complete mental somersault. The African situation is now novel and unexpected … The magnitude of our African interests is out of all proportion to our defences. These interests are in fact continental. The African territories under the rule of the Colonial Office cover an area of 2,000,000 square miles. There are living in them over 43,000,000 people, for whose destinies we are responsible. The addition of the Union of South Africa and the

> Sudan … brings these totals up to 4,652,000 square miles and 60,000,000 people … Our defensive positions there are lamentably weak, and we have given little thought to the strategic problems which may now immediately arise. It is imperative that we should think out now, before it is too late, the complicated issues involved.[4]

British and French imperial prospects—together or alone—were bleaker still in South East Asia. In British Malaya a series of industrial strikes in tin-mining compounds and Singapore's massive naval dockyard had been orchestrated by the colony's Communist Party with varying degrees of success since 1937.[5] The date was no coincidence. It signified the Party's closer identification with its larger Chinese cousin and with China's desperate struggle against Japanese invasion. Each of these causes was inflected with a strongly anti-imperialist rhetoric, the strength and appeal of which intensified as the transnational ties between Chinese communities throughout South East Asia spread in response to the growing Japanese threat.[6] Elsewhere, Vietnamese, Burmese, and Indonesian leftists, as well as other civil society groups determined to avoid a future restoration of European colonial rule, sought wider support at home and overseas. Put differently, the experience of a new, racially configured foreign occupation created the sociopolitical conditions in which local, but transnationally connected, networks of future anti-colonial insurgency took root.

Malaya's exposure to Japanese attack was, of course, heightened by the increasingly tenuous French grip over the Indochinese peninsula. French Indochina's Second World War is usually discussed in relation to a wartime colonial turn towards Vichy, the rise of Vietnamese Communist resistance, wartime famine, and ultimate revolution in 1945. But it also had significant ramifications for the security of French—and British—imperialism far removed from the South China Sea. During 1941 and 1942 southern Vietnam provided the bulk of what little organic rubber the Third Reich could obtain for its war industries. And evidence of Vichy's trans-shipment of Vietnamese rubber helped the British authorities to persuade their US counterparts to break with Pétain's regime and its colonial satellites in North and West Africa. These complex webs of connection—between communities of Chinese contesting colonial domination on the one hand, and between French Indochina's loss of economic sovereignty and the Allied decision to act against Vichy in Africa on the other—point to a wider phenomenon: the globalization of imperial crisis under the strains of multi-continental war.

Allied victory in 1945 did nothing to reverse this globalizing dynamic. If anything, the emergent post-war international system made the challenge of rebuilding empire harder still. As Colin Gray suggests, by 1945 the most intractable problem in Europe was not how to make peace *with* Germany but, rather, how to make peace *about* Germany and its future.[7] So, too, the critical dilemma for those governing European colonial empires was to sustain control over the futures of dependent territories in international and transnational environments fundamentally reshaped by war. The Soviet and American giants were assuredly less anti-colonial in practice than their founding myths might suggest. The Americans recognized that European colonial spaces presented more of a barrier to Communist influence than any real obstacle to the advance of US

free-trade capitalism.[8] The Soviet regime was also too preoccupied with its own imperial dominance in the 'Second World' of Eastern Europe to invest its political energies or military assets in anti-colonial movements in the 'Third World' of Africa and Asia. This was a bitter disappointment to anti-colonial radicals such as the Trinidadian writer George Padmore, whose wartime manuscript *How Russia Transformed Her Colonial Empire*, finally published in 1946, suggested that Soviet resilience derived from its multi-ethnic unity in service to a higher ideological cause.[9] But all was not lost for those hoping that the superpowers might yet insist that the Old World imperialists change their ways.

The US and Soviet governments were willing to intervene decisively against Western Europe's ailing colonial empires when their reputations and material interests were affected, or when potential clients in the global South were at stake. Ironically, it was the United States, not the Soviet Union, that took the lead here. From Palestine to Dutch Indonesia, the Americans, it seemed, were strategic realists, willing to sink Europe's floundering colonial ships rather than waste resource and reputation bailing them out. Perhaps such actions were not simply realism at work. They could be read differently as logical consequences of a new cultural outlook, one that was institutionally embodied in the United Nations and rhetorically embedded in new instruments of international law that at last defined basic human rights in terms fundamentally at odds with the racial hierarchies of European colonialism. To sum up, however one cuts it, in this interpretation 1945 was a watershed for Europe and its relationship with the colonial world.

Let us pause a moment to consider any problems with this line of approach. For one thing, it is perhaps too tempting to read the history backwards. The fact that we know the end points of formal colonial rule may lead us to forget that, for those involved, the process appeared less determined and more contingent. For another thing, it is equally easy to trip over the supposed 'milestone' of the Second World War, ascribing undue influence to a failing capacity or will to rule among the colonial powers themselves. Such generalizations leave no room for agency among colonized peoples themselves and dismiss both rulers and ruled as essentially homogeneous, almost preprogrammed to behave stereotypically as reactionaries or revolutionaries.

Recognizing these interpretive problems, political analysts of European decolonization are now more divided over the extent to which the Second World War triggered the collapse of European colonial rule. Much of the evidence for a deep causal link still looks persuasive. Within four years of the end of the Second World War, Britain had withdrawn from the Indian subcontinent. The Mandate for Palestine, arguably never a workable proposition, had disintegrated, leaving war and refugees trailing in its wake. To the north, France was evicted from Syria and Lebanon, while, far to the east, Dutch recognition of the Indonesian Republic in December 1949 brought down the curtain on South East Asia's largest European colonial project. Admittedly, UN-backed plans for trusteeships in former colonial territories were, in some places, abandoned or corrupted (think of British predominance in former Italian Libya, for instance). But, in others, they were well advanced.

Equally significant, the justificatory language for empire had changed profoundly, evidence of a widespread shift towards a technocratic, results-oriented administrative style that would soon become the norm in much of the global South. If basic political rights were still frequently denied within dependent territories, a stronger accent on improved living standards, sustained infrastructural investment, and proto-industrialization gave imperial powers something with which to muffle the rising chorus of transnational criticism against colonial abuses. For all that, the concept of the Second World War as a watershed in the end of empires should not be accepted uncritically. Several reasons indicate why.

To make the Second World War the decisive catalyst for decolonization underestimates pre-war trends towards the disintegration of European colonial control. Once one adds these factors up, they are not so readily dismissed: early nationalist organization and varying forms of protest, interwar rebellions, and the economic dislocation between European states and dependent colonies triggered by the global depression of the early 1930s—all were powerfully disintegrative. To take an obvious example, British rule in India, while not quite rendered untenable by Mahatma Gandhi's interwar civil resistance campaigns, was certainly refashioned in response to them. After the preceding years of protest and persecution, between 1935 and 1939 the Indian National Congress was induced to collaborate with imperial administration, first at provincial level, then more widely. Expecting India to fight a war to which its population had never assented undermined what Judith Brown terms this 'collaborative nexus', paving the way for wartime resumption of demonstrations, the 'Quit India' movement, and the jailing of Congress leaders.[10] Even so, when viewed from a more long-term perspective, the war years signified a reversion to earlier patterns of civil protest rather than something without precedent.

Primary emphasis on the years 1939–45 further implies that extraneous, war-induced factors precipitated empire collapse. It is hard to dispute this in relation to the fall of Hong Kong or Singapore or to growing US regional dominance in the Caribbean basin, one might say. Even so, this 'war first' viewpoint obscures the extent to which colonized individuals and groups were already taking the initiative in achieving their own sociopolitical advances, particularly through industrial actions, heightened—often transnational—political organization, and stronger claims for equality under law between whites and non-whites.[11] Equally, the 'Second World War as catalyst' argument minimizes the degree to which European colonial powers had begun adjusting forms of imperial control to changed economic, social, and political conditions in the colonies. To take two well-known examples: from the French Popular Front's short-lived but authentic willingness to elaborate a colonial welfare programme to the British imperial forays into development epitomized by Lord Hailey's 1938 monumental *African Survey*, redefining the scope of imperial obligation was already in the air.[12] In this sense, the war marked an interruption of planned modernization and reform, not their original cause.

Interpretational problems arise even if we do concede that the war was the principal agent of change. By 1945 there was an obvious geopolitical disjuncture between Asia and

Africa that was reflected in a differential pace of decolonization. In South and South East Asia, European colonialism was undermined by two consecutive shock waves. One was the impact of Japanese regional supremacy and the occupations that came with it between 1942 and 1945. The other was the subsequent dominance achieved by the United States around the Pacific Rim. Ultimately, it was not the regulation of Japan's defeat in 1945 but the development of Cold War in East Asia that dictated the terms of Asian decolonization, ensuring that the United States played a more dominant role in the colonial actions of France and the Netherlands.

So, too, in the Middle East, the war transformed regional politics and social organization, hastening the emergence of fully independent Arab states and intensifying the conflict between Arabs and Zionists in Mandate Palestine. But Africa south of the Sahara was a strategic backwater for most of the war, and neither colonial authorities nor most anti-colonial nationalists envisaged national independence as an immediately achievable goal. It seems equally clear that European governments and voting populations never thought that the war made abandonment of empire inevitable. In fact, popular imperialism in France and Portugal especially emerged stronger after 1945 than before it.

So where does this leave us? With the Second World War reduced to the rank of merely one cause among many for the demise of Europe's maritime empires? Surely that is to swing the pendulum too far in the opposite interpretive direction? In a field as contested as imperial history, it is perhaps unsurprising that forceful counter-arguments can easily be proposed. Let's take some of these in turn. We know that the disappointment felt by colonial leaders whose demands for additional rights went unanswered after the First World War spurred the growth of anti-colonial protest and new forms of transnational anti-colonial activism. British and French imperial rule survived nonetheless.[13] The Second World War, by contrast, had made the territorial, economic, and intellectual certainties of European imperialism crumble away.[14] By early 1942 the British, Dutch, and French colonial federations in South East Asia were either overthrown or reduced to Quisling status. India was in political and communal ferment, the outlines of eventual partition and British withdrawal increasingly visible. Sub-Saharan African colonies, although rarely on the war's strategic front lines, nonetheless experienced the global conflict in visceral terms because of harsher governmental demands made on recruiters, labourers, food producers, and families. Net purchasing power tended to decline (real-terms price inflation was widespread). Material hardship increased. Political space shrank.

Admittedly, the United Nations Charter of 1946 fell short of demanding an end to colonial rule. Indeed, its key authors showed little enthusiasm for explicit reference to any presumptive right to 'self-determination'.[15] The charter did, however, commit its signatories to develop 'self-government', a term for which French colonial officials quickly acquired an acute loathing.[16] And it soon became apparent, not just that colonial nationalist leaders expected the Allies to uphold their wartime pledges of support for democratic liberties, but that countless people around the world did too. Galvanized by transnational networks of shared interest that, for instance, linked African-Americans

seeking an end to discrimination at home with Africans and Indians who wanted freedom from colonialism, the perceived right for people of shared ethnicity to govern themselves became more closely bound up with demands for an end to racial discrimination.[17]

Having rehearsed the arguments for and against closer identification between the Second World War and the fate of colonial empires, the rest of this chapter tries to provide some answers. To do so, it explores certain themes connecting the Second World War's impact and the future of European colonialism after 1945. These themes include the war's effects on imperial thinking in Western Europe; connections between money and empire; the transition to Cold War; and, finally, a few reflections on the phenomenon of 'politics through violence' prevalent in European decolonization after 1945.

War and Imperial Thinking in Western Europe

A remarkable presumption behind the imperial policies emanating from London, Paris, Brussels, and The Hague in 1945 was that imperial relationships weakened by wartime occupations, uprisings, or deprivation could be revitalized in peace. (Portugal's wartime neutrality, although tenuously observed, spared it the worst of the conflict. If this set the Salazarist regime apart, the Lusophone imperial core of Angola and Mozambique was strongly affected by developments in neighbouring Belgian Congo and the settler-dominated regimes of British Southern Africa.) Portugal aside, the human and material costs of maintaining empire fell on four European countries devastated by war. Among them, only Britain escaped the divisive legacies of wartime collaboration at home and imperially.[18] For all that, Britain—like France, the Netherlands, and Belgium—was financially prostrate. Their governments looked to Washington for short-term financial relief, aware that tasks of domestic reconstruction were their first priority. Redistributionist fiscal policies, welfare reforms, and ambitious public spending were pursued through continuing peacetime austerity. And this determination to lay more equitable foundations for future domestic prosperity informed the two strands of political belief newly dominant in post-war north-western Europe: left-tinged social democracy and Catholic Christian democracy. Each emerged within a post-war cultural environment presciently described by scholars as one of 'life after death' in which relief at surviving the war was matched by reification of the family as the bedrock of society.[19]

The inward focus within the societies of Western Europe's imperial states does not, though, imply any governmental or popular turn away from empire. To the contrary: the urgency of post-war domestic reform was matched by imperial administrative changes that seemed almost hyperactive after the lassitude imposed by economic depression and war. Between 1945 and 1947 sweeping constitutional rewrites, mulled over in wartime, were rolled out—piecemeal in the British case, throughout its empire in the French case.

Development, once conceived primarily in terms of grand but remote infrastructural projects, was reinvented as something meaningfully local. Additional schools, piped water, housing schemes: all were potentially socially transformative because they were closer to the people.[20] This accent on bottom-up improvement in living standards was matched by new thinking about imperial citizenship, local governance, even democratic inclusion. French and British post-war imperial vocabulary replaced 'colonies' with 'territories', 'Commonwealth partnerships', and 'unions'. The same might have held true in Dutch as well had not Indonesian independence been declared in August 1945 in open defiance of the anticipated return of imperial administration.

Would there be a repeat of 1919, when peacemaking fostered new ways of thinking about imperial relationships and ethnic rights that were quickly snuffed out as colonial rulers retreated into old habits? The rapidity with which violence and rebellion engulfed colonial South East Asia might suggest so. To the west, the calamitous aftermath of Indian partition in 1947 and the tragic impasse in Palestine meanwhile pointed to a different, more chaotic future, one in which the end of empire unleashed communalist impulses that left millions of refugees dispossessed or stateless.[21] In colonial Africa and the Caribbean, though, the results were mixed. Problems abounded north of the Saharan belt. A bitter May 1945 uprising amidst near-famine conditions in eastern Algeria and sustained political and industrial militancy in neighbouring Morocco and Tunisia exposed levels of nationalist opposition that ultimately rendered French North Africa ungovernable. In Egypt dispute over the scope and strategic implications of Britain's treaty rights intensified years before the Free Officers' Movement seized power in July 1952. Ironically, former Italian Libya, epicentre of the Second World War in Africa and scene of vicious reprisal killings during the changes of regime that accompanied that campaign's back-and-forth progress, perhaps occasioned the greatest optimism. Its trusteeship status, stalled at the UN, remained in dispute throughout the late 1940s. Even so, the end of Fascist colonialism and post-war international oversight registered improvements of a sort.[22] In sharp contrast, at Africa's southern tip, the victory of Dr D. F. Malan's National Party in June 1948 heralded the programmatic introduction of apartheid, an institutionalization of total racial discrimination long in gestation.[23] Albeit an extreme manifestation, South Africa's race politics foretold a deeper imperial truth. In Portuguese and French territories as well as in British, the status of Africa's white settlers would precipitate the longest and bitterest struggles of European empire's end.

Evidence of disorder, violence, and discrimination in the global colonial landscape after 1945 is easy to find, but in some places the possibility of dialogue and enhanced imperial relationships persisted. Without simply moving from one colonial region to the next, the case of francophone Africa suffices to prove the point. French black Africa in the post-war decade witnessed the two extremes of repression resumed and reformist horizons widening. Madagascar exemplified the former: a 1947 revolt brutally suppressed at a cost of perhaps 100,000 lives. But, in much of French black Africa, what historian Frederick Cooper describes as a 'claims-making culture' took root. Colonial voices in politics, the workplace, student residencies,

and civil society tuned into the inclusive language of France's Fourth Republic; indeed, more than that: they shaped it.[24] The long-held French republican design of empire integration, fashioned through the dissemination of French language and culture and idealized in terms of colour-blind citizenship and rights equivalence, was far from realization. But the talk of wider citizenship, enhanced worker entitlements, strategic investment, and greater intercultural respect was more than empty rhetoric that could be wished away once its metropolitan opponents regained office. Along with the language, the terms of imperial politics had changed. The principal consequence was that people of influence throughout French West Africa discerned unprecedented possibilities for social improvement, democratization, and federal partnership within the framework of empire. Much as this points to a post-Second World War imperial 'moment' of more lasting duration than that of the Paris peace settlements, so, too, does the generational shift among the political leaderships of Western Europe's imperial powers.

For many in Clement Attlee's Labour administration, wartime experience in government confirmed their belief in state intervention as the locomotive of societal change.[25] The Fabian reformism of some Labour colonial specialists melded remarkably well with Colonial Office gradualism. Each was informed by positivist notions that benevolent administration validated British imperial authority. Meanwhile, in France, where the Socialist and Communist Left shared power with Christian Democrats and other centrist groups, wartime resistance—and, by extension, collaboration—had refashioned politics. A resistance past became a badge of republican legitimacy, which, somewhat paradoxically, French Communists and right-wing supporters of Charles de Gaulle mobilized for opposing political purposes. And the arc traced by resistance supporters from outlaws to national leaders resonated among anti-colonial groups from Algeria to Vietnam. All followed the same cue, couching their demands in terms of the right to resist unjust foreign rule. Little wonder that, all too briefly, France's new leadership felt bound to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh's Hanoi regime before resolving to crush it in late 1946.[26]

Shaped by markedly different wartime political cultures, those governing the postwar empires of Britain and France thus shared a willingness to tackle the imperial fissures opened by the war, recognizing that colonial practices could not simply continue as before. But these commendable impulses were soon dampened by their shrinking room to manoeuvre economically and strategically. Huge wartime debts and hardening East–West enmity transformed the political context in which imperial rebuilding was supposed to occur. More than excuses, the twin pressures of austerity and Cold War quickly circumscribed the thinking about self-determination, capacious imperial citizenship, even negotiated withdrawal that pervaded colonial ministries immediately after the war ended.[27] Attlee's government, for instance, expected colonial economic assets to assist the recovery of sterling. And, although the prime minister famously ventured the suggestion of a Middle East pull-out in 1947, by the time Labour left office in 1951 the idea seemed outlandish.[28]

Money, Empire, and Cold War

The preceding observations bring us to the identification between global status, monetary resources, and empire. A long-established phenomenon, it emerged stronger than ever after 1945. The British case was especially instructive. Sterling's uncertain future as both a reserve and a transactions currency in a global trading system dominated by US dollars redefined official thinking about the value of imperial connections. Britain's war spending was funded, in part, by borrowing from empire treasuries, meaning that the country entered peacetime with a large imperial war debt. India was Britain's largest colonial creditor, its 1.3 billion of sterling assets (at 1946 values) critical to British liquidity. Other imperial territories accounted for an additional billion plus, Egypt and Sudan alone holding 400 million. Only after tough talking with the major empire creditors, notably India and Australia, during 1946–7 were the necessary stopgap arrangements made to avert a crisis over these sterling balances.[29] Self-interest trumped fellow feeling here. It made no sense for Commonwealth governments or soon-to-be-independent India to undermine sterling's value in international markets.[30] Nor were Britain and, by extension, France, financially toothless. Each could still use strategic investment, customs tariffs, and tax breaks to foster a climate favourable to home industries and, by extension, less favourable to other outsiders. Amidst the emergent Bretton Woods system of dollar-dominated global free trade, there remained substantial pockets of protected European imperial economic influence that would endure into the 1950s and beyond.

This, though, was far from the whole story of war, money, and empire economics. Of much greater significance to many occupied and dependent populations was the war's impact on price stability. From Greece to Vietnam a toxic combination of state requisitioning and rampant inflation rendered essential foodstuffs either unavailable, unaffordable, or both. The result was famine. Japanese extraction of the bulk of Vietnamese rice during lean harvest years in 1943 and, more especially, 1944 created a starvation belt that stretched along Tonkin's Red River Delta. Conservative estimates suggest a death toll among the north Vietnamese of half a million. Probably higher, this dreadful human cost of new-style colonial occupation was integral to the Vietnamese revolution over the summer of 1945. The Communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam established in Hanoi during August–September made peasant land reform a central plank in its programme for a post-colonial state.

At much the same time, famine also engulfed north-eastern India. Slow to respond, British authorities in Bengal ultimately failed to alleviate chronic food shortages precipitated by requisitioning, rising costs, and a breakdown in Bengal's agricultural market system.[31] By the end of 1944 some 3 million Bengalis had died. A searing indictment of colonial inability to guarantee human life through the economic stresses of world war, Bengal's famine utterly discredited British rule. Meanwhile, the disintegration of social solidarity among Bengal's starving population heightened Gandhi and other

Congress leaders' determination to foster stronger national cohesion among India's poor.[32] Whether for colonial powers or their opponents, wartime famine thus registered stronger social and political impact than any promises of impending peace and a return to the certainties of European imperial rule.

With India and Palestine the most striking examples, the European colonial withdrawals of the late 1940s also triggered huge population movements and altered long-established economic and cultural relationships within and between countries and communities.[33] The post-war surge in empire disorder changed the points of contact between First World and Third. So, too, in the 'Second World'—the Eastern European and other territories living under Soviet dominion—interest in decolonization mounted. For some Eastern Europeans, anti-colonial activism was perceived as evidence of authentic socialist revolution (as in Vietnam or, rather later, in Cuba). For others, colonial insurgencies were read as proof that seemingly immovable foreign occupations could be successfully challenged.[34] Some imperial powers also reinvigorated empire connections at the same time as anti-colonial pressures increased. Post-war emigration was one facet of this. In the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s white Europeans still departed in their thousands—in the British and Portuguese cases, in their hundreds of thousands—for countries that retained imperial connections to the homeland.[35] Simultaneously, migrant traffic flowing in the opposite direction, from dependencies past or present to Europe, also reshaped European societies demographically, culturally, and politically.

As for the Cold War, it was the imperial powers' misfortune to set about post-war imperial reconstruction along the conflict's fault lines in South East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.[36] Crisis after crisis tumbled into one another within the Dutch, British, and French empires over the next quarter-century. As in 1919, so after 1945, the United States was critical. It weakened the grip of colonial powers: the Dutch in Indonesia; the British in Palestine; initially at least, the French in Indochina. At the same time Washington disappointed those colonial subjects who anticipated a brave new world of democratic freedom.[37] Just as 1919 witnessed a fleeting Wilsonian moment, so the years 1944 to 1947 might be identified as a second 'moment' in which America might have played its diplomatic and strategic cards in the anti-colonialists' favour.[38]

Events turned out otherwise. Post-war US administrations did more to conserve colonial systems than to destroy them.[39] Once overwhelmingly explained in terms of Cold War zero-sum thinking—the imperatives of Western strategic interest trumping the empty rhetoric of US anti-colonialism—historians have, more recently, been drawn to other explanations for this shift in American approach. The most subtle posit that the United States worked with its British and French partners to ease their withdrawal from empire, clearing a path for US dominance while, for the most part, avoiding open confrontation.[40] President Truman's 'layered conception of sovereignty' cast self-determination not as a basic right, but as an ideal condition contingent on the abilities and willingness of the people involved to adhere to Western standards and political loyalties.[41] Back in 1945 it was in the Far East that the European imperialists were feeblest and American military might most decisive.

The restoration of British imperial authority in post-war Malaya was assigned to a military administration poorly equipped to handle the deepening social crisis it confronted. Its most visible indicators were epidemics and malnutrition. Alongside malaria, the perennial killer of rural populations in weakened physical condition, localized outbreaks of smallpox, cholera, and typhoid added to an escalating mortality rate. Municipal authorities in Singapore and other coastal cities were overwhelmed by an influx of refugees and the wartime displaced. Increasing numbers of industrial workers were drawn to the radicalism of Malaya's Communist Party, the one political organization that could boast a solid war record of resistance to the Japanese. These disturbed conditions, strikes and health scares, rising criminality, workplace disorders, and the radicalization of Malaya's trade unions formed the backdrop to the restoration of civil administration in 1945–6.[42] By the time colonial governance was restored over the winter of 1945–6, Malaya's population was in no mood to respond to the reforms painstakingly devised by British officials in anticipation of their post-war return to South East Asia. The Malayan Union, an April 1946 constitutional plan, tied the restoration of British civil government to more equitable citizenship rights for Malaya's three principal ethnic groups—Malays, overseas Chinese, and south Indians. Well intentioned but arrogantly imposed, the Malayan Union triggered fierce opposition from Malay community leaders fearful of a loss of privilege within a society in which Malaya's two major immigrant groups would at last acquire basic civil rights. British colonial authority was soon outflanked, on the one hand by Malay conservatives anxious to preserve Malaya's long-standing communal hierarchy, on the other by Communists determined to exploit the war's social dislocations. British schemes for new citizenship arrangements, more inclusive governance, and ultimate self-government would all have to be rethought as Malaya descended into political violence over the summer of 1948.[43]

Malaya's post-war crisis, unique in its communal dynamics, was also part of a wider post-war regional trend. As we know, in Vietnam, too, Japanese occupation, Communist revolution, and the northern famine that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives made the restoration of French authority, let alone French imperial legitimacy, an impossible task. French policy after 1948 therefore hinged on building up an alternative, conservative locus of Vietnamese nationalism. French officials vested their hopes in the former emperor of Annam, Bảo Đại, as a non-Communist Vietnamese national figurehead. And the French military increasingly sought to 'Vietnamize' its war against the Communist-led regime in the north by developing a Vietnamese national army to take more of the strain.

Decolonization from the Dutch East Indies meanwhile unfolded during four years of violent struggle that followed Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta's announcement of the unilateral independence of Indonesia on 17 August 1945. In Indochina, French forces fought an eight-year war against Ho Chi Minh's Communist-led Vietminh coalition that ended in crushing defeat and final French withdrawal after the battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. In both cases, the Dutch and French colonial authorities had to fight their way back into power, meeting determined nationalist resistance after the phased withdrawal of British occupation forces in late 1945–6. But in neither Indonesia nor

Indochina were the Dutch and French imperial authorities simply fighting to restore colonial power. The Netherlands colonial authorities sought to build up a federation of pro-Dutch Indonesian states that would counterbalance the power of Sukarno's republican regime in Java. The strength of ethnic, religious, and regional differences among the populations of the Indonesian archipelago, and the residual power of pro-Dutch elites in the outer provinces, including Indonesia's second most populous island, Sumatra, seemed to favour Dutch efforts to cement a network of autonomous island governments, the so-called Malino states, that would acquiesce in an Indonesian federation under Dutch supervision.

It was against this backcloth that the two Dutch 'police actions' in Indonesia, the first in July 1947, the second in December 1948, unfolded. Blighted by flagrant military abuses against Indonesian civilians, each was intended to strengthen the Dutch hand in independence talks with Sukarno's government in the Javanese capital Djokjakarta. In the first police action of July 1947 Dutch colonial forces mounted a limited offensive in Java. This proved sufficient to wrest further concessions from the republican government in the January 1948 Renville Agreement over the precise timing and preconditions for any transfer of power. But the second police action was politically disastrous. In flagrant violation of the Renville stipulations, on 19 December 1948 Dutch paratroopers took control of Djokjakarta, only to pull back twenty-four hours later under a barrage of international criticism. Whereas France and Britain, both Security Council members, were well placed to block General Assembly consideration of their colonial improprieties, the Netherlands government was not. Far from strengthening their bargaining position, Dutch colonial officials ensured that the transfer of power in Indonesia would take place on American, not Dutch, terms.[44]

Cold War and Empire Politics through Violence

The examples of worsening violence in late colonial Malaya, Vietnam, and Indonesia illustrate a wider post-war phenomenon of the global South. Certain elements of the European imperial breakdowns in Africa and Asia after 1945 proved to be less nationally specific than colonially generic. Federations attempted, then abandoned; improvised, often chaotic, partitions; hardening settler opposition to black majority rule; and insurgencies that proved difficult to contain: these were phenomena of European decolonization whose consequences tended to spread beyond their original locale. Cumulatively, this disintegration of European–colonial connections was *globalizing* in its effects. Indeed, decolonization is perhaps better understood as a global process rather than within an analytical framework confined to a particular empire. Europe–colonial world conflicts were typically 'bottom up' in nature, characterized by substantial mobilization of the colonized and comparatively less commitment by the imperial power.[45] Usually at

a technological disadvantage, colonial insurgents turned instead to propaganda and the printed word, consolidating regional networks of support among sympathetic neighbours and publicizing their cause at the UN, in foreign press outlets, and in televisual media. As Chris Goscha has indicated for French Vietnam and Matthew Connelly for French Algeria, only rarely did the 'weak' achieve victory through decolonization by military means. More often, they won the moral argument, leaving Western Europe's imperial nations struggling to make their more progressive arguments for empire seem anything other than self-serving.[46]

Those interested in deeper, impersonal forces might be frustrated at how rarely decolonization is examined as a global phenomenon, one in which Europe's Second World War experiences transformed its relations with the colonial world. To be sure, histories frequently 'join the dots', suggesting that colonial collapses unfolded inexorably, even predictably, one after another. And the Second World War is often identified at the trigger. The point is that these presumptive links and individual empire approaches may conceal as much as they reveal. Linking colonial withdrawals in a domino theory-type sequence does not tell us very much, not least because some pull-outs were violent and total while others were relatively peaceful and far from complete. It is perhaps more useful to recognize that these post-war shifts were inherently transnational, the changes in sovereignty involved sometimes of less imminent consequence than the movement of people, ideas, and political actions across colonial—and empire—boundaries that resulted. To be sure, decolonization, by its nature, lent itself to emulation. Its catalysts, transnational or otherwise, and the shared dilemmas of imperial powers were not somehow illegible to those caught up in the process. Far from it: after 1945 opposition to imperial rule transformed a geopolitical system otherwise placed in stasis by Cold War. Necessarily global, the interaction between war, Europe, and the wider world, oft-times described by the shorthand term 'decolonization', would alter the terms on which international politics were conducted, on which capital and trade flows proceeded, and on which cultural and political attachments were understood.

Notes

* This chapter draws on my book, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France and their Roads from Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

1. Cited in Julian Go, *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 145–6; and in Wm. Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 154–5.
2. The National Archives (TNA), WO 208/52, Vice CIGS note on Lord Dillon's 'Suggested plan for de Gaulle', 10 July 1940.
3. Hostility to Britain and Free France was widespread in the French Empire even before the Mers el-Kébir bombardment, see TNA, WO 208/52, Colonial Office circular to Overseas Governors, 20 June 1940; War Office military intelligence, 'Summary of reports on morale of French Colonies up to 24 June 1940'.

4. TNA, PREM 3/99/1, Lloyd memo. for Churchill, 'African defence situation', 28 September 1940.
5. TNA, CO 273/662/10, 'Labour troubles in Malaya', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 February 1940; Shenton Thomas, Governor, Singapore, to Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald, 9 April 1940.
6. TNA, CO 273/662/11, Malaya Combined Intelligence Summary no. 7, 'Policy of the Malayan Communist Party', n.d. [October 1940].
7. Colin Gray, 'Mission Improbable, Fear, Culture, and Interest: Peace-Making, 1943–1949', in Williamson Murray and Jim Lacey (eds.), *The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 272.
8. Go, *Patterns of Empire*, 145.
9. Carol Polsgrove, *Ending British Rule in Africa: Writers in a Common Cause* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 62.
10. Judith M. Brown, 'Gandhi and Civil Resistance in India, 1917–1947: Key Issues', in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 45–6.
11. Polsgrove, *Ending British Rule*, 168–9.
12. Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur (eds.), *French Colonial Empire and the Popular Front: Hope and Disillusion* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); John W. Cell, 'Lord Hailey and the Making of the African Survey', *African Affairs*, 88/353 (1989), 481–505; Henrik Aspengren, 'Empire: A Question of Hearts? The Social Turn in Colonial Government, Bombay c.1905–1925', in Mark Duffield and Vernon Hewitt (eds.), *Empire, Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present* (Oxford: James Currey, 2009), 45–58.
13. Indispensable is Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
14. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 78, 86.
15. Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, *Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 212–20; cited in Brad Simpson, 'The United States and the Curious History of Self-Determination', *Diplomatic History*, 36/4 (2012), 679.
16. Martin Shipway, *The Road to War: France and Vietnam, 1944–1947* (Oxford: Berghahn, 1996), 51–6, 66–74.
17. Simpson, 'The United States and the Curious History', 678–81; Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), ch. 4.
18. Stephen Broadberry and Peter Howlett, 'The United Kingdom: "Victory at all costs"', in Mark Harrison (ed.), *The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 43–80; Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
19. Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, 'Introduction', in Bessel and Schumann (eds.), *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History during the 1940s and 1950s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–15; and, in the same volume, Pat Thane, 'Family Life and "Normality" in Postwar British Culture', 193–210.
20. For background, see J. M. Lee and M. Petter, *The Colonial Office: War and Development Policy* (London: Ashgate, 1982).

21. Ian Talbot, 'The End of the European Colonial Empires and Forced Migration: Some Comparative Case-Studies', in Panikos Panayi and Pippa Virdee (eds.), *Refugees and the End of Empire: Imperial Collapse and Forced Migration in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 28–50; Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (London: Oneworld, 2006).
22. Saul Kelly, *Cold War in the Desert: Britain, the United States and the Italian Colonies, 1945–1952* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), chs. 4–6.
23. Deborah Posel, *The Making of Apartheid 1948–1961: Conflict and Compromise* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 1–8; Hermann Giliomee, 'The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 1929–1948', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 29/2 (2003), 373–92.
24. Frederick Cooper, 'Alternatives to Nationalism in French Africa, 1945–1960', in Jost Dülffer and Marc Frey (eds.), *Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 110–24.
25. Stephen Brooke, *Labour's War: The Labour Party and the Second World War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
26. Stein Tønnesson, *Vietnam 1946: How the War Began* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010), chs. 5–7.
27. Charles-Robert Ageron, 'La Survivance d'un mythe: La Puissance par l'empire colonial (1944–1947)', *Revue française d'histoire d'Outre-Mer*, 77 (1985), 388–97; John Darwin, 'Was there a Fourth British Empire?', in Martin Lynn (ed.), *The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 16, 23–4.
28. William Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 6–7.
29. Catherine R. Schenk, *The Decline of Sterling: Managing the Retreat of an International Currency, 1945–1992* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 38–61.
30. A. G. Hopkins, 'Rethinking Decolonization', *Past & Present*, 200/1 (2008), 224–5; Tim Rooth, 'Britain's Other Dollar Problem: Economic Relations with Canada, 1945–1950', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 27/1 (1999), 81–108. The partial exception here was Canada, whose economic connections with the USA grew rapidly after 1945.
31. Madhusree Mukerjee, *Churchill's Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), chs. 6–10.
32. Sunil S. Amrith, 'Food and Welfare in India, c.1910–1950', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 50/4 (2008), 1018–28.
33. For European and colonial perspectives, see Panikos Panayi, 'Imperial Collapse and the Creation of Refugees in Twentieth-Century Europe', in Panayi and Virdee (eds.), *Refugees and the End of Empire*, 3–27.
34. David C. Engerman, 'The Second World's Third World', *Kritika*, 12/1 (Winter 2011), 183–211.
35. Hopkins, 'Rethinking Decolonization', 221–2.
36. John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1820–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 17.
37. Robert J. Macmahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981); Ritchie Ovendale, *Britain, the United States and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945–1962* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1996); Mark Atwood Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), ch. 1.

38. An argument most often put in relation to Roosevelt's hostility to any resumption of French control in post-war Indochina: Walter LaFeber, 'Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina, 1942–1945', *American Historical Review*, 80 (1975), 1277–95; Stein Tønnesson, 'Franklin Roosevelt, Trusteeship, and Indochina: A Reassessment', in Mark Atwood Lawrence and Fredrik Logevall (eds.), *The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 56–73.
39. Mark Atwood Lawrence, 'Explaining the Early Decisions: The United States and the French War, 1945–1954', in Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young (eds.), *Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National and Transnational Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 25–9; Mary Ann Heiss, 'The Evolution of the Imperial Idea and U.S. National Identity', *Diplomatic History*, 26/4 (2002), 533–8.
40. Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Decolonization', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 22/3 (1994), 462–511.
41. Simpson, 'The United States and the Curious History', 680.
42. T. N. Harper, 'The Politics of Disease and Disorder in Post-War Malaya', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 21/1 (1990), 90–102, 109–13; A. J. Stockwell, 'The Formation and First Years of the United Malays National Organization (U.M.N.O.)', *Modern Asian Studies*, 11/4 (1977), 485–90.
43. Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 35–7; A. J. Stockwell, '"A Widespread and Long-Concocted Plot to Overthrow Government in Malaya"? The Origins of the Malayan Emergency', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21/3 (1993), 68, 73.
44. Hong Lee Oey, *War and Diplomacy in Indonesia 1945–1950* (Townsville: James Cook University, 1981).
45. Elizabeth Schmidt, 'Top Down or Bottom Up? Nationalist Mobilization Reconsidered with Special Reference to Guinea (French West Africa)', *American Historical Review*, 110/4 (2005), 975–1014.
46. Christopher E. Goscha, *Thailand and the South East Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution, 1885–1954* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999); Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

CHAPTER 30

POWER RELATIONS DURING THE TRANSITION FROM NAZI TO POST-NAZI RULE

GARETH PRITCHARD

Maps of Europe that chart the course of the Second World War show neat lines that delineate consolidated blocks of territory.[1] The legends at the side of the maps explain that blocks shaded in one colour were under the control of the Axis powers, while territories shaded in another colour were controlled by the Allies. Little arrows indicate the movement of armies. Depending on the course of military events, the lines on the map shift to indicate the expansion and contraction of the Nazi Empire. When we get to maps of Europe after 1945, the lines become more stable. The most important line, which runs from the Baltic to the Adriatic, marks the division of Europe between the superpowers. The land that lies on the eastern side of the line is often shaded pink or red to indicate that this was now Communist territory. On the other side of the line, the countries of western Europe may be shaded blue or green to show that here the Americans held sway.

These are not just maps of the 1940s. They are also maps of how the 1940s are conceptualized by historians. The intellectual paradigms that produce the maps are based on elite categories such as the state and the 'nation'. The most important criterion that determines where the lines are drawn, and what colour the blocks of land are shaded, is state power. The purpose of the maps is to indicate which territories were controlled by which governments, and how this changed over time as a result of military campaigns and developments at the level of high politics. The problem with such maps is not that they are wrong, or that the developments that they depict are unimportant, but that they give us only a very partial view of what was happening on the ground. They tell us little about who was really calling the shots in local communities, or how power was actually experienced by ordinary people.

In this chapter, I shall try to explore what was happening to power relations underneath the events that are depicted in the maps. My primary concern here is neither the state nor society but the interaction between the two. My argument consists of four

propositions: (1) Europe's mid-century crisis led to a radical destabilization of power relations due to the simultaneous expansion and erosion of state power relative to society. (2) These contradictions in the relationship between state and society generated a process of paramilitarization that eroded the state's monopoly over the use of force. Ferocious struggles for power broke out at a local level between a wide range of criminal groups and political movements, most of which were armed. (3) Paramilitarization reached a high point during the chaotic transitional period between Nazi and post-Nazi rule when the day-to-day authority of the state broke down almost completely. (4) In order to gain an advantage over their rivals, actors on the ground established client–patron relationships with one or other of the great powers. Local struggles in Europe thereby became internationalized, which in turn contributed significantly both to the course of the Second World War and to the outbreak of the Cold War.

Power Relations in the 1940s

Power is a difficult word to define, though few social scientists or historians would deny that we need the concept.[2] Max Weber described power as 'the ability of an actor or actors to realise his/her/their will in a social action, even against the will of others'.[3] According to Moisés Naím: 'Power is the ability to direct or prevent the current or future actions of other groups and individuals.'[4] Steven Lukes, in his famous monograph on the subject, 'defined the concept of power by saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests'.[5] Implicit or explicit in such definitions of power is the concept of power inequality. If power is exercised over or against the will of others, the relationship between those who exercise power and those over whom power is exercised is by definition asymmetrical. According to Vincent Roscigno, power 'is best understood as an unequal relation, or inequality, based on personal attributes, institutional positioning and statuses that are defined, codified and acted upon within historical and cultural context'.[6] More pithily, Lenin once famously noted that the key question in politics is 'Kto? Kogo?' (Who? Whom?) In other words, who are the subjects and who are the objects of power relationships? Who dominates and who is dominated?[7]

However we choose to define them, power relations of one sort or another penetrate the whole of society and enmesh everybody in their strands. Power relationships exist both between individual human beings and between the social groups of which society is composed. The various strands are connected to form a single web that is fundamental to the organization of any human society. According to Naím, 'power has a social function. Its role is not just to enforce domination or to create winners and losers: it also organises communities, societies, marketplaces, and the world.'[8]

Within this integrated web of relationships there are constant shifts in the distribution of power which in turn generate friction. Sometimes power becomes more concentrated at certain points within the matrix. Sometimes a process of democratization leads to the diffusion of power. Specific social groups gain or lose power relative to the

whole. Under normal circumstances, these shifts in the distribution of power take place gradually. They are accommodated by gradual changes in legal frameworks, administrative practices, and social norms. But there are also occasions when a dramatic shock—for example, an economic crisis, a revolution, or a war—can disrupt the entire system of power relationships, leading to radical and unpredictable shifts in the distribution of power. Russia in the period 1917 to 1921 provides an obvious example of the radical destabilization of power relations throughout the whole of a society. Spain in the period 1935 to 1937 is another example. The collapse of Communist states between 1989 and 1991 provoked a widespread disruption of power relations throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe, at least temporarily. Nonetheless, if we look at the twentieth century as a whole, the period that witnessed the most far-reaching dislocation of power relations, across the widest geographical area, was without question the 1940s.

The first factor that destabilized the system of power relations in the 1940s was the growing power of the state relative to society. Total war required the fullest possible mobilization by the state of all available resources, including human ones. This in turn led to a massive intrusion of state power into the lives of individuals and communities. It also strengthened the power of those elites, especially military elites, which were most closely connected with the conduct of the war. Most ordinary people, by contrast, experienced a profound loss of personal autonomy in many spheres of their lives. They were conscripted in their millions into armies. If they remained in civilian life, they were subject to all kinds of wartime restrictions and controls. Millions of civilians were compelled by the state to make sacrifices, to enter new kinds of employment, to move from one location to another, and to accept state incursion into even the most intimate aspects of their lives. Even in democratic states, the rights of citizens were severely curtailed. Regimes that were already authoritarian before the war became yet more draconian. Millions of people suffered deportation and exile. The millions who were incarcerated in labour camps or concentration camps experienced extreme forms of powerlessness.[9]

A second factor that was a result of total war, however, was the antithesis of the first. If the war, in certain places and at certain times, led to a massive extension of state power, it also led, in other places and at other times (and often in the same places and at the same times), to the opposite. With the resources of the state focused overwhelmingly on prosecuting the war, other mechanisms of state control became less effective. Right across Europe, for example, the state's ability to police people's economic behaviour was undermined by the proliferation of the black market.[10] In almost all European countries, including Britain, there were substantial increases in the levels of crime in general, and of juvenile delinquency in particular.[11] In Germany, there had been a surge in the level of juvenile criminality even before the outbreak of the war. After 1939 the situation worsened considerably because the war broke up families, made regular schooling impossible, and exposed young people to the brutalities of warfare.[12] By 1942 the leadership of the Hitler Youth was warning that the problem was so severe that 'a serious risk of the political, moral and criminal breakdown of youth must be said to exist'.[13] With the almost complete collapse of the German state in 1945, many children, whose moral bearings had already been corrupted by the Nazis, simply ran amok. The level of youth

crime in Berlin in 1946 was 850 per cent higher than it had been in 1938.[14] The omnipresence of the black market and rising levels of criminality were just two signs amongst many of how the wartime state, whilst tightening its grip over some spheres of life, was losing control over others. Herein lies the paradox. Europeans in the first half of the 1940s were increasingly dominated but less and less governed.

The simultaneous expansion and retrenchment of state power had many consequences, one of the most important of which was the paramilitarization of much of European society. On the one hand, the negative experience of domination by the state gave many people an incentive to rebel. The weakening effectiveness of the day-to-day apparatus of policing and administration made rebellion possible, as did the easy availability of weapons. On the other hand, the state itself also resorted to the use of paramilitary and militia movements of various kinds as a means of reinforcing its authority in territories that it dominated but was unable properly to govern. The net result was that, to a greater extent than in any other decade of the twentieth century, the state lost its monopoly over the use of armed force.

The Paramilitarization of European Society

The process of paramilitarization that reached its climax in the 1940s had begun many years earlier during the revolutionary period at the end of the First World War. The Red Guards in Russia, the blackshirts in Italy, and the *Freikorps* in Germany were the most prominent examples of paramilitary formations that emerged during these years, but there were many others. During the 1920s there was a general reduction in the number and vigour of paramilitary movements, though in certain countries, such as France (Action Française and the Croix-de-Feu) and Germany (the SA (*Sturmabteilung*) and the Rotfrontkämpferbund), they continued to play a prominent role. With the political turmoil unleashed by the Great Depression, however, the paramilitary bands re-emerged with a vengeance.[15]

Most of the paramilitary movements that plagued Europe in the 1930s represented extreme political ideologies of the Left or, more frequently, of the Right. Obvious examples include the Iron Guard in Romania, the Arrow Cross in Hungary, Pērkonkrusts in Latvia, the Ustaša in Croatia, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in eastern Poland. Often associated with street violence and/or terrorism, these groups rarely posed a real threat to the state but they certainly constituted a threat to political or ethnic opponents. Even in France, which by comparison with many European countries was a stable parliamentary democracy, at least fifty people died as a result of political violence between 1934 and 1938.[16] Moreover, such paramilitary violence had a polarizing and destabilizing impact on conventional politics, particularly when it led to the murder of important figures such as King Alexander I of Yugoslavia or Polish

minister of internal affairs Bronisław Pieracki.[17] Many of the individuals who would later play a key role in the armed bands of the 1940s first learned how to use violence as a political tool during the 1930s through their involvement in street violence and terrorism.

With the outbreak of the Second World War and the military occupation by the Axis powers of large tracts of Europe, conditions were created which fostered a radical escalation of paramilitary violence. None of the Axis powers had the resources effectively to police the vast lands that they now occupied. Nor did they have the manpower to implement their murderous occupation policies. As a result, they looked for local volunteers to whom much of the violence could be outsourced. Sadly, there was no shortage of men who were willing to do their bidding.[18] Between 1941 and 1942, auxiliary police and militia units played a central role in the mass shootings of Jews in Croatia,[19] Romania,[20] the Baltic States,[21] Belarus,[22] and Ukraine.[23] Given licence by their Axis masters to impose terror, many of these militia also took the opportunity to settle scores with other long-standing enemies.[24] The rank and file of these units were often motivated by nothing more than a desire for extra money and rations, or by political opportunism.[25] But the leaders of the collaborationist bands were almost always men with a long and often violent history of involvement in extreme right-wing politics.

It might be useful here to give a couple of specific examples of how the war created opportunities for people from the extremes of society to extend their violent activities and to assume a more dominant position within the web of power relations. Roman Shukhevych was an ethnic Ukrainian from Galicia, which in the interwar years was part of Poland. In the 1930s, Shukhevych had become a leading member of the OUN. Having been involved in numerous murders of Polish officials and Ukrainian civilians whom the OUN deemed to be 'collaborators', he was accustomed to using violence for political purposes. After the German invasion of Poland in 1939, the OUN sought the patronage of the Nazis against their common enemies: the Poles, the Jews, and the Russians.[26] In 1941, Shukhevych served as the commander of the 'Nachtigall' battalion, which was a force of about 500 Ukrainian volunteers which entered Soviet Ukraine in 1941 in the wake of the German invasion, and which participated in pogroms against the Jewish population of western Ukraine.[27] Between 1941 and 1943, Shukhevych was an officer in one of the many auxiliary police battalions (*Schutzmannschaften*) that the Germans created in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. In this capacity, Shukhevych had ample opportunity to give bloody expression to his hatred of 'Moskals' (a pejorative term still used by Ukrainian nationalists for Russians) and Jewish people. Many Ukrainians serving in auxiliary police units, including Shukhevych, subsequently defected to the so-called Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in order to fight the Germans, the Soviets, the Poles, as well as other factions of Ukrainian nationalists. Shukhevych soon established himself as the UPA's military commander.[28]

Shukhevych was a politically motivated war criminal, but there were plenty of others whose reasons for taking up arms were more venal. Throughout occupied Europe, many of the men who gravitated towards armed collaboration had

criminal backgrounds or came from socially marginal backgrounds.[29] Henri Lafont, for instance, was a professional criminal and violent sadist in Paris. In 1940 he began to make money by robbing the premises of Jews who had fled to the south of France. In 1942 he teamed up with Pierre Bonny, a former policeman who had been sacked for corruption. The business activities of the 'Bonny–Lafont gang' soon expanded to include black market speculation and protection rackets. Shielded by the SS (*Schutzstaffel*), with whom they had a close relationship, the gang was able to purchase a spacious mansion in a fashionable Parisian street. Thenceforth, their well-appointed lair served as a headquarters from which they organized their campaign of extortion, racketeering, and terror.[30]

The war also created opportunities for people on the left-wing fringes of the political spectrum to take centre stage. Almost everywhere in Europe, partisan movements emerged shortly after the arrival of Axis forces. Although they tended at first to be small, poorly organized and equipped, and of little military significance, the partisan bands constituted the beginning of what would later become genuine mass movements.[31] In a few places, such as Serbia and Poland, the driving force in these movements were conservative nationalists. But in most countries the core of these partisan movements was made up of socialists and communists. As Pieter Lagrou argues: 'Faced with relentless persecution, organized on a basis outside of the traditional social and political networks, armed resistance required exceptional courage and therefore attracted people with an unconventional profile, inclined to radical action at high risks. This type of resistance was inevitably the feat of a radicalized minority.'[32] In Denmark, for example, the resistance movement that began to emerge in 1941 and 1942 was dominated almost entirely by members of the Danish Communist Party.[33] About half of those who took up arms in France during this period were Communists.[34] In Italy after the German occupation of 1943, a key role in the nascent partisan movement was played by veteran anti-fascists of the Spanish Civil War who possessed both a deep commitment to anti-fascism and relevant experience of political violence.[35]

Lacking the resources to eliminate the partisans, the Axis powers deployed the local auxiliary police and militia units as a central plank of their counter-insurgency strategy. In the occupied territories of the USSR, for example, locally recruited paramilitary troops made up at least half of the personnel used in counter-insurgency operations.[36] The Ustaša and other Croatian units played an equally prominent role in the struggle against both the Communist Partisans and the Serbian Chetniks.[37] In France, one of the primary activities of the Milice—when they were not rounding up Jews—was fighting the Maquis and clamping down on resistance organizations.[38]

The key point here is that the process of paramilitarization created opportunities for people who, on account of their radical political views or criminality, had previously been rather peripheral. Such individuals were able to assume important positions within the matrix of power relations at a local level, and they used their power to attack their enemies. In parts of Europe, the struggle between the various groups that were competing for power began to look more and more like civil war.[39]

The Climax of Paramilitarization, 1943–1946

For most Europeans who had fallen under the direct or indirect control of the Nazis, the period of maximum disruption to power relations began during the gradual dissolution of Nazi rule from 1943 onwards. But the German capitulation of May 1945 did not bring an end to the chaos. On the contrary, the impact of total war, the collapse of Nazi rule, and the inability of any state power to fill the vacuum, had severely degraded the ability of central authorities to govern. The state could still usually impose control through the large-scale deployment of troops. But since no government could do this in all places and at all times, the structure of the state at a regional and district level began to disintegrate. The resulting void was usually filled by a profusion of gangs and armed bands, most of which engaged in bitter and often violent struggles for power. In terms of power relations at a local level, we can thus see the period 1943 to 1946 as a distinct transitional phase between the unravelling of Nazi rule and the creation of a stable, post-war order.

Even in western Europe, where conditions were less chaotic than in the 'Wild East', the authority of the state was gravely weakened by the erosion and collapse of Nazi power and the passage of Allied armies. For example, southern Italy was plagued by criminal gangs, some of which were run by the Mafia, and some of which were unorganized bands of ruffians and deserters. According to Isobel Williams, Sicily after the liberation was 'scourged by hordes of wanted men … who were creating an increasing state of lawlessness'.[40] In northern Italy, which was still under German occupation, a British intelligence officer noted in 1944 that 'the great horse shoe of the Apennines and the Alps is infested with Partisans. If the enemy wishes to move to any particular place, even in the mountains, sufficiently strongly, he will always get there. But he cannot be everywhere at once, and immediately he moves away again the Partisans return to their old haunts.'[41] In Belgium a few months later, the newly installed post-liberation government, with a force of just 6,000 armed gendarmes at its disposal, confronted 70,000 armed resistance fighters. As the British ambassador wrote in a cable to the Foreign Office in September 1944: 'What is the authority of a government when only one out of every 5 armed men in the street is answerable to it?'[42]

In France, German rule began to break down in the months before and after the D-Day landings. There was an upsurge in the violence of the anti-German partisans culminating in the Paris Uprising of 19 to 25 August 1944.[43] Once the Germans had been driven out, however, it was not at all easy for the provisional government of Charles de Gaulle to establish its authority.[44] This was especially true in the southern and western provinces, which were cut off from the capital by the destruction of bridges, railway lines, telegraph wires, and by innumerable roadblocks manned by anti-fascist militia. Decrees issued in Paris meant little outside the major cities. In many places, former partisans—many of whom were Communists—took advantage of the chaos to carry out a purge of alleged collaborators that consumed the lives of perhaps 10,000 to 15,000

people. This 'wild épuration' did not just burn out soon after liberation but continued for months.[45] In the meantime, a right-wing Maquis Blanc, backed by the Germans, had emerged in parts of southern France and the Massif Central. Largely made up of collaborationists, former members of the Milice, and *Wehrmacht* stragglers, the Maquis Blanc fought against roaming bands of former resisters now organized in sixty regional *bataillons de securité*.[46] There was also a serious upsurge of crime that was fuelled by political and economic dislocation. In Paris and other parts of France, gangs of criminals—often in cahoots with bands of deserters—attacked civilian and military targets indiscriminately and terrorized the population. According to one American deserter: 'We robbed every café in Paris, in all sectors except our own, while the gendarmes went crazy.'[47]

Across swathes of the Balkans and eastern Europe, the armed bands proliferated in even greater numbers. In May 1943, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi in western Ukraine reported to the Vatican: 'All of Volhynia and part of Galicia are full of bands which have a certain political character. Some are made up of Poles, others of Ukrainians, and others of Communists; others are truly bandits, people of all nationalities, Germans, Jews, and Ukrainians.'[48] In Greece, successive governments between 1943 and 1946 had almost no authority outside Athens and armed bands of leftist partisans and right-wing militia rampaged across the countryside. In 1945 a British officer reported that people in the Greek provinces were complaining that the state had ceased to exist.[49]

Even the government of the USSR, with the might of the Red Army at its disposal, struggled to impose order. According to Soviet data, between 1940 and 1944 no fewer than 7,160 hostile armed bands were active on Soviet territory.[50] Nor did the expulsion of the Germans bring an end to the disorder. Catherine Merridale informs us that the 'collapse of all forms of government in the front-line regions had been total'. Not only had the Nazis inflicted massive destruction as they left, but advancing Red Army units were far too busy with military matters to worry about civilians. As a result, a 'vast belt of liberated territory on both banks of the Dnepr became the domain of armed gangs'.[51] In the Baltic States and western Ukraine, the Soviet authorities were confronted by large-scale armed insurrections on the part of the so-called Forest Brothers and the UPA respectively. Officials of the Soviet state in rural parts of western Ukraine and the Baltic States were assassinated in their thousands, and Soviet troops who ventured off the beaten track did so at their peril, as General Nikolai Vatutin, commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front of the Red Army, discovered to his cost in February 1944 when he was ambushed and mortally wounded by the UPA guerrillas.[52]

In Germany, meanwhile, the apparatus of the Nazi state collapsed almost entirely during the spring of 1945. None of the occupying armies possessed the manpower or the expertise to create overnight an effective civilian administration that was capable of coping with the devastation that they found.[53] One serious problem that confronted the occupation authorities was the criminal gangs and bands of delinquent youths which teemed in the rubble of Germany's towns and cities.[54] In the countryside, and especially in forested and mountainous areas, tens of thousands of unsurrendered *Wehrmacht* and SS troops plagued the citizenry off whom they lived. A journalist called James Wellard,

reporting on 4 May from the rear of the American Ninth Army, noted that 'We have German burgomasters complaining about the raids on their towns by SS men who are still holding out in the mountains and forests. The SS and Werewolf bands descend on little towns and villages, strip the place of food and make away before American troops can be called.'[55]

The biggest single threat to the authority of military governments in Germany after the end of the Second World War was posed by the millions of former POWs and slave workers. Through the summer and autumn of 1945, innumerable bands of these so-called 'displaced persons' (DPs), many of them armed, roamed across the German countryside searching for food and inflicting terror on the German population.[56] In Hanover and the surrounding countryside, there were thirty-one reported cases of Germans being murdered by gangs of displaced persons between 10 April and 31 May 1945. The real number was almost certainly higher, for it is unlikely that more than a fraction of incidents were reported to the British authorities.[57] In the American zone, one contemporary report noted that the most difficult problem facing the occupiers

> was not the control of the native population … but the rounding up and caring for the foreign slaves impressed into the service of the Germans…. The sudden liberation of millions of half-starved, half-crazed pediculous inmates of hundreds of labour camps threatened to swamp the machinery of the Military Government…. Thousands of displaced persons are roaming the highways, hiding in woods and on farms, and reports of looting and violence by these recently freed victims of German oppression are common.[58]

Another manifestation of the collapse of state authority in Germany was the proliferation in the spring and summer of 1945 of the so-called anti-fascist committees (antifas). German Communists and Social Democrats, many of whom had experienced years of persecution at the hands of the Nazis, emerged from the rubble in 1945 and asserted themselves on the political stage. Though they were rarely armed and only infrequently engaged in violence, the antifas were nonetheless a manifestation of the radical devolution of power to the local groups that was characteristic of this period. Given the fact that the German state apparatus had more or less collapsed, and given the inability of the Allied armies to fill the vacuum, the antifas were able for a time to dominate their communities. For the most part the antifas focused their energies on the practical tasks of clearing rubble from the streets, taking control of remaining stocks of food, preventing looting, and re-establishing the supply of gas, electricity, and water. When time and resources allowed, they also engaged in political activities such as distributing anti-fascist literature, staging public meetings, and, above all, settling scores with local Nazis. Particularly in traditional strongholds of the labour movement, the antifas played an important role during the transitional phase between the collapse of Nazi rule and the establishment of effective military government. In short, the collapse of the Nazi regime led, at least briefly, to a significant shift of power to small but determined groups of organized workers.[59]

The period of fragmentation between Nazi and post-Nazi rule thus opened up a space in local politics, not just in Germany but across large parts of Europe, that was filled by groups of people who possessed a strong will to power. Many of them were Communists. Many of them were nationalists and anti-communists. Some were little more than bandits and gangsters. But all of them had their own agendas and all of them were locked in their own local conflicts that were distinct from the geostrategic battles of the Axis powers, the western Allies, and the Soviets. In the words of Jean-Paul Himka:

> The Second World War, with its tremendous violence and massive scale, unleashed a large number of smaller conflicts fought alongside it and within it, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Political movements that represented none of the principal protagonists of the war made use of the militarization and disruption of society and the diffusion of weapons to pursue their own agendas of political, territorial, and ethnic transformation.[60]

The Internationalization of Local Conflicts

A final important point that should be made about local actors during the transitional period is that, in order to gain an advantage over their enemies, they almost always looked for patronage from one or other of the belligerent powers in the Second World War. Thereafter, in the early phases of the Cold War, they sought the backing of either the western powers or the Soviets. By the same token, governments in Washington, London, Rome, Berlin, and Moscow were actively searching for clients as a way of extending their reach into enemy territory, and consolidating their grip over territory that they already held militarily but which they were unable to police or administer.

Some of these patron–client relationships were relatively stable, especially in western Europe. In eastern Europe and the Balkans, by contrast, patron–client relationships tended to shift over time. The Forest Brothers and the UPA received logistical and intelligence support from the Germans between 1944 and 1945 and thereafter from the British and Americans.[61] In Yugoslavia, the British and Americans at first patronized the royalist Serbs of Mihailović's Chetnik movement. But the Chetniks also cooperated with both the Germans and the Italians against the Communist Partisans, who from 1943 were being supported by the Western allies.[62] Anti-communist bands in Greece were supported at various points by the Italians, the Bulgarians, the Germans, the British, as well as the Americans, whilst their Communist enemies were patronized in turn by the governments of Britain and the USA, Tito's Yugoslavia, and Communist Albania and Bulgaria.[63] After the end of the war, both MI5 and the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) gave a degree of support to various anti-communist nationalists throughout eastern Europe, many of whom had previously been patronized by the Germans.[64] What resulted from the emergence of such patron–client relationships was a tangled,

pan-European network that—in one way or another—involved a substantial portion of Europe's population, most European governments, and all of the major belligerent powers.

The actions of patrons had a substantial impact on the behaviour of clients. At the most basic level, the logistical support of patrons facilitated the violence of clients and was one of the most important reasons for the escalation of the 'war of the armed bands' in the mid-1940s. Had not the SOE (Special Operations Executive), OSS (US Office of Strategic Services), MI5, the CIA, the Abwehr, the SS, and the Soviets so generously provided the means of killing, it would have been much more difficult for armed bands to kill. There were also instances, however, where clients moderated their violent behaviour in order to please their actual or potential patrons. By 1943, for instance, the UPA could see that the Germans were going to lose the war and that it was only a matter of time before the Red Army overran western Ukraine. In response, they began to seek to win the patronage of the western powers by toning down their racist rhetoric and adopting a more democratic political programme.[65] The Baltic nationalists had been quite open about their fascist and anti-Semitic proclivities in the first half of the 1940s, when their primary sponsors had been the Nazis.[66] By the later 1940s, when they needed the patronage of the Anglo-Americans, they claimed to be fighting for the principles of liberal democracy.[67]

It was not just right-wing extremists who occasionally adopted a democratic veneer in order to please their patrons; extremists on the Left sometimes played at being democrats as well. In 1944 and 1945, Moscow instructed the leaders of Communist parties in Italy, France, and elsewhere to rein in the local hotheads whose radicalism was disrupting Moscow's plans. It wasn't easy, for most of the grass-roots revolutionaries knew little of party discipline. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that Palmiro Togliatti in Italy and Maurice Thorez in France played key roles in putting out the fires that had been lit by their own Communist Party activists.[68] Even though these conversions to democratic principles were entirely cynical, they demonstrate the sensitivity of clients to the political agenda of their patrons.

The relationship between patron and client, however, could work in both directions. Just as the former frequently influenced the capabilities and behaviour of the latter, so did patrons sometimes get enmeshed in the conflicts of their clients in ways that had a substantial impact on the course of high politics. In 1946, for example, the Americans began covertly to provide assistance to anti-Soviet insurgents in Poland, the Baltic States, and—most importantly—Ukraine. When the Kremlin became aware of American support for anti-Soviet armed bands operating behind the Iron Curtain, it led to a serious hardening of Soviet attitudes towards their former ally.[69] A similar example of how European tails could wag superpower dogs is furnished by Greece. In the wake of the defeat of the leftist partisans in the Athens uprising of December 1944, armed bands of right-wing militiamen—many of whom had previously served in the collaborationist Security Battalions—fanned out across central Greece and the Peloponnese in order to inflict bloody revenge on former members of the Communist-led partisan movement ELAS. This 'white terror' had not been ordered by the centrist government of Georgios

Papandreou in Athens, which had next to no power beyond the capital and the major cities. Instead, the white terror was a spontaneous phenomenon that was driven by local vendettas. Despite the reluctance of their Soviet masters to risk a confrontation in Greece, the Greek Communists responded to the white terror by launching a new armed insurgency. By 1946 a civil war had broken out in Greece, which in turn had far-reaching consequences for relations between the superpowers. In 1947, it was in large part in reaction to events in Greece that Truman announced the famous 'Truman Doctrine'—a major milestone on the road to Cold War in Europe.[70]

A third example of the behaviour of clients impacting on their patrons is provided by the relationship between the Soviets and the East German anti-fascists. As I have already noted, none of the occupying armies in Germany in 1945 had the capacity effectively to steer events on the ground. Yet they were all aware that the future of Germany was of vital importance to their security interests. In order to deal with Germany's terrible material problems, and also to pursue their longer-term objectives in Central Europe, all the Allied armies needed to find local agents through whom to work.[71]

In the Soviet zone, by far the most important local agent for the Soviets was the anti-fascist Left. Though the Soviets dispersed the anti-fascist committees, in practice this did not really make much difference because the personnel of the anti-fascist committees were reconstituted as the functionary corps of the two working-class political parties that the Soviets had re-legalized: the Communist Party (KPD) and Social Democratic Party (SPD). Between them, the two working-class parties soon achieved an overwhelming grip both on the reviving state apparatus and, through the workplace councils and revived trade unions, on industry.[72] The Soviets thereby confirmed the dominant position that the anti-fascist Left had taken in May 1945, albeit in a different form.

Many of the anti-fascist activists who now held power at a local level had been deeply embittered by their previous experiences. They had scores to settle, not just with the right-wing networks that had persecuted them, but also with more moderate Social Democrats who—the radicals believed—had betrayed the labour movement in 1933. The Nazi years had also alienated the anti-fascist radicals from the bulk of the population who had either supported the Nazis in their rise to power or who had failed to do anything to stand up to the Nazis once they had taken power. Veteran Communists and other anti-fascists often regarded themselves as 'outsiders amongst their own countrymen', whom they regarded as 'hopelessly Nazified'.[73] As Richard Bessel notes, in the post-war period they therefore tended to look 'with suspicion on a people that, only a few years before, had supported Hitler so enthusiastically'.[74]

As they secured their grip on the apparatus of local government and on the shop floor, so the anti-fascist activists, and, in particular, veteran members of the Communist Party, began to use their privileged access to power to hound their political enemies and to lord it over the general population. Their authoritarianism was noted by the western powers, who assumed (wrongly) that the Communists were acting so aggressively on Soviet instructions. The sectarianism of the Communists also sabotaged relations with the East German Social Democrats, who already by the autumn of 1945 were emerging as the most powerful political party in the Soviet zone. Rather than see the relationship

between the KPD and SPD in the Soviet zone break down altogether, the Soviets intervened to force the merger of the two parties to form a new, united working-class party in which the Communists were dominant. The creation of the so-called Socialist Unity Party (SED) in April 1946 was viewed with suspicion by the British and Americans, and they resisted the attempts of the Communists to bring about a unification of the KPD and SPD in the western zones as well. As a result of the forced merger of the two parties in the Soviet zone, relations between the West German Communists and Social Democrats were damaged beyond repair. April 1946 was thus a major milestone on the road to the division of Germany.[75]

In fact, the radicalism of the East German Communists had not been sanctioned by the Soviets,[76] and in many ways undermined the whole thrust of Soviet policy in Germany. It had certainly not been Stalin's intention to force a showdown in Germany at such an early stage. Rather, his game plan seems to have been to tread cautiously, to avoid a premature confrontation with the West, and in the meantime to create a 'popular front' in Germany that would consist of a spectrum of political currents but which would be led by the Communists.[77] Unfortunately for Stalin, the East German Communists were incapable of playing the role that he had assigned to them. Through their sectarianism and their pursuit of political vendettas against local enemies, the Communists wrecked Stalin's plans for a united Germany under Soviet influence. When the Soviets intervened to force the merger of the KPD and SPD in the winter of 1945–6, they did so not as part of a preconcieved policy to impose a dictatorship in the Soviet zone, but as an ad hoc response to the mess that their own primary clients had created.[78]

There are many other examples of how the Soviets and the western powers, not just in Germany, but in other parts of Europe as well, became entangled in home-grown conflicts that were not of their making. The history books tell us that Europe after 1945 was divided because of disagreements between the wartime Allies. Though this statement is true as far as it goes, one could equally well argue that the wartime Allies fell out because they became embroiled in local disputes between rival factions of Europeans. Patrick Major is therefore absolutely right when he argues:

> The interplay between external and internal led both to the super-imposition of international conflicts onto domestic problems, but also to long-standing internal class [and ethnic] antagonisms being raised to the level of diplomatic confrontations…. In the cold civil war, superpower conflicts could all too easily be manipulated against internal enemies.[79]

Mapping Power Relations during the Mid-Century Crisis

From the point of view of the social historian of power, charting the disruption to power relations in the 1940s requires a rather different set of maps to those of the military and

mainstream political historians. If we wish to conceptualize the period, not in terms of high politics and conventional military campaigns, but in terms of the breakdown and reassertion of state control, we can depict the transition from Nazi rule to the post-war order as a three-stage process that affected most of continental Europe, albeit at different times, at different speeds, and with differing degrees of severity (see Table 30.1).

During the first phase, the day-to-day authority of the state was compromised because neither the Nazis nor the other occupying powers had the resources effectively to administer the territories they had won through military conquest. This in turn led to a severe escalation of the process of paramilitarization that had begun during the inter-war period. Individuals and groups who had previously been rather peripheral due to their political extremism or their criminality moved to the centre of the stage at a local level on account of their will to take power and their willingness to use violence.

In the second phase, state control began to break down altogether as a result of total war, the collapse of the Nazi order, and the inability of any state authority to fill the vacuum that the Nazis had left. This led to radical shifts in the configuration of power relations at a local level which in turn impacted on the lives of millions of Europeans. During this chaotic transitional period between Nazi and post-Nazi rule, messy local conflicts broke out right across the Continent along political, class, and ethnic lines. Traditionally described by historians as 'armed resistance' and 'armed collaboration', the paramilitary forces that engaged in these conflicts also represented the high point of a cycle of civil violence that had begun in the 1930s and was not concluded until the end of the 1940s.

During the third and final phase, post-war central governments gradually began to reassert themselves. The process of deparamilitarization, however, was slow and difficult. Even in stolid Belgium, homicide levels remained unusually high until 1947.[80] In northern Italy, violence between former partisans and their political enemies continued to disturb public order for at least two years after the end of the war. The region around Emilia-Romagna, in north-central Italy, remained so entangled in armed violence that it became known as the 'triangle of death'.[81] In southern Italy, there were peasant rebellions against the reassertion of control by the landlords.[82] In many of the great cities of Western Europe in 1947 and 1948, massive waves of working-class unrest were also associated with political violence.[83] Further east, for example in Greece and Poland, armed bands continued to pose a threat to state control until the end of the 1940s. In the Baltic States and western Ukraine, it was not until the early 1950s that the state was finally able to reimpose its monopoly over the use of armed force.

The local conflicts that erupted during the 1940s, particularly during the phase of fragmentation between 1943 and 1946, became inextricably entangled, first in the Second World War, and then in the Cold War. Governments established patron–client relationships with local actors, either in order to consolidate their grip on territory that they had won militarily but could not administer, or to stir up trouble for hostile governments. Patrons influenced the behaviour of clients, but clients also sometimes had a major impact on the behaviour of their sponsors. The end result of this process was a Cold War that broke out, not because any of the great powers had a preconceived plan to

Table 30.1 The destabilization, fragmentation, and stabilization of state power in the 1940s

	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
E. Ukraine		I	I	II	III	III	III	III		
North Caucasus	I	II	II	II	II	III	III	III	III	III
Russia/Belarus		I	II	II	II	III	III	III	III	
W. Ukraine		I	II	II	II	II	II	II	III	III
Baltic States		I	I	I	II	II	II	II	III	III
Greece		I	II	II	II	II	II	II	II	III
Poland	I	I	II	II	II	II	III	III	III	
Yugoslavia		I	II	II	II	II	III	III	III	
N. Italy				I	II	II	III	III	III	
S. and W. France		I	I	II	II	II	III	III	III	
N. and E. France			I	I	II	III	III	III	III	
Germany		I	I	I	I	II	III	III	III	
S. Italy				II	III	III	III	III	III	

Note: Phase I = Destabilization; Phase II = Fragmentation; Phase III = Stabilization

divide Europe, but because they got sucked into messy local conflicts which they were unable to resolve but from which they were unable to walk away.

Notes

1. Many of the ideas that I articulate in this chapter were developed in collaboration with Vesna Drapac, my colleague at the University of Adelaide.
2. Steven Lukes, 'Power and Agency', *British Journal of Sociology*, 53/3 (2002), 491; Vincent J. Roscigno, 'Power, Revisited', *Social Forces*, 90/2 (2011), 349–51.
3. Roscigno, 'Power', 350.
4. Moisés Naím, *The End of Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 16.
5. Peter Morriss, 'Steven Lukes on the Concept of Power', *Political Studies Review*, 4/2 (2006), 125.
6. Roscigno, 'Power', 353.
7. Darko Suvin, 'Terms of Power, Today: An Essay in Political Epistemology', *Critical Quarterly*, 48/3 (2006), 38.
8. Naím, *End of Power*, 17.
9. One of the best introductions to the social impact of total war on Europe is Robert Gildea, Olivier Wieviorka, and Anette Warring (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 2006).
10. Kenneth Mouré, 'Food Rationing and the Black Market in France (1940–1944)', *French History*, 24/2 (2010), 262–82; Mark Roodhouse, *Black Market Britain: 1939–1955* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Lynne Taylor, 'The Black Market in Occupied Northern France, 1940–1944', *Contemporary European History*, 6/2 (1997), 153–76; Polymeris Voglis, 'Surviving Hunger', in Gildea et al. (eds.), *Surviving Hitler*, 24–9; Isobel Williams, *Allies and Italians under Occupation: Sicily and Southern Italy 1943–1945* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 169–94.
11. Sarah Fishman, *The Battle for Children: World War II, Youth Crime, and Juvenile Justice in Twentieth-Century France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); David F. Smith, 'Delinquency and Welfare in London: 1939–1949', *London Journal*, 38/1 (2013), 67–97.
12. Richard Grunberger, *A Social History of the Third Reich* (London: Penguin, 1971), 346–8.
13. Detlev Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany* (London: Penguin, 1987), 153.
14. Christoph Klessmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 53–7.
15. For an overview of political violence in the interwar period, see Chris Millington and Kevin Passmore (eds.), *Political Violence and Democracy in Western Europe, 1918–1940* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
16. Chris Millington, 'Street-Fighting Men: Political Violence in Inter-War France', *English Historical Review*, 129/538 (2014), 606–27.
17. Robert W. Seton-Watson, 'King Alexander's Assassination: Its Background and Effects', *International Affairs*, 14/1 (1935), 20–47; Grzegorz Rossolinski, *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 117–28.
18. Ruth Bettina Birn, 'Collaboration with Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe: The Case of the Estonian Security Police', *Contemporary European History*, 10/2 (2001), 181–98; Jerzy

Grzybowski, 'An Outline History of the 13th (Belarusian) Battalion of the SD Auxiliary Police (Schutzmannschafts Bataillon der SD 13)', *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 23/3 (2010), 461–76; Christopher Hale, *Hitler's Foreign Executioners: Europe's Dirty Secret* (Stroud: History Press, 2011), 296–7; Alexander Hill, *The War Behind the Eastern Front: The Soviet Partisan Movement in North-West Russia 1941–1944* (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 48–50; Wendy Lower, 'Pogroms, Mob Violence and Genocide in Western Ukraine, Summer 1941: Varied Histories, Explanations And Comparisons', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 13/3 (2011), 233–6; Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 450–1; Alfred J. Rieber, 'Civil Wars in the Soviet Union', *Kritika*, 4/1 (2003), 145–7.

19. Ljiljana Radonic, *Krieg um die Erinnerung* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 2009), 79–82.
20. Hale, *Hitler's Foreign Executioners*, 79–80, 97–100.
21. Andrej Angrick and Peter Klein, *The 'Final Solution' in Riga: Exploitation and Annihilation, 1941–1944* (Oxford and New York: Berghahn, 2009), 58–68, 328–33; Yitzhak Arad, *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 88–95; Birn, 'Collaboration', 187–91; Hale, *Hitler's Foreign Executioners*, 109–12, 128–31, 177–9, 182, 249, 258; Lower, 'Pogroms', 234–5; Mazower, *Hitler's Empire*, 174–6; Karl-Heinz Schoeps, 'Holocaust and Resistance in Vilnius: Rescuers in "Wehrmacht" Uniforms', *German Studies Review*, 31/3 (2008), 489–94.
22. Grzybowski, 'Outline', 467.
23. Delphine Bechtel, 'De Jedwabne à Zolotchiv: Pogromes locaux en Galicie, juin–juillet 1941', *Cultures d'Europe Centrale, 5. La Destruction des confins* (Paris: Centre Interdisciplinaire d'Études Centre-Européennes, 2005), 69–92; Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–1944* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 17–59; Hale, *Hitler's Foreign Executioners*, 172–3, 295; John-Paul Himka, 'Former Ukrainian Policemen in the Ukrainian National Insurgency: Continuing the Holocaust outside German Service' (unpublished manuscript, 2009), 4; Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 69–97; Vladimir Melamed, 'Organized and Unsolicited Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Multifaceted Ukrainian Context', *East European Affairs*, 37/2 (2007), 217–48.
24. Birn, 'Collaboration', 191–3; Giorgio Geddes, *Nichivó: Life, Love and Death on the Russian Front* (London: Cassell, 2001), 107–10; 164–6; Grzybowski, 'Outline', 462–3.
25. Hale, *Hitler's Foreign Executioners*, 187; Hill, *War Behind the Eastern Front*, 94–6, 103–6.
26. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (3rd edn, Englewood, CO: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1963), 73–7.
27. Hale, *Hitler's Foreign Executioners*, 138–41; Lower, 'Pogroms', 222–6, 232.
28. Himka, 'Former Ukrainian Policemen', 2; Keith Lowe, *Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II* (London: Penguin, 2012), 215–19.
29. Oleg Anisimov, *The German Occupation in Northern Russia during World War II: Political and Administrative Perspectives* (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954), 18–19; Fabian Lemmes, 'Collaboration in Wartime France, 1940–1944', *European Review of History*, 15/2 (2008), 160–1; Mazower, *Hitler's Empire*, 442–3, 450–1; The National Archives (TNA), War Office (WO), 208/713, 'PIC Paper No. 55. Greek Security Battalions. 18 July 1944'.
30. Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years 1940–1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 191.

31. Hill, *War Behind the Eastern Front*, 82–3.
32. Pieter Lagrou, 'The Politics of Memory: Resistance as a Collective Myth in Post-War France, Belgium and the Netherlands, 1945–1965', *European Review*, 11/4 (2003), 527.
33. Bjørn Schreiber Pedersen, 'Restraining Excesses: Resistance and Counter-Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Denmark 1940–1945', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10/1 (1998), 64.
34. Gabriel A. Almond, 'The Resistance and the Political Parties of Western Europe', *Political Science Quarterly*, 62/1 (1947), 28–30.
35. Jane Slaughter, *Women and the Italian Resistance, 1943–1945* (Denver, CO: Arden Press, 1997), 37–8.
36. Matthew Cooper, *The Phantom War: The German Struggle Against Soviet Partisans 1941–1944* (London: Macdonald and Jane's Publishers, 1979), 118; Timothy Mulligan, *The Politics of Illusion and Empire: German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1942–1943* (New York: Praeger, 1988), 148–9.
37. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 114–32; Jozo Tomasevitch, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1943–1945: Occupation and Collaboration* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 416–65.
38. Jean-Pierre Azéma, 'La Milice', *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire*, 28 (1990), 83–105; M. Chanal, 'La Milice française dans l'Isère: Février 1943–août 1944', *Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et des conflits contemporains*, 127 (1982), 1–42; Monique Luirard, 'La Milice française dans la Loire', *Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale*, 23/91 (1973), 77–102.
39. Perry Biddiscombe, 'The Last White Terror: The Maquis Blanc and Its Impact in Liberated France, 1944–1945', *Journal of Modern History*, 73/4 (2001), 812; Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (London: Pimlico, 2007), 33–5; Stathis N. Kalyvas, 'Armed Collaboration in Greece', *European Review of History*, 15/2 (2008), 130–1; Lemmes, 'Collaboration', 162; Mazower, *Hitler's Empire*, 8, 443, 499, 502–4.
40. Williams, *Allies and Italians*, 37–42, 64–9, 107–18.
41. TNA, WO, 204/7238, 2–3.
42. Pieter Lagrou, 'Regaining the Monopoly of Force: Agents of the State Shooting Fugitives in and around Belgium, 1940–1950', *Past and Present*, suppl. 6 (2011), 179; Geoffrey Warner, 'Allies, Government and Resistance: The Belgian Political Crisis of November 1944', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5/28 (1978), 45–60.
43. M. R. D. Foot, 'The Liberation of France and the Restoration of Democratic Government', in Gill Bennett (ed.), *The End of the War in Europe 1945* (London: HMSO, 1996), 101–2; Olivier Wieviorka, 'France', in Bob Moore (ed.), *Resistance in Western Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 125–55.
44. Lagrou, 'Politics of Memory', 532.
45. Antony Beevor and Artemis Cooper, *Paris After the Liberation: 1944–1949* (London: Penguin, 1994), 93–115; Foot, 'Liberation of France', 104; Lowe, *Savage Continent*, 148–53.
46. Biddiscombe, 'Last White Terror', 811–61.
47. Charles Glass, *The Deserters: A Hidden History of World War II* (New York: Penguin, 2013), 279-81.
48. Rieber, 'Civil Wars', 153.
49. André Gerolymatos, *Red Acropolis, Black Terror: The Greek Civil War and the Origins of Soviet–American Rivalry, 1943–1949* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 118, 157; Mark

Mazower, 'Introduction', in Mazower (ed.), *After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation, and State in Greece, 1943–1960* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 4–12.

50. Jeffrey Burds, 'The Soviet War Against "Fifth Columnists": The Case of Chechnya, 1942–1944', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 42/2 (2007), 307.
51. Catherine Merridale, *Ivan's War* (New York: Metropolitan, 2006), 237, 252.
52. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationialism*, 292–9; Serhij Kudelia, 'Choosing Violence in Irregular Wars: The Case of Anti-Soviet Insurgency in Western Ukraine', *East European Politics and Societies*, 27/1 (2013), 149–81; Lowe, *Savage Continent*, 215–19, 341–52; David Marples, *Stalinism in the Ukraine in the 1940s* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), 58–9; Rieber, 'Civil Wars', 157–60.
53. Rebecca Boehling, *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany* (New York: Berghahn, 1996), 30–7; Ulrich Borsdorf and Lutz Niethammer (eds.), *Zwischen Befreiung und Besatzung: Analysen des US-Geheimdienstes über Positionen und Strukturen deutscher Politik 1945* (Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum Verlag, 1995), 28; Patricia Meehan, *A Strange Enemy People* (London: Peter Owen Publishers, 2001), 14–18, 56–7.
54. Perry Biddiscombe, '"The Enemy of Our Enemy": A View of the Edelweiss Piraten from the British and American Archives', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 30/1 (1995), 37–63; Gordon Schaffer, *Russian Zone* (London: Gorge Allen & Unwin, 1947), 148–9.
55. Perry Biddiscombe, *Werwolf!* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998), 196–7.
56. Fritz, *Endkampf* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press), 223–35; Toby Thacker, *The End of the Third Reich* (Stroud: Tempus, 2006), 135–41.
57. Barbara Marshall, *The Origins of Post-War German Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 36; M. E. Pelly et al. (eds.), *Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series 1, v. Germany and Western Europe, 11 August–31 December 1945* (London: HMSO, 1990), 43–8.
58. Fritz, *Endkampf*, 224.
59. A comprehensive treatment of the anti-fascist committees in the western zones is to be found in Lutz Niethammer et al. (eds.), *Arbeiterinitiative 1945* (Wuppertal: Hammer, 1976). For antifas in the Soviet Zone, see Jeanette Michelmann, *Aktivisten der ersten Stunde* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2002).
60. Himka, 'Former Ukrainian Policemen', 1.
61. Stephen Dorrill, *MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service* (New York: Touchstone, 2002), 268–99; Stanley Vardys, 'The Partisan Movement in Postwar Lithuania', *Slavic Review*, 22/3 (1963), 509–10.
62. Radonic, *Krieg um die Erinnerung*, 82–6.
63. Ivo Banac, 'The Tito–Stalin Split and the Greek Civil War', in John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley (eds.), *Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 258–73; Ioanna Papathanasiou, 'The Cominform and the Greek Civil War, 1947–1949', in Philip Carabott and Thanasis D. Sfikas (eds.), *The Greek Civil War: Essays on a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silences* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004); Peter J. Stavrakis, 'Soviet Policy in Areas of Limited Control: The Case of Greece, 1944–1949', in Iatrides and Wrigley (eds.), *Greece at the Crossroads*, 227–57; Christopher M. Woodhouse, *The Struggle for Greece 1941–1949* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1976).
64. Dorrill, *MI6*, 81–90; Peter Grose, *Operation Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2001).

65. Per Anders Rudling, 'Historical Representation of the Wartime Accounts of the Activities of OUN-UPA', *East European Jewish Affairs*, 36/2 (2006), 169–74, 179–80.
66. Hale, *Hitler's Foreign Executioners*, 128–37; Josoph A. Melamed, 'The Malicious Face and Criminal Acts of the "Provisional Government" of Lithuania, June 23–August 5, 1941', *Lithuania—Crime and Punishment*, 6 (January 1999), 36–41.
67. Vardys, 'The Partisan Movement in Postwar Lithuania', 512; Violeta Davoliūtė, *The Making and Breaking of Soviet Lithuania: Memory and Modernity in the Wake of War* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 49.
68. Marco Alberato, 'Italian Communism and Violence, 1921–1948', *Twentieth Century Communism*, 2/1 (2010), 105–6; Beevor and Cooper, *Paris after the Liberation*, 135–6, 240–2; Tom Behan, *The Long Awaited Moment: The Working Class and the Italian Communist Party in Milan, 1943–1948* (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 73–81, 189–90, 210–15.
69. Jeffrey Burds, *The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948* (Pittsburgh: Russian and East European Studies Program, University of Pittsburgh, 2001), 3–35.
70. Gerolymatos, *Red Acropolis,* 194–5; Mazower, 'Introduction', 8–12.
71. Boehling, *Question of Priorities*, 35–51; Kurt Jürgensen, 'Towards Occupation: First Encounters in Northern Germany', in Ulrike Jordan (ed.), *Conditions of Surrender* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 58–62; Leonard Mosley, *Report from Germany* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1945), 71–5; Harold Zink, *United States in Germany 1944–1955* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1957), 170–5.
72. Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1995), 251–317; Gareth Pritchard, *The Making of the GDR 1945–1953: From Antifascism to Stalinism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 56–107.
73. Catherine Epstein, *The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and their Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 102.
74. Richard Bessel, *Germany 1945: From War to Peace* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 308–9.
75. Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 54–8; Patrick Major, *The Death of the KPD: Communism and Anti-Communism in West Germany, 1945–1956* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 40–60; Reiner Pommerin, 'Die Zwangsvereinigung von KPD und SPD zur SED', *Viertelsjahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 36/2 (1988), 319–25; Dirk Spilker, *The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 72–81.
76. Gareth Pritchard, *Niemandsland: A History of Unoccupied Germany 1944–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 136–51, 171–8, 188–212.
77. Spilker, *East German Leadership*, 18–84.
78. Pritchard, *Making of the GDR*, 79–136.
79. Major, *Death of the KPD*, 302.
80. Lagrou, 'Regaining the Monopoly', 178.
81. Alberato, 'Italian Communism and Violence', 103–4; Massimo Storchi, 'Post-War Violence in Italy: A Struggle for Memory', *Modern Italy*, 12/2 (2007), 243–5.
82. Lowe, *Savage Continent*, 276–8.
83. Beevor and Cooper, *Paris After Liberation*, 361–99; Behan, *Long Awaited Moment*, 181–224; Dick Geary, 'Social Protest in the Ruhr, 1945–1949', in Eleanore Breuning et al. (eds.), *Power and the People: A Social History of Central European Politics, 1945–1956* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 17–28.

CHAPTER 31

THE MEMORY OF EUROPE'S AGE OF CATASTROPHE, 1914–2014

BEN MERCER

When French authorities disinterred a body at Verdun in 1920, one of eight from whom would be selected the 'Unknown Soldier' of the First World War, they discovered the corpse of a Senegalese.[1] The body was considered ineligible, the mistake rectified, a white body found. Unidentified the soldier might have been, but there could be no question as to his nation and race (or gender, as feminist protesters pointed out when in 1970 they sought to place a wreath at the tomb in memory of the Unknown Soldier's unknown wife). Nonetheless, the Second Pan-African Congress meeting in Paris in 1921 began with a visit to the tomb where some delegates proclaimed that the Unknown Soldier might be 'a black man, because the death which struck the defenders of France made no distinction between soldiers according to the colour of their skin'.[2] Blaise Diagne, the deputy from Sengegal, knew better. He had protested the return of the unknown Senegalese soldier to the soil, and called in 1921 for a memorial to African troops on African soil. While nothing came of this proposal, France revealed in 1923 a monument in Dakar of two soldiers, one French, one Senegalese (the hand of the former resting on the shoulder of the latter). On the base were five images: the first Governor of French West Africa and the four Governors General who ruled French West Africa from 1900 to 1917.[3] The monument celebrated 'both the greatness of France's civilizing work … and also the fidelity and loyalty of the African populations to the mother power'.[4] The two soldiers, popularly known as 'Demba and Dupont', stood until 1983 when they were exiled to a Catholic cemetery and replaced by a sculpture commemorating Senegalese independence, before returning amid celebrations of Senegal's role in the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Toulouse in 2004.

Yet by the twenty-first century, few remembered the First World War. Some twelve French veterans remained alive in 2005, the moment at which Jacques Chirac suggested the last living soldier of the First World War receive a state funeral service and perhaps

be entombed alongside the Unknown Soldier beneath the Arc de Triomphe. The suggestion was not welcomed by Lazare Ponticelli, who joined the French Foreign Legion in 1914 and by January 2008 was the sole survivor. Ponticelli eventually conceded to an official Mass, but requested 'no racket, no procession'. After Ponticelli's death aged 110 in March 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy, at a televised Mass celebrated in Les Invalides, evoked the 'love of fatherland' for which the Italian-born Ponticelli (who received French citizenship in 1939) and his fellow soldiers fought. Ponticelli, who hitherto had refused to participate in official ceremonies, had stated that his only thought during combat was 'we are all going to die', and 'war is completely stupid'.[5] His personal memory now succumbed to the high diction of official ceremony.

The history of these soldiers, known and unknown, real and symbolic, illustrates both the multiple possible appropriations of the memory of conflict in Europe's age of catastrophe, and the difficulty, despite efforts, of any single actor to cement the interpretation of the past. War and genocide in the first half of the twentieth century turned much of Europe into a graveyard. In the cultural history of the aftermath came the question where the bodies were buried, at times literally, but most often metaphorically. What would be the location of the experience of mass death in the subsequent life of society? Historians have used 'memory' to designate this struggle over the past's meaning. However, the term can mean very different acts and practices. The individual's memory (socially framed) of his or her own experiences provides the object of oral history. But memory has also been used to refer to the diverse forms of representing the past—from museums to memorials, commemorations to cultural production, historical re-enactments to historiography—all of which beg the question who is doing the remembering. The field of memory is thus defined by the tension between individuals and collectives, the remembrance of a Lazare Ponticelli and the official ceremony to celebrate him. The term 'collective memory' (most often a national memory) invariably provokes the banal observation that collective memory is contested or divided. As the case of Lazare Ponticelli shows, acts of 'collective memory' continue to exist and flourish once all those who experienced an event are dead. By the early twenty-first century, society and the state 'remembered' the First World War without anyone with actual memories of the conflict. Yet this contradiction was not new: within a few years of the armistice of 1918, schoolchildren entered the classroom with little to no knowledge and no personal memory of the war. Textbooks and anniversary ceremonies became crucial instruments to construct a memory of the past which did not exist. The memory of individuals and the public representation of the past intersect, but states have the advantage of longevity over individuals.

The First World War, and war more generally, holds a special place in the literature concerning memory, a reflection of the importance of war in national identity. In 1975, Paul Fussell evocatively argued that the First World War marked a caesura in 'modern memory' and ushered in an ironic, modernist sensibility.[6] Fussell generalized from the experience of a small English public-school literary elite; subsequent historians, such as Jay Winter, emphasized by contrast the endurance of traditional languages of mourning and loss.[7] However, during the war (and after) the language of the sacred and the

profane existed side by side, deployed at different times by different groups. By 1917, tour guides produced by Michelin spoke of the battlefields as sites of pilgrimage and French publications already spoke of the sacredness of Verdun, but it was simultaneously the place to be for French elites, who could enjoy lunch with Marshal Pétain.[8] The nation's sacred loss was just one tone in which war was recorded. One English post-war brochure warned, 'BOOK EARLY if you want to see anything of the chaos and debris of War…. YOU MUST COME NOW if you want to see anything of the chaos of a modern Battlefield', warning of the imminent return of the scene to landscape.[9] An early issue of the *War Illustrated* pointed out that 'souvenir hunting has become quite an industry where the fire of battle has raged, and it is certain that the traffic in war souvenirs will flourish in the years to come when battlefields are the haunt of summer tourists'.[10]

If soldiers themselves first engaged in souvenir hunting, the collectors after the war were the bereaved, veterans, the curious. Tourists who took bones and skulls from the battlefield provided one reason to organize ossuaries. Christopher Isherwood mordantly noted that Ypres 'is certainly "for ever England … the England of sordid little teashops, faked souvenirs and touts"'.[11] In France, Daniel Sherman has traced how French companies cloaked in the claim to high art the commercial enterprise of monument building: offering catalogues with every village's choice of stele (with or without poilu, and a selection of materials and styles of lettering).[12] At the other end of the Continent, Soviet ideologues criticized the rampant misuse of the ubiquitous (if sometimes not very accurate) image of Lenin, 'fired onto porcelain pitchers, teacups and plates. It appeared on jewelry, on candy wrappers, on cigarette boxes' before the Soviet state regulated his likeness.[13] Despite the best efforts of authorities and the disparagement of cultural elites, memory was a commercial as well as sacred activity.

The First World War marked an acceleration of the 'democratization of death'.[14] In the nineteenth century, armies rarely bothered to identify the bodies of individual soldiers. As Thomas Laqueur has pointed out, after the 1880 Battle of Maiwand in the Second Afghan War, 962 dead were interred with a single burial marker to Major Blackwood of the Royal Horse Artillery. The only other name deemed worthy of remembrance was that of the pet dog that escaped: awarded a medal by Queen Victoria and stuffed for preservation, the name of Bobbie of the Royal Berkshires would live evermore.[15] The First World War demanded more names than those of dogs and officers. Increasingly, soldiers' names were listed on memorials alphabetically rather than by rank, a trend that continued after the Second World War. Thus whereas Italian monuments to the Risorgimento focused on Garibaldi or Victor Emmanuel, those of the First World War honoured the ordinary soldier. Efforts were made to bury soldiers individually, but also by nation, rather than in mass graves in which the dead of all sides commingled. The exaltation of the individual soldier in the service of the nation deepened despite the industrialization of warfare bringing mass death and the destruction of bodies beyond recognition. The contradiction between the drive to recognize individuals and the mass production of their oblivion found its resolution in the tomb of the 'Unknown Soldier'—a monument that responded to the overwhelming reality of mass mortality when the quality of being unknown was thought to be abnormal (and not just for officers).

Was the development of the 'Unknown Soldier' and other ceremonies a manipulative move by political elites to ensure social cohesion or a spontaneous, genuine expression of mourning and loss? The same question has been posed of Lenin's tomb in the Soviet Union. To be sure, English political authorities only hesitantly embraced the idea of a cenotaph and tomb of the Unknown Warrior (the suggestion 'tomb of the unknown comrade' was rejected, as was 'soldier', in order to represent the three services).[16] In the case of England, popular participation transformed the 'Unknown Warrior' from a symbol of victory to one of loss (personal rather than national). Yet the deaths of the First World War were not random, not just any loss. They commemorated the national dead, not just the dead, certainly not the dead of both sides, however much corpses may have mingled on the battlefield. The memorials to them were placed in public squares not cemeteries. Monuments tended towards what Paul Fussell described as 'high diction', the exclusion of the scabrous language of soldiers for whom the English medal DSO (awarded only to officers) did not mean Distinguished Service Order but 'Dick Shot Off'.[17] Dissenters to the ceremonies of remembrance existed, but rare was the monument which depicted soldiers as killers or inscribed the statement 'war on war'.[18]

If in Britain and France memory expressed loss and mourning, not manipulation, this testified to the relative success of the war effort. Where political consensus was lacking, no such seemingly uncomplicated language of loss was possible. This was particularly true after civil wars. Monuments to the Nationalist dead of the Spanish Civil War abounded but not to Republicans. Finnish Civil War monuments likewise ignored the 'Reds'. Italian ones after 1918 attempted to create a retrospective consensus in favour of the war effort, but in the long term the memory of the First World War still proved easier than that of the civil-war-like partisan conflict of the Second. The dilemma of memory was particularly evident where the multi-ethnic empires crumbled. In Ireland and the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, mourning was complicated. An official opening of a National War Memorial in Ireland did not occur until the 1990s. In Alsace-Lorraine, whose citizens fought mainly on the German side but were incorporated into France in 1918, memorials were dedicated simply to the children of the village who died during the war—not *mort pour la France*—and were located not in public squares as was common in the rest of France, but in cemeteries.[19] The most unadulterated focus on loss thus occurred where the national narrative failed.

In the newly established Poland and Czechoslovakia the dead died fighting for a state that no longer existed. Poles had fought in the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian imperial armies. Some nostalgia adhered particularly to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but the re-emergence of an independent Poland discouraged the blithe, nostalgic image of pre-1914 Europe that existed in much of western Europe. Instead, the new Polish state focused on the volunteers who fought in the Austro-Hungarian army, especially after the ascent of Piłsudski. The Czechoslovak state preferred to ignore those who had fought for the Austro-Hungarian Empire and instead consecrate the Czechoslovak Legions, all the while imagining a widespread resistance to Austria-Hungary from the outbreak of war. The Sudeten German minority rejected this invented memory in favour of one in which the war effort of loyal German troops was undermined by Czech and Slovak duplicity.

The remembrance of the First World War in south, central, and eastern Europe demonstrates the relative simplicity and consensus of the meaning of the conflict on the western front. Moreover, the further south and east in Europe, the less the First World War existed as a distinct event. In Bulgaria, the 'European War', as it tended to be called, constituted only one part of an era of conflict that began in 1912 interspersed with short periods of peace. In the Soviet Union, the period of total war lingered until at least 1921.

The radical revision of the map and of regimes in eastern Europe made evident the extent to which memory—the representation of and meaning ascribed to the past—fluctuated according to post-war political transformations. Thus the Russian Revolution transformed and dwarfed the significance of the war that came before it, so much so that ex-Soviet citizens, when asked to name the deadliest wars in the twentieth century, left it out, and when prompted responded 'Oh, that'.[20] The Soviet Military History Museum, in its exhibits on what the Soviet elite liked to call the 'Imperialist War', embraced criticism of the strategic mistakes of the Russian high command, and emphasized the enormous casualties while nonetheless allowing a current of Russian patriotism to remain.[21] The change in regime facilitated some critical views of the conflict. By contrast, in England, the Imperial War Museum was created both as part of the war's propaganda campaign and as a sincere attempt to record the experience. The resulting museum presented the home front perspective on war, much to the chagrin of those who had collected the material.[22] The meaning of death and destruction did not stand still. Benjamin Ziemann has noted how during the war, the 'lucky ones' were those who died quickly. Once the war was concluded, the lucky were those who had survived.[23] During the conflict some soldiers imagined the ruins standing as monuments to the war. Others dreamed of the return of the battlefield to farmland. Controversy accompanied the replanting of trees in the barren post-war wastelands. The key question for much public memory of the First World War in the 1920s was the extent to which the post-war era could deliver the desires and dreams the war produced. Most frequently, the public representation of the conflict after 1919 reflected the success of a particular institution or group. Thus in Germany, as Richard Bessel has suggested, 'officers' experiences, rather than the experiences of the great mass of the veterans of the Great War, came to determine how these events figured in the language of politics in Weimar Germany'.[24]

Memories of the Great War in the 1920s reflected the preoccupations and politics of that decade. They should not be projected back onto the First World War. George Mosse saw a 'brutalization' of politics, especially evident in Germany, which could explain the rise of National Socialism.[25] Yet while Nazis appealed to a mythology of the trenches, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) garnered the greatest votes from veterans in the Weimar Republic. The SPD even recognized (albeit with some reluctance) German atrocities in Belgium.[26] Despite the extent to which ex-servicemen's organizations talked of the bond of the front, many if not most only wished a return to civilian life. Joanna Bourke has argued that the 'idea of male bonding in the context of the war generation … flourished in private, nostalgic remembrances stripped of all the trappings of that community'.[27] Most favoured a return to domesticity over male bonding. French veterans' associations developed a distinctly anti-militarist ethos grounded in an understanding of the war as

the defeat of German militarism.[28] They disliked bellicosity, distrusted their officers, and rejected revanchist politics. In Italy, returned servicemen's leagues had little electoral impact, as did Italian fascism, however much it vaunted the arrival of a 'trenchocracy'.

The literary memory boom of the late 1920s that followed the publication of Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* reflected as much the disappointments of the Weimar Republic as it did the experience of war itself. *All Quiet on the Western Front*'s impact was ubiquitous, from England where Siegfried Sassoon wrote his war trilogy in an attempt to cash in on its success, to the USSR, where Soviet critics welcomed the book, despite reservations that the protagonist, Paul Bäumer, is shot at the end of the novel instead of joining the revolution. The ability of many Europeans to sympathize with a German protagonist as a victim of war formed part of an international reconciliation which shifted the emphasis from German 'war guilt' to one in which all Europeans slithered over the brink into the conflict.[29] Armistice Day no longer celebrated the sacrifice of the dead but a 'war to end all wars'.[30]

The re-evaluation of the Great War was by no means uniform and the 'pacifist turn' could create unlikely alliances, such as that between pacifists and German nationalists who both repudiated the evidence of German atrocities in Belgium as propaganda.[31] Too jarring to the spirit of Locarno, memory of these war crimes was reduced to a local or regional dimension. Officially sanctioned remembrance thus confined alternative memories to individual or subordinate spheres as necessary. If the 'stab in the back' myth held little sway among returned soldiers in Germany, it rapidly dominated the institutional memory of the German army and German history textbooks. Historiography remained bound to national priorities. An attempt by French and German historians to write a collaborative school textbook, inauspiciously begun in 1933, proved impossible to pull off until after the Second World War.[32] The failures of the interwar period would ultimately define much of the memory of the Great War, or at least its settlement. As Sally Marks has lamented, the Carthaginian reading of the Treaty of Versailles retains its popularity despite decades of scholarly research.[33] The 'mistakes of 1919' is simply too appealing a history lesson.

A number of historians have identified in 1945 the caesura proclaimed by Fussell for 1914. George Mosse saw in 1945 the terminus of the 'Myth of the War Experience', the end of the sacred cult of the fallen soldiers in the service of martial nationalism. So, too, Jay Winter contrasted the emphasis on traditional languages after the First War to how, after the Second, 'Other voices emerged, and other cultural forms appeared. Many of them were abstract, and thereby both more liberated from specific cultural and political reference and less accessible to a mass audience. Their austere simplicity is powerful and compelling, and points to 1945 as the real caesura in European cultural life.'[34] These claims to cultural death are greatly exaggerated, themselves a trope of modern culture. 'Poetry is dead', remarked the French soldier Louis Mairet in 1917, and the observation would be regularly repeated in the twentieth century.[35] As Michael Geyer has noted, after the First World War, 'it was everywhere emphasized that the experience of industrial war could find no adequate expression, because it transcended all means of representation'.[36] Representations flourished despite this critical affirmation of unrepresentability.

After 1945, the languages of heroism and nationalism were undoubtedly muted for the defeated nations, who made do with traditions of national martyrdom. The bland mythology of the 'greatest generation' invoked in the United States was hardly available to Germans, but Soviet monuments and narratives appealed to the heroism of Stalin, the Communist Party, the Red Army, and Soviet peoples. In Great Britain, the 'People's War' evoked a populist heroism: the 'dominant image, focusing on Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the Blitz, figured Britain as a nation of "ordinary" people, emerging victoriously from the war having stood *alone* against the enemy, and *together* in solidarity as they survived the massive air bombardment of the Blitz'.[37] The Second World War played a crucial role in a British post-war identity that emphasized success in war and a benevolent imperialism, even or especially as its empire crumbled. If a martial nationalism declined in the post-war era, it reflected the disinclination of Europeans to fight each other, preferring instead to inflict death and destruction in colonial wars outside its borders.

Nonetheless, the aftermath of the Second World War differed markedly from that of the First. Soviet military dead alone surpassed the 10 million of all nations in the First World War. Civilian casualties outnumbered the military. There was no confusion about the defeat of Germany, driven home by the presence of Soviet, American, and British troops on German soil, the saturation bombing of German cities, and the suicide of Adolf Hitler. Glory was in short supply. The British and Soviets could recount a victorious war of moral certainties (marginalizing the Nazi–Soviet pact, appeasement, their own alliance, and the time it took to identify Nazi Germany and not each other as the greater evil). Most Europeans, however, experienced the war in a grey zone of accommodation, collaboration, retreat, and resistance. This experience of occupation prepared the ground for trials of collaborators, irrelevant to the largely static First World War, while the total defeat of Germany permitted immediate prosecution of war crimes. The issue of imperial German atrocities in Belgium in 1914 continued to create controversy in the aftermath of the Versailles Treaty (which stipulated that war crimes would be prosecuted) and German school textbooks stated as late as the 1990s that the atrocities were the invention of Allied propaganda. By contrast, the debate over the war crimes of Nazi Germany concerned not whether they occurred but the extent of responsibility.

The clarity of defeat and the pursuit of war crimes marked West Germany in particular. While the trials at Nuremberg were often read as victors' justice, they drove home the defeat of Nazism and the responsibility of its leadership, and may have been 'decisive in convincing many Germans that the Nazi reign of terror was completely dead, insofar as law, constitutionalism and the restored *Rechtsstaat* were the hallmarks of a post-Nazi social order'.[38] Elsewhere, the process of denazification and defascistization stalled even more quickly. In Belgium a widespread popular desire for punishment of collaborators was repressed by a pragmatic political class.[39] In Italy, there was no equivalent of Nuremberg. Attempts to prosecute Italian war crimes foundered against the resistance of the post-war regime, the monarchy, and the military, with the collusion of the British government. Most operations of justice petered out rapidly in the context of a reinvigorated Cold War. Nonetheless, criminal trials endured as a feature of the memorialization

of the Second World War until well into the twenty-first century in a way utterly unlike anything the First World War produced.

In contrast to the memory of the First World War (analysed in terms of mourning, myths, and modernity), a framework of silence, repression, and forgetting has been applied to the Second. The popularity of the metaphor of silence stems partly from the appealing idea of the 'return of the repressed', which naturalizes one historical paradigm by labelling its predecessor the product of repression. Yet nothing guarantees that silenced historical events must one day be 'worked through'. The traumatic motif of much memory literature underestimates the ease with which the past can rather be worked away. The allegation of amnesia designates as abnormal the ubiquitous process of a selective ordering of the past. The failure of the First World War to secure a significant place in the memory of eastern Europe should give pause to any assumptions of an inevitably resurgent memory. There was an enormous amount of selective repression after 1918. Monuments to the dead rarely represented soldiers in the act of killing. Much of the post-war literature presented soldiers as victims of the war rather than participants and killers. Indeed, for individual soldiers, 'their memory of killing did not match their pre-held scripts of what war was "about". Rather, they more closely resembled their image of murder.'[40] After the Second World War, it was not just soldiers who had participated in murder. If the First World War failed to resemble the cultural scripts of war, the Second, with its partisan conflicts, civil wars, and genocides, fell even further short. There was much to be silent about.

Silence covers a wide variety of phenomena. In some instances, it is the product of censorship. Thus the Soviet Union prohibited (until 1988) the printing or reference to military orders 227 (which created battalions to shoot Soviet troops who retreated) and 270 (which equated being taken prisoner with treason).[41] West European states also censored controversial events. The French government demanded an image of Vichy officials be cut from Alain Resnais's *Night and Fog*, and banned Marcel Ophuls's *The Sorrow and the Pity* from television.[42] In the 1950s, Italian courts imprisoned for 'insult to the armed forces' two journalists making a documentary on the Italian invasion of Greece,[43] while article 301 of the Turkish penal code criminalizes insulting Turkishness and has stifled discussion of the Armenian genocide. All states have made use of varying degrees of restriction to archival materials. Pieter Lagrou in his comparative analysis of the legacy of the Second World War noted the remarkable openness of Dutch archives compared to the regrettable obstructions in accessing French archives and the lamentable state of Belgian records where cabinet records are the property of the politicians who created them.[44] Ruth Ben-Ghiat has pointed out how in Italy, the 'many lacunae within the historical record on Italian Fascism and its wars are in part a direct product of persistent practices of obstructionism that range from the removal by archivists of sensitive single documents from public domain files to the inaccessibility of entire civilian and military documentary collections…. To cite just one example … the Italian Navy and Air Force archives are open for the years 1940 to 1943 only to Italian Navy and Air Force historians.'[45] Through censorship and secrecy states have at times quite successfully kept in check a full accounting of the past.

Imposed by secrecy and censorship, silence has also been chosen and advocated, and not just by perpetrators seeking to shed their responsibility. In France in the 1920s, some schoolteachers argued that the First World War was indeed best forgotten, lest its remembrance merely ingrain xenophobia and militarism.[46] While exiled veterans of the Spanish Civil War retained as their primary focus the denunciation and destruction of the Franco regime, veterans who remained in Spain often remembered their Republicanism as the product of geographical accident—a stance born partly of pragmatic desire to receive the pensions and benefits available to nationalist veterans but also the practical necessity of living alongside their former enemies.[47] In post-Franco Spain, the silence of Republican families for fear of discrimination turned into a consensus not to dig up the past amid common fears of a *coup d'état*. The amnesty law of 1977 proved widely popular. Until very late in the twentieth century school textbooks emphasized the Spanish Civil War as a fratricidal tragedy. These silences were not the same as forgetting—they were a conscious choice not to use the past in a particular way rather than to forget it—although they could produce an absence of memory in generations to come. Nor was the choice of silence freely made, but depended on the value the past could offer in the present. Thus in the Soviet Union, individuals could collude in the silence about Stalinist crimes partly in order to avoid the status of victims.[48]

The basic narrative of memory of the Second World War is by now familiar, with Henry Rousso's *The Vichy Syndrome* providing the paradigmatic case study.[49] In the aftermath of the relatively brief and frequently shallow purges, societies on both sides of the Iron Curtain settled into a myth of victimhood in which Germany bore sole responsibility for the horrors of war and genocide. The populations of Europe thus emerged as innocent victims, or anti-fascist resisters with a few collaborators. In much of Western Europe, and especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, and Italy, politicians had to deal with the significant number of ex-National Socialist or Fascist voters. As Jeffrey Herf has pointed out with respect to West Germany, 'there was no electoral majority in the 1950s for political leaders who spoke bluntly about and sought timely justice for crimes of the Nazi era'.[50] In Eastern Europe, the Communist dictatorships sought legitimacy in imagining they were founded on Communist resistance to Nazism. The Soviet Union downplayed the populist people's war evoked during the conflict itself to focus instead on the role of Stalin. Thus both Allied and collaborator nations placed guilt solely on Germany, the German Democratic Republic displaced the legacy of Nazism onto the Federal Republic, and West Germans directed it towards Hitler.

Citizens of West Germany imagined themselves as doubly victimized, first by Nazism, then in the expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe, in the division of Germany and Soviet occupation. Returned POWs became emblematic national figures of Christian redemptive suffering.[51] In France, too, 'the nation as victim and martyr took on new importance as a theme of commemoration' after 1945.[52] In Austria, official memory of the Second World War appealed to the status of 'first victim of Nazism', declared by the Allies in the Moscow Declaration of 1943 in an unsuccessful attempt to incite resistance. The population eagerly embraced the myth: an opinion poll in 1946 showed only 4 per cent agreed all Austrians shared some guilt for letting Nazism come to power.[53] A

discourse of victimhood, particularly for international consumption, and a discourse of soldierly heroism coexisted side by side. Outside Vienna, monuments to Austrian dead served as 'an account of heroes who had sacrificed their lives in devoted obligation to their duty [*treue Pflichterfüllung*], in order to protect the *Heimat* against impetuously intruding enemies'.[54] The concentration camp of Mauthausen was marginalized to being an object of Communist commemoration only. In Italy, the philosopher Benedetto Croce proclaimed that Italian fascism was a parenthesis in national history, and the two decades of dictatorship were left in the shadows of the German-backed Repubblica Sociale Italiano. Italians liked to believe, and foreigners were inclined to agree, that they were *brava gente*, 'good people', simply incapable of real involvement in the crimes of the mid-twentieth century.

There was no amnesia of the Second World War and its crimes after 1945, but rather a very selective remembrance which severely limited the responsibility and participation of the populations which had perpetrated, supported, and collaborated in Nazism and fascism. The idea of totalitarianism emphasized the victimization of the individual in a regime based on terror, neglected popular consent, and equated communism and Nazism, conveniently obscuring that the peoples of the Soviet Union had been a major victim of Nazi Germany's racial war of annihilation. The Cold War played a key role in cementing this representation, perhaps most evident in Greece, where after the 1944 conflict between British forces and the Greek left-wing Resistance, the collaborationist justification of defending Greece against communism won considerable government sympathy. The post-war Greek government was one 'unwilling either to praise the resistance or to condemn collaborators'.[55] Indeed, the Greek and Dutch governments initially refused to contribute to the international monument at Auschwitz, the Dutch rationale being that any such support would constitute financing Communist propaganda.[56]

The Cold War thus contributed to obscuring the systematic mass murder of Europe's Jews, and the racial focus on Nazi ideology more broadly. The Soviet Union transformed the Jewish victims of Babi Yar into generic Soviet citizens, not to distract from the anti-Communist drive of Nazism, the Soviet narrative of the war, or the Soviet Union's own anti-Semitism. Across Europe, Jewish victims of Nazism were either assimilated into a generic category of victims, the racial nature of (and widespread participation in) their persecution obscured, or found themselves at the bottom of a hierarchy of suffering, extraneous to the demands of a narrative of national martyrdom. When West Germans acknowledged the Holocaust, 'it was most frequently in order to establish a measure of the horror of their own experience'.[57] A number of factors hindered a thorough engagement with the Holocaust. There were fewer survivors of the Nazi extermination camps than there were of Nazi concentration camps. Anti-Semitism and racism persisted in the post-war era. The trials at Nuremberg did not focus on Nazi racism and the victor nations tended not to emphasize the abuse of minority rights, all too aware of their own implication in imperial and racial hierarchies. Neither nationalist nor Communist and anti-fascist narratives placed the racial victims of Nazism at the centre of post-war memory.

The anti-totalitarian memory of the Second World War suited well the political constellation of the 1950s in which anti-communism rather than anti-fascism formed the political backbone of the era, European states focused on their empires and the Cold War, and democracy appeared only weakly established. The past would be revisited with the thawing of the Cold War, the political shift to the Left in the 1960s, decolonization, and the achievement of sustained prosperity. The emergence of a new generation who had not directly experienced the interwar era also posed the question of what memory would be communicated to them. In this changed context, a particular event, publication, or text sparked a new level of debate about the past. This reawakening of debate and interest about the past was thus not always a result of new information. Indeed, in some instances the information had been available for years. The *Diary of Anne Frank* won an audience in Germany not in its first German edition of 1950, but rather in 1955. The international attention it received then raised its profile in the Netherlands. In Italy, Primo Levi's *If This Is A Man* had been turned down a number of times before being accepted by a small publishing house which printed a few thousand copies in 1947 before folding. Its republication by Einaudi in 1958 signalled a new audience for the memories of Holocaust survivors. Even so, the Holocaust only assumed the position of central event of the Second World War some two decades later with the transmission of the US series *Holocaust* on German TV in 1978.

In West Germany, the Ulm Einsatzgruppen Trial of 1958, the arrest and trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961, and the Auschwitz trials of the early 1960s each created opportunities for re-evaluations of the past, but these events had little impact in Austria. An Austrian debate would wait until international pressure created the Waldheim affair in 1986 (Waldheim nonetheless winning his presidential election). In Italy, it was the failed legitimation of neo-fascism in the short-lived Tambroni government of 1960 that signalled a new emphasis on the Resistance as the foundation of the Italian Republic. In France, Marcel Ophuls's film about Vichy, *The Sorrow and the Pity*, was released in 1969, and the controversy over the pardon granted in 1971 by Pompidou to Paul Touvier, Lyons chief of the paramilitary created to fight the French Resistance, began a new debate in post-Gaullist France on the French Second World War. While Eastern Europe would for the most part wait until the collapse of the Communist dictatorships to renew a public engagement with the past, the death of Stalin opened up the possibility of a different appreciation of the Soviet Great Patriotic War, but one which still stressed the primacy of the Communist Party. The USSR now built its tomb to an unknown soldier, at which newly wedded couples would stop after their marriage ceremony. Despite the gap between official ceremony and the Soviet population, jokes about the Second World War were not as welcome as jokes about the pompous celebration of the centenary of Lenin's birth.[58]

Myths of victimhood did not disappear in the 1960s, 1970s, or after, but they were rivalled by new interpretations that achieved varying levels of official sanction. Within the Federal Republic of Germany, the contribution of German traditions and institutions to Nazism displaced the centrality of Hitler, a focus first reflected in renewed debate on German responsibility for the First World War. A gradual

widening of responsibility for Nazism, fascism, and collaboration was fostered by the anti-nationalist and anti-fascist ethos of the new social movements of the 1960s which rejected the anti-totalitarian equation of Nazism and communism and reinscribed the history of the far Right into the national narrative, or portrayed it as a product of the crisis of capitalism. The 1960s and 1970s marked the high point of an identification with an anti-fascist resistance, symbolized by the accession of Willy Brandt (forced to leave Germany after 1933 and who had organized resistance to Nazism in exile) to German chancellor or Sandro Pertini (who had spent most of the Fascist era in prison) to the Italian presidency. However, if the evocation of resistance ascribed guilt and responsibility to conservative, nationalist, militarist, and capitalist circles, it frequently ignored the extent of popular consent and participation in Nazism and fascism. At its most tendentious, the heroic story of the Resistance supported the dense ideological vision of the Red Brigades and other left-wing terrorists who equated capitalism and fascism in the most literal manner.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War undid the geopolitical settlement produced in 1945, wiping from the map and memory one of the victors of the Second World War and returning Germany to its pre-1945 position of dominance in Europe, albeit within the confines of the European Union. The turning point of 1989–90 no more ushered in an era of historical truth or a 'normalization' of the past than had previous political transformations. The conversion of the Soviet Union's short-term victory into a long-term defeat reinvigorated the totalitarian assertion of equivalence between Nazism and communism, especially in Eastern European nations eager to emphasize the crimes of the Communist dictatorship and their status as victims of both Nazi and Stalinist persecution. Even in Russia voices could be found to suggest that the Soviet Union would have been better off under Hitler than Stalin.[59] In Eastern Europe, the assertion of a status of dual victim has at times jarred with the European context in which, as Tony Judt put it, recognition of the Holocaust constitutes 'the entry ticket' to Europe.[60] The history of the Holocaust in public memory has consequently emerged with greater clarity east of Germany. Poles have replayed debates familiar from Germany over Polish participation in the Holocaust, especially in the murder of the Jewish population of Jedwabne.[61] The Ukraine commemorated Babi Yar as a Jewish tragedy in 1991, and Russia developed a Holocaust museum, if located within its 'Park of Victory' dedicated to the Great Patriotic War.

Indeed, nationalist narratives have proved quite capable of integrating or explaining away what once was censored. Thus Russian textbooks contextualize the secret protocols of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact as an expansion forced on a reluctant Soviet Union.[62] In Western Europe, the end of the Cold War merely confirmed the disintegration of any anti-fascist consensus achieved in the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1990s, in most West European polities the far Right had re-emerged as a significant political presence and the far-right historical narrative found mainstream political legitimation. At its most crass, this has seen figures such as Silvio Berlusconi claim that 'Mussolini never killed anyone'. While Nazi Germany, or specifically the Holocaust, remains the widely accepted standard of absolute evil, the

European rightward drift has relegitimated nationalist traditions, distancing them from Nazism and the Holocaust, with the reunited Germany once again designated to shoulder the burden of guilt. In Western Europe where anti-Semitism is, for the moment, less prominent than the racism and discrimination directed at immigrants, the ambiguity of official memories is most evident in remembrance of European colonialism.

Thus in Italy, although in 1995 the Italian government reversed its denial of having used gas in Ethiopia, the brutalities of Italian colonialism, atrocities in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, concentration camps and slave labour have had little impact on the self-presentation of Italians as *brava gente*. British governments and some historians indulge an idealized benevolent imperialism or insular 'island story'. In France, governments that have openly acknowledged French responsibility for the deportation of Jews from France during the Second World War, have nonetheless found it necessary to insist that schools teach the 'positive role of the French presence overseas, particularly in North Africa'.[63] These controversies point to a persistent gap between historiographical research and public memory, as for example in the Belgian debate over Adam Hochschild's *King Leopold's Ghost,* which shocked despite offering little new information on atrocities in the Congo, and which was also exemplary in how few Congolese voices were heard in that debate.[64]

Germany thus appears to have followed something of a special path of memory, more willing or more compelled to approach in a thoroughgoing manner its past than most other European nations. Despite some debate over the genocide of the Herero, Germany has tended to see itself as blessed by the late birth and early death of its extra-European colonial ambitions. Indeed, Germany's unique status in part reflects it having treated other Europeans in the way those Europeans treated colonial subjects (a hypocrisy perhaps most blatant in the disproportionate attention paid to German atrocities in Belgium compared to Belgian atrocities in the Congo). Rather than forgetfulness, by the early twenty-first century, some historians have been unnerved by a reunited Germany's *Sündenstolz*, a perverse pride in its coming to terms with the past. Indeed, the German embrace of Daniel Goldhagen's simplistic thesis in *Hitler's Willing Executioners* of a peculiarly German eliminationist anti-Semitism demonstrated one form of self-indulgence in a particular vision of German guilt (even while a contemporaneous exhibit of crimes of the *Wehrmacht* proved much more controversial).[65] There is an enduring gap between acknowledgement of national or institutional guilt and widespread participation. The city of Nuremberg's belated embrace of its role as Nazism's favoured rallying site tended to feature 'anonymous flag-waving paraders'.[66] Research on young Germans suggests that while they are knowledgeable and appalled about the crimes of Nazism, they find it difficult to implicate their own grandparents as perpetrators.[67] The familiar role of Germans as victims has not disappeared and re-emerged in public debate about the fire-bombing of German cities and mass rapes by Soviets at the end of the Second World War. In both cases claims of silence and taboo were hardly accurate, serving rather to relegitimate old narratives. As Mary Nolan has pointed out, the German cities described in representations of the bombing are 'filled with defenseless and innocent

German women, children, and old men. It [the air war] is told from the perspective of those one-dimensional victims, who are always "Germans" or residents of Cologne or Hamburg or Dresden, and never Nazis or Wehrmacht soldiers or supervisors of slave laborers in local factories or denouncers of Jews in hiding.'[68] The development of a Holocaust consciousness has not dismantled the appeal of an imagined community of innocent 'Germans'.

In Henry Rousso's narrative of remembrance, the years after 1974 are the years of 'obsession'. The assumption that somehow after a period of debate the past would indeed pass away has proven to be naive. Indeed, historians of memory have at times been curiously hesitant advocates of historical truth. Tony Judt has argued that 'there is something to be said, socially speaking, for taboos',[69] and Jan Werner-Müller that 'saying that post-war Europe was built on "founding myths" and forgetting is not necessarily cynical: after all, the myths were often helpful in building a liberal order, and there was much that needed to be forgotten. Some myths arguably contributed to the fact that in 1945 the mistakes of 1919 were not repeated.'[70] Most frequently, the benefits of silence and taboos are seen to have been most salutary for the Federal Republic of Germany. In this view, the lack of engagement with the Nazi past served the successful re-education of West Germans into democratic consciousness. Yet, as Jeffrey Herf has noted, the argument that silence was necessary to ensure a democratic Federal Republic assumes that there existed only one path of democratization.[71] Instead, perhaps the Federal Republic achieved in part its comparatively commendable record because any moratorium on an extended debate about the past in West Germany did not last very long. Calls to 'move on' were never lacking. Already in 1946, Konrad Adenauer asked that 'ordinary members of the Nazi Party "finally" be left in peace'.[72] The idea of 'finally' drawing an end to the debates about the past reached its height of popularity in the mid-1960s. More recently, Henry Rousso, having diagnosed the 'Vichy Syndrome', a history of French evasion of collaboration and anti-Semitism, has argued for a 'right to forget' as well as a 'duty to remember' and lamented the 'loss of direction in the memory of the French nation', that 'the memory of our nation indeed remains incapable of giving a unified historical account'. A better conclusion is that there is no unity to history or memory and, in a democratic polity, nor should there be.

Notes

1. See Yves La Naour, *The Living Unknown Soldier: A Story of Grief and the Great War*, trans. Penny Allen (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 75.
2. Chimelu Chime, *Integration and Politics among African States: Limitations and Horizons of Mid-Term Theorizing* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977), 126.
3. See Ruth Ginio, 'African Colonial Soldiers between Memory and Forgetfulness: The Case of Post-Colonial Senegal', *Outre-Mers*, 94/350–1 (2006), 144–5.
4. Brigitte Reinwald, 'Recycling the Empire's Unknown Soldier: Contested Memories of French West African Colonial Combatants' War Experience', in Indra Sengupta (ed.),

Memory, History and Colonialism: Engaging with Pierre Nora in Colonial and Postcolonial Contexts (London: German Historical Institute, 2009), 30.

5. Douglas Martin, 'Lazare Ponticelli, France's Last Veteran of World War I, Is Dead at 110', *New York Times*, 13 March 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/13/world/europe/13ponticelli.html?_r=0>, accessed 5 November 2013.
6. Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).
7. Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
8. Antoine Prost, 'Verdun', in Pierre Nora (ed.), *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, Vol. I (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 381.
9. Modris Eksteins, 'War, Memory and the Modern: Pilgrimage and Tourism to the Western Front', in Douglas Mackaman and Michael Mays (eds.), *World War I and the Cultures of Modernity* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2000), 154.
10. Nicholas J. Saunders, *Trench Art: A Brief History & Guide, 1914–1939* (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2001), 123–5.
11. Eksteins, 'War, Memory and the Modern', 158.
12. Daniel J. Sherman, 'Art, Commerce, and the Production of Memory in France after World War I', in John R. Gillis (ed.), *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 186–211.
13. Nina Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 232.
14. Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, trans. Todd Samuel Presner et al. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 312–24.
15. Thomas Laqueur, 'Memory and Naming in the Great War', in Gillis (ed.), *Commemorations*, 152.
16. Joanna Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 251.
17. Graham Seal, '"We're Here Because We're Here": Trench Culture of the Great War', *Folklore*, 124/2 (2013), 191.
18. Antoine Prost, 'Monuments to the Dead', in Pierre Nora (ed.), *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, Vol. II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 316.
19. William Kidd, 'From the Moselle to the Pyrenees: Commemoration, Cultural Memory and "Debatable Lands"', *Journal of European Studies*, 35/1 (2005), 120.
20. Catherine Merridale, *Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Twentieth-Century Russia* (New York: Viking, 2000), 100.
21. Karen Petrone, *The Great War in Russian Memory* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 210.
22. Gaynor Kavanagh, 'Museum as Memorial: The Origins of the Imperial War Museum', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 23/1 (1988), 93.
23. Benjamin Ziemann, *War Experiences in Rural Germany: 1914–1923* (Oxford: Berg, 2007), 211.
24. Richard Bessel, 'The Great War in German Memory: The Soldiers of the First World War, Demobilization and Weimar Political Culture', *German History*, 6/1 (1988), 34.
25. George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

26. John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).
27. Bourke, *Dismembering*, 155.
28. Antoine Prost, *In the Wake of War: Les Anciens Combattants and French Society 1914–1939*, trans. Helen McPhail (Providence, RI: Berg, 1992).
29. Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 296.
30. Adrian Gregory, *The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day, 1919–1946* (Oxford: Berg, 1994).
31. Horne and Kramer, *German Atrocities*, 429.
32. See Mona Siegel and Kristen Harjes, 'Disarming Hatred: History Education, National Memories, and Franco-German Reconciliation from World War I to the Cold War', *History of Education Quarterly*, 52/3 (2012), 370–402.
33. Sally Marks, 'Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918–1921', *Journal of Modern History*, 85/3 (2013), 632.
34. Winter, *Sites of Memory*, 228.
35. Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*, 214.
36. Michael Geyer, 'The Place of the Second World War in German Memory and History', *New German Critique*, 71 (Spring–Summer 1997), 12.
37. Sonya O. Rose, 'From the "New Jerusalem" to the "Decline" of the "New Elizabethan Age": National Identity and Citizenship in Britain, 1945–1956', in Frank Biess and Robert G. Moeller (eds.), *Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 232.
38. Paul Betts, 'Germany, International Justice and the Twentieth Century', *History and Memory*, 17/1–2 (2005), 62.
39. Martin Conway, 'Justice in Postwar Belgium: Popular Passions and Political Realities', in István Deák, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 133–56.
40. Joanna Bourke, 'Introduction: "Remembering" War', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 39/4 (2004), 478.
41. Nina Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 102–3.
42. Jean-Mark Dreyfus, 'Censorship and Approval: The Reception of Nuit et Brouillard in France', in Ewout van der Knaap (ed.), *Uncovering the Holocaust: The International Reception of Night and Fog* (London: Wallflower, 2006), 38.
43. Claudio Fogu, '*Italiani brava gente*: The Legacy of Fascist Historical Culture on Italian Politics of Memory', in Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu (eds.), *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 152.
44. Pieter Lagrou, *The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945–1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 12.
45. Ruth Ben-Ghiat, 'A Lesser Evil? Italian Fascism in/and the Totalitarian Equation', in Helmut Dubiel and Gabriel Motzkin (eds.), *The Lesser Evil: Moral Approaches to Genocide Practices* (London: Routledge, 2004), 147.
46. Mona Siegel, '"History Is the Opposite of Forgetting": The Limits of Memory and the Lessons of History in Interwar France', *Journal of Modern History*, 74/4 (2002), 770–800.
47. Paloma Aguilar, 'Agents of Memory: Spanish Civil War Veterans and Disabled Soldiers', in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (eds.), *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 99–100.

48. Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 183.
49. Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
50. Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 387.
51. Frank Biess, 'Survivors of Totalitarianism: Returning POWs and the Reconstruction of Masculine Citizenship in West Germany, 1945–1955', in Hanna Schissler (ed.), *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 57–82.
52. Sarah Farmer, *Martyred Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 10.
53. Oliver Rathkolb, 'The Anschluss in the Rear-View Mirror, 1938–2008: Historical Memories between Debate and Transformation', *Contemporary Austrian Studies*, 17 (2009), 14.
54. Heidemarie Uhl, 'Of Heroes and Victims: World War II in Austrian Memory', *Austrian History Yearbook*, 42 (2011), 188.
55. Mark Mazower, 'The Cold War and the Appropriation of Memory: Greece after Liberation', in Deák et al. (ed.), *The Politics of Retribution*, 221.
56. Lagrou, *Legacy of Nazi Occupation*, 287–9.
57. Robert G. Moeller, 'War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany', *American Historical Review*, 101/4 (1996), 1026.
58. Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead*, 44–5.
59. Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead*, 203.
60. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 803.
61. See Jan T. Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001) and Marci Shore, 'Conversing with Ghosts: Jedwabne, Zydokomuna, and Totalitarianism', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 6/2 (2005), 345–74.
62. See James V. Wertsch, 'Blank Spots in Collective Memory: A Case Study of Russia', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 617 (May 2008), 58–71.
63. Laird Boswell, 'Should France be Ashamed of its History? Coming to Terms with the Past in France and Its Eastern Borderlands', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 9/2–3 (2008), 238.
64. Geert Castryck, 'Whose History is History? Singularities and Dualities of the Public Debate on Belgian Colonialism', in Csaba Lévai (ed.), *Europe and the Word in European Historiography* (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2006), 71–88.
65. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners* (New York: Knopf, 1996).
66. Neil Gregor, '"The Illusion of Remembrance": The Karl Diehl Affair and the Memory of National Socialism in Nuremberg, 1945–1999', *Journal of Modern History*, 75/3 (2003), 630.
67. See Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller, and Karoline Tschuggnall, '*Opa war kein Nazi': Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2002).
68. Mary Nolan, 'Air Wars, Memory Wars', *Central European History*, 38/1 (2005), 30.
69. Tony Judt, 'The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Post-war Europe', in Jan-Werner Müller (ed.), *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 179.

70. Jan-Werner Müller, 'Introduction: The Power of Memory, the Memory of Power and the Power over Memory', in Müller (ed.), *Memory and Power*, 5.
71. Jeffrey Herf, 'The Emergence and Legacies of Divided Memory: Germany and the Holocaust after 1945', in Müller (ed.), *Memory and Power*, 205.
72. Herf, *Divided Memory*, 379.

Index

Abelshauser, Werner 464–5
abortion 416
Adenauer, Konrad 626
agriculture *see* rural society
Albania, Civil War 548
Aldcroft, D.H. 199
Algiers, proposed landings 577
All Quiet on the Western Front 618
America *see* United States
Amery, Leo 447
Anarchism *see* political Left
anarcho-syndicalist socialist movements 82
Anderson, M.S. 35
Angell, Norman 35, 119, 123
Anglo-French non-intervention policy 213
Anglo-Russian Entente (1907) 36
Anschluss 207
anti-colonialism 223, 229
  and Second World War 576–82
Anti-Comintern Pact (1937) 480
anti-Semitism 143, 401–2
  Bulgaria 490
  and collaboration 532–3
  in France 265–6, 269, 489
  Hungary 310, 314, 401, 491
  Italy 490
  Nazi Germany 218, 401, 485, 522–6
  Romania 490
anticlericalism 402–3
Arab Revolt 151
Arendt, Hannah 345
Armenians
  deportation/genocide of 54, 148, 373
  resistance among 151, 152
Atlantic Charter 337, 423, 435
Attlee, Clement 584
Auden, W.H. 207
Audoin-Rouzeau, Stéphane 64
Austria
  Civil War (1934) 3, 391
  Communist Party 295
  living standards 53
  and Nazism 621–2
  social welfare legislation 32
  Socialism 290
Austro-Hungary
  economic disorganization 105
  motivating troops 168
autarchy 11
authoritarian coups 287
authoritarian government 2, 4, 5, 13, 45–6, 93
Auxiliary Service Law (1916) 50, 85
AVNOJ 568–9
Axis powers, Second World War 480–92

Baghdad Railway 36
Balance of Power 119, 125
Balfour, Arthur 123, 126, 127
Balfour Declaration 143, 524
Balkan Wars (1912-13) 3, 23, 37, 141–2, 368, 373, 557
Balkans, militias post-Second World War 600
Bank of International Settlement (Basel) 175
Battle of Maiwand 615
Battle of Neretva 537
Battle of Omdurman 226
Bauman, Zygmunt 346
Bavaria, revolution (1918) 4, 77
BBC, world affairs coverage 219
Becker, Annette 64
Belarus, food rationing data 503
Belgium
  collaboration 619
  colonial migration 232–4
  colonization 226, 228, 229, 230–2, 236
  First World War civilian refugees 52, 146

Belgium (*Cont.*)
imperial policies (1945) 582
political system 25
Socialism 289
Ten Year Plan 231–2
Bell, Philip 215
belle époque era (1900-14) 1–2, 9, 23–39, 370
Ben-Ghiat, Ruth 620
Beneš, Edvard 172
Benjamin, Walter 219
Berchtold, Count 39
Berend, Ivan 196
Berkhoff, Karel 502
Berlin, Isaiah 323
Bessel, Richard 79, 604, 617
Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von 164
Beveridge Plan 338
Beveridge, William 323, 337
biopolitics 376–7, 381, 525
Bismarck, Otto von 10, 25, 27, 29, 31, 325
black market 66–7, 504, 595, 598
Blinkhorn, Martin 303, 304, 306
Blum, Jerome 243
Blum, Léon 215
Blum, M. 106
Bobbitt, Philip 215
Bolsheviks *see* Russia, Revolution
Bonnet, Georges 212
Bonny, Pierre 598
Bosnian Crisis 23, 37
Bourke, Joanna 617
Bowman, Isaiah 130
Boyce, Robert 130
Brasillach, Robert 308
Brecht, Bertolt 220
Bretton Woods 436, 585
Briand, Aristide 10, 129, 271, 440, 445, 447
Britain
army recruit malnourishment 334
belle époque era 23
class conflict and democracy 264
colonial economies 269
colonial migration 232–4
colonial troops 143, 233–4, 580
colonial workforces 140, 233–4
colonialism 225, 226, 228, 234, 237, 367, 576–89
Communist Party 294
conscription 6
consumerism 13
decolonization post-Second World War 576–89
democracy and empire 268
education system 337
empire and global trading, post-Second World War 585–8
First World War labour strikes 330
First World War social dissent 371
foreign affairs/policy interwar period 119, 219
GDP data (1928-37) 193–5, 194
General Strike (1926) 331
and global trading system, post-Second World War 585–8
gold standard 269
in Great Depression 13, 193–200, 201, 269–70
economic data *see* Great Depression
health insurance 331
home front nationalism 372
imperial policies (1945) 582
income tax 26–7
Indian labour reserve 233–4
industrial legislation 26
interwar democracy 266–9
interwar economy 269
interwar military build-up 465–7
Irish army recruits 143
Irish home rule 150
Keynesian influence 466
khaki election 160
Labour party 287
and League of Nations 265
Lib-Labism 81
living standards 53
marriage patterns 72
memories of Second World War 619–26
National Assistance 338
national challenges in empire 140
National Health Service 337
National Insurance 337
nationalism 368, 369, 371, 372
and war 374–6
nationalist demonstrations 142

naval conferences 427
old age pensions 26
pacifism 270
parliamentary candidate coupon system 263–4
Peace Society 34
political system 12–13, 24
political violence 395
post-war Malaya 587
public housing 331
relations with Switzerland during Second World War 469–71
Second World War industrial production 466
Second World War mobilization 464–7
Second World War resource mobilization 463
social policies 328
social reform legislation 26
social unrest pre-First World War 370
social welfare 337–8
Socialism 287, 289
state nationalization 85
state power in wartime 5–6
taxation 26–7
trade unions 85, 92
voting rights 266
welfare legislation 335
working-class movements 81, 267
working-class radicalism 90
see also First World War; Second World War
Brittain, Vera 270
Brown, Judith 580
brutalization thesis 55, 80
BUF (British Union of Fascists) 395, 447
Bukharin, Nikolai 367
Bulgaria
Communist Party 294
revolution (1923) 4, 78
Butler, Rohan 207

Cabalzar, Ferruccio Guido 313–14
Callahan, Michael D. 274
capitalist globalization, and nationalism 367
capitalist restructuring 11
Capoccia, Giovanni 264, 275, 276
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 35
Castel, Robert 327
Catholic Church, Church-State relations 25–6
Cecil, Robert 123, 124, 125
censorship 42, 45, 46, 48, 49
CGIL (General Confederation of Labour) 85
Chamberlain, Austen 309
Chamberlain, Neville 210, 217
Church-State relations 25–6
Churchill, Winston
on America 437
on British national values 208
and Communists 550
and de Gaulle 209
on European integration 451
on Franco-German reconciliation 452
and Mussolini 171, 309
and romantic integration 440
civil war 391–3, 537–52
identities roles 545–9
outcomes 550–1
and post-war economic recovery 551
in southern Mediterranean 538–40
see also individual countries
civilian internment, First World War 54
civilian life
First World War *see* First World War
Second World War 497–513
air raids 498
atrocities against civilians 499
black markets 504
children 509
civilian population deaths 513
civilian work 506–7
collaboration 498, 510
compromises 510–11
curfews 508, 511
family life 509–11
famine 504–6, 512
food supply 500–1
fraternization 408, 419–21, 498, 510–11
lack of essentials 507
mutual support networks 509–10
peasants 501–2
public transport 508–9
queuing 507

civilian life (*Cont.*)
refugees 509–10
resistance/retribution 511–12
territorial differences 497
terror 511–12
under oppressive occupation 499, 508–9
urban population 502–4
urban space 508–9
see also women
civility, and revolution 79–80
Clark, Christopher 39
class conflict, and democracy 264
Clavin, Patricia 273
Clemenceau, Georges 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 131, 162
Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea 308, 309, 312
Cohrs, Patrick 130
Cold War 3, 78, 552, 584
collaboration 498, 510, 532–3, 538, 547, 550, 551, 576, 619, 621, 622
collectivization 3, 163, 251–2, 254–5, 297, 348, 379, 502
colonial cultural/ideology changes 234–7
colonial education 231
colonial humanism 228
colonial migration 232–4, 235
colonial violence, post-war 583–9
colonial webs 234–7
colonialism
decolonization, post-Second World War 576
and League of Nations 274
see also individual countries
Combes, Émile 26
Combined Repatriation Executive 562
Comintern *see* Communist Internationals
Committee of Union and Progress 142
communism
popular fronts 366
rural France 254–5
spread of, post-Second World War 437–8
see also political Left
communist colonial activity, post-First World War 234
Communist Internationals 35, 77, 81, 82, 84, 89, 90, 294–5, 370
Communist Parties 92, 269, 294–7, 381, 398, 550, 587, 598, 603
democratic activities 603
Communist resistance *see* resistance
Communist states, collapse of 595
compulsion, nature of in modern states 343
Concert of Europe 123
Concert of Vienna 272
conference diplomacy 217
Congress of Europe 451
Connelly, Matthew 589
conscription 6, 42, 46, 49–50, 55, 246
consensus dictatorship 359
consumerism 13
Continental wars, length of 34
Continuation War 472, 473
contraception 410, 412, 413
Coolidge, Calvin 427
Cooper, Duff 447
Cooper, Frederick 235, 583
Corner, Paul 288
corporatism 85, 86, 109–10
Costigliola, Frank 427
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard 440, 445–6, 447
Council of Europe Consultative Assembly 453
Council of Five 128
Council of Four 126, 128
Council of Ten 126
The Course of German History 207
Court of Arbitration (Hague) 35
Covenant of the League of Nations *see* League of Nations
Cox, M. 108
Credit-Anstalt Bank collapse 195
Creel, George 426
criminals, in wartime 597–8, 599
crisis of modernity 15
Crisis of the Population Question 335
Croatia
fascism 315
and paramilitarization 594, 596–602
Ustasa regime 315
Croce, Benedetto 622
Cuban War (1898) *see* Spanish-American War (1898)
cultural violence 401–2

Curzon, George 132
Czechoslovak-Hungarian treaty of friendship 568
Czechoslovakia
  Communist Party 294
  fascism in 270–1
  and Germany 172–3, 207, 215
  Hungarian minority groups 560–1
  interwar democracy 266–8
  interwar period 207
  and League of Nations 272
  National Democrats 270
  nationalism 373
  population movement patterns 566–70
  presidential election 264
  Socialism 288

Dada movement 228
Daladier, Édouard 269
D'Annunzio, Gabriele 169
Dark Continent 8–9, 11
Darwin, John 224, 237
Davis, Belinda 67
Dawes Plan 131, 192–3
D'Azeglio, Massimo 366
De Felice, Renzo 213
de Gaulle, Charles 209, 577, 584, 599
decolonization, post-Second World War 576
Decree on Peace 375
Defence of the Realm Act 71
Delavignette, Robert 228
democracy
  and dictatorships 217
  and empire 268
  in interwar Europe 261–76
democratic governance, post-First World War 110
democratization of death 615
demographic re-engineering 142
Denmark
  collaboration 532–3
  Communist Party 294, 598
  homosexuality 416
  nationalism 368
deparamilitarization 606
Deportation and Settlement Law 147
Diagne, Blaise 613
dictatorships 2, 4, 8, 13, 175, 263, 309, 343–59
  and democracies 217, 263
Dimitrijevich, Dragutin 37–8
diplomacy, military measures in 37
Directorate of Tribes 146
disarmament, post-First World War 129
displaced persons, First World War 146–7
Dobry, Michel 318
Dollfuss, Engelbert 311, 312, 313, 392
domestic hierarchies 80–4
Dorgères, Henry 256–7
Doriot, Jacques 270
Dreyfus Affair 23, 26, 28, 215
Durkheim, Émile 325

Easter Rising 143, 149–50
Eastern Europe
  ethnic cleansing post-First World War 175
  ethnic diversity 173
  famine 174
  political instability 174
  political systems post-First World War 172–4
Ebert, Friedrich 78, 109, 371
Eckes, Alfred E. 425, 431
The Economic Consequences of the Peace 23–4, 129–30
economic democracy 287
economic integration federalists 444
economic integration functionalists 444
economic integration initiatives 444
Eden, Anthony 208, 211, 437
education budgets 27
Eichengreen, B.J. 195, 198, 199
Eichmann, Adolf 623
Eldredge, Niles 542
Eley, Geoff 284, 286, 370, 371
emigration, to colonies 232–4
Empire Shopping Weeks 269
empires/colonies 223–37
Engels, Friedrich 35, 82
Enloe, Cynthia 72
entente cordiale (1904) 36
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta 325
ethnic complications, post-First World War Europe 126
ethnic democracy 265

ethnic hierarchies 80–4
ethnic rationalization 8
eugenics 11, 334, 335–6, 410, 416, 417, 485
Europe
  as historical subject 10–12
  national boundaries/sovereignty post-First World War 126–9
European civil war, concept of 388–403
European colonialism 223–37
European Convention on Human Rights 444, 449
European decolonization, post-Second World War 576–89
European integration 440–54
  nation-state as socio-political entity 450
  national sovereignty 451
  and nationalism 445–6
  as romantic project 444–7
Evans, Richard, J. 217
Exposition Coloniale Internationale (1931) 223, 229
Exposition Universelle (1900) 328
Ezhov, Nikolai 348

facade democracy 262
Factory Acts 26
Fallen Soldiers 79
famine, Second World War 504–6
fascism *see* political Right
Fatherland Party 45
February Revolution *see* Russia, Revolution (1917)
Federal Reserve System 182
Feinstein, C.H. 111
female *see* women
Ferdinand, Archduke Franz, assassination of 37–8
Ferguson, Niall 37, 38, 224
fin-de-siecle internationalism 441–3
Final Solution *see* Holocaust
Fink, Carole 271
Finland
  Civil War (1918) 3, 90, 214, 390, 393
  democracy 173
  as German ally in Second World War 468, 471–5
  interwar economy 472–3, 474
  mobilization 473
  and Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) 473, 474
  neutrality of 472
  revolution 90
  war costs 474
Finlay, Ronald 112
First World War
  agricultural underproduction 62
  Archduke Ferdinand assassination 37–8
  Armistice talks 164
  beginnings of 37–9
  black market 66–7
  British state power 5–6
  child mortality 50
  children's war work 63
  civilians 47–52, 52–3
    deportations 54
    internment 54
    refugees 52
  and community changes 61–73
  consciousness change 371
  conscription 6, 42, 46, 49–50, 55
  consumer prices 330
  corporatism 85, 86, 109–10
  cost to Europe 423
  demobilization 68, 72, 111, 164
  demographic changes following 13
  disarmament 129
  displaced persons 146–7
  economic consequences of 108–12
    post-war 160–1
  economic disorganization 105
  economics of 97–112
  educational disruption 63
  effect of 1
  end of 121
  environmental destruction 248
  ethnic/cultural identity changes 65
  food crises 106
  forced deportations 147–9
  forced migrations 557
  gender roles 61–73
  genocide 54
  and Great Depression 112
  height and nutrition 106–8
  home front nationalism 372

home/front connections 41, 47–52
impact on countryside 246–9
impact on empires 375
impact on families 61–73
imperial/colonial loyalty 142–5
imperial/colonial troops 142–5
imperial/colonial workforces 65
industrial policy 328–9
industrialization of warfare 462
infant mortality rate 107–8
inflation 330
inter-allied debts 130–1
jingoism, pre-war 369, 370
labour shortages 62
labour strikes 330
labour unrest 67–8, 85
legacy of 55–6
literature on 613–18
living standards 53
memories of 613–18
migrants 138–9
minorities in 142–6
minority resistance 149–54
mobilization for 6, 42, 98–104, 142–5, 374
see also conscription
mortality rates 3, 50, 52–5, 68–9, 329
and nationalism 365, 368, 371–2
patriotic consensus (1914-16) 371–3
post-war events *see* post-First World War
post-war tour guides 615
postal communications 48
prisoner of war killings 54
public exhibitions 47–8
public health effects 63–4
public war effort 42–5
rationing 101–3, 109
re-mobilization 45
reconstruction period economics 97–112
refugees 52, 138–9, 146
religion in communities 64–5
resources by nation 104–9
Russian POW repatriation 273
shortages 66–7, 329
social dissent 371
social/political divisions 84
trade unions 85
venereal disease 70–1
Versailles peace treaty *see* Paris Peace Conference
violence levels in 41, 52–5
voluntary organizations 372
war graves 615
wartime prostitution 70
welfare aid agencies 67
women in war zones 70–1
women's wartime employment 62–3, 67–8, 70
workforce de-skilling 84–5
Fischer, Conan 10
Fischer, Fritz 37, 38
Fitzpatrick, Sheila 7, 11
Five Particulars speech 120
Fordism 329, 428
foreign trade, interwar period 112
Foucault, Michel 345
Four Ends speech 120
Four Freedoms 423, 435
Four Principles speech 120
Fourteen Points (Wilson) 120, 122, 149, 162, 164, 262, 271, 375, 423, 425
fragmentation 389
France
Algiers, proposed landings 577
anti-Semitism 265–6, 269
Basque army recruits 143
belle époque era 23
Church-State relations 25–6
collaboration 551, 600
colonialism 226, 227, 228, 231, 235, 367, 577–8, 583–4
Communist Party 294, 295–7, 381, 603
contraception 412
culpability for Second World War 211
demobilization 111
democracy and empire 268
European integration 446–7
First World War social dissent 371
home front nationalism 372
homosexuality 413
ideological extremes 270
imperial policies (1945) 582
imperial/colonial workforces 140
income tax 26–7
interwar democracy 266–9

France (*Cont.*)
and League of Nations 271–2
living standards 53
Maginot mentality 270
national challenges in empire 140
National Socialism 270
nationalism 367, 368, 369, 372
and war 374–6
nationalist demonstrations 142
pacifism 270
paramilitarization 594, 596–602
Paris Uprising (1944) 599
political divisions 1930s 285
political system 13, 25
political violence 399
Popular Front 214–15
post-First World War debt 163
post-Nazi occupation 599–600
Resistance 381, 600
rural communism 254–5
rural politics 254
Second World War resource mobilization 463
sexual issues 412
social reform legislation 26
social violence 269
South-East Asia, post-war 587–8
utopian socialism 34
weapons obsolescence 462
working-class movements 81
working-class radicalism 90
France and the Origins of the Second World War 211
Franco, Francisco 215, 394, 446
Freud, Sigmund 34, 407
Friedländer, Saul 2, 8
Fritzsche, Peter 6, 371
Furet, François 284
Fussell, Paul 614, 616, 618

Galton, Francis 334
Gandhi, Mahatma 580, 586
Gas Shell Bombardment 41, 47
Gay, Peter 370
Gellner, Ernest 367
General Theory of Money, Interest and Employment 333
Geneva Conventions 54
Genoa Conference (1922) 133
genocide
China 520
First World War 54–5
Nazi Germany *see* Holocaust; Nazis
and paramilitaries 597
Soviet Union 520
geopolitical hierarchies 80–4
Germany
acknowledgement of past 625
American companies in 433
anti-fascist resistance 624
anti-Semitism as state doctrine 218
Armistice talks 164
atrocities during First World War 53
authoritarian image 163
as autocratic 29
Axis imperialism, Second World War 480–92
belle époque era 23
big business and Hitler 216–17, 220
charismatic leadership 15
Christian democracy 338
Church-State relations 25–6
civil disorder post-Second World War 600–1
civil war 393
colonialism/imperialism 225–6, 367, 483–5, 486, 525–6
and Nazis/Holocaust 236–7
Communist activity post-Second World War 602–5
Communist Party 294, 295
culpability for First World War 623
culpability for Second World War 207–12, 215, 216
and Czechoslovakia 172–3
deflationary policies 193
demobilization First World War 164
economic disorganization 105
economy in First World War 100–2
education system 32
elections (1928) 167
fascist radicalization 310–13
and Finland, in Second World War 468, 471–5

First World War social dissent 371
food supply 101–3, 329, 501
and France 175
Germans as victims 625–6
Gestapo image 350–1
and Great Depression 192–200, 464
economic data *see* Great Depression
Hitler *see* Hitler
Holocaust *see* Holocaust
home front nationalism 372
housing stock in First World War 104
hyperinflation 110–11
industrialization of 30–1, 100
inflation 330
and interwar fascist colonialism 488
juvenile criminality 595–6
Keynesian influence 466
labour demographics 100
living standards 53
marriage loan programme 464–5, 528
mass expulsion of Germans post-Second World War 382
memories of Second World War 619–26
militarism of 29–30
military spending, interwar 462, 464–7
mobilization in First World War 100–4
mobilization in Second World War 217, 464–7
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) 380, 473, 474, 491, 624
nationalism 367, 368, 369, 370, 372, 376–7
and war 374–6
nationalist demonstrations 142
Nazis *see* Nazis
Nuremberg War Crimes Trials 207, 453, 519, 619
Operation Barbarossa 472, 473, 474, 529–31
paramilitarization 594, 596–602
and Paris Peace Conference *see* Paris Peace Conference
peasant fascism 255–7
political system 12, 24, 25, 29–30, 92–3, 163–5
political violence 395–7, 399
population engineering 335
population movement patterns 563–70
post-First World War 131–3, 160–1
militarism 166–8
post-war occupation 600–1, 604
presidential election 264
rationing in First World War 101–3, 109
rationing in Second World War 466–7, 502
Reichsbanner 55, 167
relations with Switzerland during Second World War 469–71
reparations post-First World War 130–1, 160–1, 163–6
resources in First World War 104–9
revolution 78–9, 89
SA paramilitaries 168, 219, 397
Schlieffen Plan 29, 38
Second World War 480–92
civilian work 506–7
conquests 486–7, 529–31
defeat 491–2
industrial production 466
military reverses 490
mobilization 217, 464–7
refusal to surrender 491–2
resource mobilization 463
Second World War civilian population loss 513
social insurance 327
social partnership 93
social unrest pre-First World War 370
social welfare legislation 31–2, 338
Socialism 287
SS paramilitaries 219
Stahlhelm 167
state-society relations 6–7
surveillance 345–6, 349–52
Versailles peace treaty *see* Paris Peace Conference
violence interwar 343
wages in First World War 100, 330
war and national regeneration 356
see also First World War; Second World War
Gerwarth, Robert 13, 80, 395
Geyer, Michael 11–12, 79, 618
Gibbs, Philip 391
Gioia, Maria 73
Giraud, Henri 209
Gläser, Ernst 66

global trade, and war 112
gold standard 196, 198, 199, 201, 202, 269, 425, 427
Goldschmidt, Richard 335
Golson, Ed 468, 469
Gömbös, Gyula 310–11, 314–15
Göring, Hermann 217
Goscha, Chris 589
Gould, Stephen J. 542
Government of India Act (1935) 226
Gramophone Company 41, 42, 47
Graves, Robert 219
Gray, Colin 578
Grazia, Victoria de 429
Great Depression
  American recovery from 433–6
  average tariff level by country (1929-30) 183–5
  and Axis empires 480
  balance of payments data by country (1920-37) 187–91
  Britain in 13, 193–200, 201, 269–70
  British GDP data (1928-37) 193–5
  capital mobility, international 197
  and colonial disinvestment 230
  and colonial resources 230
  and democracy 261–2
  depression phase (1929-32) 192–5
  and development 229–32
  economic development data by country (1929-30) 183–5
  effects of 2, 9–10, 12, 171
  in Europe 179–202
  exchange rates 196, 197
  expansionary fiscal policy 197
  and First World War 112
  food prices data (1929-30) 181
  food production data (1929-30) 180
  France 171
  German GDP data (1928-37) 193–5
  global influences 192
  gold standard 196, 198, 199, 201, 202
  illiteracy data by country 183–5
  industrial production data (1929-30) 180
  key indicators 183–5
  Kindleberger thesis 195, 198–9, 201
  macroeconomic data/trends 187–91
  manufactures prices data (1929-30) 181
  monetary policy independence 197
  Nazi Party, rise of *see* Nazis
  and paramilitarization 594, 596–602
  political development data by country (1929-30) 183–5
  populism 270
  price indices data by country (1920-37) 187–91
  raw materials prices data (1929-30) 181
  raw materials production data (1929-30) 181
  real GDP
    data by country (1920-37) 183–5, 187–91, 196, 200–1
    per capita data by country (1929-30) 183–5
  recovery phase (1932-37) 196–200
  and Second World War 216–17
  social legislation 332–3
  and Soviet Union 182
  state fragility index 182–5
  technocracy 270
  trade openness ratio by country 183–5
  trade/tariff barriers 192, 198, 200
  unemployment 200, 269–70, 333
    data by country (1920-37) 187–91
  in United States 182
  Wall Street Crash (1929) 192
  working population distribution data by country (1929-30) 183–5
  world production data (1929-30) 180, 181
  world trade data (1929-30) 180
  see also post-First World War
The Great Dictator 213
The Great Illusion 35, 123
The Great Inter-war Crisis 130
Great Patriotic War (Soviet Union) *see* Second World War
great powers, post-Second World War 594
Great War *see* First World War
Greater Danger Principle 378, 379
Greece
  anti-Communist activity 604
  Civil War (1943-9) 3, 388, 538, 539, 540–3, 549, 550–1
  collaboration 622

Communist Party 294
fascism in 316–17
revolution (1936) 4
Greek-Turkish population transfer agreement (1923) 557
Greek-Turkish War (1919-22) 3, 55, 225
Gregory, Adrian 372
Grenadou, Ephraïm 249
Grey, Edward 123–4, 271
Griffin, Roger 302
Guesde, Jules 371
Guilty Men 208
Gurvitch, Georges 323

Habsburg Empire 23, 30, 46, 140, 141, 144, 145, 373
Hague, imperial policies (1945) 582
Hague Congress of Europe 451
Hague Conventions 54, 123, 370, 441, 453
Hague Court of Arbitration 35, 123
Hague Peace Palace 442
Hague Permanent Court of International Justice 175
Hale, Oron J. 27
Harding, Warren 129, 427
Harper, John 437
Hart, Peter 150
Hashimite rebellion 151
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (1901) 36
Heidegger, Martin 432–3
height, and nutrition 106–8
Hélias, Pierre Jakez 248
Hemingway, Ernest 213
Henderson, Arthur 371
Henlein, Konrad 270–1
Henriksen, Thomas 228
Herf, Jeffrey 621, 626
Hervé, Gustav 35
Herzen, Alexander 28
Heydrich, Reinhard 338
Hilferding, Rudolf 36, 328
Himka, Jean-Paul 602
Himmler, Heinrich 488, 525, 527
Hindenberg Programme 100
Hindenburg, Paul von 165–6
Hinsley, Harry 123
historical consciousness 6

Hitler, Adolf
anti-Semitism of 524–5
as Chancellor 310
culpability for Second World War 207–12, 215, 216
death of 9
doctrine of conflict 218
European integration 447
and German big business 216–17, 220
and international cooperation 217
and international Jewry 218
nationalism 376
nationalist policy 377–9
opportunism of 209
policy models 378
post-First World War blame 165
racism 366, 376
rise of 9, 10, 12, 307–8, 310
and Roosevelt 218
self-determination 376
and Stalin 377–9
as war planner 209–10
see also Germany; Nazis; political Right
Hobsbawm, Eric 1, 8, 13, 365, 368, 389
Hobson, J.A. 36, 119
Hobson-Lenin thesis 37
Hodge, Alan 219
Hohner 42–3
Hollywood 428
Holocaust 518–34
and anti-Semitic ideology 485, 522–6
and Cold War 622
and collaboration 532–3
concentration/death camps 414, 415, 417–18, 485, 489, 520, 595
contexts for 520
deaths during 2, 3
and general crisis 15
and German democracy 527–9
and German economic/social crisis 521–2
and German imperialism 236–7, 529–31
Jewish Question 314
Kristallnacht 522, 528, 533
memories of 624
migration from 533

Holocaust (*Cont.*)
and non-Jewish genocide 417
Nuremberg War Crimes Trials 207, 453, 519, 619
and paramilitaries 597
as policy 519
policy/implementation of 7–8
and war conditions 529–31
see also Nazis
Holquist, Peter 79
"home front" expression 49
Home Rule Act 150
home/front connections 41, 47–52
homosexuality 407, 410–11, 412, 413, 414–16
Hoover, Herbert 429
Horne, John 390, 395
Horthy, Miklós 305–6, 312, 394, 490
House, Edward 121
Howard, Esme 122
Hull, Cordell 430
Hull, Isabel 271
human rights 440–54
civilization rhetoric 449–50
Congress of Europe 451–2
and European Communities 454
European Convention on Human Rights 444, 449
and Holocaust 448
romantic roots in 1940s 447–54
and Second World War 450
United States Bill of Rights 448
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 441, 448, 449
Hungarian-Romanian War (1918-20) 3
Hungarian-Slovak relations 560
Hungary
anti-Semitism 315, 490, 534
Arrow Cross 490
civil war 393–4
collaboration 532–3
ethnic groups 560
fascism in 310–11
nationalism 367
and religion 394
and paramilitarization 594, 596–602
population movement patterns 566–70
revolution (1918-19) 4, 77, 91, 305–6
social policy 332
Husayn, Sharif 151

illiberal democracy 261
ILO (International Labour Organization) 330, 336, 337
Imperial Conference 125
imperial militarism 369
imperial/colonial troops, First World War 142–5
imperial/colonial workforces
First World War 65
pre-First World War 140
Imperialism 36
Imperialism and the World Economy 367
inclusive democracy 262
income tax 26–7
India
British troops in 233
famine 585–6
independence 226, 580
as labour reserve 233–4
Indian National Congress 580
Indonesia, post-war 588
industrial conscription 49–50
industrialization, of warfare 462
infant mortality rate, First World War 107–8
influenza pandemic (1919) 174
Inglot, Tomasz 338
inopportune bloodshed 5
interclass coalitions 81–2
interdependence (Marx) 424
International Association for the Legal Protection of Workers 328
international hierarchies 80–4
International Labour Organization 175
international law 441–3
international patron-client relationships 602
International Peace Congresses 34
Amsterdam (1904) 35
Copenhagen (1910) 36
Paris (1900) 35
Stuttgart (1907) 35
internationalization, of local conflicts, post-Second World War 602–5
Internationals *see* Communist Internationals

interwar period
1920s and liberalism 263–6
1930s and democratic survival 269–71
American recovery in 433–6
border conflict 165
colonial conditions 234
colonial migration 232–4
Communist colonial activity 234
conflicts 232–4
constitutional republics 389
counter-revolutionaries 389
crises 223–37
cultural crisis 227–9
cultural ideology changes 234–7
democracy 171–2
in Europe 261–76
democratic erosion 389
dictatorships 343–59
economic weakness 229–30
effects/conditions 68, 72, 109–12, 175
empires/colonies 223–37
ethnic tensions 561–2
gender-role boundaries 400
Great Depression *see* Great Depression
health/welfare 410
militarism 166–8
military spending 462, 465–7
military/political violence distinction 390
minority resistance 149–54
national minorities integration 265
naval conferences 427
origins of Second World War 207–20, *see also* Second World War
paramilitarism 389
political Left in 282–98
political polarization 389
political Right in 301–18
political violence 388–403, 389
population policy 333–6
post-First World War effects *see* post-First World War
reconstruction 160–75
reparations 130–1, 160–1, 163–6
riots 214
settlement 129–30, 174–5
sexual issues 409
state violence 343–59
state-sponsored violence 388
trade deficits 110
see also Great Depression
intimacy of violence 5
Ireland
Civil War (1922-3) 3, 214, 390, 392–4
Communist Party 294
Easter Rising 143, 149–50
industrialization and religious tension 140
military service in First World War 143
Irish Question 23
Irish Republican Army 150
Irish War of Independence 150
Iron Guard 308, 312
Iron Man landmark 43
Irwin, D.A. 198
Isherwood, Christopher 615
Italo-Ethiopian War 207, 213, 225, 356, 482, 625
Italy
annexation of Rome 168
atrocity denial reversal 625
Axis imperialism, Second World War 480–92
belle époque era 23
Christian democracy 338
Church-State relations 25–6
Civil War (1943-45) 538, 540, 541, 542–3, 544, 547, 548–9, 550–1
colonialism/imperialism 168, 207, 213, 225, 227, 228, 355–6, 481–2, 486, 583
Communist Party 294, 381, 398, 603
consumerist modernity 432
contraception 412
criminal gangs 599
culpability for Second World War 213
dependence on Germany 482, 486
European integration 446
Fascism in 13, 93, 168–71, 301–10, 353–5
Fascist Italy and United States 431–2
fascist radicalization 310–13
in First World War 168–9, 481
homosexuality 412
interwar violence 343
March on Rome 306, 353
nationalism 366, 374, 376–7, 561
and war 374–6
paramilitarization 594, 596–602

Italy (*Cont.*)
and Paris Peace Conference 481
peasant fascism 255–7
political system 93, 169–70
political violence 395–7
population engineering 335
population in Yugoslavia 569
post-First World War social unrest 169–70
post-Nazi occupation 599
racial mixing 490
revolution (1922) 4, 77, 89, 306
Russian socialist inspiration 169
in Second World War 480–92
sexual issues 411–12
social undesirables 354
Socialism 288
state violence 352–5
state-sponsored violence 388
surveillance state 345–6
trade unions 85
and Vatican City 171
war crimes 619–20
war and national regeneration 356
and Yugoslavia 569–70
see also Mussolini
Italy in First World War 168–9

Japan
and Axis imperialism, Second World War 480–92
colonialism/imperialism 482–3
fascism in 483
and League of Nations 483
in Manchuria 483, 491
modernization 482
nationalism 367
naval conferences 427
political system 483
Second World War 480–92
conquests 486–8
defeat 491–2
refusal to surrender 491–2
Jewish Codex 314
Jewish genocide *see* Holocaust
Jewish Question 314
Jewsiewicki, Bogumil 230
Joll, James 369
Joyless Street 61
Judt, Tony 8, 624, 626
July Crisis (1914) 23, 37, 142

Kalyvas, Stathis 4–5, 541–2
Kautsky, Karl 36, 82
Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) 445
Kemal, Mustafa 153
Kerensky, Alexander 78, 87–8
Kerr, Philip 127
Kershaw, Ian 2, 5, 217
Key, Ellen 334
Keynes, John Maynard 23–4, 121, 129–30, 166, 179, 197–8, 201–2, 287, 333, 466
Kienthal meeting 84
Kindleberger, C.P. 195, 198–9, 201
King, Boswell 409
Knock, Thomas 120
Knox, MacGregor 214
Kramer, Alan 390
Kraus, Karl 89
Kronstadt rebellion 297
Kun, Béla 77, 91, 145, 305
Kvaternik, Slavko 315

La Motte, Ellen 70
labour legislation debate 26
labour radicalism 67–8
Lafont, Henri 598
Lagrou, Pieter 598
land reform 252–7
language of internationalism 442
Lansing, Robert 121, 126–7, 375
Lapland War 472, 475
Laqueur, Thomas 615
Larnaude, Ferdinand 124
Laroque, Pierre 338
The Last Days of Hitler 208
Latvia
fascism 314
and paramilitarization 594, 596–602
Laval, Pierre 217
Laye, Camara 230–1
League of Nations 9, 120, 122–6, 129, 139, 150, 165, 175, 220, 265, 271–4, 330, 426
and interwar democracy 265–76
and interwar internationalism 443

League covenant 443
League mandates 443
see also Hague
Left, as political force *see* political Left
Leimgruber, Matthieu 340
Lend-Lease 423, 435
Lenin, Vladimir 126, 153, 163, 216, 374, 375, 378, 594
Levi, Carlo 249
Lib-Labism 81, 89, 92
liberal democracy, post-First World War 161–3
liberalism
1920s 263–6
international legitimacy of 92–3
The Lights that Failed 130
Ligue de la Paix 34
Linz Programme 290
Lippmann, Walter 430
living standards/conditions 13, 24, 53
Lloyd George, David 26, 38, 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130–1, 133, 150, 160, 162, 207, 263, 267
LNU (League of Nations Union) 218
local conflicts, internationalization of 602–5, 606
Locarno agreements/Conference 216, 427, 445
long nineteenth century 1
Low Countries
Communist Party 294
democracy post-First World War 171
political systems 12
Luce, Henry 434
Luebbert, Gregory 81–2
Lukes, Steven 594
Luxemburg, Rosa 35

McCormick, Chauncey 68
MacDonald, Ramsay 119, 264
McKibbin, Ross 264
McMeekin, Sean 39
MacMillan, Margaret 130, 369
Madriaga, Salvador de 214
Maier, Charles 4, 11, 329, 368
Makers of the Modern World 130
Making War, Forging Revolution 79
Makino, Baron 126
Malaya
Communist Party 587
in post-war period 587
male voting rights 25, 330
Mann, Michael 309
Mann, Thomas 77–8, 94, 370
Mannheim, Carl Gustaf 276
Mao Zedong, genocide by 520
Marc, Alexandre 452
Marks, Sally 618
marriage 408–9
marriage loan programme 464–5, 528
Marshall Plan 438
Marshall, T.H. 323
Marx, Karl 35
Marxism 35
Marxist socialist movements 82, 84
Masaryk, Tomáš 90, 172, 263, 264
mass killing 4
Mathieu, Jules 229
Matteotti, Giacomo 170
Maurras, Charles 270
Maxwell-Fyfe, David 453
May, Ernest 212
Mayer, Arno 14–15
Mazgaj, Paul 318
Mazower, Mark 2, 3, 8–9, 11, 218, 262, 276, 324, 339, 543
Mein Kampf 208
Memorandum of London 570
Metaxas, Ioannis 316–17
Meyer, Konrad 488
migrations, forcible 557–9
Milan council movement 92
militarism, imperial 369
militarist nationalism 368–70
military jingoism 369, 370
military necessity 357
military spending, Second World War 462
Military-Industrial Complex 110
Millerandism 35
Milward, Alan 450
Minehan, Philip 550
Ministry of Information 45
minorities 138
modernity of Wilhelmism 33

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) 380, 473, 491, 624
Mommsen, Hans 209
monarchical power 263
monarcho-fascist dictatorship 376
Monnet, Jean 440
Morel, E.D. 119
Moroccan Crises 23, 37
Moscow Declaration 621
Mosley, Oswald 395, 447
Mosse, George 79, 302, 617, 618
Munich Agreement 209–12
Munich Crisis 561
municipal anarchism 293
municipal socialism 290–1
Mussert, Anton 12
Mussolini, Benito 169, 213–14, 249, 481
  and European integration 446
  fall of 486, 491
  and international cooperation 217
  nationalism 376–7
  political legitimation of 624
  racism 366
  and rise of Fascism 305, 353, 376
Myrdal, Alva 335
Myrdal, Gunnar 335
Myth of the War Experience 55

Naím, Moises 594
Nansen, Fridtjof 273
Nansen passport 273
Napoleonic Concordat 26
national challenges, in empires 140
National Fascist Party *see* Italy
National Insurance Act (1911) 26
national movements 138
national questions 138–9
national self-determination 126–9
National War Aims Committee 45
National War Savings Committee 43–4
nationalism
  and anti-war sentiment 370
  consolidation of nation states 381
  consolidation post-Second World War 381–2
  and European integration 445–6, 451
  and fascism 376–7
  internationalism to multinationalism 377–9
  militarist 368–70
  and multi-ethnic empires 369
  nation and class 374–6
  nationalization and indigenization 379–80
  and nationhood 365–6
  Nazi biopolitical nationalism 376–7
  and Nazis 376–7, 529
  pre-First World War 139–42, 145
  and reformist agenda 370
  and religion 394
  and revolution 90
  subaltern nationalisms 373–4
  and total war 368–70
  and war 37, 97, 150, 374–6
  zenith of 11
nationalist demonstrations 142
nationalization 365–82
naval conferences 427
Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact (1939) 212
Nazis
  biopolitics 376–7, 381, 525
  book burning 401
  coercion 350–1
  collaboration 532–3
  concentration/death camps 414, 415, 417–18, 485, 489, 520, 525, 530, 534, 622
  and democratic consensus 527–9
  denunciation 352
  economic strategy 201
  electoral campaigning 168
  Ethnic Register 489
  eugenics 336, 485, 525
  European integration 447
  euthanasia 485
  and Fascists 377
  forced migration 557–8
  General Settlement Plan East 530–1
  genocide/ethnic cleansing 2, 3, 7–8, 15, 219, 226, 236–7, 356, 359, 381, 485, 488, 489, 505, 527–31
    see also Holocaust
  and German expansionism 218, 376–7, 486, 525–6, 559
  global extermination programme 530
  handicapped/disabled murders 417

Holocaust *see* Holocaust
homosexuality 414–15
internal state violence 356–7, 359
Kristallnacht 522, 528, 533
medical experiments 415
and mythology of trenches 617
and nationalism 376–7, 529
non-German Waffen SS 547
Nuremberg Laws 528
Nuremberg racial model 314
Nuremberg War Crimes Trials 207, 453, 519, 619
peasant fascism 255–7
philosophy of 218
political violence 395–7
popular legitimacy 527–9
racial fitness 525
racial hygiene 336, 485
racism 366, 376–7, 489
rise of 7, 11, 168, 199
sexual issues 413–15
'socially undesirable' groups 326, 351, 356–7, 365–6, 485, 518, 527–9
Soviet genocide plans by 489, 505, 518
and Stalinism 11
sterilization 414–15, 417, 525
surveillance 345–6, 349–52
territorial administration 606
transition to post-Nazi rule 593–608
and United States 432–3
violent characteristics of 526–7
see also Germany; Hitler; Holocaust; political Right
NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) 192
Netherlands
colonization 227
political system 12
revolution 90
South-East Asia, post-war 587–8
New Diplomacy 119–33
see also League of Nations
Nicolson, Harold 123, 130
Nolan, Mary 424, 428
Nolte, Ernst 302, 389
Norway
Communist Party 294
fascism in 271
political system 92–3
revolution 89
nostalgia 441
Nuremberg War Crimes Trials 207, 453, 519, 619

Ober Ost 52
October Revolution *see* Russia, Revolution (1917)
Open Door 424
Origins of the Second World War 208
Orlando, Vittorio 126
O'Rourke, Kevin 112
Orwell, George 287, 296, 345
Ottesen-Jensen, Elise 409
Ottoman Empire
citizenship rights 140
colonial troops 143
deportations 148
fall of 225–6
nationalism 140–2, 151–2
refugees 146
wartime demographic politics 145
Overy, Richard 216

Pabst, G.W. 61
Paderewski, Ignace 172
Padmore, George 579
Pale of Settlement 402, 531
paramilitarization
1943-46 period 599–602
and criminal opportunism 597–8
deparamilitarization 606
in European society 594, 596–8
Paris Peace Conference 9, 23–4, 110, 122–33, 150, 163–6, 169, 174–5, 199, 225, 234, 263, 271, 375, 426, 481, 567
Paris Uprising (1944) 599
Parker, R.A.C. 210
parliamentary systems in Europe 24–5
Passmore, Kevin 395
Passy, Frederic 34
patriotic consensus (1914-16) 371–3
patriotic instruction 45
patriotism
at war 380–1
and profit 42
Pavone, Claudio 546

Payne, Stanley 302, 390
Peace Pledge Union 270
Peace Society 34
Peace without Victory speech 120
peasants *see* rural society
peer-polity influence 11–12
Penter, Tanja 504
Percy, Eustace 123
periodization 8–10, 14
Permanent Court of International Justice 175
Pétain, Philippe 577
Peukert, Detlev 15, 331
Philadelphia Declaration 337
Pichon, Stephen 126
Pickstone, John 327
Piłsudski, Józef 90, 144, 172, 174, 394
Pincus, Steven 94
Pipes, Richard 28
Pireaud, Marie 62
Pireaud, Paul 71
Pivert, Marceau 215
Poland
  civilian atrocities 499
  collaboration 4–5
  deportations 149
  food supply 502
  genocide in 533
  German expansionism 559–60
  intergroup violence 4–5
  international relations 172
  nationalism 141
  nationalism and religion 394
  and paramilitarization 594, 596–602
  political instability 174
  population movement patterns 563–70
  revolution (1926) 4
political changes/realignments 559–63
political debate, location of 399
political Left 81
  and 1930s economic crisis 284
  Anarchists 292–4, 397
  Communists 294–7
  definition of 282–6
  and fascist Right 283, 284–5
  goals/strategies 283–4
  interwar period in 282–98
  popular fronts 295–6
  Socialists 286–91
  in USSR 284–5
  see also revolution
political Right
  1922 significance 305–9
  Austria 309, 311
  Croatia 315
  European fascist groups 308–9
  fascism 301–18, 397–8
    concept/definition of 301–4
    conservative/radical 304
    as nationalization 481–5
  fascist radicalization 304, 305
  fascist trappings 317
  Germany 7, 11, 168, 199, 207, 255–7, 301, 303, 304, 309, 310, 317–18
    see also Germany; Nazis
  Greece 316–17
  Hungary 310–11, 315
  interwar period 301–18
  Italy 13, 93, 168–71, 255–7, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 310, 317–18, 481–2
    see also Italy
  Latvia 313–14
  Portugal 311–12
  Romania 308, 312
  Spain 309, 312
political uniforms legislation 394–5
political violence 1–5, 388–403
politics, and war 112
Ponsonby, Arthur 119
Ponticelli, Lazare 614
population engineering 333–6
population movements
  forced migration 557–9
  national patterns 563–70
  Second World War 557–72
population question 335
populism 270
Portugal
  colonization 226–7, 228–9
  fascism 311
  revolutions 4
  sexual issues 415
post-First World War *see* interwar period
postal communications 48
Postwar 8

power relations
1940s 594–6
definitions 594
mapping during mid-century crisis 605–8
post-Second World War period 593–608
presidential election/power 263–4
Preto Rolão 311–12
Primo de Rivera, Miguel 308, 309, 394
privileged social groups 81
Problems of Social Policy 337
profiteers 48
propaganda 41, 42–5, 66, 69, 426
Prost, Antoine 79
public health debate 26

Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps 51
Quisling, Vidkun 271

racial equality, League of Nations 165
radical Enlightenment 261
rationing
First World War 101–3, 109
Second World War 466–7, 502–4
Recasting Bourgeois Europe 11
Red Vienna 391, 396
reformist socialism 82, 92
refugees
First World War 52, 138–9, 146
Second World War 557
Reichsbanner 55, 167
Reichstag Peace Resolution 165
Remarque, Erich Maria 618
Renville Agreement 588
Reparation Commission 131
resistance movements 539–52
revisionism 35
revolution 4, 23, 27–8, 35, 37, 46, 77–94
and civility 79–80
class-nation politics 91
and hierarchies 80–4
international crisis 94
legacies of 92–4
neo-Tocquevillian approach 94
social crisis 94
and war 79
revolutionary politics, wartime militarization 79
Rhineland Crisis 207, 219
Ritschl, A.O. 193
Rodgers, Daniel 325
Romania
fascism in 308, 312
and paramilitarization 594, 596–602
romantic internationalism 440–54
romantic roots, of human rights (1940s) 447–54
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 217–18, 423, 432, 433–6, 557
The Roots of National Socialism 207
Rome-Berlin Axis (1936) 480
Roscigno, Vincent 594
Rosenberg, Emily 425
Rousso, Henry 626
rural society 243–57
active population in agriculture 244–6
agriculture and the economy 250
collectivization 3, 163, 251–2, 254–5, 297
and conscription 246
economic stagnation 249–50
impact of Great Depression 249–50
impact of war 246–9, 374
land reform 252–7
peasant cultures 243
peasant fascism 255–7
peasant resistance/discontent 251–3
peasants in Second World War 501–2
political parties/activity 252–7
rural communism 254–5
rural/urban animosity 247
social structure 244–6
Russia
agricultural reform 32
art/culture in 33–4
belle époque era 23
Bolshevik Revolution *see* Revolution(s)
citizenship rights 140
Civil War (1918-20) 3, 145, 152, 162, 214, 390, 393, 402
class tensions and national unity 373–4
conditions/political system in Imperial era 27–9
corporatism 86

Russia (*Cont.*)
deportations 149
economic development 32
economic disorganization 105
ethnic diversity 140
group hierarchies 85–6
imperialism 140–1
labour strikes pre-First World War 370
leaves war (1917) 88
and liberal freedoms 162
living standards 53
mobilization in First World War 104
mortality rates 3
nationalism 140, 153, 370, 374–80
paramilitarization 594, 596–602
peasants' radicalization 87
population diversity 140
post-First World War 131–2
POW repatriation First World War 273
power relations destabilization 595
refugees 146
Revolution (1905) 23, 27–8, 35
Revolution(s) (1917) 4, 37, 46, 77, 78, 79, 81, 83, 85–8, 89, 91, 109, 151, 162–3, 234, 294, 378, 446
sexual liberation post-Revolution 408
social welfare legislation 32–3
social/class system 85–7
state-sponsored violence 388
strikes (1914) 28
wartime demographic politics 145
weapons obsolescence 462
worker groups 86
see also Soviet Union; Stalin
Russo-Finnish War (1939-40) 3
Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) 23, 480
Russo-Polish War (1919-20) 3, 78, 92, 162
Ryder, H.I.D. 34

Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira 311–12
Salleron, Louis 452
Salt March 223
Sanborn, Joshua 79
Sarkozy, Nicolas 614
Sarraut, Albert 229
Sassoon, Siegfried 618
Scandinavia
democracy post-First World War 171
political systems 12
Schlieffen Plan 29, 38
Schmitt, Carl 305
Scott, James C. 346
Second Congress of the Comintern 92
Second International 35, 77, 82, 84, 370
Second World War
aggregate cost of 464
Anglo-French non-intervention policy 213
appeasement 210–11, 212, 550
Atlantic Charter 337, 423, 435
Axis defeat 490–2
Axis powers in 480–92
Battle of France 209, 212
black markets 504, 595
British state power 5–6
censorship/restrictions on accounts of 620–1
civil wars 539–52
civilian life in *see* civilian life
clash of utopian ideologies 217
Combined Repatriation Executive 562
and decolonization 576–82
Dunkirk 209
economic crisis and extremist politics 216
economic impact 463
effect of 9
environmental destruction 248
famine 504–6
forced migrations 557–72
Franco-British alliance 212
German culpability 207–10
German expansionism 486, 525–6, 559–61
and Great Depression 216–17
and human rights 450
impact on countryside 247
interwar origins of 207–20
Katyn Forest massacre 380
key issues/questions on origins 219
Lend-Lease 423, 435
memories of 619–26
Mers-el-Kébir fleet attack 209
military spending 462
mobilization for 464–7
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) 380, 473, 491, 624

morality during occupation 497–8
mortality rates 2, 3, 476, 491, 505, 512, 513
Munich Agreement 209–12
Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact (1939) 212
neutral states 461, 467–71
and Paris Peace Conference/ Versailles settlement 9, 15, 209, 216
peasants, civilian life 501–2
population transfers 557–72
post-war trade deficits 110
Potsdam Agreement 382, 566
rationing 466–7, 502–4
refugees 557
resistance movements 539–52
resource mobilization by country 463
Rhineland Crisis 207, 219
social welfare 338
Teheran Conference 562
trade and neutral states 467–71
war graves 615
wartime economies 461–76
Yalta Agreement 382, 566
segmented societies 82–3
Seidman, Michael 291
self-determination policy 375
September programme (1914) 37
settlement post-First World War 129–30
Sex and Human Nature 409
sexuality in wartime 407–21
Sherman, Daniel 615
shirkers 48
short-war illusion 34, 35
Shubert, Adrian 391
Shukhevych, Roman 597–8
Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) 480
Sino-Japanese War (1937) 217
Slovakia, revolution 77
Smith, Denis Mack 213
Snyder, Timothy 368
Sobn, Anne-Marie 13–14
social identities (1900-50) 323–40
social improvement constitutions 331
social insurance 26, 327–8, 331, 332, 338
social legislation 324, 326–7
social policy
Atlantic Charter 337
and economic crises 326, 329
eugenics 11, 334, 335–6
and European integration 340
health insurance 331
housing 331, 332
and ideologies 324
individuals and community 326, 329
and industrialization 324–5
and interest groups 325
and international organizations 325, 331
and labour 327
(1900-50) 323–40
and organized capitalism 328–9
organizing capitalism 326–9
Philadelphia Declaration 337
planning 333
and political modernization 324–5
population engineering 333–6
post-Second World War 337–9
and 'undesirable' groups 326, 335
universalism 337, 339
utopian aspirations 336–9
and war veterans/victims 331, 332
welfare state emergence 323–40
social rights 323
social welfare (1900-50) 323–40
social welfare
and authoritarianism 324
and social integration 325
social welfare debate 26
Socialism *see* political Left
socialist movements, types of 82
socialist patriotism 36
society of civilized nations 453
Sonnino, Sidney 126, 169, 375
South Africa, nationalism 583
South-East Asia, post-war 587–8
Soviet Union
anticlericalism 402–3
civilian population loss, Second World War 513
class categories 4
Cold war 438
collective punishment 381
collectivization 3, 163, 251–2, 254–5, 297, 348, 379, 502
Communist Party 297
corporatism 93–4

Soviet Union (*Cont.*)
dechristianization campaign 402
deportations 381, 558
disorder post-Second World War 600
as empire of republics 380
ethnic cleansing 381
and European colonial empires 579
exclusion from Paris Peace Conference 163
famine 505
Five Year Plans 431
food supply 502
forced migration 381, 557–8
GDP data (1920-37) 183–5, 187–91, 196, 200–1
and gold standard 196
and Great Depression 181
Great Terror 344
Greater Danger Principle 378, 379
gulags 379
homosexuality 415–16
imperial dominance 579
industrialization 163, 365, 431
intergroup violence 4–5
internal state violence 357–8
interwar violence 343
Katyn Forest massacre 380
kulak oppression 251–2, 358
memories of Second World War 619–26
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) 380, 473, 474, 491, 624
mortality rates, Second World War 476, 513
nationalism 140, 153, 370, 374–80
nationalities policy 379
New Economic Policy 78, 93, 163, 251, 332
Operation Barbarossa 472, 473, 474
passport system 348
patriotism 380–1
and political Left in 1930s 284–5
political violence 395–6
population movement patterns 563–70
repression in 347–9
resource mobilization, Second World War 463
sexual issues 415
social control 349
Stalinism 7
state-society relations 6–7
surveillance in 345–9
Ukrainian demographics 506
and United States 431
war communism 93
welfare legislation 331
see also Russia; Stalin
Spain
anarchism 292–3
anticlericalism 402–3
Civil War (1936-9) 3, 5, 207, 213, 214, 287, 293, 296, 388, 390, 391–4, 402, 446, 468, 537, 538, 548, 550
colonialism 225, 227
Communist Party 296
contraception 413
European integration 446
fascism 309, 312
homosexuality 413
interwar economy 468
MAOC 398
nationalism 367
and religion 394
political divisions 1930s 285
political system 93
political violence 398–9
Popular Front 215, 398
revolution (1923) 4, 77, 89
sexual issues 413
social policy 332
Socialism 288, 292–3
Spanish-American War 226, 424
Spencer, Herbert 369
Spengler, Oswald 369, 432
Stahlhelm 167
Stalin, Joseph 4, 94, 163
on American capitalism 431
death of 623
foreign policy 212–13
and genocide 379
genocide by 520
and Hitler 377–9
internal oppression 252, 286
and international cooperation 217
nationalism 140, 153, 370, 374–80
policy models 378
and social revolutions 546
and traitor nationalities 380

see also Soviet Union
Stalinism 7, 379
and Communism 297
and Nazism 11, 377–9
state fragility index 182
state power destabilization (1940s), by country 607
state power fragmentation (1940s), by country 607
state power stabilization (1940s), by country 607
Stavisky riots (1934) 215
Steer, George 388
Štefanik, Milan 172
Stein, Oswald 336
Steinberg, Jonathan 315
Steiner, Zara 130, 219
sterilization 414–17, 525
Sternhell, Zeev 302
Stevenson, David 37
Stolypin, Piotr 28, 32
Stresemann, Gustav 10, 445
suffrage riots 25
Suny, Ronald 380
Supiot, Alain 337
surveillance 42, 45, 46, 388
Nazi Germany 349–52
Soviet Union 345–9
surveillance state 345–6
The Survey of International Affairs 1931 216
Sweden
Communist Party 294
nationalism 368
neutrality of 14
political system 12, 92–3
Socialism 289
Swett, Pamela 291
Switzerland
interwar economy 469
neutrality of 14, 468, 469–71
relations during Second World War 469–71
trade partners 469–70
working-class movements 81

tank banks 43–4
Taylor, A.J.P. 5–6, 207–8, 209, 369, 423
Taylorism 329
technocracy 270
and romanticism 440, 441
technological developments 14
Temin, P. 198
territoriality 368
Thane, Pat 338, 340
Third International (Comintern) 77, 81, 89, 90
thirty years war thesis 214, 216, 218
Thomas, Albert 85
Thomas, Martin 227, 234
Thorez, Maurice 296, 381, 603
Thorp, Mary 66
Titmuss, Richard 337
Todd, Selina 6
Togliatti, Palmiro 381, 603
Tooze, Adam 10, 217
Traverso, Enzo 390
Treaties of Locarno 216, 427, 445
Treaty of Guarantee 209
Treaty of Lausanne 55, 71, 152, 153
Treaty of Neuilly 152
Treaty of Paris 427
Treaty of Rapallo 562
Treaty of Trianon 560, 566
Treaty of Versailles *see* Paris Peace Conference
Treitschke, Heinrich von 34
Trevelyan, Charles 119
Trevor-Roper, Hugh 208, 209
Tripartite Monetary Agreement 199
Tripartite Pact (1940) 480
Triple Alliance 92, 374
Triple Entente 37, 374
The Triumph of the Dark 219
Troesltra, Pieter 90
Truman Doctrine 208, 438, 604
Truman, Harry 586
Turkey
Civil War 145
nationalism 368, 373
Twenty-One Points (Comintern) 92

UDC (Union of Democratic Control) 119
Ukraine, famine 3
Ulmanis, Karlis 314
Unfinished Peace after World War I 130
Union des Grandes Associations contre la Propaganda Ennemie 45

union sacrée 48
United Nations 218, 436
United Nations Charter, and colonial rule 581
United States
  in 1920s 426–9
  anti-Communist support by 603
  Bill of Rights 448
  Cold War 437
  colonialism 226
  communications in First World War 425–6
  Communist Party 431
  consumerism 13
  currencies of power 425
  as democracy 424
  dominance of 10, 92, 161
  and Europe (1914-45) 423–38
  in Europe, post-Second World War 436–8
  and European colonial empires 579, 586
  and European policies/programmes 436
  fighting men in First World War 425
  film industry 426, 428
  finance in First World War 425
  in First World War 161, 425–6
  Fourteen Points (Wilson) 120, 122, 149, 162, 164, 262, 271, 375, 423, 425
  GDP data (1920-37) 183–5, 187–91, 196, 200–1
  globalism 424
  and Great Depression 182
  ideology in First World War 425
  immigration control 427
  imperial presidency 263
  isolationism 217–18, 433
  Lend-Lease 423, 435
  naval conferences 427
  and Nazis 432–3
  New Deal 433–6
  New Diplomacy 119–33
  propaganda 426
  resource mobilization, Second World War 463
  in Second World War 434–8
  and Soviet Union 431
  Spanish-American War 226, 424
  tariff barriers 427
  Truman Doctrine 208, 438, 604
  war debts, First World War 425, 427, 429–30
  wartime conferences 436
  Wilson's speeches 120–1
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 441, 448, 449
Unknown Soldier 613–14, 616
USSR *see* Soviet Union
utopian ideologies, clash of 217
utopian socialism 34, 82

Valéry, Paul 423
Valois, Georges 308
Vandervelde, Émile 371
Vatican City 171
Vatutin, Nikolai 600
venereal disease 70–1, 408
Versailles Conference/Treaty *see* Paris Peace Conference
Vichy Syndrome 626
Vienna 1900 33
Vienna
  civil war 391, 396
  municipal Socialism 290
Vienna Accords 561, 566
Viola, Lynn 252
violence, nature of in modern states 343
Voth, H.-J. 192
voting rights 14, 25, 110, 224, 266, 330
Vyshinskii, Andrej 567

Waldheim affair 623
Wall Street Crash (1929) 192
  see also Great Depression
war
  and human nature 407
  post-war memories of 613–18
  and sexual violence 408
  and sexuality 407–21
War Council (1912) 37
war cultures 390, 401
war enthusiasm 42
war graves 615
war landmarks 43–4
war memorials 55, 616
warfare, industrialization of 462
Warsaw Ghetto 2

wartime militarization, and revolutionary politics 79
Washington Naval Conference (1921-2) 129
Webb, Beatrice 328
Webb, Sidney 328
Weber, Eugen 243, 367
Weber, Max 594
welfare *see* social welfare/policy
Welles, Sumner 576
Werner-Müller, Jan 626
Wiener, Martin 224
Williams, Isobel 599
Williamson, Sam 39
Wilson, Woodrow 119–22, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 130–1, 145, 149–50, 161–2, 164, 169, 172, 175–6, 234, 262, 263, 271, 375, 423, 425–6
Winter, Jay 614, 618
Winter War 472, 473
Wolf, N. 199
women
  anti-feminist view of 409
  changes in lifestyle 13–14
  in concentration/death camps 418–19
  female conscription 50
  infidelity concerns 71
  in military role 401
  political activity post-First World War 266
  and political violence 400–1
  rape 71, 419
  sexual emancipation 411
  sexual issues 407–21
  sexual relations in occupied nations 420, 510
  sexual violence on Eastern Front 418–20
  venereal disease legislation 70–1, 408
  voting rights 14, 25, 110, 224, 266, 330
  and war support 69–70
  in war zones 70–1
  wartime employment 62–3, 67–8, 70, 84, 246, 248, 334–5
  wartime fraternization 408, 419–21, 498, 510–11
  wartime prostitution 70, 408, 418–19
Women's Army Auxiliary Corps 51
Women's Land Army 62
womens' rights groups 333–4
World Economic Conference (1933) 195
World Trade Organization 436
The World of Yesterday 215

Young Plan (1929) 131
Young, Robert 211
Young Turks 147–8, 152
Yugoslavia
  Civil War (1941-45) 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 543, 543–8, 550, 551
  collaboration 547
  genocide 545
  and Italy 569–70
  Partisans 539, 546, 550, 569, 602–3
  political patrons 603
  socio-economic/political reconstruction 568–9
  Soviet-British accord 569

Zeiler, Thomas W. 425, 431
Zimmerwald Manifesto 374
Zimmerwald meeting 84
Zweig, Stefan 215, 423